Early Soviet COIN Experience in Central Asia

[marct]

Hi Beelzebubalicious,

I skimmed through this paper at lunch and enjoyed it, especially given that I'm living in a former soviet republic (ukraine). Some interesting examples of social engineering. I'd like to see what Marc T has to say given his recent paper addressing the subject (10 questions).

Well, I just read it through and, if it were handed in for a social science course, I would give it a C+/B-. Where, I kept asking myself, is the freakin' data? Where is the model for social engineering? I don't really have a problem with descriptive papers, which is what this is, but if you want to talk about comparative effects of hard and soft power and their influences on social and cultural engineering, you really do need both a mode and data.

You can argue and poke holes into what the British and Americans have done, but I can't swallow this from what I understand of Soviet attitudes, beliefs and methods. From what I've heard and seen, it was a systematic effort to wipe clean the subject society and replace it with the communist system (that they could then control). It was done with extreme brutality and with every effective means. Frankly, I don't see a lot of parallels with the current American and British efforts.

Oh, the parallels are there but the relative scale is different. The focus on social engineering of an end state, along with the threat of hard power if that end state isn't "acceptable", is a key parallel - you could just replace "communism" with "democracy". The key differences, at least as I see it, are twofold. First, which the author notes, the Russians controlled the area before their civil war and were not about to give it up while Iraq and Afghanistan are not viewed (at least rhetorically) as part of "the West".

Second, and the author doesn't mention this, is that the Soviets were an insurgency with a highly developed political theory and pragmatics (cf. Lenin's military writings). During a fair amount of the time the paper covers, the civil war was still on, but there is no mention at all of any effects of campaigns by the legitimate government (i.e. the White Russians). Given the military campaigns underway and the importance of tha region as a transhipment point for White Russian troops, if find this more than somewhat disturbing.

Of course, from a Russian perspective, and I can't claim to understand this, it may appear that the Soviet occupation and counter-insurgency efforts were, in fact, just the Russian equivalents of other counter-insurgency efforts or occupations. It just doesn't work with me.

One thing about the Russian national character (and I usually don't like such generalizations, but this one actually fits), is that they have a deep seated cultural fear / hatred of "eastern / Islamic hordes" that goes back, at least, to the time of Gengis Khan (say, roughly, 1130 or so). The visciousness of their COIN efforts (or conquest, take your pick) stem, in part, from this fear.

[Jedburgh]

....One thing about the Russian national character (and I usually don't like such generalizations, but this one actually fits), is that they have a deep seated cultural fear / hatred of "eastern / Islamic hordes" that goes back, at least, to the time of Gengis Khan (say, roughly, 1130 or so). The visciousness of their COIN efforts (or conquest, take your pick) stem, in part, from this fear.

Russian Analytical Digest, 2 Jul 08: Russia and Islam

This issue of RAD contains three analytic articles focused on the subject:

Islam and the State in Russia

In dealing with Islam, Putin has sought to ensure that Muslims remain loyal to the state and suppressed any political opposition that appears in religious form. In Muslim-majority regions, local leaders often promote Islamic traditions and use the association with their religion to bolster their authority in the political sphere. The federal authorities often support the use of tradition as a way of promoting stability in the usually volatile North Caucasus. Nevertheless, the authorities seek to exert tight control over what they perceive as an Islamist opposition. Often the federal authorities use harsh methods to crack down on the Islamists, provoking anger in the Muslim community. Traditional forms of Islam are now becoming politicized, giving Muslims a new identity which is gradually cutting off the North Caucasus from the rest of Russia. With its focus on political loyalty, the Kremlin has overlooked this development.

Russia and the Muslim World: The Chechnya Factor and Beyond

This article looks at Russia’s relations to the Muslim world as an aspect of its foreign policy directly related to domestic issues. It argues that because of its own large Muslim population and its desire to conduct an independent foreign policy, Russia has developed a special relationship with Muslim countries and claims a diff erent approach to fighting terrorism than the US. Th is relationship is not without problems, as the case of Iran demonstrates. Also, Russia’s confl ict with Muslim-dominated Chechnya has shown the difficulties that Russian leaders have in coping with autonomy struggles and religious diversity within the Russian Federation.

Muslim Fundamentalism in Dagestan: A Movement on the Rise

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian republic of Dagestan has faced numerous security threats. A number of ethnic groups, clans, and organized crime groups live side by side there and periodically resort to violence to pursue their interests. Violence among Islamic fundamentalist militants is also on the rise. All indications suggest that their underground movements are gaining momentum. Th is article addresses the central questions: Why are more people joining the ranks of these groups and why are they increasingly prone to violence?