The Counterinsurgency Cliff Notes

[Rank amateur]

It's quite exclusionary to those who are not part of the "in crowd."

As someone who is definitely not part of the "in crowd," I feel qualified to comment. When you post here about a subject, it is inevitable that someone will respond who has more knowledge, more expertise and and more experience than you. If you don't take their comment personally - if you don't feel like you've lost a debate - then there is to reason to feel like you're not welcome.

In my opinion, it is the most intelligent conversation on the internet and I've found the council to make remarkably open to diverse personalities and dissenting views.

[SWJED]

There is neither an “in crowd” nor "out crowd" on the Council. This thread started as a very good discussion about a very promising paper submitted by a new Council member - let's get back on topic. Thanks.

[marct]

This thread started as a very good discussion about a very promising paper submitted by a new Council member - let's get back on topic. Thanks.

Very good point! I think both Jason and Steve have highlighted an interesting problem that has a direct effect on smaller units.

I'm sorry if this comes across as curt, but with all the talk about mentoring and training (I would use the word educating)...I think we owe him better.

Part of adapting to COIN is recognizing that the 'Burger King' mentality (in & out, with the burger and fixings of your choice in five minutes or less) does not apply. Many were the hours I spent over chai and cigarettes while we all figured out 'who was who' and what we would be able to agree upon before we even got to the point of discussing it...

Let me start with Jason's comment and specifically draw out some of the differences between mentoring, training and education. The simplest differences are

• Mentoring - a 1:1 relationship between a "master" and an "apprentice" or "journeyman" in a craft (or profession). Mentoring is a relationship that is ongoing and often breaches the formal boundaries of organizations (e.g. SNCOs often mentor junior officers). Possibly more important is that "mentoring" is a way of passing on craft "knowledge" (technically, in Victor Turner's terminology, "tribal gnosis") that pertains to how the craft operates, the history of the craft, and, most importantly, the perceptions that are important to survive and prosper in the craft. It tends to deal with the informal knowledge of the craft.
• Training - this is a 1:many relationship where specific technical skills are passed on. Furthermore, these skills are limited to skills that have been worked out in extremely fine detail; they are almost "mechanistic" - think about learning the multiplication tables by rote as an example.
• Education - ideally, education operates on a 1:few relationship and is designed to pass on the formal knowledge of a craft (or profession) and to certify that knowledge in some generally accepted form.

Let me give an example of this. Training teaches you how to kick down doors and clear a building; education provides the framework for kicking down doors in general terms, and mentoring teaches you to recognize clues as to when kicking down doors in a specific situation is a good or bad idea.

Let me get back to the issue of sensemaking meetings both before deployment and post-deployment.

First off, one of the things that I think everyone can agree on is that no matter how well prepared you are for an event or mission, your preparation will be insufficient. Or, in other words, "no plan ever survives contact with the enemy" and "Sierra happens". When this happens, and it will as CPT C notes in his paper, how are you going to deal with it? This is a question of making sense of what is going on.

Now, if we are talking about a conventional engagement, that can be handled well enough by trained responses. Remember when I said that training was similar to rote learning? Well, what happens is that training, especially physical training, gets stuck in muscle memory and cannalizes parts of the brain, specifically neural circuity that identify sensory cues at a purely sub-conscious level and triggers of pre-programed ("trained") responses. This works pretty well in a conventional conflict and an open battlefield but, in many ways, is a disadvantage in a COIN fight where your opponent knows how you are trained. In effect, they can use your training against you by setting up events or situations that take advantage of that training to produce results that change other people's perceptions about you.

Okay, so let's shift over to education now. Most of CPT C's paper focuses on that - he is providing a private level context for the training they already have and in a language they will understand and be able to read quickly (unlike, say, FM 3-24). That is a laudable goal and I think he has done a really good job with it. But how does it / will it play out in theatre? As with any form of education, it is only an approximation (actually an abstraction) of reality. The answer is the same as with most systems of education - middlin' well. It is too intellectual, even when it isn't . Once your company is in theatre, they will inevitable run into something that will confuse them because it doesn't really fit into either the training or education (technically, this is called a "breach" or a "reality shock" in their phenomenology). What happens then?

