The Counterinsurgency Cliff Notes

[Ken White]

Welcome Aboard.

I'll also reiterate Cav Guy's suggestion that you go to the "Tell us about you #2" last page (LINK) and join the crowd. Can't tell the players without a program...

[Mark O'Neill]

CPT C,

I think it is good thing when people think enough about things, and feel passionate enough about it, to get up and do something about it.

Whilst not intending to be negative towards the industry and application you have displayed, I am not sure that a lot of the material you detail is not just 'sound' small unit TTP rather than specifically 'COIN' material. ( I guess this is similar to the view offered earlier by Ken).

Whilst there is a need for such material, I am relatively confident that most of it must be being taught somewhere, as it is currently practised in theatre. The US infantry units I have spent time with all appear to practise this stuff to varying degrees. Some of them are very, very good at it.

I know for a fact that material much like this has been 'rote' in the Australian Army since before Vietnam -it was taught for many years from the 1960s at the Battle Wing in Canungra.

Are you aware that the COIN CFE had / has a COIN Handbook for junior leaders that was given out for a few years?

It was put together by an Aussie SF SNCO and a few US Navy Seals with some supervision at the end by an Officer on staff who had been involved in FM 3-24. It even evolved into a second edition. Whilst not 'perfect' it was more than adequate, and I beleive in parts quite good considering the speed in which it was drafted and created in theatre.

If you PM me and provide a .mil address I will see if I can find a .pdf or other form of e-copy to send to you.

Issue of the handbook was suspended in late 07 in anticipation of a replacement item being issued in CONUS. (It did take a fair bit of effort to keep it current and publish it - the CFE is not assigned personnel or resourced for a doctrine writing task).

I recently became aware that the issue of an handbook in CONUS still has not occurred (Cav Guy might know more about when this will actually happen).

Cheers,

Mark

[Cpt C]

Mark,
No, I was not aware that ther was a handbook. As far as specific COIN training, most units are left to do it on their own (army units are currently spending about a year at home between deployments). The only place that I am aware of that is consistently teaching COIN to the conventional army is the COIN academy in Iraq. Most company commanders go to this course when they first arrive in theater. COIN is also breifly touched on in other army schools, but not so much as to have a definitive impact on the conventional army as a whole. We are working to change that here at Fort Benning and are making some headway.
However, as you mentioned, there are many handbooks and tools out there for units to refer to. The problem is working that training into a conventional unit's training cycle between deployments. There is so much to do in so little time that it is difficult to implement it at the large level (and, unfortunately, many units do not do it out of laziness). So when this training does occur, it is often at the battalion or company level, and some companies are better than others.
You mention that some of what I refer to is just regular infantry tactics. Yes, I did get a little off track into counter-guerilla tactics and I plan to re-write and clarify that distinction. However, I mostly just identified and described the regular infantry tactics necessary to implement a greater COIN strategy. I know that a lot of this knowledge is already out there, but the point of my paper is more to give focus and guidance to small-unit leaders in iraq, not completely re-train them. Someone else had similar comments that "you shouldn't have to train that stuff." Well, we do. I just returned from a 15-month deployment where I served as a rifle platoon leader and recon PL and bounced all around the map and worked with just about every different type of organization in theater. I can tell you first hand that MOST CONVENTIONAL UNITS ARE NOT EVEN TRYING TO FIGHT COIN. The U.S. Army is an extremely massive organization and not everyone is a John Rambo. Not everyone is on forums in their spare time trying to learn more about COIN. Most people in the CONVENTIONAL army are just there for a pay check, have a wife and kids at home, and will do as little as possible in a combat zone. COIN is difficult. COIN puts soldiers out in the open, exposed to the enemy. So many units aren't doing it. In fact, many are doing what I call "patrolling to survive," which i can get into with you off line. Additionally, it is not what young bubbas signed up to do. They signed up to kick in doors and shoot people (which, admittedly, I totally identify with). That is what the U.S. army is trained to do (and is very very good at). It is in our blood, so that is what we do in theater.
I don't mean to be bashing my organization, but we have to be honest with ourselves. This is reality. Our army is doing great things to change our mindset and embrace the COIN fight. All units do cultural awareness training, which is a great start. COIN is slowly trickling through our ranks, but it will take time to change as a whole.
I know what an infantry platoon trains on. I what how what life is like in Iraq right now. I know how short their attention span is. I know how many other things they have on their mind besides learning COIN. So I wrote this paper for them. It's my way of saying "hey, you don't need to completely retrain to win this fight. Let's just refocus a little bit. These techniques will support your unit's COIN strategy and will get us out of the desert faster." It's not a complete lesson on COIN- smarter men than me have already done that. But this is something that you might actually get everyone in an infantry platoon to read, without all the fluff that they really don't need to know anyway (or care to know, honestly). Just what they need to know to roll out the wire and complete the mission (which is why I call it the "cliff notes"). The higher-level commanders will work the larger strategy piece. Again, this is not the ideal solution, but this is reality.
I hope that helps. If I am not conveying that in my paper, please let me know. I really appreciate your comments. They are making me think deeper about where this paper should go. Please keep the comments coming.
Craig

