The Basrah Gambit

[SWJED]

The Basrah Gambit – Defining Moment for Iraq or the Jaysh al-Mahdi? By Malcolm Nance at SWJ Blog.

Engaging the Mahdi Militia in Basrah and labeling them as equal to Al-Qaeda in Iraq is a deadly gamble that may leave Iran the winner.

On 19 March, 2008 CNN’s Iraq war correspondent, Kyra Phillips gave a live interview from in front of the crossed Swords at the Tomb of the Unknowns parade ground in Baghdad’s International Zone (IZ). She cheerfully reported that Iraq had somehow changed after five years and the lack of mortar and rocket fire allowed her to broadcast live. Rockets and mortars were a daily occurrence in the heavily fortified center of government over the previous 1,825 days. On this indirect fire free day, Phillips proclaimed, “there was a time twice a day there would be mortar rounds coming into this area. Now, five years later, Kiran, very rarely are you seeing that type of action, mortars or rockets coming in here. And the fact that I'm here live right now tells you this is a sign of progress.”

The media’s definition of “very rarely” would be exactly four days. That Sunday the IZ and surrounding neighborhoods would be bombarded with a 12-hour long barrage of rockets and mortars, which killed 13 civilians in the outlying neighborhoods. The barrages continued throughout the week and embassy workers and residents of the IZ were informed they could not go outside of concrete structures without body armor and helmets – a standing order for the first five years, which somehow needed to be reiterated. Phillip’s ridiculously premature assessment that the surge had dispelled mayhem and resentment of the 2003 invasion, was short-circuited by the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), or Mahdi Militia...

[Ron Humphrey]

After reading this I find myself with some questions

1- Considering that something like this did have to happen at some point (as the author points out) and that JAM did as expected (which is to say disappeared before incurring too many losses). Then also taking into account that either militia Badr or Mahdi both have Iranian connections. Does anything change the fact that it had to happen and at least in large part seems smarter to have done so when there would be more rather than less backup available if needed.

2. Am I mistaken and have the militias been effectively providing for and caring for their area and that everything that a government should do was being done by these hero thugs in Basra: if so why did the actual Iraqi government have to go in there and screw it all up? Am I missing something here.

3. Although I did hear and see that Sadr called a ceasefire I don't remember hearing that the IA/ IP have stopped moving through the area and securing neighborhoods. Are we to believe that Maliki doesn't realize exactly what this means and let's not forget that this operation was Iraqi planned and although support may be provided all in all it would seem that it will be dealt with in more of an Iraqi manner than what might be done in an American operation.

4. How exactly should this have been handled since everyone seems so certain that this wasn't the right way.

[Ken White]

After reading this I find myself with some questions.
. . .
4. How exactly should this have been handled since everyone seems so certain that this wasn't the right way.

Heh. Fair question, though...

[tequila]

If you're going to whack the hornet's nest, and yes it did need whacking, then at least make sure (1) the hornets don't win (2) you don't just go after just one species of hornet when there are at least four that need to get dead.

What Sadr has done is show that his militia can stand up to and defeat the best efforts of the Iraqi Army, that he can turn the violence on and off even in the face of an offensive by said army, and thus can control the streets of southern Iraq and Baghdad even from a perch in Qom. Maliki looks pathetic while the Iranians preen as the one side that all Shia factions can go to for intercession.

We'll see how this plays out, but right now it's hard to imagine the last few days as any kind of success.

[Abu Buckwheat]

If you're going to whack the hornet's nest, and yes it did need whacking, then at least make sure (1) the hornets don't win (2) you don't just go after just one species of hornet when there are at least four that need to get dead.

BBWwaaaahahahahahaaa.... well that comment made writing the whole blog entry in one flight back to CONUS worth it. Hey tequila, can I use this in my next book?

Seriously though ...

My assertion is that this was not part of the surge but a completely different component of a North-South offensive. The MNF-I and the Kurd IA Divisons would clear Mosul while Maliki would be give the chance to use the Badr Corps, er, I mean, the "Iraqi Army" and police to clear Basrah.

The ruse of going after only the "rogue" JAM units surely weakened the JAM but no one who has spent anytime there (I spent almost a year in Basrah and all of my Iraqi bosyguards are from there) was going to think that the JAM was not wildly popular. they are more popular than the central government, but not because they provide services. They provide a gunweilding voice and see that the future could bear great promise for them. The JAM, the Hizb'Dawa and the Badr Corps have been banging away to gain dominence for five years and this last year the JAM has made headway. Granted, the Garamsheh tribe runs all of the guns and crime, and this is fueled by the money that still flows from the tolerated Ali Baba port at Mina Abu Floos. The big question is what made Maliki think Shiites were going to really fight hard against the JAM when the JAMs could come to their family's front door any given night and kill them all? Thats why policemen surrendered ... for their family's sake. Everyone knows everyone in Southern Iraq.

4. How exactly should this have been handled since everyone seems so certain that this wasn't the right way.

To answer the question they could have bought a Kurd/Peshmerga division down south quietly and let them do it. They would have done the job in a slugfest like bloodbath that would probably raze a good piece of western and northern Basrah. However, Maliki would be out of office the next day. The final answer: Train IA units for the mission in secret in Fallujah (live fire training), pretend you are going to Ramadi, turn left, drive overnight and blitz Basrah with heavy US armor and air support from the afloat Marine unit in the Gulf ... then effect the BSP super rapido! ... however this would have taken allot of troops we just don't have and a level of planning they don't have. There was no real airpower or heavy armor (the T-55s and T-72s being up in Taji-stan) supporting the offensive except for some M113s and some police Cougars. This was doomed from the inception and it appears both Cheney and McCain were briefed about it. Thats MHO.

[Tom Odom]

Malcom,

Great blog, Welcome back!

Tom

[SWJED]

‘What’s Happening In Basra?’
by Paul Smyth
Small Wars Journal Magazine

The recent Iraqi military operation in Basra has generated much speculation in media and commentary circles, but without access to classified sources it is extremely difficult to accurately judge what has been happening in Basra and why. Even attempts to draw on Iraqi sources or anonymous quotes from within the Coalition do not eradicate confused or contradictory reporting. Hence, some commentators will claim that the targets of the Iraqi security clampdown in Basra are the criminal and Iranian sponsored ‘Special Groups’ that plague the city, while others will equally assert that it is the militia followers of Moqtada Al Sadr which are being attacked in order to weaken his power base ahead of provincial elections.

Whether the subject in view is the motive behind the operation, its timing and conduct, the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias, the role of Iran or the relative effect the operation is having on the standing of the various protagonists, there is no consensus of opinion which reigns supreme...