The Basrah Gambit

[Ken White]

think he's got the broad strokes correct. This from your link:

"The artificial constellation of the so-called “moderate coalition” under Maliki is to a large extent the result of a weaponry-focused American misreading of the many channels of Iranian influence. This was best summed up by Ryan Crocker’s comments in the US Senate on 8 April: in an attempt at playing down the significance of Mahmud Amadinejad’s popularity in Iraqi government circles, Crocker referred to the staunch anti-Iranian attitude of the Iraqi Shiites during the Iran-Iraq War. What Crocker failed to mention was that his own administration’s main Shiite partner in Iraq, ISCI, is the only sizeable Shiite party that fought on the Iranian side."

is, I believe correct in essence but wrong in detail -- at least in one detail.

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

[Rex Brynen]

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

I'm not sure which "Arabists" you're referring to, Ken, and which aspect you think they're misreading.

Most of the Iraq specialists that I know (inside and outside government) would absolutely agree with Tequila on the nuances of Shi'ite politics in Iraq (and the multidimensional patterns of Iranian connections, influence, and constraints).

[Ken White]

I'm not sure which "Arabists" you're referring to, Ken, and which aspect you think they're misreading.

Most of the Iraq specialists that I know (inside and outside government) would absolutely agree with Tequila on the nuances of Shi'ite politics in Iraq (and the multidimensional patterns of Iranian connections, influence, and constraints).

Those in the US government.

I agreed with Tequila -- or, rather, with his linked article (broadly; minor caveats of little note). I disagreed with Crocker. They are applying western logic to what they see and are told by their nominal counterparts in the area as opposed to watching what's happening and trusting their own intel folks.

What you see there is rarely what you get...

[tequila]

I think by "weaponry focused", Visser was saying that Crocker's testimony focused on Iranian weapons/military aid to factions in Iraq as its primary means of influence. Visser says this focus on military aid alone is incorrect - Crocker should focus as well on Iran's myriad and longstanding political ties to varying Iraqi factions, which are at least as important and probably far more so than whatever EFPs the Quds Force doles out to the "special groups".

I think Visser is on the mark here. I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq - in the past American representatives in Baghdad have indicated they believe Iran is pushing the "special groups" to eventually become a Hizbullah-like proxy in Iraq. What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters. The "special groups" to the extent that they exist are not a coherent grouping, have no political aims, and exist mainly to set off IEDs. The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.

[Ron Humphrey]

I think Visser is on the mark here. I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq - in the past American representatives in Baghdad have indicated they believe Iran is pushing the "special groups" to eventually become a Hizbullah-like proxy in Iraq. What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters. The "special groups" to the extent that they exist are not a coherent grouping, have no political aims, and exist mainly to set off IEDs. The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.

What roles do the ISCI actually play in the Iranian governance which would make them anything more than a supported proxy in Iraq. If the only thing they get out of it is control of Iraq while carrying major IOU's to Iran why would it not be preferable to them to owe Iran little to naught and be in control anyway?

Since the theme seems to be that the party's over and all thats left is to pass out the parting gifts?

[Ken White]

...Crocker should focus as well on Iran's myriad and longstanding political ties to varying Iraqi factions, which are at least as important and probably far more so than whatever EFPs the Quds Force doles out to the "special groups".

Agreed.

...What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters.

True, thus my annoyance at the (intentional?) mis-labeling -- or misstating by our folks.

...The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.

I'm not sure the initial statement is correct and, while I agree to an extent with the last comment, I don't think it'll make a long term difference.

[Rex Brynen]

I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq

He's right, he's just got the model wrong: Iranian policy closely mirrors that of the Syrians (not the Iranians) in Lebanon--that is, backing a number of different horses at the same time, while trying to position themselves as the mediator/balancer/most important patron.

[tequila]

What roles do the ISCI actually play in the Iranian governance which would make them anything more than a supported proxy in Iraq. If the only thing they get out of it is control of Iraq while carrying major IOU's to Iran why would it not be preferable to them to owe Iran little to naught and be in control anyway?

Research a bit about the history of ISCI - they were originally a splitoff of al-Dawa, the "original" Shia religious party in Iraq, who were heavily influenced by the Iranian Revolution and went with Khomeini's theory of vilayet-i-fiqh rather than the more standard "quietist" school propagated by Najaf at the time. The IRGC, much as it formed the core of Hizbullah originally, formed ISCI's Badr Brigade out of ISCI volunteers and later on Shia POWs from the Iran-Iraq War. Thus Badr's core principally consists of those Iraqi Shia who turned traitor and fought on Iran's side during the war - you can see where the antipathy towards them in Iraq might come from.