[Ken White]

""hopefully, everyone knows to do this without any training... "" Let me clarify that the comment referred specifically and only to Marc T's comment about the advisability of having routine Platoon confabs; simply getting the joes together and everybody talks about what's happening...

It did not apply to training or to your very good paper.

With respect to the tactical stuff, I said that what Raymond Millen said concerning TTP is in fact basic infantry / maneuver unit tactics and should be taught, adding; "''in other words, what you highlight that he's suggesting is basic -- and we Americans do not do the basics well because we have to learn on the job after the war starts and as we go instead of being trained in them upon entry.""

IOW, I agree with you that we do not train it in the institution, at both officer and enlisted entry training -- and we should. I can totally understand the thrust of your comments just above and can empathize -- but I do know some units, as Mark O'Neill said, do train themselves and do a very good job. That comes down to the personality and the desires of commanders and there are indeed too many who do not want to do the COIN thing at all.

Keep on pushing.

[marct]

""hopefully, everyone knows to do this without any training... "" Let me clarify that the comment referred specifically and only to Marc T's comment about the advisability of having routine Platoon confabs; simply getting the joes together and everybody talks about what's happening...

That was certainly how I took it . I'll admit, I was taking it a touch beyond a "confab" and more into the real of "collective sensemaking" across the ranks with, possibly, a touch of the old Maoist "speaking anger" added in (forget the source, it's a great group dynamics method ).

I keep thinking back to the founding of the 1st Marine Raider BTN and its use of Maoist principles for organizational learning, adaptation and motivation. In the type of topsy-turvy "reality" (?) that is COIN, such principle can stand a group in good stead.

[Ken White]

That was certainly how I took it . I'll admit, I was taking it a touch beyond a "confab" and more into the real of "collective sensemaking" across the ranks with, possibly, a touch of the old Maoist "speaking anger" added in (forget the source, it's a great group dynamics method ).

The first few will be vague and general, specificity and openness come with repetition. Unless firm steps are taken to stop them, the kids will open up. Needless to say, they should not be so stopped but encouraged to speak up. Unless one is afraid of them...

I keep thinking back to the founding of the 1st Marine Raider BTN and its use of Maoist principles for organizational learning, adaptation and motivation. In the type of topsy-turvy "reality" (?) that is COIN, such principle can stand a group in good stead.

Mao may have been Carlson's source but the idea pre dates Mao. Ever been to a First Nations Band Council meeting? 'Speaking anger' -- but quietly...

[marct]

The first few will be vague and general, specificity and openness come with repetition. Unless firm steps are taken to stop them, the kids will open up. Needless to say, they should not be so stopped but encouraged to speak up. Unless one is afraid of them...

Too true ! Still, setting up that type of organizational culture is, IMO, a very useful adjunct to the more technical TTPs in this type of fight. 'sides that, it gets back into the discussion-mentoring idea.

