The Basrah Gambit

[Ron Humphrey]

B, but when they asked "how long is a little more time?" I'd give them an answer, because this is what I do for a living and I know what a reasonable time is. I know how to set metrics and see if we're on the right track or not. I also know that if I don't get results it's because I screwed up. (None of my clients have ever made a mistake.)
.)

As to this as Ken said metrics for real time decisions in war are pretty fuzzy and more often than not if one gets stuck on them one will probably get stuck

Also consider that the client not being liable for bad luck in an ad campaign at worst cost someone their livelihood. In War whether the "clients" like it or not if it goes wrong someone or many someones die. It is largely different doing risk management in markets vs in war and it would be better for all of us if some would come to realize that. Unfortunately probably won't happen because most that have that problem aren't really paying attention to the war itself but what propaganda value it holds for them

[Rank amateur]

My apologies to Ken and Ron. I was responding to multiple quotes, started copying the quote tags and then deleted some quotes and got confused about who said what. (Maybe someone can fix it for me. I can't edit it anymore.)


To summarize my thoughts. War is messy. COIN particularly so, but I think we need to move beyond "it takes a long time" to "A COIN effort is going down the wrong track if [or the right track if]...."

From Abu Muqawama

While we're on the subject of Lebanonization, though, here's another historical analogy that Amb. Crocker missed. In Lebanon, in September 1983, the U.S. lent direct support to what it assumed was a national institution, the Lebanese Army, in the battle at Souk el-Gharb. By doing so, it became, in the eyes of the rest of the Lebanese population, just another militia and thus fair game. What happened next? Ask any U.S. Marine.

Now we all know the situations in Iraq and Lebanon are not exactly the same, but Souk el-Gharb was running through Abu Muqawama's head during the battle of Basra two weeks ago when we were lending our support to the "national" army of Iraq in its fight with the Sadr crew. To us good-natured Americans, it may have looked as if we were lending our support to the legitimate, national institutions of Iraq. But to other Iraqis, it probably looked as if we were taking sides in the intra-Shia political dispute between ISCI and Sadr in the run-up to this fall's provincial elections.

I think we can discuss the issue here, which is one reason why I like having discussions here, but I can't see the Senate having a reasonable discussion about it.

Then stop using the word!

An excellent example of how a single word can make it difficult to wrap everything up. Imagine how long we'd both go on if we both believed that this was a debate, instead of a conversation, and that one of us would be declared a winner and the other a loser.

In any event, I think it's safe to say that if we do withdraw precipitously, the Islamists will claim 'victory' and thus trumpet our 'defeat.' That can have a detrimental long term effect albeit not probably a fatal one -- so any cost benefit analysis should consider that in some detail.

An excellent point. I think the analysis really depends on how the debate is framed. Losing a battle in a long war isn't a problem. In a long war, you can have Pyrrhic victories. On the other hand, if you frame Iraq in black and white terms, no one likes to lose.

[tequila]

Well now, this is interesting: Petraeus on the Sadr movement:

General David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, said Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is a "leader of an important and legitimate political movement," urging the Iraqi government, in whose selection Sadr was a kingmaker, to recognize and deal with it.

"I think the way, the best way to characterize Muqtada al-Sadr is that he is the face and the leadership of a very important and legitimate political movement in Iraq," he said."

Muqtada, the leader of the Sadrist movement, is the son of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by the former Iraqi regime's intelligence agencies in early 1999. The elder Sadr was Marja al-Taqlid, source of emulation, for Shiite Muslims. Muqtada is also the leader of Jaysh al-Mahdi, or the Mahdi Army, militias, which he founded in July 2003 as a military wing for his movement.

"Sadr's movement is part of the alliance that elected the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki," Petraeus said during a joint press conference he held in Washington on Thursday with U.S. ambassador in Iraq Ryan Crocker.

Much more from both Petraeus and Crocker on Sadr's movement in 10 April press conference in DC. You can see it on CSPAN's website - scroll down to "Petraeus and Amb. Crocker News Conference on Iraq (April 10, 2008)".

The Muqtada question is right at the beginning. Crocker and Petraeus both emphasize the Sadrists' legitimacy, say that that Sadr is not an enemy of the U.S., and Petraeus even calls on the Iraqi government not to "back anyone into a corner".

[Ron Humphrey]

Well now, this is interesting: Petraeus on the Sadr movement:



Much more from both Petraeus and Crocker on Sadr's movement in 10 April press conference in DC. You can see it on CSPAN's website - scroll down to "Petraeus and Amb. Crocker News Conference on Iraq (April 10, 2008)".

The Muqtada question is right at the beginning. Crocker and Petraeus both emphasize the Sadrists' legitimacy, say that that Sadr is not an enemy of the U.S., and Petraeus even calls on the Iraqi government not to "back anyone into a corner".

never quite so predictable as some might think it is

[Ken White]

Life's never quite so predictable as some might think it is

or writ or supm'n...

Fortunately, I'm all for that; life would sure be dull and boring, otherwise.

[Ron Humphrey]

Any one want to lay odds on the actual perpetrators of the Sadr's aides assassination having been Special groups rather than IA/IP or Coalition as seems to be the first place many are looking

[davidbfpo]

Under this title in The Daily Telegraph (UK) the author Con Coughlin, who supported the Iraqi invasion advocates UK forces leave Basra airbase: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/m.../11/do1104.xml

The comments it has attracted do include some reasoned responses.

He has also written an article on Afghanistan 'Whose side are the Afghans on?', which reveals he is accompanying the UK's most senior military officer, Air Chief Marshal Jock Stirrup: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main...wafghan112.xml (which I will copy to an Afghan thread).

davidbfpo

[Schmedlap]

Any one want to lay odds on the actual perpetrators of the Sadr's aides assassination having been Special groups rather than IA/IP or Coalition as seems to be the first place many are looking

My initial gut reaction - and my continued belief - is ISCI. Najaf brings in million and millions of dollars in donations to the shrines. ISCI doesn't want JAM nosing in on their territory. They get their cut for now. When Sistani kicks the bucket, they hope to get a bigger slice. The farther away JAM stays, the bigger the slice for ISCI.

[Ken White]

...
To summarize my thoughts. War is messy. COIN particularly so, but I think we need to move beyond "it takes a long time" to "A COIN effort is going down the wrong track if [or the right track if]...."

I agree. Now all we have to do is convince the politicians and that 1/3 who are adamantly opposed to the Iraq intervention at all levels that should happen...

I think we can discuss the issue here, which is one reason why I like having discussions here, but I can't see the Senate having a reasonable discussion about it.

Sadly true. Even more sad is the fact that neither Iraq or US policy are the real issues.

An excellent example of how a single word can make it difficult to wrap everything up. Imagine how long we'd both go on if we both believed that this was a debate, instead of a conversation, and that one of us would be declared a winner and the other a loser.

Also totally true and a sad commentary on public and politics in the US today.

An excellent point. I think the analysis really depends on how the debate is framed. Losing a battle in a long war isn't a problem. In a long war, you can have Pyrrhic victories. On the other hand, if you frame Iraq in black and white terms, no one likes to lose.

Also true though I would submit some battles are far more important than others and their loss can affect the future course of the war.