Relationship between the political system and causes of war (questions)

[William F. Owen]

I note with interest your suggesting that information technology increases tempo.

Research done in the UK shows this to be very much in doubt. In WW2 Divisional HQs were much smaller, and did things far quicker using less people and resources. My understanding is that there is substantial evidence from both the UK and Sweden that higher levels of information actually slow down decision making and thus tempo.

It has been further suggested that what increases really increased tempo is small thoroughly trained Divisional and Formation staffs. Not sure if this helps, but I can forward you a thesis that deals with this if you are interested.

[John T. Fishel]

3. Depends (the classic answer) on the intel. If we had accurate info on WMD in Iraq in 2002 would we have gone to war? If we had accurate intel on Saddam's intentions prior to his 1990 invasion of Kuwait, could we have prevented it?

This leads to #1:

As a Lieutenant (back in the dark ages) I was a strat intel officer assigned to the Pentagon. We analyzed all kinds of info (political, economic, military, and informational - the classic instruments of power) from all sources for the decisionmaking political and administrative leadership. Responding to our analysis (I'm talking here about the entire intel community) they would use this as input to their policy decisions. Intelligence, of course, was not their only source of critical info. For non-denied areas, the media was often better informed than the entire intel community. This remains the case although, perhaps, the degree to which it is true may have changed. In addition to intel on friends and adversaries the decisionmakers have to take account of our own capabilities. For the military, this is coordinated through the 3 shop. As Graham Allison points out in Essence of Decision (if you haven't read it for pol sci you must ) Presidents are limited by the capabilities of their bureaucracies. Finally, recognize the wisdom of Clausewitz' (Saint Carl to the denisons of SWJ) in his one point of total consistency through all 8 books, that war is the continuation of policy/politics with the addition of other means.

I'll leave the other questions for others more current like Wilf.

Hope this was of some use.

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

@ Finally, recognize the wisdom of Clausewitz' (Saint Carl to the denisons of SWJ) in his one point of total consistency through all 8 books, that war is the continuation of policy/politics with the addition of other means.

@ I'll leave the other questions for others more current like Wilf.

@ - To paraphrase the excellent Colin S. Gray, "If Clausewitz didn't say it then it's probably wrong."

@ - actually all a bit above my pay grade, old Chap!

[John T. Fishel]

Wilf--

I thought you gave a really good answer to #2 - so I didn't touch it.

Regarding Saint Carl: Although I've used him for years and read in On War I had never read the whole thing until this semester when I assigned it to my course on War & conflict from ancient times to the present. Stupid me, I had to read it too! The Howard/Paret translation with essays by both along with Brodie and the latter's commentary is superb. Despite being written in great detail at the end of the Napoleonic era, it is surpising how well the examples hold up today. Unlike Sun Tzu, who writes in aphorisms, Clausewitz goes into excruciating detail and that is, I think, one of the real strengths of the work. The examples he chooses often are timeless. So, whoever said tha old dogs (like me) can't learn new tricks? (And if you are reading this Steve Metz, I will expect a remark to resemble since I just left myself wide open.)

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

Despite being written in great detail at the end of the Napoleonic era, it is surpising how well the examples hold up today. Unlike Sun Tzu, who writes in aphorisms, Clausewitz goes into excruciating detail and that is, I think, one of the real strengths of the work. The examples he chooses often are timeless.

Yes! Yes! Yes! This is why the old dead Prussian is so good (or "way cool"). The enduring empirical nature of his writing is excellent, and a thorough understanding of CvC leads you to so many other good things, as well as an ability to dismiss a lot of others.

I would strongly recommend reading Foch's Principles of War, 1903 English translation was 1918. Foch was a big CvC fan and it shows CvC in a more modern context. I think it excellent! One day I really need to examine if it truly is CvC in application, but my current understanding is that it is.

Warning: - Robert Leonhard, who I consider one of the best living Military minds is very down on Foch's book. Never asked him quite why, but I guess I should.

Sun Tzu? "A single hamster cannot defeat a bear, but many hamsters make a good meal"

[Steve Blair]

What technology tends to do is create a series of information bottlenecks. While it has the capability to greatly increase optempo, it also has the ability to slow actual reaction time greatly. This is because as information becomes easier to gather, higher levels develop a greater need to "see" everything. As more information flows up the chain, it quickly overwhelms the capability of people to absorb and evaluate it, so it lingers and often doesn't get to the people who need it.

