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Thread: The Basrah Gambit

  1. #21
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    More NYT:

    U.S. Cites Planning Gaps in Iraqi Assault on Basra - NYTIMES 3 April.

    Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker first learned of the Iraqi plan on Friday, March 21: Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki would be heading to Basra with Iraqi troops to bring order to the city.

    But the Iraqi operation was not what the United States expected. Instead of methodically building up their combat power and gradually stepping up operations against renegade militias, Mr. Maliki’s forces lunged into the city, attacking before all of the Iraqi reinforcements had even arrived. By the following Tuesday, a major fight was on.

    “The sense we had was that this would be a long-term effort: increased pressure gradually squeezing the Special Groups,” Mr. Crocker said in an interview, using the American term for Iranian-backed militias. “That is not what kind of emerged."

    ...

    The operation indicates that the Iraqi military can quickly organize and deploy forces over considerable distances. Two Iraqi C-130s and several Iraqi helicopters were also involved in the operation, an important step for a military that is still struggling to develop an air combat ability.

    But interviews with a wide range of American and military officials also suggest that Mr. Maliki overestimated his military’s abilities and underestimated the scale of the resistance. The Iraqi prime minister also displayed an impulsive leadership style that did not give his forces or that of his most powerful allies, the American and British military, time to prepare.

    ...
    As the Iraqi military and civilian casualties grew and the Iraqi planning appeared to be little more than an improvisation, the United States mounted an intensive military and political effort to try to turn around the situation, according to accounts by Mr. Crocker and several American military officials in Baghdad and Washington who spoke on condition of anonymity.

    Two senior American military officers — a member of the Navy Seals and a Marine major general — were sent to Basra to help coordinate the Iraqi planning, the military officials said. Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division were pressed into service as combat advisers while air controllers were positioned to call in airstrikes on behalf of beleaguered Iraqi units. American transport planes joined the Iraqis in ferrying supplies to Iraqi troops ...

  2. #22
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    Default Sadr Posturing?

    Long time lurker, first time poster....
    Saw this in an email and am curious what the more experienced and knowledgeable think. Is this an attempt to get JAM legitimacy? An attempt to enter the political process with a statesman-like gesture? Neither? Both?

    http://www.reuters.com/article/world...34078820080407

    Iraq's Sadr to disband Mehdi Army if clerics order

    By Khaled Farhan

    NAJAF, Iraq (Reuters) - Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is ready to disband his militia if Shi'ite religious leaders demand it, his aides said on Monday, a surprising offer given renewed clashes between his fighters and security forces.

    The news came after Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who launched a crackdown on Sadr's Mehdi Army late last month, ordered the cleric to disband his militia or face exclusion from the Iraqi political process.

  3. #23
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Post Considering that

    Quote Originally Posted by Wx Guesser View Post
    Long time lurker, first time poster....
    Saw this in an email and am curious what the more experienced and knowledgeable think. Is this an attempt to get JAM legitimacy? An attempt to enter the political process with a statesman-like gesture? Neither? Both?

    http://www.reuters.com/article/world...34078820080407
    it is wise as many here have stated before to take the actions of others as those of rational players then this would make perfect sense.

    Sadr envisions himself as a representative of the populous and also holds his faith in high enough regard that he is studying to become an Ayatollah. As such should he choose to act against the grain of those religious leaders he might very well not only lose his "army" but lose any chance of leading other than marginally in a religious context within Iraq.

    So he puts it to the leaders there. If they say yes disarm then he is fine with that because in the end he still looks to become a large part of the religious forum and thus has both political and social clout. Should they say no don't disband than he has a much larger bargaining chip with the current GOI in that any actions he orders have been in a way signed off on by those clerics.

    Please take a moment and introduce yourself LINK to us as it provides a context on where your coming from and allows for much more accurate responses
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    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Religious leaders tell al-Sadr to keep militia intact: Sadr spokesman - CNN

    Iraq's top Shiite religious leaders have told anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr not to disband his Mehdi Army, an al-Sadr spokesman said Monday amid fresh fighting in the militia's Baghdad strongholds.

    Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki demanded Sunday that the cleric disband his militia, which waged two uprisings against U.S. troops in 2004, or see his supporters barred from public office.

    But al-Sadr spokesman Salah al-Obeidi said al-Sadr has consulted with Iraq's Shiite clerical leadership "and they refused that." He did not provide details of the talks.

  5. #25
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Question Interesting

    Considering how misleading some information that comes out in media is due to what can only hope is simple ignorance of culture, the question would be which leader's exactly gave this edict. There are various conditions which might exist depending on who it was.
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    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Sadr always proposes to disband the Mahdi Army upon orders from the Najaf Hawza whenever there is some sort of controversy - he also did this back in 2004 and after Karbala in 2006. He knows that the Hawza will never intervene so directly into politics and publicly order said disbandment specifically for the Mahdi Army alone. Most likely is that the Hawza refused to acknowledge the query at all.

