The Basrah Gambit

[Ron Humphrey]

I'm an ad guy. "Not remotely sensible" is what I do. Not remotely sensible can also decide elections. Just my opinion, but I think "bring home the troops who are not fighting Al Qeada" could win votes.

But this begs the question are those votes associated with grievance against a wrong action or are they votes without an inform and accepted awareess of the consequences of doing so.

In other words if you want me to do something because it's what you feel, believe whichever fine your the populous and ultimately you rule, However if you require this without consideration of it's very likely aftershocks and the very good possibility that you or your family may suffer from it in the long run then it's on you.

If on the other hand you are like many others who wish to push for what they want without being willing to accept responsibility for its outcomes, then Should the decision be quite that simple?

[Rank amateur]

then Should the decision be quite that simple?

John Kerry thought that every issue should be analyzed and explained in agonizing detail. (If I could've figured out a way to get him elected I'd be a lot smarter - and richer - than I am.)

[Schmedlap]

I'm unclear on some assumptions that seem to underpin much of the discussion about recent activity in Basra and Nassiriya. My impression is that the following are generally accepted as true:

1. JAM/Sadr is no better or worse than Badr/ISCI in terms of the security situation and any possibility of a future stable Iraq

2. Some type of action had to be taken against JAM and/or Badr in Basra, at some point in the near future

3. JAM has inflicted more damage upon the ISF than the ISF has inflicted upon JAM

If 1 and 3 are accepted as true, could someone please explain why?

[tequila]

1) ISCI/SCIRI began life as a creation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. It was originally a breakoff faction of al-Dawa which split mainly because its members chose to follow Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of vilayet-i-fiqh, or clerical rule. It may have achieved some independent political life since 2003, but its IRGC ties are strong and well-documented. Its political position regarding Iraqi federalism (advocating for a strong southern federal region with near-independent powers) is in line with Iranian interests.

3) Who knows proper casualty figures - I doubt anyone does. What matters is that the ISF was unable to seize or maintain control over any Mahdi Army strongholds in Basra until Sadr told the militia to stand down, while Sadr's forces were able to launch attacks throughout the south and put the ISF on the run in numerous locations including in Nasiriyah. I saw TV footage of Mahdi Army militia strolling about in broad daylight as late as yesterday, as well as several Mahdi Army fighters driving captured ISF hummvees. That Maliki extended his "deadline", took the deal, as well as claiming all along that he never targeted the Sadr Current specifically, shows that the ISF did not exactly sweep all before it.

[Schmedlap]

Its political position regarding Iraqi federalism (advocating for a strong southern federal region with near-independent powers) is in line with Iranian interests.

And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.

What matters is that the ISF was unable to seize or maintain control over any Mahdi Army strongholds in Basra until Sadr told the militia to stand down, while Sadr's forces were able to launch attacks throughout the south and put the ISF on the run in numerous locations including in Nasiriyah.

It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

[tequila]

And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.

It is also the recipe for a divided, militarily weak central government.

My own assumption is that Iran's maximal solution is a stable but weak Iraq which which it can dominate through its tight relationships with Shiite religious parties and the Iraqi Kurdish parties. The best way to accomplish this is through a strongly federalist constitution and a weak central government.

It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

My own feeling is that Sadr did not want to force the U.S. to intervene on the side of the ISF. He knows from 2005 that taking on U.S. forces head-on is suicide. Routing the ISF comprehensively in Basra would only bring in more airstrikes and possible U.S. intervention in Baghdad and perhaps even down south. An outright military defeat of the ISF and the US is not in the cards, but a military standoff combined with a well-orchestrated political victory that shows the hollowness of Maliki's posturing looks pretty good. Not a bad place to be with local elections on the horizon.

[Ron Humphrey]

And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.



It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

And I think we'll find that this may come down more on the side of an IO/IE failure on the part of ISAF than on actual capability to accomplish the mission.

[Rank amateur]

The NYT has more info - via the UK - on the fighting.

The defense secretary, Desmond Browne, also used his statement in the House of Commons to acknowledge that British military involvement in last week’s fighting in Basra was more extensive than previously disclosed.

At one point, he said, British tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and ground troops were deployed to help extract Iraqi government troops from a firefight with Shiite militiamen in the city.

Mr. Browne said British involvement in that battle was in addition to other actions in support of Iraqi forces.

He said those actions included aerial surveillance of the city; low-level missions by combat aircraft aimed at reinforcing Iraqi troops by establishing a menacing aerial presence over combat zones; the use of helicopters that carried food and ammunition to the Iraqis; and medical care for wounded Iraqi troops at British combat hospitals outside the city.

Mr. Browne said the use of British ground troops in the fighting was ordered “in extremis,” suggesting that the deployment of forces from the British base at Basra was a last-ditch measure to save Iraqi troops.