The Counterinsurgency Cliff Notes

[Cpt C]

Mark,
No, I was not aware that ther was a handbook. As far as specific COIN training, most units are left to do it on their own (army units are currently spending about a year at home between deployments). The only place that I am aware of that is consistently teaching COIN to the conventional army is the COIN academy in Iraq. Most company commanders go to this course when they first arrive in theater. COIN is also breifly touched on in other army schools, but not so much as to have a definitive impact on the conventional army as a whole. We are working to change that here at Fort Benning and are making some headway.
However, as you mentioned, there are many handbooks and tools out there for units to refer to. The problem is working that training into a conventional unit's training cycle between deployments. There is so much to do in so little time that it is difficult to implement it at the large level (and, unfortunately, many units do not do it out of laziness). So when this training does occur, it is often at the battalion or company level, and some companies are better than others.
You mention that some of what I refer to is just regular infantry tactics. Yes, I did get a little off track into counter-guerilla tactics and I plan to re-write and clarify that distinction. However, I mostly just identified and described the regular infantry tactics necessary to implement a greater COIN strategy. I know that a lot of this knowledge is already out there, but the point of my paper is more to give focus and guidance to small-unit leaders in iraq, not completely re-train them. Someone else had similar comments that "you shouldn't have to train that stuff." Well, we do. I just returned from a 15-month deployment where I served as a rifle platoon leader and recon PL and bounced all around the map and worked with just about every different type of organization in theater. I can tell you first hand that MOST CONVENTIONAL UNITS ARE NOT EVEN TRYING TO FIGHT COIN. The U.S. Army is an extremely massive organization and not everyone is a John Rambo. Not everyone is on forums in their spare time trying to learn more about COIN. Most people in the CONVENTIONAL army are just there for a pay check, have a wife and kids at home, and will do as little as possible in a combat zone. COIN is difficult. COIN puts soldiers out in the open, exposed to the enemy. So many units aren't doing it. In fact, many are doing what I call "patrolling to survive," which i can get into with you off line. Additionally, it is not what young bubbas signed up to do. They signed up to kick in doors and shoot people (which, admittedly, I totally identify with). That is what the U.S. army is trained to do (and is very very good at). It is in our blood, so that is what we do in theater.
I don't mean to be bashing my organization, but we have to be honest with ourselves. This is reality. Our army is doing great things to change our mindset and embrace the COIN fight. All units do cultural awareness training, which is a great start. COIN is slowly trickling through our ranks, but it will take time to change as a whole.
I know what an infantry platoon trains on. I what how what life is like in Iraq right now. I know how short their attention span is. I know how many other things they have on their mind besides learning COIN. So I wrote this paper for them. It's my way of saying "hey, you don't need to completely retrain to win this fight. Let's just refocus a little bit. These techniques will support your unit's COIN strategy and will get us out of the desert faster." It's not a complete lesson on COIN- smarter men than me have already done that. But this is something that you might actually get everyone in an infantry platoon to read, without all the fluff that they really don't need to know anyway (or care to know, honestly). Just what they need to know to roll out the wire and complete the mission (which is why I call it the "cliff notes"). The higher-level commanders will work the larger strategy piece. Again, this is not the ideal solution, but this is reality.
I hope that helps. If I am not conveying that in my paper, please let me know. I really appreciate your comments. They are making me think deeper about where this paper should go. Please keep the comments coming.
Craig

[Ken White]

""hopefully, everyone knows to do this without any training... "" Let me clarify that the comment referred specifically and only to Marc T's comment about the advisability of having routine Platoon confabs; simply getting the joes together and everybody talks about what's happening...

It did not apply to training or to your very good paper.

With respect to the tactical stuff, I said that what Raymond Millen said concerning TTP is in fact basic infantry / maneuver unit tactics and should be taught, adding; "''in other words, what you highlight that he's suggesting is basic -- and we Americans do not do the basics well because we have to learn on the job after the war starts and as we go instead of being trained in them upon entry.""