Mao may have been Carlson's source but the idea pre dates Mao. Ever been to a First Nations Band Council meeting? 'Speaking anger' -- but quietly...

LOLOL - I'll have to make a "no comment" statement on that one, since the answer is "yes". As a note, when I was growing up, my mother used to run Consciousness Raising groups in our living room - and people wonder why I started to read so much .

[walrus]

Mark posted:

I know for a fact that material much like this has been 'rote' in the Australian Army since before Vietnam -it was taught for many years from the 1960s at the Battle Wing in Canungra.

Cpt C,

I just found my little "Notes for Students" from JTC Battle Wing days. It starts with "You cannot go into action with an open book in your hands" and that sets the tone of the remainder. The rest of my Canungra notes would have been pulped years ago.

I'm not sure its much help, being a little "jungle" oriented, and there is no legal way I can release it. So what I'll do is read what I have in conjunction with your paper and I'll see if there is any constructive comment I can make as a result.

[Cavguy]

Whilst not intending to be negative towards the industry and application you have displayed, I am not sure that a lot of the material you detail is not just 'sound' small unit TTP rather than specifically 'COIN' material. ( I guess this is similar to the view offered earlier by Ken).

I told him the same before he came and posted here. Even the TTP is useful - but he reflects a lot of what I see everyday - officers (at all grades) don't generally understand the difference between counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgency. I hear C-IED, SKT, C-Sniper, E2S, etc. described as "COIN" all the time. Houston, we have an education problem.

Whilst there is a need for such material, I am relatively confident that most of it must be being taught somewhere, as it is currently practised in theatre. The US infantry units I have spent time with all appear to practise this stuff to varying degrees. Some of them are very, very good at it.

Varies by unit, but it's amazing what fear of death will do. The gap he's addressing is in "published" material. Very little of what he is writing is actually on paper.

I know for a fact that material much like this has been 'rote' in the Australian Army since before Vietnam -it was taught for many years from the 1960s at the Battle Wing in Canungra.

I think there's a value in it getting "re-written" from time to time for the masses. Soldiers are generally anti-intellectual, anti-non-US generated doctrine, and anti-any war older than they are when seeking advice. Even if it's "everything old is new", it has tremendous credibility coming from the current generation rather than an old or foreign source. You wouldn't believe the problems I have getting people to read Bernard Fall, Trinquier, and Galula just because they're French, and all the bias against the French military learning. So even if it's been out before, it's valuable to hear it from a contemporary context. And amazing how the lessons are so similar ....

I'm not saying that's right, it's just how it is.

Are you aware that the COIN CFE had / has a COIN Handbook for junior leaders that was given out for a few years?

Whilst not 'perfect' it was more than adequate, and I beleive in parts quite good considering the speed in which it was drafted and created in theatre.

...

I recently became aware that the issue of an handbook in CONUS still has not occurred (Cav Guy might know more about when this will actually happen).

Well, it's been an adventure. Send me the old one via my email on coin.army.mil. Focus has been shifted off of a handbook and more onto a FM 3-24.2, Tactics in counterinsurgency. Handbooks are good, but the schoolhouse needs doctrine to teach off of, and to begin DOTMLPF funding for the issues - can't do that with a handbook.

That said, look for some of it to be out soon in 'handbook' format.

[Ken White]

...Focus has been shifted off of a handbook and more onto a FM 3-24.2, Tactics in counterinsurgency. Handbooks are good, but the schoolhouse needs doctrine to teach off of, and to begin DOTMLPF funding for the issues - can't do that with a handbook.

That said, look for some of it to be out soon in 'handbook' format.

in front of the horse... Still.

I know, I know. Yeah, that's the way the process works -- still backwards; if the troops could use it to good effect, that ought to be the priority. Bureaucracy...

Sigh.

[Cavguy]

in front of the horse... Still.

I know, I know. Yeah, that's the way the process works -- still backwards; if the troops could use it to good effect, that ought to be the priority. Bureaucracy...

