The Basrah Gambit

[tequila]

Religious leaders tell al-Sadr to keep militia intact: Sadr spokesman - CNN

Iraq's top Shiite religious leaders have told anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr not to disband his Mehdi Army, an al-Sadr spokesman said Monday amid fresh fighting in the militia's Baghdad strongholds.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki demanded Sunday that the cleric disband his militia, which waged two uprisings against U.S. troops in 2004, or see his supporters barred from public office.

But al-Sadr spokesman Salah al-Obeidi said al-Sadr has consulted with Iraq's Shiite clerical leadership "and they refused that." He did not provide details of the talks.

[Ron Humphrey]

Religious leaders tell al-Sadr to keep militia intact: Sadr spokesman - CNN

Considering how misleading some information that comes out in media is due to what can only hope is simple ignorance of culture, the question would be which leader's exactly gave this edict. There are various conditions which might exist depending on who it was.

[tequila]

Sadr always proposes to disband the Mahdi Army upon orders from the Najaf Hawza whenever there is some sort of controversy - he also did this back in 2004 and after Karbala in 2006. He knows that the Hawza will never intervene so directly into politics and publicly order said disbandment specifically for the Mahdi Army alone. Most likely is that the Hawza refused to acknowledge the query at all.

The Mahdi Army is not going to disband any more than the Badr Brigade "disbanded" by rebadging itself in Interior Ministry uniforms and calling itself the Badr "Organization."

[tequila]

Reider Visser has updated thoughts on the Basra operation and the issue of Iranian influence. He cautions against reading the situation as simply a Maliki/ISCI alliance against Sadr, instead hinting at this being a primarily Maliki-rooted initiative as the PM seeks new allies and his own power base. Iran maintains a key presence on all sides. A superbly informative read as always.

Maliki, Hakim, and Iran's Role in the Basra Fighting

[Ron Humphrey]

[QUOTE=tequila;44443]Reider Visser has updated thoughts on the Basra operation and the issue of Iranian influence. He cautions against reading the situation as simply a Maliki/ISCI alliance against Sadr, instead hinting at this being a primarily Maliki-rooted initiative as the PM seeks new allies and his own power base. Iran maintains a key presence on all sides. A superbly informative read as always.

I'll try it again-
Link retry

[Ron Humphrey]

But I'm not sure there aren't some key pieces of the US side of the puzzle being left out. Also seems to me the Kurdish and Sunni pieces are going to be a larger factor than is hinted to here.

I will agree with the fact that some figures here would do well to look a little deeper into how things work over there then they currently do.

[Ken White]

think he's got the broad strokes correct. This from your link:

"The artificial constellation of the so-called “moderate coalition” under Maliki is to a large extent the result of a weaponry-focused American misreading of the many channels of Iranian influence. This was best summed up by Ryan Crocker’s comments in the US Senate on 8 April: in an attempt at playing down the significance of Mahmud Amadinejad’s popularity in Iraqi government circles, Crocker referred to the staunch anti-Iranian attitude of the Iraqi Shiites during the Iran-Iraq War. What Crocker failed to mention was that his own administration’s main Shiite partner in Iraq, ISCI, is the only sizeable Shiite party that fought on the Iranian side."

is, I believe correct in essence but wrong in detail -- at least in one detail.

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

[Rex Brynen]

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

I'm not sure which "Arabists" you're referring to, Ken, and which aspect you think they're misreading.

Most of the Iraq specialists that I know (inside and outside government) would absolutely agree with Tequila on the nuances of Shi'ite politics in Iraq (and the multidimensional patterns of Iranian connections, influence, and constraints).

[Ron Humphrey]

think he's got the broad strokes correct. This from your link:is, I believe correct in essence but wrong in detail -- at least in one detail.

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

Tolstoy wrote in War and Peace:

When a man acts alone he always carries with him a certain series of considerations, that have as he supposes, directed his past conduct, and that serve to justify to him his present action, and to lead him to make projects for his future activity

.

If we accept that the same principle applies for the thinking, planning and perceptions of a man, then how is one to differentiate when one is simply seeing what they wish, what they expect, or what is actually taking place.