IOW, I agree with you that we do not train it in the institution, at both officer and enlisted entry training -- and we should. I can totally understand the thrust of your comments just above and can empathize -- but I do know some units, as Mark O'Neill said, do train themselves and do a very good job. That comes down to the personality and the desires of commanders and there are indeed too many who do not want to do the COIN thing at all.

Keep on pushing.

[walrus]

Mark posted:

I know for a fact that material much like this has been 'rote' in the Australian Army since before Vietnam -it was taught for many years from the 1960s at the Battle Wing in Canungra.

Cpt C,

I just found my little "Notes for Students" from JTC Battle Wing days. It starts with "You cannot go into action with an open book in your hands" and that sets the tone of the remainder. The rest of my Canungra notes would have been pulped years ago.

I'm not sure its much help, being a little "jungle" oriented, and there is no legal way I can release it. So what I'll do is read what I have in conjunction with your paper and I'll see if there is any constructive comment I can make as a result.

[Cavguy]

Whilst not intending to be negative towards the industry and application you have displayed, I am not sure that a lot of the material you detail is not just 'sound' small unit TTP rather than specifically 'COIN' material. ( I guess this is similar to the view offered earlier by Ken).

I told him the same before he came and posted here. Even the TTP is useful - but he reflects a lot of what I see everyday - officers (at all grades) don't generally understand the difference between counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgency. I hear C-IED, SKT, C-Sniper, E2S, etc. described as "COIN" all the time. Houston, we have an education problem.

Whilst there is a need for such material, I am relatively confident that most of it must be being taught somewhere, as it is currently practised in theatre. The US infantry units I have spent time with all appear to practise this stuff to varying degrees. Some of them are very, very good at it.

Varies by unit, but it's amazing what fear of death will do. The gap he's addressing is in "published" material. Very little of what he is writing is actually on paper.

I know for a fact that material much like this has been 'rote' in the Australian Army since before Vietnam -it was taught for many years from the 1960s at the Battle Wing in Canungra.

I think there's a value in it getting "re-written" from time to time for the masses. Soldiers are generally anti-intellectual, anti-non-US generated doctrine, and anti-any war older than they are when seeking advice. Even if it's "everything old is new", it has tremendous credibility coming from the current generation rather than an old or foreign source. You wouldn't believe the problems I have getting people to read Bernard Fall, Trinquier, and Galula just because they're French, and all the bias against the French military learning. So even if it's been out before, it's valuable to hear it from a contemporary context. And amazing how the lessons are so similar ....

I'm not saying that's right, it's just how it is.

Are you aware that the COIN CFE had / has a COIN Handbook for junior leaders that was given out for a few years?

Whilst not 'perfect' it was more than adequate, and I beleive in parts quite good considering the speed in which it was drafted and created in theatre.

...

I recently became aware that the issue of an handbook in CONUS still has not occurred (Cav Guy might know more about when this will actually happen).

Well, it's been an adventure. Send me the old one via my email on coin.army.mil. Focus has been shifted off of a handbook and more onto a FM 3-24.2, Tactics in counterinsurgency. Handbooks are good, but the schoolhouse needs doctrine to teach off of, and to begin DOTMLPF funding for the issues - can't do that with a handbook.

That said, look for some of it to be out soon in 'handbook' format.

[Ken White]

...Focus has been shifted off of a handbook and more onto a FM 3-24.2, Tactics in counterinsurgency. Handbooks are good, but the schoolhouse needs doctrine to teach off of, and to begin DOTMLPF funding for the issues - can't do that with a handbook.

That said, look for some of it to be out soon in 'handbook' format.

in front of the horse... Still.

I know, I know. Yeah, that's the way the process works -- still backwards; if the troops could use it to good effect, that ought to be the priority. Bureaucracy...

Sigh.

[Cavguy]

in front of the horse... Still.

I know, I know. Yeah, that's the way the process works -- still backwards; if the troops could use it to good effect, that ought to be the priority. Bureaucracy...

Sigh.

I wouldn't quite go that far. The idea is that there are plenty of TTP manuals from CALL out there, (and there's lots) and enough COIN articles and ideas. In fact, the major issue is there are too many handbooks and TTP's, often conflicting. What is now needed is to 'codify' what is going to be the Army answer for tactical application of COIN principles, and settle some of the debates going on.

