The Basrah Gambit

[tequila]

Sadr always proposes to disband the Mahdi Army upon orders from the Najaf Hawza whenever there is some sort of controversy - he also did this back in 2004 and after Karbala in 2006. He knows that the Hawza will never intervene so directly into politics and publicly order said disbandment specifically for the Mahdi Army alone. Most likely is that the Hawza refused to acknowledge the query at all.

The Mahdi Army is not going to disband any more than the Badr Brigade "disbanded" by rebadging itself in Interior Ministry uniforms and calling itself the Badr "Organization."

[tequila]

Reider Visser has updated thoughts on the Basra operation and the issue of Iranian influence. He cautions against reading the situation as simply a Maliki/ISCI alliance against Sadr, instead hinting at this being a primarily Maliki-rooted initiative as the PM seeks new allies and his own power base. Iran maintains a key presence on all sides. A superbly informative read as always.

Maliki, Hakim, and Iran's Role in the Basra Fighting

[Ron Humphrey]

[QUOTE=tequila;44443]Reider Visser has updated thoughts on the Basra operation and the issue of Iranian influence. He cautions against reading the situation as simply a Maliki/ISCI alliance against Sadr, instead hinting at this being a primarily Maliki-rooted initiative as the PM seeks new allies and his own power base. Iran maintains a key presence on all sides. A superbly informative read as always.

I'll try it again-
Link retry

[Ron Humphrey]

But I'm not sure there aren't some key pieces of the US side of the puzzle being left out. Also seems to me the Kurdish and Sunni pieces are going to be a larger factor than is hinted to here.

I will agree with the fact that some figures here would do well to look a little deeper into how things work over there then they currently do.

[Ken White]

think he's got the broad strokes correct. This from your link:

"The artificial constellation of the so-called “moderate coalition” under Maliki is to a large extent the result of a weaponry-focused American misreading of the many channels of Iranian influence. This was best summed up by Ryan Crocker’s comments in the US Senate on 8 April: in an attempt at playing down the significance of Mahmud Amadinejad’s popularity in Iraqi government circles, Crocker referred to the staunch anti-Iranian attitude of the Iraqi Shiites during the Iran-Iraq War. What Crocker failed to mention was that his own administration’s main Shiite partner in Iraq, ISCI, is the only sizeable Shiite party that fought on the Iranian side."

is, I believe correct in essence but wrong in detail -- at least in one detail.

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

[Rex Brynen]

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

I'm not sure which "Arabists" you're referring to, Ken, and which aspect you think they're misreading.

Most of the Iraq specialists that I know (inside and outside government) would absolutely agree with Tequila on the nuances of Shi'ite politics in Iraq (and the multidimensional patterns of Iranian connections, influence, and constraints).

[Ken White]

I'm not sure which "Arabists" you're referring to, Ken, and which aspect you think they're misreading.

Most of the Iraq specialists that I know (inside and outside government) would absolutely agree with Tequila on the nuances of Shi'ite politics in Iraq (and the multidimensional patterns of Iranian connections, influence, and constraints).

Those in the US government.

I agreed with Tequila -- or, rather, with his linked article (broadly; minor caveats of little note). I disagreed with Crocker. They are applying western logic to what they see and are told by their nominal counterparts in the area as opposed to watching what's happening and trusting their own intel folks.

What you see there is rarely what you get...

[tequila]

I think by "weaponry focused", Visser was saying that Crocker's testimony focused on Iranian weapons/military aid to factions in Iraq as its primary means of influence. Visser says this focus on military aid alone is incorrect - Crocker should focus as well on Iran's myriad and longstanding political ties to varying Iraqi factions, which are at least as important and probably far more so than whatever EFPs the Quds Force doles out to the "special groups".

I think Visser is on the mark here. I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq - in the past American representatives in Baghdad have indicated they believe Iran is pushing the "special groups" to eventually become a Hizbullah-like proxy in Iraq. What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters. The "special groups" to the extent that they exist are not a coherent grouping, have no political aims, and exist mainly to set off IEDs. The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.

[Ron Humphrey]

think he's got the broad strokes correct. This from your link:is, I believe correct in essence but wrong in detail -- at least in one detail.

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

Tolstoy wrote in War and Peace:

When a man acts alone he always carries with him a certain series of considerations, that have as he supposes, directed his past conduct, and that serve to justify to him his present action, and to lead him to make projects for his future activity

.

If we accept that the same principle applies for the thinking, planning and perceptions of a man, then how is one to differentiate when one is simply seeing what they wish, what they expect, or what is actually taking place.

[Rank amateur]

Then how is one to differentiate when one is simply seeing what they wish, what they expect, or what is actually taking place.

In advertising, we do focus groups and polling. In conventional combat I imagine the key is expecting fog, friction and enemy adaptation and not getting personally attached to any particular tactic or plan. (There's a Darwinian process; people who see what
they want to see will sooner or later end up dead or defeated.)

Personally, I think the way we've defined "victory" and "defeat" in Iraq - and all the politics that surrounds those issues - pretty much guarantees that even if you can see what's actually happening, not very many people are going to agree with you.

I'm sure that Marc and Rex will also have some excellent suggestions for you.

the shoe fits on the other side as well.

Undoubtedly and those who attack us pay a high price for their misjudgment.

I think quite a few of those in positions of power know that better than we may give them credit for.

I hope you're not seeing what you want to see , but that just goes to show how difficult the problems of perception are.

[Ron Humphrey]

I hope you're not seeing what you want to see , but that just goes to show how difficult the problems of perception are.

But luckily enough for us I'm not the one who decides who does what, where.

Now one would think those who do decide have a some much wider scope than I

[Ken White]

...
Personally, I think the way we've defined "victory" and "defeat" in Iraq - and all the politics that surrounds those issues - pretty much guarantees that even if you can see what's actually happening, not very many people are going to agree with you.
...

I'm curious as to what those definitions are?