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The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Real
The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Reality
Entry Excerpt:
The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Reality
by Joshua Thiel
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Maneuver warfare at its core is a mechanistic endeavor and fits with a corresponding necessity of top-down hierarchies. Conversely, counterinsurgency is a more ambiguous environment that varies in its complexity and context; it is the chess match of war. It is different in every locale and can cover the entire spectrum of war simultaneously. Consequently, counterinsurgency is difficult to put on a bumper sticker, to trademark as a catch phrase, or sell to a population and their representatives. In 2006 the United States (U.S.) public’s perception of success or failure of the Iraqi counterinsurgency strategy was concentrated around the concept of massing combat power in time and space, often called the “The Surge.” The term, “The Surge,” condensed a new counterinsurgency strategy into a simple and quantifiable slogan for the sound bite culture surrounding current affairs in the modern world. Unfortunately, counterinsurgency is more complex than “add more and then you win.”
Download The Full Article: The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data:
Major Joshua Thiel is a United States Army Special Forces Officer and a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. He is currently serving in 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne).
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