[Ken White]

I wouldn't quite go that far. The idea is that there are plenty of TTP manuals from CALL out there, (and there's lots) and enough COIN articles and ideas. In fact, the major issue is there are too many handbooks and TTP's, often conflicting. What is now needed is to 'codify' what is going to be the Army answer for tactical application of COIN principles, and settle some of the debates going on.

unless things have changed radically, the dissemination is spotty. Hopefully, that has changed...

Divisions and Schools do their own thing focusing on their experience and AO in the case of Divs, area of expertise for the Schools. Then the Theater tries to standardize a bit. Both of 'em...

Getting everyone on one sheet of music has never been easy; communities vary in their interests and approaches. It generally gets worked out even if it is too often not very timely.

The lack of standardization is a problem in a sense; it's also an advantage in a sense as competing ideas aren't all bad and can be advantageous -- in the end, it boils down to what works for the unit where they are when they're there and no book is ever going to cover all that. Still, the basics are what's important and they don't change much...

An even better idea than a handbook would be to train people a little better (Sorry, the debbil made me do it... ).

[Jason Pape]

Mark -

I wish you were right about this stuff being common knowledge. You SHOULD be right. But the sad fact is, as Craig explained...too many "leaders" (at all echelons) in our Army still do not practice, let alone understand COIN. What Craig is doing here is needed at all levels, despite all that has already been written on the subject of COIN. You'll note above that I ran into the same frustration at the field-grade level. And like Craig, I decided to sit down and just start brainstorming all the things "we" take for granted as common-knowledge at this point...but from the brigade perspective. We really do need to figure out a way to translate FM 3-24, etc. into TTPs and approaches that more people can get their minds around (ideally with real-life evidence as "proof" that it actually works). Otherwise, we'll lose the nay-sayers completely.


Craig -

Coincidently, I recently came across this (links below) AAR from a Rifle Co Cdr in OIF 06-08 that complements your piece quite well. It's one of the best company-level COIN documents I've seen lately...worth taking a look at as you continue to refine your piece. Don't lose heart. We need to be having the same kind of conversation you're writing about at all levels - particulary company/platoon & brigade/battalion - and it wouldn't it be great if we could somehow get the ideas nested and?

Keep doing what you're doing...it's great work - and needed! It's amazing how many people still don't believe it's possible (or right) for our Soldiers to do this stuff. Most people here are believers (hence the "so what?")...hopefully we can use their collective knowledge and constructive criticism to strengthen our message and spread the word.


Walrus -

You'll enjoy this document, as it provides evidence to some of the things you mentioned you'd like to know are happening...

Link 1

Link 2

[jcustis]

Keep doing what you're doing...it's great work - and needed! It's amazing how many people still don't believe it's possible (or right) for our Soldiers to do this stuff. Most people here are believers (hence the "so what?")...hopefully we can use their collective knowledge and constructive criticism to strengthen our message and spread the word.

Yeppers, this is good stuff and important work, no matter how you look at it. I'm kind of gruffy like Ken White that if you sit back and look at these things, many of them are basics that sadly have to be learned over and over, or forged new outright, because we just don't work the basics well.

I remember in the Infantry Officer Course that the instructor staff put out this bound reader of sorts, with articles from all over the place that spoke to the business of being a good platoon commander. In this day and age of .pdfs and point papers, does anyone know of a good COIN reader that encompases these AARs, TTPs, smart cards, etc. and is current as of say 12 months ago? There are some good handbooks, but the ones like the SOSO handbook I can recall from 4 years ago is woefully out of date when it comes to many of the non-kinetic issues.

[Tom Odom]

Yeppers, this is good stuff and important work, no matter how you look at it. I'm kind of gruffy like Ken White that if you sit back and look at these things, many of them are basics that sadly have to be learned over and over, or forged new outright, because we just don't work the basics well.