    The Mahdi Army is not going to disband any more than the Badr Brigade "disbanded" by rebadging itself in Interior Ministry uniforms and calling itself the Badr "Organization."

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    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Reider Visser has updated thoughts on the Basra operation and the issue of Iranian influence. He cautions against reading the situation as simply a Maliki/ISCI alliance against Sadr, instead hinting at this being a primarily Maliki-rooted initiative as the PM seeks new allies and his own power base. Iran maintains a key presence on all sides. A superbly informative read as always.

    Maliki, Hakim, and Iran's Role in the Basra Fighting

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    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Smile Link didn't work

    [QUOTE=tequila;44443]Reider Visser has updated thoughts on the Basra operation and the issue of Iranian influence. He cautions against reading the situation as simply a Maliki/ISCI alliance against Sadr, instead hinting at this being a primarily Maliki-rooted initiative as the PM seeks new allies and his own power base. Iran maintains a key presence on all sides. A superbly informative read as always.

    I'll try it again-
    Link retry
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    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Post I've give you that it's thorough

    But I'm not sure there aren't some key pieces of the US side of the puzzle being left out. Also seems to me the Kurdish and Sunni pieces are going to be a larger factor than is hinted to here.

    I will agree with the fact that some figures here would do well to look a little deeper into how things work over there then they currently do.
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Some good points, Tequila. Don't totally agree but I

    think he's got the broad strokes correct. This from your link:
    "The artificial constellation of the so-called “moderate coalition” under Maliki is to a large extent the result of a weaponry-focused American misreading of the many channels of Iranian influence. This was best summed up by Ryan Crocker’s comments in the US Senate on 8 April: in an attempt at playing down the significance of Mahmud Amadinejad’s popularity in Iraqi government circles, Crocker referred to the staunch anti-Iranian attitude of the Iraqi Shiites during the Iran-Iraq War. What Crocker failed to mention was that his own administration’s main Shiite partner in Iraq, ISCI, is the only sizeable Shiite party that fought on the Iranian side."
    is, I believe correct in essence but wrong in detail -- at least in one detail.

    The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.
    I'm not sure which "Arabists" you're referring to, Ken, and which aspect you think they're misreading.

    Most of the Iraq specialists that I know (inside and outside government) would absolutely agree with Tequila on the nuances of Shi'ite politics in Iraq (and the multidimensional patterns of Iranian connections, influence, and constraints).

  12. #32
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Crocker at.al.

    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    I'm not sure which "Arabists" you're referring to, Ken, and which aspect you think they're misreading.

    Most of the Iraq specialists that I know (inside and outside government) would absolutely agree with Tequila on the nuances of Shi'ite politics in Iraq (and the multidimensional patterns of Iranian connections, influence, and constraints).
    Those in the US government.

    I agreed with Tequila -- or, rather, with his linked article (broadly; minor caveats of little note). I disagreed with Crocker. They are applying western logic to what they see and are told by their nominal counterparts in the area as opposed to watching what's happening and trusting their own intel folks.

    What you see there is rarely what you get...

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    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    I think by "weaponry focused", Visser was saying that Crocker's testimony focused on Iranian weapons/military aid to factions in Iraq as its primary means of influence. Visser says this focus on military aid alone is incorrect - Crocker should focus as well on Iran's myriad and longstanding political ties to varying Iraqi factions, which are at least as important and probably far more so than whatever EFPs the Quds Force doles out to the "special groups".

    I think Visser is on the mark here. I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq - in the past American representatives in Baghdad have indicated they believe Iran is pushing the "special groups" to eventually become a Hizbullah-like proxy in Iraq. What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters. The "special groups" to the extent that they exist are not a coherent grouping, have no political aims, and exist mainly to set off IEDs. The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.

  14. #34
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Question Tolstoy

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    think he's got the broad strokes correct. This from your link:is, I believe correct in essence but wrong in detail -- at least in one detail.

    The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.
    Tolstoy wrote in War and Peace:
    When a man acts alone he always carries with him a certain series of considerations, that have as he supposes, directed his past conduct, and that serve to justify to him his present action, and to lead him to make projects for his future activity
    .

    If we accept that the same principle applies for the thinking, planning and perceptions of a man, then how is one to differentiate when one is simply seeing what they wish, what they expect, or what is actually taking place.
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

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    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Question Reference this

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post

    I think Visser is on the mark here. I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq - in the past American representatives in Baghdad have indicated they believe Iran is pushing the "special groups" to eventually become a Hizbullah-like proxy in Iraq. What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters. The "special groups" to the extent that they exist are not a coherent grouping, have no political aims, and exist mainly to set off IEDs. The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.
    What roles do the ISCI actually play in the Iranian governance which would make them anything more than a supported proxy in Iraq. If the only thing they get out of it is control of Iraq while carrying major IOU's to Iran why would it not be preferable to them to owe Iran little to naught and be in control anyway?