With the increased flow of information comes the "need" of some higher formation commanders to try to control everything they can "see." The great anecdotal example of this is the Vietnam "charlie-charlie" bird. You have guys on the ground slogging through terrible terrain and the Brigade CO running the show from 500 feet yelling that the troops should "move faster" because it "doesn't look that bad from up here." All this combines to create Saint Carl's "friction," and results in units reacting much slower than they might otherwise.

But it doesn't have to happen that way. If you want some good examples of fairly fast turnaround enabled by technology, take a look at some SOG operations from the same period. Here the focus was on getting the job done, and often tech was used as a tool for that and not the master.

Technology makes it easier for the process to become the end instead of the process serving the end. And that's my take on that...for whatever it's worth...

[AmericanPride]

Thanks for the responses and also whoever moved the thread (I realized I posted in the wrong forum after the fact ).

Research done in the UK shows this to be very much in doubt. In WW2 Divisional HQs were much smaller, and did things far quicker using less people and resources. My understanding is that there is substantial evidence from both the UK and Sweden that higher levels of information actually slow down decision making and thus tempo. It has been further suggested that what increases really increased tempo is small thoroughly trained Divisional and Formation staffs. Not sure if this helps, but I can forward you a thesis that deals with this if you are interested.

I would appreciate that document. It seems to me that what you state suggests that information management depends on the competency of the decision maker involved. But if we're to assume that the decision-maker is a rational actor (I'm more or less required to use realism, or a modified version of it, as a theoretical framework), and everything else being equal, can we claim with any kind of confidence that the rapidity in which an actor turns around information from collection to application will be a decisive factor in political or military action vis-a-vis other actors? (Obviously I am not entirely familiar with the ins and outs of the intelligence cycle, so I must ask: is the pace of the intelligence cycle an indication of its effective use?) I recently read through Keegan's book Intelligence in War, and while he suggests that "exertion" (in the Clausewitzian sense) is the decisive factor in victory, I think he misses the underlying causes which brought the forces together at the decisive point. I suppose then, beginning with the idea that intelligence, in a broad sense, is necessary, I assumed that more of a good thing would automatically indicate a better thing. But I see why that may not be the case.

3. Depends (the classic answer) on the intel. If we had accurate info on WMD in Iraq in 2002 would we have gone to war? If we had accurate intel on Saddam's intentions prior to his 1990 invasion of Kuwait, could we have prevented it?

If we are to assume that a state's interests are permanent (for theoretical purposes), I think the next question becomes: does intelligence decrease uncertainty? Clausewitz called intelligence a "chasm" between conception and execution. And if we're also to assume that states are concerned with relative power and gains among them, can we say that a state with less certainty about another's behavior will be more likely to resort to violence in order to realize its interests? The classic "prisoners dilemma" suggests that if actors had knowledge of one another's intentions, they will cooperate.

I suspect the degree of relevance has much to do with the personalities of the state decisionmakers. By this I mean, how much access to intel the decisonmakers demand and how much use (read "opennness of mind to being persuaded by 'facts' delivered by strategic intel") they actually make of the intel provided.

This is the key problem in realist theory (which I'm using as a theoretical framework for my thesis). Other authors suggest however, realism can be modified from the state-centric focus to the nature of the faction, or factions, governing the country. But I'm trying to explore whether or not intelligence as a concept is inherent in the state consideration, determination, and pursuit of its interests. So while it can be said that interests determines friends and foes, realism asserts that states have the singular interest in their security and that politics is self-help. With that assumption, I will modify my question to: to what extent does strategic intelligence assist the state in discriminating between friend and foe?

What technology tends to do is create a series of information bottlenecks.

This is something I addressed a few pages into my paper when I came upon relating the nature of the political system to state decision making. It seems to me that while technology can enable more decisions to be made faster, it reduces the number of choices actually available because it simultaneously provides information which discredits options that might otherwise seem viable. This assumes of course that states are rational actors and will choose the option with the most utility as far as their interests are concerned.