I remember in the Infantry Officer Course that the instructor staff put out this bound reader of sorts, with articles from all over the place that spoke to the business of being a good platoon commander. In this day and age of .pdfs and point papers, does anyone know of a good COIN reader that encompases these AARs, TTPs, smart cards, etc. and is current as of say 12 months ago? There are some good handbooks, but the ones like the SOSO handbook I can recall from 4 years ago is woefully out of date when it comes to many of the non-kinetic issues.

Yes there is. Look at the latest issue of the USMC Lessons Learned Center Newsletter (March)for information on the Company-level SOSO series originated at JRTC. Now at 7 volumes, all published since 2005. Includes information from SWJ members.

Also look at the Southern Afghanistan COIN Handbook still in use in theater and cited as part of the USMC LLs report on USMC Operations in Afghanistan.

Then regarding non-kinetic issues (aside from how they are discussed in the above citations) look at the planning studies cite on here as part of the recent thread on EBO.

Finally as advisory hopefully looked on as integral to COIN look at the advisor team newsletter with again great input from SWJ.

Bottom line: the information is out there. If there is a problem, it deals more with sorting through it all.

Tom

[Ken White]

...Bottom line: the information is out there. If there is a problem, it deals more with sorting through it all.
Tom

that and getting the document / info to the right place at the right time. I saw some really neat and very helpful stuff about fighting in Viet Nam, published in late 1965. Would've been great stuff to know; wish I'd run across it before 1972.

Not trying to attack CALL or anyone else in the documenting and informing business. They all do a vary valuable job. All the services mean well and spend big bucks trying to do that -- but the info generally doesn't get where it should in a timely manner and our use of short tours and the rapid rotation between tours is not helpful in that regard. I base that comment not only on my long bygone experience but in talking to people who are out in the field today. Distribution may be better than it was in my day but the spear chunkers tell me they rarely get it in a timely manner.

Nor does the great work by the documenters excuse the fact that we do not train the basics at all well...

[Tom Odom]

that and getting the document / info to the right place at the right time. I saw some really neat and very helpful stuff about fighting in Viet Nam, published in late 1965. Would've been great stuff to know; wish I'd run across it before 1972.

Not trying to attack CALL or anyone else in the documenting and informing business. They all do a vary valuable job. All the services mean well and spend big bucks trying to do that -- but the info generally doesn't get where it should in a timely manner and our use of short tours and the rapid rotation between tours is not helpful in that regard. I base that comment not only on my long bygone experience but in talking to people who are out in the field today. Distribution may be better than it was in my day but the spear chunkers tell me they rarely get it in a timely manner.

Nor does the great work by the documenters excuse the fact that we do not train the basics at all well...

Understand, and no, I don't see it as an attack at all. CALL has expanded itself dramatically in just the past few years. Much of that has been to address the issues you point to, and no, we don't have it solved either. But in this realm the internet and automation has done much that was simply not possible in 1972. SIPR and NIPR allow near instantaneous connection with both theaters and I will say those connections are very active.

My bottom line on all of this is that like all things military it goes back to leadership. that is to say continued Army level leadership emphasis on improving the sharing of knowledge and leadership that starts with team leaders and goes up, emphasizing seeking out that information.

Best

Tom

[Ron Humphrey]

Yes there is. Look at the latest issue of the USMC Lessons Learned Center Newsletter (March)for information on the Company-level SOSO series originated at JRTC. Now at 7 volumes, all published since 2005. Includes information from SWJ members.

Also look at the Southern Afghanistan COIN Handbook still in use in theater and cited as part of the USMC LLs report on USMC Operations in Afghanistan.

Then regarding non-kinetic issues (aside from how they are discussed in the above citations) look at the planning studies cite on here as part of the recent thread on EBO.

Finally as advisory hopefully looked on as integral to COIN look at the advisor team newsletter with again great input from SWJ.

Bottom line: the information is out there. If there is a problem, it deals more with sorting through it all.

Tom

Some very good stuff there

[Ken White]

...My bottom line on all of this is that like all things military it goes back to leadership. that is to say continued Army level leadership emphasis on improving the sharing of knowledge and leadership that starts with team leaders and goes up, emphasizing seeking out that information.