Sigh.

I wouldn't quite go that far. The idea is that there are plenty of TTP manuals from CALL out there, (and there's lots) and enough COIN articles and ideas. In fact, the major issue is there are too many handbooks and TTP's, often conflicting. What is now needed is to 'codify' what is going to be the Army answer for tactical application of COIN principles, and settle some of the debates going on.

[Ken White]

I wouldn't quite go that far. The idea is that there are plenty of TTP manuals from CALL out there, (and there's lots) and enough COIN articles and ideas. In fact, the major issue is there are too many handbooks and TTP's, often conflicting. What is now needed is to 'codify' what is going to be the Army answer for tactical application of COIN principles, and settle some of the debates going on.

unless things have changed radically, the dissemination is spotty. Hopefully, that has changed...

Divisions and Schools do their own thing focusing on their experience and AO in the case of Divs, area of expertise for the Schools. Then the Theater tries to standardize a bit. Both of 'em...

Getting everyone on one sheet of music has never been easy; communities vary in their interests and approaches. It generally gets worked out even if it is too often not very timely.

The lack of standardization is a problem in a sense; it's also an advantage in a sense as competing ideas aren't all bad and can be advantageous -- in the end, it boils down to what works for the unit where they are when they're there and no book is ever going to cover all that. Still, the basics are what's important and they don't change much...

An even better idea than a handbook would be to train people a little better (Sorry, the debbil made me do it... ).

[Jason Pape]

Mark -

I wish you were right about this stuff being common knowledge. You SHOULD be right. But the sad fact is, as Craig explained...too many "leaders" (at all echelons) in our Army still do not practice, let alone understand COIN. What Craig is doing here is needed at all levels, despite all that has already been written on the subject of COIN. You'll note above that I ran into the same frustration at the field-grade level. And like Craig, I decided to sit down and just start brainstorming all the things "we" take for granted as common-knowledge at this point...but from the brigade perspective. We really do need to figure out a way to translate FM 3-24, etc. into TTPs and approaches that more people can get their minds around (ideally with real-life evidence as "proof" that it actually works). Otherwise, we'll lose the nay-sayers completely.


Craig -

Coincidently, I recently came across this (links below) AAR from a Rifle Co Cdr in OIF 06-08 that complements your piece quite well. It's one of the best company-level COIN documents I've seen lately...worth taking a look at as you continue to refine your piece. Don't lose heart. We need to be having the same kind of conversation you're writing about at all levels - particulary company/platoon & brigade/battalion - and it wouldn't it be great if we could somehow get the ideas nested and?

Keep doing what you're doing...it's great work - and needed! It's amazing how many people still don't believe it's possible (or right) for our Soldiers to do this stuff. Most people here are believers (hence the "so what?")...hopefully we can use their collective knowledge and constructive criticism to strengthen our message and spread the word.


Walrus -

You'll enjoy this document, as it provides evidence to some of the things you mentioned you'd like to know are happening...

Link 1

Link 2

[jcustis]

Craig,

I have read this piece at least five times to digest it further, and it is still good stuff. Like the AAR linked in to this thread, and along with the 28 Articles, your stuff is going into a binder that I will carry forward in a few months. You guys are on the right track, believe me. I thought I was a well-trained, experienced, and well-read officer who "gets it," but everytime I come here I realize that what I really know is between jack and ####.

Still, I have a few points that I hope will strengthen this:

-If we intend for a document to truly reach the masses, we have to remember the intended audience. In your third paragraph, you mention that the company's officers should read the Twenty-Eight Articles. Why just the officers? I know the point you are trying to make, but remember the intended audience. The amazing thing about COIN is that we must remember that just because you are a combat arms guy, you don't hold a monopoly on knowing what's best. Until early to mid 2002, we weren't even thinking about it,so who is to say officers are somehowe smarter about it? I'm not saying this to somehow dimish what you've taken the time to labor over, but you are trying to find widespread readership and acceptance. For that matter, are officers really doing the heavy lifting anymore? I hear it said that it isn't even a company commander's fight, so if it rests on the back of platoons, it certainly doesn't rest on the back of the single lieutenant there...so why are officers the predominant bloc of folks being published?

o You will get this information best through conversation, not direct questioning (though at times it may come to that). Learn what is important to the local populace and use that to start genuine conversations. Even if you don’t really care, you need to pretend like you do for those 10 or 15 minutes that you are engaging that Local National. It will result in you gaining the situational understanding and intel that you need to accomplish your mission.

