The Basrah Gambit

[tequila]

1) ISCI/SCIRI began life as a creation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. It was originally a breakoff faction of al-Dawa which split mainly because its members chose to follow Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of vilayet-i-fiqh, or clerical rule. It may have achieved some independent political life since 2003, but its IRGC ties are strong and well-documented. Its political position regarding Iraqi federalism (advocating for a strong southern federal region with near-independent powers) is in line with Iranian interests.

3) Who knows proper casualty figures - I doubt anyone does. What matters is that the ISF was unable to seize or maintain control over any Mahdi Army strongholds in Basra until Sadr told the militia to stand down, while Sadr's forces were able to launch attacks throughout the south and put the ISF on the run in numerous locations including in Nasiriyah. I saw TV footage of Mahdi Army militia strolling about in broad daylight as late as yesterday, as well as several Mahdi Army fighters driving captured ISF hummvees. That Maliki extended his "deadline", took the deal, as well as claiming all along that he never targeted the Sadr Current specifically, shows that the ISF did not exactly sweep all before it.

[Schmedlap]

Its political position regarding Iraqi federalism (advocating for a strong southern federal region with near-independent powers) is in line with Iranian interests.

And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.

What matters is that the ISF was unable to seize or maintain control over any Mahdi Army strongholds in Basra until Sadr told the militia to stand down, while Sadr's forces were able to launch attacks throughout the south and put the ISF on the run in numerous locations including in Nasiriyah.

It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

[tequila]

And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.

It is also the recipe for a divided, militarily weak central government.

My own assumption is that Iran's maximal solution is a stable but weak Iraq which which it can dominate through its tight relationships with Shiite religious parties and the Iraqi Kurdish parties. The best way to accomplish this is through a strongly federalist constitution and a weak central government.

It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

My own feeling is that Sadr did not want to force the U.S. to intervene on the side of the ISF. He knows from 2005 that taking on U.S. forces head-on is suicide. Routing the ISF comprehensively in Basra would only bring in more airstrikes and possible U.S. intervention in Baghdad and perhaps even down south. An outright military defeat of the ISF and the US is not in the cards, but a military standoff combined with a well-orchestrated political victory that shows the hollowness of Maliki's posturing looks pretty good. Not a bad place to be with local elections on the horizon.

[Ron Humphrey]

And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.



It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

And I think we'll find that this may come down more on the side of an IO/IE failure on the part of ISAF than on actual capability to accomplish the mission.

[Rank amateur]

The NYT has more info - via the UK - on the fighting.

The defense secretary, Desmond Browne, also used his statement in the House of Commons to acknowledge that British military involvement in last week’s fighting in Basra was more extensive than previously disclosed.

At one point, he said, British tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and ground troops were deployed to help extract Iraqi government troops from a firefight with Shiite militiamen in the city.

Mr. Browne said British involvement in that battle was in addition to other actions in support of Iraqi forces.

He said those actions included aerial surveillance of the city; low-level missions by combat aircraft aimed at reinforcing Iraqi troops by establishing a menacing aerial presence over combat zones; the use of helicopters that carried food and ammunition to the Iraqis; and medical care for wounded Iraqi troops at British combat hospitals outside the city.

Mr. Browne said the use of British ground troops in the fighting was ordered “in extremis,” suggesting that the deployment of forces from the British base at Basra was a last-ditch measure to save Iraqi troops.

[tequila]

More NYT:

U.S. Cites Planning Gaps in Iraqi Assault on Basra - NYTIMES 3 April.

Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker first learned of the Iraqi plan on Friday, March 21: Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki would be heading to Basra with Iraqi troops to bring order to the city.

But the Iraqi operation was not what the United States expected. Instead of methodically building up their combat power and gradually stepping up operations against renegade militias, Mr. Maliki’s forces lunged into the city, attacking before all of the Iraqi reinforcements had even arrived. By the following Tuesday, a major fight was on.

“The sense we had was that this would be a long-term effort: increased pressure gradually squeezing the Special Groups,” Mr. Crocker said in an interview, using the American term for Iranian-backed militias. “That is not what kind of emerged."

...

The operation indicates that the Iraqi military can quickly organize and deploy forces over considerable distances. Two Iraqi C-130s and several Iraqi helicopters were also involved in the operation, an important step for a military that is still struggling to develop an air combat ability.

But interviews with a wide range of American and military officials also suggest that Mr. Maliki overestimated his military’s abilities and underestimated the scale of the resistance. The Iraqi prime minister also displayed an impulsive leadership style that did not give his forces or that of his most powerful allies, the American and British military, time to prepare.

...
As the Iraqi military and civilian casualties grew and the Iraqi planning appeared to be little more than an improvisation, the United States mounted an intensive military and political effort to try to turn around the situation, according to accounts by Mr. Crocker and several American military officials in Baghdad and Washington who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Two senior American military officers — a member of the Navy Seals and a Marine major general — were sent to Basra to help coordinate the Iraqi planning, the military officials said. Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division were pressed into service as combat advisers while air controllers were positioned to call in airstrikes on behalf of beleaguered Iraqi units. American transport planes joined the Iraqis in ferrying supplies to Iraqi troops ...

[Wx Guesser]

Long time lurker, first time poster....
Saw this in an email and am curious what the more experienced and knowledgeable think. Is this an attempt to get JAM legitimacy? An attempt to enter the political process with a statesman-like gesture? Neither? Both?

http://www.reuters.com/article/world...34078820080407

Iraq's Sadr to disband Mehdi Army if clerics order

By Khaled Farhan

NAJAF, Iraq (Reuters) - Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is ready to disband his militia if Shi'ite religious leaders demand it, his aides said on Monday, a surprising offer given renewed clashes between his fighters and security forces.

The news came after Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who launched a crackdown on Sadr's Mehdi Army late last month, ordered the cleric to disband his militia or face exclusion from the Iraqi political process.

[Ron Humphrey]

Long time lurker, first time poster....
Saw this in an email and am curious what the more experienced and knowledgeable think. Is this an attempt to get JAM legitimacy? An attempt to enter the political process with a statesman-like gesture? Neither? Both?

http://www.reuters.com/article/world...34078820080407

it is wise as many here have stated before to take the actions of others as those of rational players then this would make perfect sense.

Sadr envisions himself as a representative of the populous and also holds his faith in high enough regard that he is studying to become an Ayatollah. As such should he choose to act against the grain of those religious leaders he might very well not only lose his "army" but lose any chance of leading other than marginally in a religious context within Iraq.

So he puts it to the leaders there. If they say yes disarm then he is fine with that because in the end he still looks to become a large part of the religious forum and thus has both political and social clout. Should they say no don't disband than he has a much larger bargaining chip with the current GOI in that any actions he orders have been in a way signed off on by those clerics.

Please take a moment and introduce yourself LINK to us as it provides a context on where your coming from and allows for much more accurate responses