Best

Tom

So you said it far better than I did. And you did state the absolute truth and the reason for dissemination failures. Too many in the Army forget that, from Corporal up, EVERYBODY is a trainer, all the time, in combat and out. Show me a unit that doesn't perform well and I'll show you one where the emphasis on training all day every day has been allowed to be overcome by alligators...

Good job.

[Cavguy]

that and getting the document / info to the right place at the right time. I saw some really neat and very helpful stuff about fighting in Viet Nam, published in late 1965. Would've been great stuff to know; wish I'd run across it before 1972.

I base that comment not only on my long bygone experience but in talking to people who are out in the field today. Distribution may be better than it was in my day but the spear chunkers tell me they rarely get it in a timely manner.

Going to disagree some with you here Ken. If the soldier is interested, he only has to take 1 or 2 steps to find what he's looking for.

If said soldier wants info on COIN, he doesn't have to look far to get to:

COIN.ARMY.MIL - lists top reads, classes, links to other forums (including here)
BCKS COIN FORUM - Where he can ask FOUO level questions and share (also related to 30+ professional forums on company command, MI, S3/XO, NCO Net, etc)
Small Wars Journal - 'nuff said we link to the SWJ library from COIN.ARMY.MIL
CALL - Not always the easiest to search, but tons of info on EVERYTHING.

CALL now has a POC in EVERY installation whose sole job is to find information at the request of users in CALL's database. It's the COIN L2I program. Soldier can say "I want everything on Detainee ops for a PLT" and within 48 hours call will send it to them.

If the line isn't getting it in today's information environment, it isn't because the Army hasn't led the horse to the water.

The larger issue is one of willingness. I was a heavy user of Company Command and LOGNET forums. Both allowed me to tap into the expertise of peers and experts in fields. I was a much, much more effective commander because of Company Command. Want some creative ideas on rewarding soldiers? It's there. Want a good supply room SOP? It's there. Want creative ways to train house clearing training? it's there. Have a question? Your peers and those who have gone before will answer it in a few hours. I saved countless hours because I was willing to read and learn from those who have gone before.

However, out of 13 company commanders in my BCT, I was the only one active on that site. Whenever I found something good, I passed it on to my peers. But it just amazed me that they were unwilling to utilize a resource that would make them tremendously more effective at leading soldiers. The lick is on them, not the Army.

I did see a good idea from the Israeli army at a recent conference. They appointed a "KM" specialist additional duty in each PLT, whose job was to scour fourms and sites and bring the latest relevant info to the bosses.

Dissemination of good knowledge is also faster than ever. Let's take the CO CDR document Jason Pape linked above, which I think is the best current OIF AAR I've read at company level.

Three weeks ago - document posted on companycommand.mil
Yesterday@0830 - Jason sends me the document and asks if I have seen this
Yesterday@0845 - I finish reading it, and think it's outstanding. I get permission from the author to distribute widely in the .mil community.
Yesterday @0900-1100 - Forward to the CTC O/C teams, CALL, CALL L2I, COIN Road to War Orgs, post on COIN.ARMY.MIL AKO and SharePoint, post on BCKS COIN forum, highlight the document on company command, send to USMC IW Center and commander's courses, COIN CFE's, plus interested individuals.
Yesterday @1500 - Get word from Tom that the commander of JRTC has the document, who will soon be the commander of a very large US Army division. I also get forwarded the document from about 5 others asking the same question Jason did - "have you seen it?" Other BCKS forums cross-post the document.
Today @0800 - Document sent to CALL for publishing and immediate distro.

Talk about KM success! Thousands of accesses in just a few hours.

Your soldier now has access to it in any number of forums. Key people in many chains of command have the document for use. All he has to do is look. He's likely going to get a paper copy sent to his CO CP in a few weeks as well. His boss may force it on him through distro.

I just don't buy that motivated professionals can't find useful and relevant info today. If they're not getting it, it's because they're not making the effort. IMO. Effective range of that excuse is zero.

========

Onto FM versus handbook ....

The larger, and bigger question, is multiply the document above x100. Each places a slightly different flavor. One unit uses COIN COG, another TCAF, another Combat Analytics, another uses HTS, etc. Which is right? Which one is the "best" to use overall?

