The Basrah Gambit

[tequila]

More NYT:

U.S. Cites Planning Gaps in Iraqi Assault on Basra - NYTIMES 3 April.

Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker first learned of the Iraqi plan on Friday, March 21: Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki would be heading to Basra with Iraqi troops to bring order to the city.

But the Iraqi operation was not what the United States expected. Instead of methodically building up their combat power and gradually stepping up operations against renegade militias, Mr. Maliki’s forces lunged into the city, attacking before all of the Iraqi reinforcements had even arrived. By the following Tuesday, a major fight was on.

“The sense we had was that this would be a long-term effort: increased pressure gradually squeezing the Special Groups,” Mr. Crocker said in an interview, using the American term for Iranian-backed militias. “That is not what kind of emerged."

...

The operation indicates that the Iraqi military can quickly organize and deploy forces over considerable distances. Two Iraqi C-130s and several Iraqi helicopters were also involved in the operation, an important step for a military that is still struggling to develop an air combat ability.

But interviews with a wide range of American and military officials also suggest that Mr. Maliki overestimated his military’s abilities and underestimated the scale of the resistance. The Iraqi prime minister also displayed an impulsive leadership style that did not give his forces or that of his most powerful allies, the American and British military, time to prepare.

...
As the Iraqi military and civilian casualties grew and the Iraqi planning appeared to be little more than an improvisation, the United States mounted an intensive military and political effort to try to turn around the situation, according to accounts by Mr. Crocker and several American military officials in Baghdad and Washington who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Two senior American military officers — a member of the Navy Seals and a Marine major general — were sent to Basra to help coordinate the Iraqi planning, the military officials said. Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division were pressed into service as combat advisers while air controllers were positioned to call in airstrikes on behalf of beleaguered Iraqi units. American transport planes joined the Iraqis in ferrying supplies to Iraqi troops ...

[Wx Guesser]

Long time lurker, first time poster....
Saw this in an email and am curious what the more experienced and knowledgeable think. Is this an attempt to get JAM legitimacy? An attempt to enter the political process with a statesman-like gesture? Neither? Both?

http://www.reuters.com/article/world...34078820080407

Iraq's Sadr to disband Mehdi Army if clerics order

By Khaled Farhan

NAJAF, Iraq (Reuters) - Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is ready to disband his militia if Shi'ite religious leaders demand it, his aides said on Monday, a surprising offer given renewed clashes between his fighters and security forces.

The news came after Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who launched a crackdown on Sadr's Mehdi Army late last month, ordered the cleric to disband his militia or face exclusion from the Iraqi political process.

[Ron Humphrey]

Long time lurker, first time poster....
Saw this in an email and am curious what the more experienced and knowledgeable think. Is this an attempt to get JAM legitimacy? An attempt to enter the political process with a statesman-like gesture? Neither? Both?

http://www.reuters.com/article/world...34078820080407

it is wise as many here have stated before to take the actions of others as those of rational players then this would make perfect sense.

Sadr envisions himself as a representative of the populous and also holds his faith in high enough regard that he is studying to become an Ayatollah. As such should he choose to act against the grain of those religious leaders he might very well not only lose his "army" but lose any chance of leading other than marginally in a religious context within Iraq.

So he puts it to the leaders there. If they say yes disarm then he is fine with that because in the end he still looks to become a large part of the religious forum and thus has both political and social clout. Should they say no don't disband than he has a much larger bargaining chip with the current GOI in that any actions he orders have been in a way signed off on by those clerics.

Please take a moment and introduce yourself LINK to us as it provides a context on where your coming from and allows for much more accurate responses

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Religious leaders tell al-Sadr to keep militia intact: Sadr spokesman - CNN

Iraq's top Shiite religious leaders have told anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr not to disband his Mehdi Army, an al-Sadr spokesman said Monday amid fresh fighting in the militia's Baghdad strongholds.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki demanded Sunday that the cleric disband his militia, which waged two uprisings against U.S. troops in 2004, or see his supporters barred from public office.

But al-Sadr spokesman Salah al-Obeidi said al-Sadr has consulted with Iraq's Shiite clerical leadership "and they refused that." He did not provide details of the talks.

[Ron Humphrey]

Religious leaders tell al-Sadr to keep militia intact: Sadr spokesman - CNN

Considering how misleading some information that comes out in media is due to what can only hope is simple ignorance of culture, the question would be which leader's exactly gave this edict. There are various conditions which might exist depending on who it was.

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Sadr always proposes to disband the Mahdi Army upon orders from the Najaf Hawza whenever there is some sort of controversy - he also did this back in 2004 and after Karbala in 2006. He knows that the Hawza will never intervene so directly into politics and publicly order said disbandment specifically for the Mahdi Army alone. Most likely is that the Hawza refused to acknowledge the query at all.

The Mahdi Army is not going to disband any more than the Badr Brigade "disbanded" by rebadging itself in Interior Ministry uniforms and calling itself the Badr "Organization."

[tequila]

Reider Visser has updated thoughts on the Basra operation and the issue of Iranian influence. He cautions against reading the situation as simply a Maliki/ISCI alliance against Sadr, instead hinting at this being a primarily Maliki-rooted initiative as the PM seeks new allies and his own power base. Iran maintains a key presence on all sides. A superbly informative read as always.

Maliki, Hakim, and Iran's Role in the Basra Fighting