Page 3 of 3 FirstFirst 123
Results 41 to 56 of 56

Thread: The Counterinsurgency Cliff Notes

  1. #41
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The first few will be vague and general, specificity and openness come with repetition. Unless firm steps are taken to stop them, the kids will open up. Needless to say, they should not be so stopped but encouraged to speak up. Unless one is afraid of them...
    Too true ! Still, setting up that type of organizational culture is, IMO, a very useful adjunct to the more technical TTPs in this type of fight. 'sides that, it gets back into the discussion-mentoring idea.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Mao may have been Carlson's source but the idea pre dates Mao. Ever been to a First Nations Band Council meeting? 'Speaking anger' -- but quietly...
    LOLOL - I'll have to make a "no comment" statement on that one, since the answer is "yes". As a note, when I was growing up, my mother used to run Consciousness Raising groups in our living room - and people wonder why I started to read so much .
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  2. #42
    Registered User Jason Pape's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Location
    Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    7

    Default Mao...Myself & Me...

    Gentlemen -

    Craig came to SWJ looking for some help. Remember who started this thread and why. Some constructive criticism, recommendations, or references toward his post if you will...

    I'm new to SWJ as a poster, but have been an avid observer for some time. The reason I've hesitated to post in the past is because the discussions always seem to devolve into bouts of banter between council members. It's quite exclusionary to those who are not part of the "in crowd." Some of this could be done on email perhaps?

    Let's not forget...Craig et al are the ones who are IN THIS FIGHT and they could use some help. While many on SWJ are past their fightin' years or simply commentating from the periphery, Craig and his peers are in the middle of it all - trying to sort things out. So rather than scoff at his misinterpretation of COIN, or joke about stuff written on the fringe before the young captain was even born, shouldn't we try to help the lad out?

    I'm sorry if this comes across as curt, but with all the talk about mentoring and training (I would use the word educating)...I think we owe him better.
    Jason M. Pape

  3. #43
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Posts
    1,111

    Wink Patience Young Jedi...

    Quote Originally Posted by Jason Pape View Post

    I'm sorry if this comes across as curt, but with all the talk about mentoring and training (I would use the word educating)...I think we owe him better.
    Jason,

    Part of adapting to COIN is recognizing that the 'Burger King' mentality (in & out, with the burger and fixings of your choice in five minutes or less) does not apply. Many were the hours I spent over chai and cigarettes while we all figured out 'who was who' and what we would be able to agree upon before we even got to the point of discussing it...

    If you are in a hurry check the sources Cavguy provided in this thread and do a search for the specific topics. You can also click on the poster's name here at the SWJ to review what topics they have commented on or search this site...there is enough info here to keep one busy for months, possibly years...

    Regards,

    Steve
    Sapere Aude

  4. #44
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Posts
    567

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Jason Pape View Post
    It's quite exclusionary to those who are not part of the "in crowd."
    As someone who is definitely not part of the "in crowd," I feel qualified to comment. When you post here about a subject, it is inevitable that someone will respond who has more knowledge, more expertise and and more experience than you. If you don't take their comment personally - if you don't feel like you've lost a debate - then there is to reason to feel like you're not welcome.

    In my opinion, it is the most intelligent conversation on the internet and I've found the council to make remarkably open to diverse personalities and dissenting views.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

  5. #45
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2005
    Location
    Largo, Florida
    Posts
    3,989

    Default A Bit of Clarification

    There is neither an “in crowd” nor "out crowd" on the Council. This thread started as a very good discussion about a very promising paper submitted by a new Council member - let's get back on topic. Thanks.

  6. #46
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by SWJED View Post
    This thread started as a very good discussion about a very promising paper submitted by a new Council member - let's get back on topic. Thanks.
    Very good point! I think both Jason and Steve have highlighted an interesting problem that has a direct effect on smaller units.

