Intelligence, Data, COIN and CT

[Jedburgh]

Canadian Army Journal, Winter '08: To Provide Focus: Intelligence and Counterinsurgency

From Large Formations....

In a conventional scenario, military intelligence focuses on a larger view of the enemy with minimal impact from individuals. In this context, intelligence is interested in where the enemy forces are and what capabilities they have in terms of equipment and strength. Cold War intelligence doctrine was heavily influenced by the American AirLand Battle doctrine, which required “rapid intelligence analysis to identify quickly the enemy main effort as far away as possible to give US Army maneuver units time to shift laterally from across the front in mass.” The current intelligence doctrine and practices of today still reflect this Cold War mentality.

The current intelligence doctrine is focused on fighting a conventional adversary and is based on four assumptions. The first is that the process needs to focus on the terrain and the enemy only. The second is that the adversary is an organized force conducting combat operations. The third is that an extensive intelligence database on that adversary already exists. The last assumption is that any analysis, supported by the use of templates, would predict the enemy’s potential courses of action. This is based on a top-down approach, which was “originally designed to identify large enemy organizations from [their] parts, and the enemy intentions from a study of stable doctrine, long-term unit positioning, common equipment capability, and terrain limitations.” By focusing first on analyzing and identifying the details of a situation, it was then expected that the big picture would quickly emerge.

....To Individuals

In a counter-insurgency scenario, the focus changes from large enemy formations to individuals. The threat is typically composed of small groups, mixed with and difficult to distinguish from the local population. The intelligence focus, therefore, revolves around providing an understanding of the operational environment in order to facilitate the identification of the factors driving the insurgency and to provide information on those conditions and ways to alleviate them. In addition, intelligence must aim at finding: who are the key players; what are their connections (alliances, organizations, associates) and what do they want to do? To be efficient, therefore, intelligence processes and doctrine need to be adjusted to the specific nature of counter-insurgency operations. In other words, based on American, British, Canadian and Australian doctrine on counterinsurgency, as well as the recent lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, what are the intelligence characteristics in counter-insurgency?

[Ron Humphrey]

Canadian Army Journal, Winter '08: To Provide Focus: Intelligence and Counterinsurgency

makes the movement.

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 10 Jun 08: Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies

....This monograph presents a broad range of analytic techniques that can be used to support the security portion of counterinsurgency operations. Its purpose is not to discuss the broader elements of counterinsurgency, such as nation-building and improvements to governance in nations threatened with insurgency. Instead, it combines research supporting two complementary studies: one focused on ways to improve U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities and a second aimed at developing operational analysis techniques to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The first study provides a framework for thinking about the nature of an insurgency and the latter then examines operational analysis techniques to answer the operational and tactical counterinsurgency questions that evolve at each stage in the insurgency.....

[William F. Owen]

From Large Formations....

....To Individuals

So would the statement that "Intelligence should be aimed at supporting the FIND function, within a Core Functions context" be incorrect?

[davidbfpo]

Wilf,

From my armchair and having read both papers in full - the FIND role is a core function.

Incidentally the RAND diagram on phases in insurgent / terrorist planning is excellent and should be on the wall in an intelligence cell etc.

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 27 Jan 09: Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis

The aim of this study was to assist the Department of the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in better understanding the intelligence analytic requirements of irregular warfare (IW). To do this, we were to develop an analytic framework for IW that could be used as the basis for an educational and training curriculum that would enhance NGIC analysts’ capabilities for assessing IW situations.

In December 2006, after considering a number of alternative definitions for irregular warfare and acknowledging the many conceptual and other challenges associated with trying to define this term with precision, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following definition:

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.

Definitions aside, large numbers of academic, doctrinal, and other publications stress that the outcomes of IW situations depend on both the level of one’s understanding of the population and the deftness with which non-military and indirect means are employed to influence and build legitimacy. Accordingly, the study team’s principal efforts were devoted to developing an analytic framework for understanding IW situations, whether population-centric (such as counterinsurgency) or counterterrorism, that focused on “irregular features” of the operating environment—that is, the central environmental and operational variables whose interplay determines the overall trajectory of an irregular conflict toward either success or failure......

[Jedburgh]

CIA, Undated (FOIA release 5 Jan 09): Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency

This pamphlet contains key definitions and analytic guides applicable to any insurgency. Analysts with the knowledge of the political, military and socio-economic characteristics of a specific insurgency will find these definitions and frameworks helpful in evaluating the major components of the conflict. Among other things, this guide is designed to assist in conducting a net assessment of the overall status or progress of a specific conflict.