Well, while a lot of people have studied this, I always liked Burkart Holzner's version of the options (highly abstracted and paraphrased):

1. They may move into a dreamlike state where "reality" isn't "real";
2. their sense of reality may dissolve such that they deny sensory evidence;
3. their belief in all their education (actually model of reality) may collapse - in some cases they become fixated on specific events that have bypassed their neo-cortex and lodged in their limbic memory (shell shock or PTSD is an example of this). In extreme cases, they may go catatonic;
4. in order to avoid a mental collapse, they may fixate on some individual observation or belief to the point of neurosis; and,
5. in some cases, they may rapidly shift one construction of reality for another (think Damascus road conversion types).

Now, pretty much every culture we (Anthropologists) have studied (that's about 5000+) recognizes this problem in one way or another and, surprise surprise, has come up with similar solutions; usually centering around some form of mentoring and often in some ritualized form (Charles Laughlin calls this the Shamanic Cycle or Cycle of Meaning). This ritualized form almost always involves a "specialist" who either interprets or helps to interpret the experience of the individual for them. This is what Mao did with his "speaking anger", and it is really Mao's formulation of it that has been globalized even though, as Ken pointed out, he certainly didn't originate it.

Which, in my academic roundabout way, gets back to the whole point of CPT C's paper - living with COIN. Ongoing meetings that act as sense-making "rituals" and cross rank boundaries reduce the likelihood of reality shock while, at the same time, providing a safe space for mentoring to take place thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of a company in achieving its mission. At the same time, they also increase the likelihood that individuals in the company stay sane (as well as alive!).

Marc

[Jason Pape]

I do apologize for the tone of my previous post. My intent was not to correct anyone in particular, but to recommend a correction in our collective course to bring us back to the topic...a captain looking for feedback re: COIN. And he has received some terrific feedback thus far! But given the incredible talent in this forum, he could get more.

I've attached a small document with some thoughts on this, so that I don't take up any more space on this thread with my tangent. This is not meant personally...just something to consider.

Afterall, SWJ is about

the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field. We hope this, in turn, advances the practice and effectiveness of those forces prosecuting Small Wars.

Now..I'm going to go back and read Cpt C's piece again and see if I can contribute anything else.

[Jason Pape]

BOG - avoid absolutes. I (think I) know what you're trying to get at, and I'm often concerned we're not "on the ground" enough - especially w/ MRAPs, etc. But remember...you're encouraging a discussion here - not making rules. There are some missions (even within the larger COIN framework) that do not require you to be "on foot."

Language - check out http://www.tacticallanguage.com/ in addition to LingNet. If you have a boss who tells you to use Rosetta Stone...fight it. You need to know how to converse, not speak words, in IRAQI (not Arabic).

AO Expert - also discuss how you're going to continuously consolidate all of that information (including how you're going to get at the tacit knowledge your Soldiers don't even realize they've developed) so that it doesn't leave theater with you. Too often, we wait until to the end-of-tour to try and put it all together for the relief; it's almost always just a collection of data. Try to create a "Matrix-type download of what WE know about the AO" that remains with the unit after you leave and allows them to continue to explore and update as they go.
Here's an example I had all the way back in OIF I (condensed for space & to get rid of classified stuff, but gives you the idea; haven't de-clasified my newer one):
https://www.us.army.mil/suite/folder/7430604
(AKO login required)

Time Limits - again, avoid rules. Having a "time limit" is almost as bad as doing patrols for a specified time. Rather - THINK about time. eg. IF we are on-site for more than X minutes, we should do Y IOT mediate risk. Sometimes it takes longer than X to do what you need to do. Things like cache hunting and destruction take a long time! My scouts were typically "in sector" for 72-96 hours at a time. It's good that you talk about patterns and "schedules"...talk about those more!

Finally...another piece worth discussing at the platoon level: an article called "Operations David & Goliath" starting on page 9 of this link. It's certainly not the answer...it's simply something to have a discussion over.

Hope this helps...

[Jason Pape]

Craig -

One other thing came to mind...something worth talking about at the platoon level: FORCE PROTECTION.

My concern is that some young leaders in today's environment might believe their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission. ie. I worry that we are placing force protection above mission accomplishment. While they are not mutually exclusive, you cannot always have both.