    Quote Originally Posted by Jason Pape View Post
    I'm sorry if this comes across as curt, but with all the talk about mentoring and training (I would use the word educating)...I think we owe him better.
    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    Part of adapting to COIN is recognizing that the 'Burger King' mentality (in & out, with the burger and fixings of your choice in five minutes or less) does not apply. Many were the hours I spent over chai and cigarettes while we all figured out 'who was who' and what we would be able to agree upon before we even got to the point of discussing it...
    Let me start with Jason's comment and specifically draw out some of the differences between mentoring, training and education. The simplest differences are
    • Mentoring - a 1:1 relationship between a "master" and an "apprentice" or "journeyman" in a craft (or profession). Mentoring is a relationship that is ongoing and often breaches the formal boundaries of organizations (e.g. SNCOs often mentor junior officers). Possibly more important is that "mentoring" is a way of passing on craft "knowledge" (technically, in Victor Turner's terminology, "tribal gnosis") that pertains to how the craft operates, the history of the craft, and, most importantly, the perceptions that are important to survive and prosper in the craft. It tends to deal with the informal knowledge of the craft.
    • Training - this is a 1:many relationship where specific technical skills are passed on. Furthermore, these skills are limited to skills that have been worked out in extremely fine detail; they are almost "mechanistic" - think about learning the multiplication tables by rote as an example.
    • Education - ideally, education operates on a 1:few relationship and is designed to pass on the formal knowledge of a craft (or profession) and to certify that knowledge in some generally accepted form.
    Let me give an example of this. Training teaches you how to kick down doors and clear a building; education provides the framework for kicking down doors in general terms, and mentoring teaches you to recognize clues as to when kicking down doors in a specific situation is a good or bad idea.

    Let me get back to the issue of sensemaking meetings both before deployment and post-deployment.

    First off, one of the things that I think everyone can agree on is that no matter how well prepared you are for an event or mission, your preparation will be insufficient. Or, in other words, "no plan ever survives contact with the enemy" and "Sierra happens". When this happens, and it will as CPT C notes in his paper, how are you going to deal with it? This is a question of making sense of what is going on.

    Now, if we are talking about a conventional engagement, that can be handled well enough by trained responses. Remember when I said that training was similar to rote learning? Well, what happens is that training, especially physical training, gets stuck in muscle memory and cannalizes parts of the brain, specifically neural circuity that identify sensory cues at a purely sub-conscious level and triggers of pre-programed ("trained") responses. This works pretty well in a conventional conflict and an open battlefield but, in many ways, is a disadvantage in a COIN fight where your opponent knows how you are trained. In effect, they can use your training against you by setting up events or situations that take advantage of that training to produce results that change other people's perceptions about you.

    Okay, so let's shift over to education now. Most of CPT C's paper focuses on that - he is providing a private level context for the training they already have and in a language they will understand and be able to read quickly (unlike, say, FM 3-24). That is a laudable goal and I think he has done a really good job with it. But how does it / will it play out in theatre? As with any form of education, it is only an approximation (actually an abstraction) of reality. The answer is the same as with most systems of education - middlin' well. It is too intellectual, even when it isn't . Once your company is in theatre, they will inevitable run into something that will confuse them because it doesn't really fit into either the training or education (technically, this is called a "breach" or a "reality shock" in their phenomenology). What happens then?

    Well, while a lot of people have studied this, I always liked Burkart Holzner's version of the options (highly abstracted and paraphrased):
    1. They may move into a dreamlike state where "reality" isn't "real";
    2. their sense of reality may dissolve such that they deny sensory evidence;
    3. their belief in all their education (actually model of reality) may collapse - in some cases they become fixated on specific events that have bypassed their neo-cortex and lodged in their limbic memory (shell shock or PTSD is an example of this). In extreme cases, they may go catatonic;
    4. in order to avoid a mental collapse, they may fixate on some individual observation or belief to the point of neurosis; and,
    5. in some cases, they may rapidly shift one construction of reality for another (think Damascus road conversion types).
    Now, pretty much every culture we (Anthropologists) have studied (that's about 5000+) recognizes this problem in one way or another and, surprise surprise, has come up with similar solutions; usually centering around some form of mentoring and often in some ritualized form (Charles Laughlin calls this the Shamanic Cycle or Cycle of Meaning). This ritualized form almost always involves a "specialist" who either interprets or helps to interpret the experience of the individual for them. This is what Mao did with his "speaking anger", and it is really Mao's formulation of it that has been globalized even though, as Ken pointed out, he certainly didn't originate it.

