Bush-Petraeus and US civ-mil relations

[ipopescu]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...T2008040502476

Today's WP story on the close relation between Bush and Petraeus raises a number of important questions for students of civil-military relations, a number of which have been debated on this forum on other occasions. Of particular importance to me it seems to discuss whether there is anything wrong, as some people quoted in this piece imply, with civilian leaders going down the chain of command and relying more on the advice a particular military leader as opposed to a more formal decision-making process. My gut feeling is that the president ought to be able to select among competing advice from various military leaders to the best of his judgement. As long as all parties have a chance to make their case, I don't see a big problem with it. But I look forward to hearing good counter-arguments...

Here are a few good paragraphs from the piece:

In the waning months of his administration, Bush has hitched his fortunes to those of his bookish four-star general, bypassing several levels of the military chain of command to give Petraeus a privileged voice in White House deliberations over Iraq, according to current and former administration officials and retired officers. In so doing, Bush's working relationship with his field commander has taken on an intensity that is rare in the history of the nation's wartime presidents...
Bush's reliance on Petraeus has made other military officials uneasy, has rankled congressional Democrats and has created friction that helped spur the departure last month of Adm. William J. "Fox" Fallon, who, while Petraeus's boss as chief of U.S. Central Command, found his voice eclipsed on Iraq...
Bush's relationship with Petraeus marks a departure for modern war presidencies. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton left it largely to their military advisers in Washington to communicate with field commanders, according to scholars of civilian-military relations...

[John T. Fishel]

The President is THE Commander-in-Chief. As such, he can take advice from anybody he wants. As President Washington established in 1794, in that role he can put on a uniform and take the field in person.

I don't see it as a question of CMR. But rather as one of quality of decision making. In this case, I believe the President is right to listen directly to his field commander bot in preference to his CJCS and COMCENT as long as he doesn't cut the CJCS out of the loop. (If he has lost confidence in the CJCS then he should ask for his resignation...)

Cheers

JohnT

[Rank amateur]

Some in this administration have a history of listening only to those who tell them what they want to hear. I think the issue is whether that's happening again. (I don't know, but if it's not than I don't see a problem.)

It'll be interesting to see if those who are passed over in the chain of command want a little payback against Petraeus when the president's term is over.

[Ken White]

...It'll be interesting to see if those who are passed over in the chain of command want a little payback against Petraeus when the president's term is over.

between Bush and Petraeus who could do that. Petraeus outranks Dempsey...

[Rob Thornton]

From what I can tell through the news, the President, Congress and the Secretary of Defense are getting the type of advice that helps them understand the risk, understand the conditions both at home and in Iraq (or Afghanistan) for that matter. The service chiefs, the GCC, and the CJCS have all been vocal - I'd attribute a good chunk of this candor to the positive atmosphere created by Secretary Gates, that those in uniform charged to give their best advice and judgment before elected officials should in fact do just that.

General Petreaus is being asked to do likewise based on the responsibilities and authorities to which he's been given as the MNF-I CDR, not as a service chief, a GCC or anything else. While I suspect he is as conscious about strains on the services, or about strategic risk in other parts of the globe, remember he is testifying on the war in Iraq. I'm sure Congress will ask related questions of the type we saw last time, be they about Iran, Turkey, the broader Long War, service strains, MRAP, you name it, but the focus of their questions should be on the war in Iraq.

Some in Congress (from both sides) will use the opportunity to ask questions which will be more statements designed to support their personal or political view(s) and ambition; showing the role domestic politics has on FP - to be expected - it was done last time, and will be done this time.

I read a page on the flight today from Colin Gray's Book "Another Bloody Century: Future War" that I think is worth quoting:

None the less, American strategic and military culture does have a long standing tendency to take a narrow military view of war, which is perhaps understandable for a military culture rigid in its determination to to eschew politics, and in practice to discount consideration of, and preparation for, the character of the peace that should follow. This is a classic example of an army (I think meaning "military" - Rob) having the vices of its virtues. The U.S. Armed Forces have a long and praiseworthy tradition of staying out of politics. The military are professionals in 'the management of violence', while policy, the purpose for which violence is managed, is strictly a civilian responsibility. Despite the basic merit in this division of responsibilities, it has the potential for strategic disaster, disappointment at least, if the political and military realms fail to conduct an honest dialogue. That dialogue obviously threatens to draw soldiers into policymaking and civilian policy makers into military planning and strategy. There should be nothing surprising about this condition. After all, Clausewitz argued:

Once again: war is an instrument of policy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and measure by its standards. The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword instead of the pen, but on that account does not cease to think according to its own laws.


A little earlier, Clausewitz cautioned that 'a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy'. That requirement is far from habitually met, and points to the need for civilian amateurs to engage with military issues, possibly in opposition to the views of military professionals.

pg 190.

On the preceding page Gray mentions the errors a military can fall victim to(bolded where drawn from the text):

1) confusing military with strategic success - meaning the former is about defeating enemy forces, the latter is about using the defeat to advance policy goals, and in this case our interests in the region, with regard to the Long War, and with our long range interests.