-This is an outstanding point that I think could stand some expansion. I've come to realize that unless you are well-trained in interrogation techniques, you cannot elicit information well with simple direct questions. It is too easy to be told: 1) outright lies; 2) what they think you want to hear.

o Make your interpreter feel like part of the team. They are probably already getting paid a healthy amount, but make sure that they are getting to meals, going on leave when authorized, getting escorted to the PX when necessary and available, and are being treated well (most ‘terps are not!).

-Abso-freakin'-lutely...This is a critical aspect of handling linguists that we have to master, but as you say, most of them are not treated well. I'd be interested if you'd discuss what you think are the underlying causes of poor treatment in a PM, but for purposes here, it might be good to offer up a bibliography of sorts for further TTPs and research on the business of employing linguists. There is education to be had in this area, but too often, what the troops will do is mimic a style they saw the last time around that was in use by a leader. That style may not have been appropriate, the same way that a boot NCO may think leadership is acting like a drill instructor because that is all he has as a frame of reference. Make sense? The good linguists who don't whine should be pampered as best we can, lavished with small gifts, and always allowed to take advantage of some of the services the troops enjoy. We did not do this my second time over for OIF II, and I can see that this failure may have contributed to the attrition we had to deal with.

o Maintain a time limit in your sector of one hour (or whatever you deem appropriate per your enemy situation). As soon as you cross into your AO the time starts.

-I'm not sure I understand why you use the expression, "cross into the AO". Aren't we supposed to be already living in the AO? I think this reinforces the bad notion of commuting to the fight. On a tactical level, we need to stop thinking of AOs, sectors, and zones, because they are still fairly arbitrary divisions. We need to revert to something more basic, like neighborhoods, tribal districts, boroughs, etc. We are not trying to change "Areas of Operation" but rather the people within them - thus changing a neighborhood. It's sort of like the distinction between a house and a home. I think your people (both higher, lower, and laterally) will have a different perspective and outlook based on the choice of term.

You're doing good work regardless, so keep it up and come out with another chapter soon.

[William F. Owen]

On a tactical level, we need to stop thinking of AOs, sectors, and zones, because they are still fairly arbitrary divisions. We need to revert to something more basic, like neighborhoods, tribal districts, boroughs, etc. We are not trying to change "Areas of Operation" but rather the people within them - thus changing a neighborhood. It's sort of like the distinction between a house and a home. I think your people (both higher, lower, and laterally) will have a different perspective and outlook based on the choice of term.

So, a units tactical responsibility would be protecting the "Al-Atawa" Clan, not the persons living within the AO boundaries?

Not sure how that would work, but your general observation is insightful, original, and useful. This is impressive stuff, by any measure. Much obliged!

[jcustis]

So, a units tactical responsibility would be protecting the "Al-Atawa" Clan, not the persons living within the AO boundaries?

We would be protecting all of the people living with the AO's arbitrary boundaries, but we would have to go back to what these Captains are getting at - look, listen, touch the people and get a feel for who exactly is where, what they do, how they get there to do it, and where their relatives live.

You could have three, four, or five neighborhoods that break out under tribal/sect lines, and all within an AO. For a few days, your tasks and purpose focus on X tribe that are within Y neigborhodd. Then later on in the week, the focus shifts to Y tribe in Z neighborhood.

I think you could focus your efforts on a particular tribe/sect, and by increasing their security you in turn increase the security for an adjacent tribe or sect, but sadly I am still too dim on the demographics of Iraq to know how valid that assumption would be.