Thus ISCI has historically aligned with Iran for both practical and philosophical reasons. Visser agrees that it is simplistic to call them simply Iranian patsies, just as it is also quite simplistic and inaccurate (IMO far more so in the Lebanese case) to call Lebanese Hizbullah simply Iranian patsies. Both movements have their own motives and political objectives. But on a concrete basis, ISCI's political goals in Iraq mirror those of Iran's (a crippled central government combined with a very strong Shia-dominated southern federal region, thus assuring Iraq's perpetual weakness) far more than any other group, other than perhaps the Kurds (who also favor a weak center dominated by federal regions).

[Ron Humphrey]

Research a bit about the history of ISCI - they were originally a splitoff of al-Dawa, the "original" Shia religious party in Iraq, who were heavily influenced by the Iranian Revolution and went with Khomeini's theory of vilayet-i-fiqh rather than the more standard "quietist" school propagated by Najaf at the time. The IRGC, much as it formed the core of Hizbullah originally, formed ISCI's Badr Brigade out of ISCI volunteers and later on Shia POWs from the Iran-Iraq War. Thus Badr's core principally consists of those Iraqi Shia who turned traitor and fought on Iran's side during the war - you can see where the antipathy towards them in Iraq might come from.

Thus ISCI has historically aligned with Iran for both practical and philosophical reasons. Visser agrees that it is simplistic to call them simply Iranian patsies, just as it is also quite simplistic and inaccurate (IMO far more so in the Lebanese case) to call Lebanese Hizbullah simply Iranian patsies. Both movements have their own motives and political objectives. But on a concrete basis, ISCI's political goals in Iraq mirror those of Iran's (a crippled central government combined with a very strong Shia-dominated southern federal region, thus assuring Iraq's perpetual weakness) far more than any other group, other than perhaps the Kurds (who also favor a weak center dominated by federal regions).

Considering that this is as you infer a well known fact in the area doesn't it seem somewhat unusual to assume that our leaders there are unaware let alone necessarily complicit in its fruition. I realize it may seem naive of me but somehow I just don't think it's gonna be quite as easy as for ISCI as it may look on the surface.

[Ron Humphrey]

think he's got the broad strokes correct. This from your link:is, I believe correct in essence but wrong in detail -- at least in one detail.

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

Tolstoy wrote in War and Peace:

When a man acts alone he always carries with him a certain series of considerations, that have as he supposes, directed his past conduct, and that serve to justify to him his present action, and to lead him to make projects for his future activity

.

If we accept that the same principle applies for the thinking, planning and perceptions of a man, then how is one to differentiate when one is simply seeing what they wish, what they expect, or what is actually taking place.

[Rank amateur]

Then how is one to differentiate when one is simply seeing what they wish, what they expect, or what is actually taking place.

In advertising, we do focus groups and polling. In conventional combat I imagine the key is expecting fog, friction and enemy adaptation and not getting personally attached to any particular tactic or plan. (There's a Darwinian process; people who see what
they want to see will sooner or later end up dead or defeated.)

Personally, I think the way we've defined "victory" and "defeat" in Iraq - and all the politics that surrounds those issues - pretty much guarantees that even if you can see what's actually happening, not very many people are going to agree with you.

I'm sure that Marc and Rex will also have some excellent suggestions for you.

the shoe fits on the other side as well.

Undoubtedly and those who attack us pay a high price for their misjudgment.

I think quite a few of those in positions of power know that better than we may give them credit for.

I hope you're not seeing what you want to see , but that just goes to show how difficult the problems of perception are.

[Ron Humphrey]

I hope you're not seeing what you want to see , but that just goes to show how difficult the problems of perception are.

But luckily enough for us I'm not the one who decides who does what, where.

Now one would think those who do decide have a some much wider scope than I

[Ken White]

...
Personally, I think the way we've defined "victory" and "defeat" in Iraq - and all the politics that surrounds those issues - pretty much guarantees that even if you can see what's actually happening, not very many people are going to agree with you.
...

I'm curious as to what those definitions are?

[Rank amateur]

I'm curious as to what those definitions are?

An excellent question. (I'm talking about layman's spin, but I haven't seen any coordinated effort by anyone to replace the spin with a more nuanced approach. Present company excluded of course. The dialog on council is always extremely intelligent and nuanced.)

Near as I can tell, anyone who wants to withdraw troops is admitting defeat and anyone who wants to stay supports victory. There doesn't seem to be a very big "weigh the costs and benefits" camp and those people seem to end up being quickly labelled defeatists. It might change after our election but both candidates have a vested interest in keeping the debate binary until then. I don't really see any candidate saying "I just saw a 15 slide PowerPoint that made me change my mind."