    Which, in my academic roundabout way, gets back to the whole point of CPT C's paper - living with COIN. Ongoing meetings that act as sense-making "rituals" and cross rank boundaries reduce the likelihood of reality shock while, at the same time, providing a safe space for mentoring to take place thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of a company in achieving its mission. At the same time, they also increase the likelihood that individuals in the company stay sane (as well as alive!).

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  7. #47
    Registered User Jason Pape's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Location
    Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    7

    Default My bad...

    I do apologize for the tone of my previous post. My intent was not to correct anyone in particular, but to recommend a correction in our collective course to bring us back to the topic...a captain looking for feedback re: COIN. And he has received some terrific feedback thus far! But given the incredible talent in this forum, he could get more.

    I've attached a small document with some thoughts on this, so that I don't take up any more space on this thread with my tangent. This is not meant personally...just something to consider.

    Afterall, SWJ is about
    the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field. We hope this, in turn, advances the practice and effectiveness of those forces prosecuting Small Wars.
    Now..I'm going to go back and read Cpt C's piece again and see if I can contribute anything else.
    Attached Files Attached Files
    Jason M. Pape

  8. #48
    Registered User Jason Pape's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Location
    Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    7

    Default Some more ideas on your COIN Cliff Notes...

    BOG - avoid absolutes. I (think I) know what you're trying to get at, and I'm often concerned we're not "on the ground" enough - especially w/ MRAPs, etc. But remember...you're encouraging a discussion here - not making rules. There are some missions (even within the larger COIN framework) that do not require you to be "on foot."

    Language - check out http://www.tacticallanguage.com/ in addition to LingNet. If you have a boss who tells you to use Rosetta Stone...fight it. You need to know how to converse, not speak words, in IRAQI (not Arabic).

    AO Expert - also discuss how you're going to continuously consolidate all of that information (including how you're going to get at the tacit knowledge your Soldiers don't even realize they've developed) so that it doesn't leave theater with you. Too often, we wait until to the end-of-tour to try and put it all together for the relief; it's almost always just a collection of data. Try to create a "Matrix-type download of what WE know about the AO" that remains with the unit after you leave and allows them to continue to explore and update as they go.
    Here's an example I had all the way back in OIF I (condensed for space & to get rid of classified stuff, but gives you the idea; haven't de-clasified my newer one):
    https://www.us.army.mil/suite/folder/7430604
    (AKO login required)

    Time Limits - again, avoid rules. Having a "time limit" is almost as bad as doing patrols for a specified time. Rather - THINK about time. eg. IF we are on-site for more than X minutes, we should do Y IOT mediate risk. Sometimes it takes longer than X to do what you need to do. Things like cache hunting and destruction take a long time! My scouts were typically "in sector" for 72-96 hours at a time. It's good that you talk about patterns and "schedules"...talk about those more!

    Finally...another piece worth discussing at the platoon level: an article called "Operations David & Goliath" starting on page 9 of this link. It's certainly not the answer...it's simply something to have a discussion over.

    Hope this helps...
    Last edited by Jason Pape; 04-04-2008 at 06:53 PM.
    Jason M. Pape

  9. #49
    Registered User Jason Pape's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Location
    Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    7

    Default "Force Protection"

    Craig -

    One other thing came to mind...something worth talking about at the platoon level: FORCE PROTECTION.

    My concern is that some young leaders in today's environment might believe their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission. ie. I worry that we are placing force protection above mission accomplishment. While they are not mutually exclusive, you cannot always have both.

    As an example, and perhaps as a tangent - I worry about the politicization of the MRAP fielding in Iraq. I worry even more about people who implicitly support the "more protection is better" argument. I'm an Armor Officer, and I love the Abrams MBT, but I did everything I could to stay off off tanks in Iraq. When I was almost blown up by a massive IED and my commander tried to get me back on "track," I refused because it would not allow me to do what I needed to do in COIN. I worry about reinforcing a "commute to work" mentality with the MRAP, etc. and wonder whether more (as in Frag Kit 6 & gunner's 'cloches') is really better, or if force protection might become such a concern that it is a detriment to successful COIN Ops.

