The Basrah Gambit

[Ken White]

I'm not sure which "Arabists" you're referring to, Ken, and which aspect you think they're misreading.

Most of the Iraq specialists that I know (inside and outside government) would absolutely agree with Tequila on the nuances of Shi'ite politics in Iraq (and the multidimensional patterns of Iranian connections, influence, and constraints).

Those in the US government.

I agreed with Tequila -- or, rather, with his linked article (broadly; minor caveats of little note). I disagreed with Crocker. They are applying western logic to what they see and are told by their nominal counterparts in the area as opposed to watching what's happening and trusting their own intel folks.

What you see there is rarely what you get...

[tequila]

I think by "weaponry focused", Visser was saying that Crocker's testimony focused on Iranian weapons/military aid to factions in Iraq as its primary means of influence. Visser says this focus on military aid alone is incorrect - Crocker should focus as well on Iran's myriad and longstanding political ties to varying Iraqi factions, which are at least as important and probably far more so than whatever EFPs the Quds Force doles out to the "special groups".

I think Visser is on the mark here. I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq - in the past American representatives in Baghdad have indicated they believe Iran is pushing the "special groups" to eventually become a Hizbullah-like proxy in Iraq. What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters. The "special groups" to the extent that they exist are not a coherent grouping, have no political aims, and exist mainly to set off IEDs. The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.

[Ron Humphrey]

I think Visser is on the mark here. I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq - in the past American representatives in Baghdad have indicated they believe Iran is pushing the "special groups" to eventually become a Hizbullah-like proxy in Iraq. What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters. The "special groups" to the extent that they exist are not a coherent grouping, have no political aims, and exist mainly to set off IEDs. The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.

What roles do the ISCI actually play in the Iranian governance which would make them anything more than a supported proxy in Iraq. If the only thing they get out of it is control of Iraq while carrying major IOU's to Iran why would it not be preferable to them to owe Iran little to naught and be in control anyway?

Since the theme seems to be that the party's over and all thats left is to pass out the parting gifts?

[Ken White]

...Crocker should focus as well on Iran's myriad and longstanding political ties to varying Iraqi factions, which are at least as important and probably far more so than whatever EFPs the Quds Force doles out to the "special groups".

Agreed.

...What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters.

True, thus my annoyance at the (intentional?) mis-labeling -- or misstating by our folks.

...The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.

I'm not sure the initial statement is correct and, while I agree to an extent with the last comment, I don't think it'll make a long term difference.

[Rex Brynen]

I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq

He's right, he's just got the model wrong: Iranian policy closely mirrors that of the Syrians (not the Iranians) in Lebanon--that is, backing a number of different horses at the same time, while trying to position themselves as the mediator/balancer/most important patron.

[tequila]

What roles do the ISCI actually play in the Iranian governance which would make them anything more than a supported proxy in Iraq. If the only thing they get out of it is control of Iraq while carrying major IOU's to Iran why would it not be preferable to them to owe Iran little to naught and be in control anyway?

Research a bit about the history of ISCI - they were originally a splitoff of al-Dawa, the "original" Shia religious party in Iraq, who were heavily influenced by the Iranian Revolution and went with Khomeini's theory of vilayet-i-fiqh rather than the more standard "quietist" school propagated by Najaf at the time. The IRGC, much as it formed the core of Hizbullah originally, formed ISCI's Badr Brigade out of ISCI volunteers and later on Shia POWs from the Iran-Iraq War. Thus Badr's core principally consists of those Iraqi Shia who turned traitor and fought on Iran's side during the war - you can see where the antipathy towards them in Iraq might come from.

Thus ISCI has historically aligned with Iran for both practical and philosophical reasons. Visser agrees that it is simplistic to call them simply Iranian patsies, just as it is also quite simplistic and inaccurate (IMO far more so in the Lebanese case) to call Lebanese Hizbullah simply Iranian patsies. Both movements have their own motives and political objectives. But on a concrete basis, ISCI's political goals in Iraq mirror those of Iran's (a crippled central government combined with a very strong Shia-dominated southern federal region, thus assuring Iraq's perpetual weakness) far more than any other group, other than perhaps the Kurds (who also favor a weak center dominated by federal regions).

[Ron Humphrey]

Research a bit about the history of ISCI - they were originally a splitoff of al-Dawa, the "original" Shia religious party in Iraq, who were heavily influenced by the Iranian Revolution and went with Khomeini's theory of vilayet-i-fiqh rather than the more standard "quietist" school propagated by Najaf at the time. The IRGC, much as it formed the core of Hizbullah originally, formed ISCI's Badr Brigade out of ISCI volunteers and later on Shia POWs from the Iran-Iraq War. Thus Badr's core principally consists of those Iraqi Shia who turned traitor and fought on Iran's side during the war - you can see where the antipathy towards them in Iraq might come from.

Thus ISCI has historically aligned with Iran for both practical and philosophical reasons. Visser agrees that it is simplistic to call them simply Iranian patsies, just as it is also quite simplistic and inaccurate (IMO far more so in the Lebanese case) to call Lebanese Hizbullah simply Iranian patsies. Both movements have their own motives and political objectives. But on a concrete basis, ISCI's political goals in Iraq mirror those of Iran's (a crippled central government combined with a very strong Shia-dominated southern federal region, thus assuring Iraq's perpetual weakness) far more than any other group, other than perhaps the Kurds (who also favor a weak center dominated by federal regions).

Considering that this is as you infer a well known fact in the area doesn't it seem somewhat unusual to assume that our leaders there are unaware let alone necessarily complicit in its fruition. I realize it may seem naive of me but somehow I just don't think it's gonna be quite as easy as for ISCI as it may look on the surface.

[tequila]

Considering that this is as you infer a well known fact in the area doesn't it seem somewhat unusual to assume that our leaders there are unaware let alone necessarily complicit in its fruition. I realize it may seem naive of me but somehow I just don't think it's gonna be quite as easy as for ISCI as it may look on the surface.

Our President was unaware of the Sunni/Shi'i divide in Islam until shortly before the invasion of Iraq.

If there is some secret American plan to sideline or curb ISCI, it does not appear to be working given that party's level of influence in the Iraqi government and security forces. OTOH, ISCI does have the advantage of being a relatively well-disciplined force and never having been caught trying to kill American soldiers - few factions in the Iraqi government can really make that claim, excepting the Kurds.

[Ron Humphrey]

Our President was unaware of the Sunni/Shi'i divide in Islam until shortly before the invasion of Iraq.

If there is some secret American plan to sideline or curb ISCI, it does not appear to be working given that party's level of influence in the Iraqi government and security forces. OTOH, ISCI does have the advantage of being a relatively well-disciplined force and never having been caught trying to kill American soldiers - few factions in the Iraqi government can really make that claim, excepting the Kurds.

Cutural awareness being important and not quite as good as it could have been I don't think anyone disagrees however I wasn't trying to point to some sort of "secret" operations but rather thinking about the fact that as well as westerners not always reading those in the mid-east the shoe fits on the other side as well and as such there may be considerations within the overall context which they haven't seen also.

I just think one should never be drawn into thinking they have seen the whole picture on either side. It's only wise to always review what they think they know in order to compare it to the reality they face. I think quite a few of those in positions of power know that better than we may give them credit for.