2) confusing combat with war - understanding that when one type of combat ends, it does not necessarily mean the war is over - there is more to war then combat, and securing the gains achieved through combat is vital with regard to the policy end.

3) This last one war is about peace, not about itself, goes back to another observation made by Gray regarding the end of "securing a better peace, as opposed to trying to achieve a "victory"" paraphrased . I think that is a very pragmatic and useful way for both military and civilians to look at war (not warfare) a "better peace" does not mean daydreaming that we'll never go to war again - that somehow everyone will have learned their lesson; on the contrary its about achieving your policy goals - both those that are immediate, and those that are related, enduring and potentially further down the pike - so that when war does inevitably occur, we are better positioned.

In my mind, lawmakers asking the questions and military and diplomatic professionals answering those questions should put Iraq within the context of what we are trying to achieve both inside and outside of Iraq, both now and with regard to the future. In my mind, the context should determine the weight and worth allocated to the Clausewitzian "object in view". It should not be relegated to the rationale for our invasion of Iraq - it should be discussed with what "a better peace" means in terms of securing our short and long term interests. The former is about domestic political posturing, the latter is about advancing our FP interests.

Best, Rob

[George L. Singleton]

[QUOTE=ipopescu;44110]http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...T2008040502476

Today's WP story on the close relation between Bush and Petraeus raises a number of important questions for students of civil-military relations, a number of which have been debated on this forum on other occasions. Of particular importance to me it seems to discuss whether there is anything wrong, as some people quoted in this piece imply, with civilian leaders going down the chain of command and relying more on the advice a particular military leader as opposed to a more formal decision-making process. My gut feeling is that the president ought to be able to select among competing advice from various military leaders to the best of his judgement. As long as all parties have a chance to make their case, I don't see a big problem with it. But I look forward to hearing good counter-arguments...

Here are some reactions from/by Colonel George Singleton, USAF, a veteran of the 1965 Indo-Paksitan War and of Desert Storm (I) when he volunteered from the active reserve back onto active duty to hep run that war's airlift from Charleston AFB as Assistant Deputy Commander for Airlift starting January 1, 1991:

I think if our Duke University Political Science Professor reads US Civil War History he finds more often than not that President Lincoln delt directly with various field commanding Generals who he fired, sometimes rehired, but delt with directly to keep his finger on the literal pulse of field and battle field ops.

Considering that any Private on up can be interviewed and quoted in the world news media these days, which violates all past norms of at war information control and censorship, I see nothing wrong in and do not object to the President's style of dealing directly for information with folks like General Petraeus.

One has to assume, which the Professor overlooks innocently I'm sure, that General Petraeus most likely vets his ideas that are written down through his chain of command in advance of meetings with the President or hearings before the Congress.

George L. Singleton, Colonel, USAF, Ret.
History major, University of Alabama, College of A&S, 1962
US Embassy, Karachi, Pakistan, 1963-1965 (U-2 Base @ Peshawar Liaison Officer inside the US Embassy then in Karachi, W. Pak.); retired reserve 06, at the Assistant Chief of Staff levels (J-1 and J-4), HQUSSOCOM, retired 1994); retired US Civil Service and former Area Manager, NDMS (National Disaster Medical System, then made up of VA, FEMA, USPHS, & DOD).

[John T. Fishel]

While Gray is correct in his analysis of the historical general case of the US Army as generally divorced from policy, he doesn't take account to the evolution that began with the National Security Act of 1947 and accellerated with Goldwater-Nichols. The former made the JCS the military advisors to the President while the latter made the CJCS the PRINCIPAL military advisor to the President and placed him in the position of statutory advisor to the NSC. In practice, this has made the CJCS a full participant in the Principals Committee, the VCJCS a full participant in the Deputies Commmittee, and the JS full participants in the PCCs. In effect, since at least 1986 and perhaps 1947 the military have been fully integrated into the policy making process.

Cheers

JohnT

[ipopescu]

I think if our Duke University Political Science Professor reads US Civil War History he finds more often than not that President Lincoln delt directly with various field commanding Generals who he fired, sometimes rehired, but delt with directly to keep his finger on the literal pulse of field and battle field ops.

Sir, I am merely a grad student at Duke. As for your substantive point, I agree with it. I think Eliot Cohen in his analysis of Lincoln in Supreme Command persuasively makes the case that Lincoln's "hands-on" approach to civ-mil relations is one that deserves careful study by our present leaders.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi John, Good points - but I read Gray's points more broadly. While I think we've taken steps to mitigate the disconnects - such as the CJCS's responsibilities, I think the broader point is that there is a gap in understanding between the civilians and the uniformed side. There is also the issue of how much an administration wishes to avail itself of that advice, and I think a related issue of how much the CJCS, Service Chiefs, Functional CMDs and GCCs are perceived by Congress as partisan based on a congressional members own domestic political bias and ambitions is also important. I suspect we'll see some of this played out over the next few days.