    I think we need to have candid conversations with our junior leaders about how accepting risk, or better - mitigating risk in a deliberate manner, rather than risk-avoidance is the right mentality. Even deeper...the discussion that MAYBE, by taking greater risk now (ie. staying closer to the ground rather than climbing onto MRAP elephants) we might be negating risks to come...

    To me (Armor-Cav guy), moving dismounted is A technique with several advantages but also very limited (in speed, distance and support). The MRAP, to me, represents the latest chapter in a vicious cycle of pursuing protection rather than fighting smarter, harder, and LIGHTER. Previous chapters in the protection novel included Frag Kit 6 and gunner's 'cloches' (see Maginot Line for illustration) on M1114s...both responses to an enemy TTP that, in my mind, don't make enough of a difference to justify the drawbacks (weight, obscuration, etc.)

    I'm a huge fan of the M1114. But not what I see now. You might as well put the gunner inside with the rest of the crew, or go with the MRAP. But most people seem very satisfied with more armor, more stuff on the cupola, and heck...even a new vehicle altogether...the MRAP. But 1. how many lives will it save? 2. How much will it hamper our agility, ability, and mentality to get at COIN the right way?

    I'm still not getting to my point. Let me try it this way...
    1. More is not always better! More armor (usually) = more weight = less mobility and less agility. And if it doesn't REALLY mean better protection (if a catastrophic IED is still a catastrophic IED) then it isn't worth the baggage.
    2. More protection (often) encourages less thinking. I've personally seen units (leaders) lulled into thinking their C-IED or armor package "protect" them like a magical cloak, thus forgetting about patterns, CREW fratricide, etc. There are some places we MUST go REPEATEDLY and REGULARLY...we need CREW, armor, and deliberate clearance techniques to do that. But we should not adopt that mentality for ALL operations.
    3. In the end, we are part of a profession that requires us to be prepared to take casualties. We owe all that we have to protecting our Soldiers and setting them up for success. But we cannot forsake mission accomplishment for protection. Sometimes...SOMETIMES...taking risks, and taking causalities as a result of these risks, means more Soldiers are saved in the long-run due to mission accomplishment. This is the hard-smart-counterintuitive discussion I'm most eager to have with junior leaders. So...instead of providing more protection that allows us to do routine missions and get the most guys back for refit & Cinnabon...we need to be willing to go light, stay out longer, and take reasonable risks that make us more effective. Ironically, if our #1 concern is saving Soldiers lives, I worry that we will lose more Soldiers in the long run...
    Jason M. Pape

  10. #50
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Kansas
    Posts
    1,099

    Thumbs up It can be frustrating trying to put what you

    know into context when describing it to others. Thats part of what SWJ gives is a way in which varying experiences and knowledge from others comes together in a picture which kinda makes sense.

    Thanks for your efforts.

    This kinda reminds me of a discussion I was in where the best I could do to describe what your speaking of was the following.

    If the population in your AO do not feel secure than you the counter insurgent aren't secure no matter how much armor you wrap around yourself.
    It ain't perfect but I think it reflects some of what Galula, Kilcullen, and others have stated. And you having lived it can represent the validity of it by simply sharing your experience.
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

    Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur

  11. #51
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Good job all the way through, Jason

    Though I have to say your last three paragraphs above are, IMO, particularly good and very much correct.

  12. #52
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Jason Pape View Post
    Craig -

    One other thing came to mind...something worth talking about at the platoon level: FORCE PROTECTION.

    My concern is that some young leaders in today's environment might believe their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission. ie. I worry that we are placing force protection above mission accomplishment. While they are not mutually exclusive, you cannot always have both.
    The term and concept of "Force Protection" is UK in origin. Anyone who reads Leonhard will know that you balance security against activity, so the ultimate logic of force protection is to nothing other than protect the force.

    Thus - their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission.