There is no answer on the street. FM 3-24 tells you how to think about it, and how to analyze it, but not how to do it tactically. We don't have any authoritative document saying "TCAF and COIN COG are the standard every soldier should be trained on". CCC, ANCOC, BOLIC, and other instructors can take TTP's and teach them, but there is no doctrine for them to reference regarding tools and systems for applying COIN doctrine. So Knox teaches X, Benning Y, etc. Afghanistan has a handbook. Iraq has a handbook. CALL has another handbook. 3ID has a handbook. All have slightly different approaches, some better than others. Many of the proponents of their individual systems (COIN Center is equally guilty here) claim the other systems are "insufficient" and "wrong". Joe is confused, so he does what makes sense to him, or does what he always does. But we lose synergy because everyone’s doing their own thing, and not everything is “right.”

That's the point from our earlier conversation - the current "gap" is for a FM. A non-theater specific set of guidelines/methods for tactical level application of COIN doctrine that everyone can/will impliment. To settle on a "least bad" solution. Just like all doctrine, it's a baseline for everyone, and no one is restricted from innovating or using another system. But it will standardize what is "the" way, like MDMP does, 5 paragraph OPORDs, IPB, etc, so we can communicate between units and branches effectively.

Niel

[Ken White]

Going to disagree some with you here Ken. If the soldier is interested, he only has to take 1 or 2 steps to find what he's looking for.

I do not doubt that; always been true. I can recall many years ago being hassled by most of my peers for visiting the Post Library about one a week -- and I wasn't looking for new fiction.

...CALL now has a POC in EVERY installation whose sole job is to find information at the request of users in CALL's database. It's the COIN L2I program. Soldier can say "I want everything on Detainee ops for a PLT" and within 48 hours call will send it to them.

If the line isn't getting it in today's information environment, it isn't because the Army hasn't led the horse to the water.

The larger issue is one of willingness. I was a heavy user of Company Command and LOGNET forums. Both allowed me to tap into the expertise of peers and experts in fields. I was a much, much more effective commander because of Company Command. Want some creative ideas on rewarding soldiers? It's there. Want a good supply room SOP? It's there. Want creative ways to train house clearing training? it's there. Have a question? Your peers and those who have gone before will answer it in a few hours. I saved countless hours because I was willing to read and learn from those who have gone before.

However, out of 13 company commanders in my BCT, I was the only one active on that site. Whenever I found something good, I passed it on to my peers. But it just amazed me that they were unwilling to utilize a resource that would make them tremendously more effective at leading soldiers. The lick is on them, not the Army.

Good for CALL. I've never doubted the info is available, from what I hear, it still doesn't get there unless people work at it and I'm sure efforts to fix that are being made. That said, if it is available and unit doesn't have it, then it's the units fault. Basically, we are in total agreement on all this. That has long been the problem -- IMO, it goes back to selection and who gets promoted. One size does not fit all...

I'd also submit there is a significant training shortfall. We tell folks "You are responsible for your career." Ridiculous. What they should be told is that "You are responsible for the training and capability of your subordinates; screw it up and you're toast." I know a number of reasons we do not do that -- and I submit that if you're going to send people to combat; you have an obligation to do that which transcends all those valid sociological and political reasons to not do it.

I did see a good idea from the Israeli army at a recent conference. They appointed a "KM" specialist additional duty in each PLT, whose job was to scour fourms and sites and bring the latest relevant info to the bosses.

That is a good idea but I was doing that forty plus years ago, that's no brag, I did it because my first PSG tabbed me to be the searcher 20 years earlier and I was far from alone, most good units back in my day did that. All of the change in the post Viet Nam Army was not the golden gift some make it out to be.

Dissemination of good knowledge is also faster than ever. Let's take the CO CDR document Jason Pape linked above, which I think is the best current OIF AAR I've read at company level...Talk about KM success! Thousands of accesses in just a few hours.