As an example, and perhaps as a tangent - I worry about the politicization of the MRAP fielding in Iraq. I worry even more about people who implicitly support the "more protection is better" argument. I'm an Armor Officer, and I love the Abrams MBT, but I did everything I could to stay off off tanks in Iraq. When I was almost blown up by a massive IED and my commander tried to get me back on "track," I refused because it would not allow me to do what I needed to do in COIN. I worry about reinforcing a "commute to work" mentality with the MRAP, etc. and wonder whether more (as in Frag Kit 6 & gunner's 'cloches') is really better, or if force protection might become such a concern that it is a detriment to successful COIN Ops.

I think we need to have candid conversations with our junior leaders about how accepting risk, or better - mitigating risk in a deliberate manner, rather than risk-avoidance is the right mentality. Even deeper...the discussion that MAYBE, by taking greater risk now (ie. staying closer to the ground rather than climbing onto MRAP elephants) we might be negating risks to come...

To me (Armor-Cav guy), moving dismounted is A technique with several advantages but also very limited (in speed, distance and support). The MRAP, to me, represents the latest chapter in a vicious cycle of pursuing protection rather than fighting smarter, harder, and LIGHTER. Previous chapters in the protection novel included Frag Kit 6 and gunner's 'cloches' (see Maginot Line for illustration) on M1114s...both responses to an enemy TTP that, in my mind, don't make enough of a difference to justify the drawbacks (weight, obscuration, etc.)

I'm a huge fan of the M1114. But not what I see now. You might as well put the gunner inside with the rest of the crew, or go with the MRAP. But most people seem very satisfied with more armor, more stuff on the cupola, and heck...even a new vehicle altogether...the MRAP. But 1. how many lives will it save? 2. How much will it hamper our agility, ability, and mentality to get at COIN the right way?

I'm still not getting to my point. Let me try it this way...
1. More is not always better! More armor (usually) = more weight = less mobility and less agility. And if it doesn't REALLY mean better protection (if a catastrophic IED is still a catastrophic IED) then it isn't worth the baggage.
2. More protection (often) encourages less thinking. I've personally seen units (leaders) lulled into thinking their C-IED or armor package "protect" them like a magical cloak, thus forgetting about patterns, CREW fratricide, etc. There are some places we MUST go REPEATEDLY and REGULARLY...we need CREW, armor, and deliberate clearance techniques to do that. But we should not adopt that mentality for ALL operations.
3. In the end, we are part of a profession that requires us to be prepared to take casualties. We owe all that we have to protecting our Soldiers and setting them up for success. But we cannot forsake mission accomplishment for protection. Sometimes...SOMETIMES...taking risks, and taking causalities as a result of these risks, means more Soldiers are saved in the long-run due to mission accomplishment. This is the hard-smart-counterintuitive discussion I'm most eager to have with junior leaders. So...instead of providing more protection that allows us to do routine missions and get the most guys back for refit & Cinnabon...we need to be willing to go light, stay out longer, and take reasonable risks that make us more effective. Ironically, if our #1 concern is saving Soldiers lives, I worry that we will lose more Soldiers in the long run...

[Ron Humphrey]

know into context when describing it to others. Thats part of what SWJ gives is a way in which varying experiences and knowledge from others comes together in a picture which kinda makes sense.

Thanks for your efforts.

This kinda reminds me of a discussion I was in where the best I could do to describe what your speaking of was the following.

If the population in your AO do not feel secure than you the counter insurgent aren't secure no matter how much armor you wrap around yourself.

It ain't perfect but I think it reflects some of what Galula, Kilcullen, and others have stated. And you having lived it can represent the validity of it by simply sharing your experience.

[William F. Owen]

Craig -

One other thing came to mind...something worth talking about at the platoon level: FORCE PROTECTION.

My concern is that some young leaders in today's environment might believe their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission. ie. I worry that we are placing force protection above mission accomplishment. While they are not mutually exclusive, you cannot always have both.

The term and concept of "Force Protection" is UK in origin. Anyone who reads Leonhard will know that you balance security against activity, so the ultimate logic of force protection is to nothing other than protect the force.

Thus - their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission.

IMO the concept of Force Protection verges on silliness, (like IPB) if explicit in nature, rather than implicit. It's a statement of the obvious (like hearts and minds) which has taken on a life of it's own.

The primary means of creating force protection is to defeat the enemies core functions. (This has recently become the "onion layers of defence" which is entirely passive and thus not useful) - the best force protection is to the defeat/suppress/exhaust the enemy. It is the heart of the so-called COIN mission.