    IMO the concept of Force Protection verges on silliness, (like IPB) if explicit in nature, rather than implicit. It's a statement of the obvious (like hearts and minds) which has taken on a life of it's own.

    The primary means of creating force protection is to defeat the enemies core functions. (This has recently become the "onion layers of defence" which is entirely passive and thus not useful) - the best force protection is to the defeat/suppress/exhaust the enemy. It is the heart of the so-called COIN mission.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  13. #53
    Registered User
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Location
    Fort Benning
    Posts
    6

    Default

    Jason and Will,

    Thank you for your comments. i wasn't going to spill over into this subject in detail, but you both mentioned something that is a very important issue to me. I briefly mentioned in an earlier post "patrolling to survive." This is what I use to refer to the techniques that many units are currently using in Iraq. Basically, it consists of "buttoning up" in your brad/hmmwv/tank/etc, doing a few laps through the major roads in your AO, and calling that your patrol. And I'm not talking out of my ass here- I could write an alarming long list of battalions that i personally witnessed doing this when I was in iraq (just a few short months ago). This technique is used by units who don't necessarily want to get into any real #### and just want to get home (not that you can really blame anyone for that). However, this technique is flawed in that the exact opposite occurs. It allows the enemy safe haven to build his engagement areas, coerce the populace, and study and patternize the counterinsurgent. And then all of a sudden that unit will realize that their AO has gone to #### and they are having mass-casualty engagements because of it. And so will everyone else who has to travel through that AO to get to somewhere else (I was often that guy).
    Too much emphasis on Force Protenction can encourage "patrolling to survive." And sometimes at no fault of the soldier; too much armor and weight can make it almost imposssible to patrol on foot and engage the populace in the middle of an iraqi summer. The american public doesn't want to see american casualties, so they hammer politicians to give us more armor, who in turn hammer the army to give us more armor, who do, and then eventually the soldier is so overburdened that he cannot perform his infantry (or other) tasks. it is a vicious and unfortuante cycle. But we also do it to ourselves. I have seen units affix bullet-proof glass to their vehicles that completely surrounds the soldier in the hatch (without even a gun port). This is claimed to be a Force Protection measure, but it completely prevents the soldier in the hatch from returning fire. I can't even begin to count how many times I had to return fire from the hatch of my stryker and I can't imagine what it would be like if i wasn't able to do so. A Force Pro measure such as this is going too far and stifles not only the ability of the soldier but also the warrior ethos within that soldier. It is a careful balance that leaders must figure out, regardless of which vehicle platform they have.

    I guess the message that I want to get out to people is that sometimes the best Force Protection measure is actually to sacrifice some Force Protection in order go get into the populace and eradicate the enemy. Instead of just focussing on protecting yourself from that IED blast, stop it from ever occuring in the first place. That is how you will win the fight.

    Craig
    Last edited by Cpt C; 04-06-2008 at 04:03 AM.

  14. #54
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    SOCAL
    Posts
    2,152

    Default

    Craig,

    I have read this piece at least five times to digest it further, and it is still good stuff. Like the AAR linked in to this thread, and along with the 28 Articles, your stuff is going into a binder that I will carry forward in a few months. You guys are on the right track, believe me. I thought I was a well-trained, experienced, and well-read officer who "gets it," but everytime I come here I realize that what I really know is between jack and ####.

    Still, I have a few points that I hope will strengthen this:

    -If we intend for a document to truly reach the masses, we have to remember the intended audience. In your third paragraph, you mention that the company's officers should read the Twenty-Eight Articles. Why just the officers? I know the point you are trying to make, but remember the intended audience. The amazing thing about COIN is that we must remember that just because you are a combat arms guy, you don't hold a monopoly on knowing what's best. Until early to mid 2002, we weren't even thinking about it,so who is to say officers are somehowe smarter about it? I'm not saying this to somehow dimish what you've taken the time to labor over, but you are trying to find widespread readership and acceptance. For that matter, are officers really doing the heavy lifting anymore? I hear it said that it isn't even a company commander's fight, so if it rests on the back of platoons, it certainly doesn't rest on the back of the single lieutenant there...so why are officers the predominant bloc of folks being published?