Interestingly, I found a game theory simulation that suggested we should be lowering our definition of victory. Which would suggest that I'm wrong or the country isn't being rationale.

[Ron Humphrey]

Near as I can tell, anyone who wants to withdraw troops is admitting defeat and anyone who wants to stay supports victory. There doesn't seem to be a very big "weigh the costs and benefits" camp and those people seem to end up being quickly labelled defeatists. It might change after our election but both candidates have a vested interest in keeping the debate binary until then. I don't really see any candidate saying "I just saw a 15 slide PowerPoint that made me change my mind."

Is that the idea that everyone including the GOI wants large amounts of American forces there for any longer than absolutely necessary is highly lacking a realistic assessment. Everyone wants the same thing for a variety of different reasons. The difference is to be found in the fact that some don't like it when the world doesn't move to their beat. A wise approach is to consider what can be done while maintaining a forward momentum towards a long term solution.

This doesn't fit to well with those who think that
A: The world can go to heck in a handbasket and well still be able to avoid suffering for it because we our US

B: How can we fund our five thousand plus govt gimme programs if we actually have to spend money trying to help stabilize countries who may not be able to do it on their own(for a variety of reasons)and which if we don't could and probably will cost us much more in the long run

Let me ask you a question. If you are hired to run an advertising campaign for blue shoes and get the contract for 3 million then two months after you start the company decides it isn't happy because the results aren't what they want them to be. And lets just throw in that one week after you got the job there was a world wide boycott of blue shoes because black is the new blue what would you tell them.

A: ok here's your money back sorry bout that

B: You have to give it a little more time because we're working behind the scenes to make blue the new purple

Cwhatever your answer is since i'm pretty sure you won't pick either A or B)

Interestingly, I found a game theory simulation that suggested we should be lowering our definition of victory. Which would suggest that I'm wrong or the country isn't being rationale.

As to that sometimes simulations are good for telling you that you might have to adjust your expectations in order to match them to the given scenario

[Rank amateur]

A: ok here's your money back sorry bout that

B: You have to give it a little more time because we're working behind the scenes to make blue the new purple

Cwhatever your answer is since i'm pretty sure you won't pick either A or B)

B, but when they asked "how long is a little more time?" I'd give them an answer, because this is what I do for a living and I know what a reasonable time is. I know how to set metrics and see if we're on the right track or not. I also know that if I don't get results it's because I screwed up. (None of my clients have ever made a mistake.)

I have a strong personal dislike of the terms victory and defeat attached to any COIN or nation building effort. The best one can hope for is a satisfactory outcome -- that obviously can vary dependent upon outlook.

We agree. (Although every time I say that, you say we don't.) I just think that once the commander in chief uses the terms victory and defeat it is extremely difficult to find middle ground. Now that I think about it, that's probably a more accurate expression of what I meant initially. If we hypothetically came to an acceptable outcome, I don't think many people would accept it. They'd still be looking for victory or looking back at all the mistakes. (It goes back to seeing what you want, biases, self images, allegiances etc. All that spin doctor stuff that has it's uses but can also cause problems.)

[Ken White]

...
Near as I can tell, anyone who wants to withdraw troops is admitting defeat and anyone who wants to stay supports victory. There doesn't seem to be a very big "weigh the costs and benefits" camp and those people seem to end up being quickly labelled defeatists. It might change after our election but both candidates have a vested interest in keeping the debate binary until then. I don't really see any candidate saying "I just saw a 15 slide PowerPoint that made me change my mind."

I suppose one could look at it that way. I have a strong personal dislike of the terms victory and defeat attached to any COIN or nation building effort. The best one can hope for is a satisfactory outcome -- that obviously can vary dependent upon outlook.

In any event, I think it's safe to say that if we do withdraw precipitously, the Islamists will claim 'victory' and thus trumpet our 'defeat.' That can have a detrimental long term effect albeit not probably a fatal one -- so any cost benefit analysis should consider that in some detail.

What the candidates now say and what they will do if elected and getting all the detailed classified briefings are more than likely to be quite different things. I was almost looking forward to Kerry being elected in '04 so I could watch him back and fill in December. You're correct that both do have an interest in keeping it binary until then, though.

Interestingly, I found a game theory simulation that suggested we should be lowering our definition of victory. Which would suggest that I'm wrong or the country isn't being rationale.

Americans. Not being rational? Surely you jest, Sir!

Heh -- I thought that was an American specialty...

In fairness to them, though, in this case they're using the worlds that ignorant politicians and media (and even the random General...) use. That misue of the words has skewed the meaning of them beyond all hope of redemption for this one, I'm afraid. This may not be the most politicized war we've ever had but it sure is the one with the widest communication (of sorts...).