    Since the theme seems to be that the party's over and all thats left is to pass out the parting gifts?
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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I got most of that; just think it's a rather silly phrase.

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    ...Crocker should focus as well on Iran's myriad and longstanding political ties to varying Iraqi factions, which are at least as important and probably far more so than whatever EFPs the Quds Force doles out to the "special groups".
    Agreed.
    ...What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters.
    True, thus my annoyance at the (intentional?) mis-labeling -- or misstating by our folks.
    ...The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.
    I'm not sure the initial statement is correct and, while I agree to an extent with the last comment, I don't think it'll make a long term difference.

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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq
    He's right, he's just got the model wrong: Iranian policy closely mirrors that of the Syrians (not the Iranians) in Lebanon--that is, backing a number of different horses at the same time, while trying to position themselves as the mediator/balancer/most important patron.

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    What roles do the ISCI actually play in the Iranian governance which would make them anything more than a supported proxy in Iraq. If the only thing they get out of it is control of Iraq while carrying major IOU's to Iran why would it not be preferable to them to owe Iran little to naught and be in control anyway?
    Research a bit about the history of ISCI - they were originally a splitoff of al-Dawa, the "original" Shia religious party in Iraq, who were heavily influenced by the Iranian Revolution and went with Khomeini's theory of vilayet-i-fiqh rather than the more standard "quietist" school propagated by Najaf at the time. The IRGC, much as it formed the core of Hizbullah originally, formed ISCI's Badr Brigade out of ISCI volunteers and later on Shia POWs from the Iran-Iraq War. Thus Badr's core principally consists of those Iraqi Shia who turned traitor and fought on Iran's side during the war - you can see where the antipathy towards them in Iraq might come from.

    Thus ISCI has historically aligned with Iran for both practical and philosophical reasons. Visser agrees that it is simplistic to call them simply Iranian patsies, just as it is also quite simplistic and inaccurate (IMO far more so in the Lebanese case) to call Lebanese Hizbullah simply Iranian patsies. Both movements have their own motives and political objectives. But on a concrete basis, ISCI's political goals in Iraq mirror those of Iran's (a crippled central government combined with a very strong Shia-dominated southern federal region, thus assuring Iraq's perpetual weakness) far more than any other group, other than perhaps the Kurds (who also favor a weak center dominated by federal regions).

  19. #39
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Wink Thank you for the explanation

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    Research a bit about the history of ISCI - they were originally a splitoff of al-Dawa, the "original" Shia religious party in Iraq, who were heavily influenced by the Iranian Revolution and went with Khomeini's theory of vilayet-i-fiqh rather than the more standard "quietist" school propagated by Najaf at the time. The IRGC, much as it formed the core of Hizbullah originally, formed ISCI's Badr Brigade out of ISCI volunteers and later on Shia POWs from the Iran-Iraq War. Thus Badr's core principally consists of those Iraqi Shia who turned traitor and fought on Iran's side during the war - you can see where the antipathy towards them in Iraq might come from.

    Thus ISCI has historically aligned with Iran for both practical and philosophical reasons. Visser agrees that it is simplistic to call them simply Iranian patsies, just as it is also quite simplistic and inaccurate (IMO far more so in the Lebanese case) to call Lebanese Hizbullah simply Iranian patsies. Both movements have their own motives and political objectives. But on a concrete basis, ISCI's political goals in Iraq mirror those of Iran's (a crippled central government combined with a very strong Shia-dominated southern federal region, thus assuring Iraq's perpetual weakness) far more than any other group, other than perhaps the Kurds (who also favor a weak center dominated by federal regions).
    Considering that this is as you infer a well known fact in the area doesn't it seem somewhat unusual to assume that our leaders there are unaware let alone necessarily complicit in its fruition. I realize it may seem naive of me but somehow I just don't think it's gonna be quite as easy as for ISCI as it may look on the surface.
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

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    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Considering that this is as you infer a well known fact in the area doesn't it seem somewhat unusual to assume that our leaders there are unaware let alone necessarily complicit in its fruition. I realize it may seem naive of me but somehow I just don't think it's gonna be quite as easy as for ISCI as it may look on the surface.
    Our President was unaware of the Sunni/Shi'i divide in Islam until shortly before the invasion of Iraq.

    If there is some secret American plan to sideline or curb ISCI, it does not appear to be working given that party's level of influence in the Iraqi government and security forces. OTOH, ISCI does have the advantage of being a relatively well-disciplined force and never having been caught trying to kill American soldiers - few factions in the Iraqi government can really make that claim, excepting the Kurds.

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