    o You will get this information best through conversation, not direct questioning (though at times it may come to that). Learn what is important to the local populace and use that to start genuine conversations. Even if you don’t really care, you need to pretend like you do for those 10 or 15 minutes that you are engaging that Local National. It will result in you gaining the situational understanding and intel that you need to accomplish your mission.
    -This is an outstanding point that I think could stand some expansion. I've come to realize that unless you are well-trained in interrogation techniques, you cannot elicit information well with simple direct questions. It is too easy to be told: 1) outright lies; 2) what they think you want to hear.

    o Make your interpreter feel like part of the team. They are probably already getting paid a healthy amount, but make sure that they are getting to meals, going on leave when authorized, getting escorted to the PX when necessary and available, and are being treated well (most ‘terps are not!).
    -Abso-freakin'-lutely...This is a critical aspect of handling linguists that we have to master, but as you say, most of them are not treated well. I'd be interested if you'd discuss what you think are the underlying causes of poor treatment in a PM, but for purposes here, it might be good to offer up a bibliography of sorts for further TTPs and research on the business of employing linguists. There is education to be had in this area, but too often, what the troops will do is mimic a style they saw the last time around that was in use by a leader. That style may not have been appropriate, the same way that a boot NCO may think leadership is acting like a drill instructor because that is all he has as a frame of reference. Make sense? The good linguists who don't whine should be pampered as best we can, lavished with small gifts, and always allowed to take advantage of some of the services the troops enjoy. We did not do this my second time over for OIF II, and I can see that this failure may have contributed to the attrition we had to deal with.

    o Maintain a time limit in your sector of one hour (or whatever you deem appropriate per your enemy situation). As soon as you cross into your AO the time starts.
    -I'm not sure I understand why you use the expression, "cross into the AO". Aren't we supposed to be already living in the AO? I think this reinforces the bad notion of commuting to the fight. On a tactical level, we need to stop thinking of AOs, sectors, and zones, because they are still fairly arbitrary divisions. We need to revert to something more basic, like neighborhoods, tribal districts, boroughs, etc. We are not trying to change "Areas of Operation" but rather the people within them - thus changing a neighborhood. It's sort of like the distinction between a house and a home. I think your people (both higher, lower, and laterally) will have a different perspective and outlook based on the choice of term.

    You're doing good work regardless, so keep it up and come out with another chapter soon.

  15. #55
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default Something to note!

    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    On a tactical level, we need to stop thinking of AOs, sectors, and zones, because they are still fairly arbitrary divisions. We need to revert to something more basic, like neighborhoods, tribal districts, boroughs, etc. We are not trying to change "Areas of Operation" but rather the people within them - thus changing a neighborhood. It's sort of like the distinction between a house and a home. I think your people (both higher, lower, and laterally) will have a different perspective and outlook based on the choice of term.
    So, a units tactical responsibility would be protecting the "Al-Atawa" Clan, not the persons living within the AO boundaries?

    Not sure how that would work, but your general observation is insightful, original, and useful. This is impressive stuff, by any measure. Much obliged!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  16. #56
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    SOCAL
    Posts
    2,152

    Default

    So, a units tactical responsibility would be protecting the "Al-Atawa" Clan, not the persons living within the AO boundaries?
    We would be protecting all of the people living with the AO's arbitrary boundaries, but we would have to go back to what these Captains are getting at - look, listen, touch the people and get a feel for who exactly is where, what they do, how they get there to do it, and where their relatives live.

    You could have three, four, or five neighborhoods that break out under tribal/sect lines, and all within an AO. For a few days, your tasks and purpose focus on X tribe that are within Y neigborhodd. Then later on in the week, the focus shifts to Y tribe in Z neighborhood.

    I think you could focus your efforts on a particular tribe/sect, and by increasing their security you in turn increase the security for an adjacent tribe or sect, but sadly I am still too dim on the demographics of Iraq to know how valid that assumption would be.
    Last edited by jcustis; 04-10-2008 at 01:47 PM.

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •