Relationship between the political system and causes of war (questions)

[AmericanPride]

Thanks for the responses and also whoever moved the thread (I realized I posted in the wrong forum after the fact ).

Research done in the UK shows this to be very much in doubt. In WW2 Divisional HQs were much smaller, and did things far quicker using less people and resources. My understanding is that there is substantial evidence from both the UK and Sweden that higher levels of information actually slow down decision making and thus tempo. It has been further suggested that what increases really increased tempo is small thoroughly trained Divisional and Formation staffs. Not sure if this helps, but I can forward you a thesis that deals with this if you are interested.

I would appreciate that document. It seems to me that what you state suggests that information management depends on the competency of the decision maker involved. But if we're to assume that the decision-maker is a rational actor (I'm more or less required to use realism, or a modified version of it, as a theoretical framework), and everything else being equal, can we claim with any kind of confidence that the rapidity in which an actor turns around information from collection to application will be a decisive factor in political or military action vis-a-vis other actors? (Obviously I am not entirely familiar with the ins and outs of the intelligence cycle, so I must ask: is the pace of the intelligence cycle an indication of its effective use?) I recently read through Keegan's book Intelligence in War, and while he suggests that "exertion" (in the Clausewitzian sense) is the decisive factor in victory, I think he misses the underlying causes which brought the forces together at the decisive point. I suppose then, beginning with the idea that intelligence, in a broad sense, is necessary, I assumed that more of a good thing would automatically indicate a better thing. But I see why that may not be the case.

3. Depends (the classic answer) on the intel. If we had accurate info on WMD in Iraq in 2002 would we have gone to war? If we had accurate intel on Saddam's intentions prior to his 1990 invasion of Kuwait, could we have prevented it?

If we are to assume that a state's interests are permanent (for theoretical purposes), I think the next question becomes: does intelligence decrease uncertainty? Clausewitz called intelligence a "chasm" between conception and execution. And if we're also to assume that states are concerned with relative power and gains among them, can we say that a state with less certainty about another's behavior will be more likely to resort to violence in order to realize its interests? The classic "prisoners dilemma" suggests that if actors had knowledge of one another's intentions, they will cooperate.

I suspect the degree of relevance has much to do with the personalities of the state decisionmakers. By this I mean, how much access to intel the decisonmakers demand and how much use (read "opennness of mind to being persuaded by 'facts' delivered by strategic intel") they actually make of the intel provided.

This is the key problem in realist theory (which I'm using as a theoretical framework for my thesis). Other authors suggest however, realism can be modified from the state-centric focus to the nature of the faction, or factions, governing the country. But I'm trying to explore whether or not intelligence as a concept is inherent in the state consideration, determination, and pursuit of its interests. So while it can be said that interests determines friends and foes, realism asserts that states have the singular interest in their security and that politics is self-help. With that assumption, I will modify my question to: to what extent does strategic intelligence assist the state in discriminating between friend and foe?

What technology tends to do is create a series of information bottlenecks.

This is something I addressed a few pages into my paper when I came upon relating the nature of the political system to state decision making. It seems to me that while technology can enable more decisions to be made faster, it reduces the number of choices actually available because it simultaneously provides information which discredits options that might otherwise seem viable. This assumes of course that states are rational actors and will choose the option with the most utility as far as their interests are concerned.

[Steve Blair]

The other thing increased information based on technology does is create more "fingers in the pie" because more people gain access to that information. And that need in turn drives your information management framework.

Information is normally subjective, especially information dealing with humans (motivations, actions, etc.), as opposed to objective. As your information flow increases, the need for effective analysis grows at the same pace. However, I think this gets offset (and in some ways canceled) by the number of people who gain access both to the information and the product of the analysis. A number of different opinions and information can lead to decision paralysis, especially if those close to the top of the food chain are not comfortable making decisions (or want a comfortable amount of "group think" behind those decisions). Likewise, the ability to discern between useful information and "white noise" and/or disinformation becomes even more critical as the flow increases.

Regarding Keegan, I'd be wary of many of his statements in some areas. He's done some good stuff, but I also think that he's become a little full of his own sense of all-knowingness when it comes to history. He's good to read, but be sure you check the sources he uses and allow yourself to come to your own conclusions. If you haven't read it already, I'd recommend the most recent edition of Handel's "Masters of War." He does a great job of breaking down Saint Carl (among others) and points out that Clausewitz was more focused on tactical and operational intelligence than he was what we would consider strategic intelligence.

[John T. Fishel]

Again, it depends. While decreasing uncertainty can increase the sense that one's action are rational it may also provoke rashness. Alternatively, while the existence of uncertainty may provoke action against an adversary to defeat the possible threat, it is equally likely to produce policy paralysis. The role of the individual actor again. That said, you will probably get better policy the more you can reduce uncertainty with solid data and analysis.

Don't be particularly concerned about being forced into a realist mode. Allison's work (mentioned previously) demonstrates that the best predicting of his 3 models is the classical rational actor. The other 2 (org theory and the 'political' [stressing individual background, biases, and preference] only fill holes in the rational actor explanation/prediction. The key to its use is the rigor with which the model is applied - and I don't mean quantification necessarily.

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

. I suppose then, beginning with the idea that intelligence, in a broad sense, is necessary, I assumed that more of a good thing would automatically indicate a better thing. But I see why that may not be the case.
.

The problem with intelligence is that it is not an absolute thing. It's subjective, and constantly changing in both nature and relevance. You often don't known how good it is, till it's moment has come and gone.

[Tom Odom]

At the risk of self-promoting, read my memoirs, especially the final three chapters on Rwanda regarding intelligence reporting, analysis, and strategic warning concerning the prospects for a larger war in central Africa.

Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda, TAMU press 2005. Your library probably has it.

I also suggest that you read this article in SWJ magazine:
Guerrillas From the Mist: A Defense Attaché Watches the Rwandan Patriotic Front Transform from Insurgent to Counter Insurgent

Best

Tom

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

It’s nice to see that Tom isn’t beneath engaging in a little blatant self-promotion of his many literary accomplishments.

Information overload certainly becomes a by-product of increased collection capability. This may, or may not, "blur" the picture. However, I believe this is more relevant to the utilization of operational intelligence where the LIMFAC is time.

“The method in which state actors collect, evaluate, and apply strategic intelligence will decisively judge their fate” rings true throughout the history of conflict. Within the realm of strategic intelligence more may be better yet also increases the requirement for analysts to determine what is useful information and what may be dis-information. Despite the advances in collection and analysis, we still cannot “see” into the heart and mind of a state leader.

It is not merely a factor of what, or how much, you know; it’s in how you leverage that knowledge into viable action.

[Jedburgh]

If you are looking at the influence of intelligence upon decision making at the national strategic decision-making level, then I highly recommend giving a read of a book I've recommended on this board a couple of times: Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars

The book was published by Princeton University Press in '86 and consists of sixteen essays that describe in fair detail intelligence collection, analysis and decision making at the national level in countries about to go to war (Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Great Britain and Italy before WWI and Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the US before WWII).

And, although they don't go into as much detail on the strategic intelligence feed into national-level pre-conflict decision making, I also recommend Irresolute Princes: Kremlin Decision Making in Middle East Crises, 1967-1973, Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress, and Who's at the Helm? Lessons of Lebanon. There's more, but that's just an off-the-cuff recommendation before I go get my post-lunch coffee.....

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Signals of War: The Flaklands Conflicts of 1982 by Lawrence Freedman is pretty good but nothing beats:

The Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman

[Tom Odom]

It’s nice to see that Tom isn’t beneath engaging in a little blatant self-promotion of his many literary accomplishments.

It was not blatant. It was flagrant.

[Steve Blair]

It was not blatant. It was flagrant.

Or was that flatulent?

In all seriousness, Tom, your book's on my "to buy" list. Only "Mars Learning" is ahead of it right now.

[CR6]

The Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman

Good choice, from the standpoint of how leaders can become locked into the execution of pre-determined plans (Moltke the Younger), despite intelligence that the actual situation is different from the one for which you planned.

I also recommend Stoessinger's Why Nations GO to War, specifically chapter one, for a discussion of how personality and state of mind affect rational thought under stress.

[J Wolfsberger]

One point that hasn't been made yet, is that most of our intelligence sources (SIGINT, ELINT, etc.) tell you about capability and potential. They give no insight into intentions, which are, in any case, changeable as the wind.

With regard to the latter, the only source is human intelligence, i.e. the mistress, cabinet member, bureaucrat, etc. who's been turned and is now feeding information to the other side. (A US capability that was gutted in the late seventies and is only now being rebuilt.) Even then, the intel is only as good as what the source is told. If his own people are lying to him, the best he can do is pass on the lies. On top of which, the source may be lying to us for his own motives.

Our decision to go into Iraq provides a good example of the problems:

1. We knew Saddam would use chemical weapons. (He already had, against Iran in war and Kurdish civilians in "revolt.")
2. We knew he had the capability to produce them. (Anyone who can't convert a fertilizer, pesticide, pharmaceutical, etc. plant to manufacture chemical weapons, and hide the capability, simply isn't trying.)
3. We were getting reports from inside his cabinet that he claimed to still have them. (These apparently were true.)
4. We were told by Iraqi expats that he had them. (These apparently were false, and presented out of personal motives.)
5. We had chatter among his officer corps about the use of their own chemical weapons. ("Do you think he'll really use them?" "Are you ready if he does?")

To summarize, the intel that he had chemical weapons was good. As it turns out, the reason it was good is that Saddam was trying to make it good, running a domestic and international bluff.

Didn't work out well for him.

(WHAT!?! Tom wrote a book!?! Who knew? )