Yes it is -- and a lot of Attaboys due all involved. We can be thankful there was not a loser or excessively bureaucratic stumbling block among those involved (and in fairness, there are far fewer of those about today than there were even five years ago -- ain't combat great? )

I just don't buy that motivated professionals can't find useful and relevant info today. If they're not getting it, it's because they're not making the effort. IMO. Effective range of that excuse is zero.

While I agree, can I suggest an issue is what to do about those who do not make the effort? As you said above; one out of 13. As Martha Stewart would say "That is not a good thing."

No snark -- that has long been a serious problem -- the problem -- and my sensing is it is better than it was but still has a long way to go. The same problem exists with NCOs, about one out 10 or so really wants to be tactically and technically proficient above the level of survival and future promotion. That problem really needs to be fixed...

========

Onto FM versus handbook ....That's the point from our earlier conversation - the current "gap" is for a FM. A non-theater specific set of guidelines/methods for tactical level application of COIN doctrine that everyone can/will impliment. To settle on a "least bad" solution. Just like all doctrine, it's a baseline for everyone, and no one is restricted from innovating or using another system. But it will standardize what is "the" way, like MDMP does, 5 paragraph OPORDs, IPB, etc, so we can communicate between units and branches effectively.

Niel

Totally concur with all that and having done the doctrine and FM writing stint in my misspent youth am aware of the process (and its shortfalls) but my base point -- and I didn't say it well -- goes back to something I said here some months ago. I said handbook, bad shorthand on my part, I really meant a Co/By/Trp level FM. FM 3-24 is good, long overdue, needed etc. etc. -- but what about something Joe Team Leader can stick in his ACU pocket? We used to do the books by command echelon -- and we started at the bottom and worked up and much effort was concurrent in different departmens of the same school; now, it seems we start at the top and work down and we're far slower than we used to be (too many cooks?). The staff weenies (I used to one of those too ) and the POM should not be the priority, that should go to the guy on the ground.

And that's really all I meant.

[Surferbeetle]

Cavguy,

Keep up the good work on this, COIN knowledge management is the better for your efforts.

An AKO wide webmail which summarized some of your key points (links, km available, projected date for the 3-24 ttp's, etc) in the last post aimed at E6+, WO1+, and O3+ types would generate ALOT of interest, conversation, and perhaps even change among us knuckledraggers...

[marct]

I thought it was an interesting piece and worth looking at on the viewpoints of the ISAF. In particular, the point that caught my eye was

The trouble, the MPs said, is that the 37 countries contributing to NATO's International Security Assistance Force lack a "well defined strategic vision for its presence" in Afghanistan. While NATO troops performed "brilliantly at the tactical level, the alliance does not yet have a sufficiently explicit goal for what it wants to achieve".

Link here.

[marct]

""hopefully, everyone knows to do this without any training... "" Let me clarify that the comment referred specifically and only to Marc T's comment about the advisability of having routine Platoon confabs; simply getting the joes together and everybody talks about what's happening...

That was certainly how I took it . I'll admit, I was taking it a touch beyond a "confab" and more into the real of "collective sensemaking" across the ranks with, possibly, a touch of the old Maoist "speaking anger" added in (forget the source, it's a great group dynamics method ).

I keep thinking back to the founding of the 1st Marine Raider BTN and its use of Maoist principles for organizational learning, adaptation and motivation. In the type of topsy-turvy "reality" (?) that is COIN, such principle can stand a group in good stead.

[Ken White]

That was certainly how I took it . I'll admit, I was taking it a touch beyond a "confab" and more into the real of "collective sensemaking" across the ranks with, possibly, a touch of the old Maoist "speaking anger" added in (forget the source, it's a great group dynamics method ).

The first few will be vague and general, specificity and openness come with repetition. Unless firm steps are taken to stop them, the kids will open up. Needless to say, they should not be so stopped but encouraged to speak up. Unless one is afraid of them...

I keep thinking back to the founding of the 1st Marine Raider BTN and its use of Maoist principles for organizational learning, adaptation and motivation. In the type of topsy-turvy "reality" (?) that is COIN, such principle can stand a group in good stead.

Mao may have been Carlson's source but the idea pre dates Mao. Ever been to a First Nations Band Council meeting? 'Speaking anger' -- but quietly...