It might be summed up as an issue regarding the willingness of all parties to use the system to its full potential for the purpose of providing the best advice to all and building as common a picture as possible so risk is articulated, and decisions can be made.

Best, Rob

[George L. Singleton]

Sir, I am merely a grad student at Duke. As for your substantive point, I agree with it. I think Eliot Cohen in his analysis of Lincoln in Supreme Command persuasively makes the case that Lincoln's "hands-on" approach to civ-mil relations is one that deserves careful study by our present leaders.

I am glad to be corrected that you are a Duke graduate student vs. a Duke Professor. I hope you continue your studies and completge a PhD and teach college level history.

My wife and I have just completed putting three daughters through two degrees each, and it is expensive, as it is expensive at Duke. Oldest earned two architecture degrees, concurrently, at Auburn. One twin did a combined undergraduate/MEd two degrees at Vanderbilt where senior year was all graduate courses counted dually for undergrad and graduate school first year, so the MEd then only required one actual additional grad school year. Second twin did a BA in Spanish and Sociology at Furman University, then a two year Masters in Teaching English as a Second Language in the Graduate School of The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa.

Keep up your good studies and don't pay much attention to us old 68 year old back bencher retired Air Force 06s.

[ipopescu]

Rob,
Excellent post; I'm happy you brought Colin Gray's passages into discussion, in particular these two:

Confusing military with strategic success - meaning the former is about defeating enemy forces, the latter is about using the defeat to advance policy goals, and in this case our interests in the region, with regard to the Long War, and with our long range interests.

This last one war is about peace, not about itself, goes back to another observation made by Gray regarding the end of "securing a better peace, as opposed to trying to achieve a "victory"" paraphrased

As a "dogmatic" follower of Clausewitz in believing that wars are ultimately judged by the quality of the peace that they bring, i.e. the accomplishment of what people often refer to as the "political" objectives, I often have had some sympathy for those who argue that it's somewhat illogical to talk about "success" on the military side while the political goals are unmet. If wars are about obtaining political results from he application of military force, than I think it's rather unhelpful to separate between "military" vs. "political" objectives. Having said that, I fully agree that members of Congress ought to realistically appraise what's the most likely political outcome that we can get in Iraq from this point on, regardless of initial expectations, and compare the costs of continuing our presence with the likely costs of withdrawal.

For a good discussion of what "victory" and "success" should be thought off at this point, this recent memo from my previous boss Tony Cordesman makes some fine "real-world" arguments.

On a larger point, I believe Dr. Gray's critique of the American way of war, in particular its separation of military and political spheres, is unfortunately illustrated in a way even by the very form in which we hold these upcoming hearings: Petraeus is there to talk about the military side, and Crocker about the political side, as if they are separate things. Clearly in the operational conduct of these operations we have a much better (if far from ideal) symbiosis between the civilian and military components in the field, but I seriously wonder if most decision-makers in Washington conceptualize of war and strategy in a way that Gray (or Clausewitz) would approve. And considering that current warfare seems to require an ever higher level of strategic acuity in obtaining political goals through the use of force, that's all the more unfortunate...

Best,
Ionut

[Ken White]

One minor problem with Gray's construct -- and to a lesser extent, yours and Cordesman's, IMO, is that all three envision a political and military convergence that has never existed in this country. The British do it very well as do most Commonwealth countries but it is alien to historical practice here. I cannot say it will never happen but believe it is unlikely given our current structure of government. The frequent (if not constant) tension caused by domestic politics between Congress and the Executive branch has and will generally serve to disrupt any meaningful effort to get significant cooperation. Cooperation and unity of effort can be and probably will be improved but integration on the European model is highly unlikely.

I'm pretty well convinced that in any counterinsurgency effort, any talk of victory or defeat, of winning or losing is specious. Those words shouldn't be used to talk of possible outcomes. Not only the politicians but the Armed forces need to stop using them. The best that has been since WW II or can ever be achieved, short of scorched earth -- which we aren't going to do -- is an acceptable outcome; the worst is abandoning the effort and the possibility of an undesirable but usually not crippling outcome to us as an assister, for the host nation it can be a disaster. This particular effort is subject to those parameters but also has an added consideration. Perception of 'defeat.' In the case of Iraq and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan, our precipitous departure would trigger the perception, not the reality, that AQ et.al. had 'won.' They would of course tout this view loudly even though it would be incorrect and it would do them some good for a while. It would likely embolden them to attempt other attacks in order to attain their goals. In short, it would not be a disaster to us but it most likely would be the source of more and more grave long term trouble than would staying in both nations for quite some time. Obviously it would be far more dangerous for Iraq.

Al Qaeda in Iraq is problematic, no question and they aren't going away soon; in Zawahiri's latest Q&A session videotape, he acknowledges Iraq is their principal concern. However, both he and Cordesman rely on the long term viability of AQ for their assessments -- possibly they're correct. However, there are a number of other efforts than those readily visible addressing AQ as an entity. We'll see.

[Rob Thornton]

From Ionut:

but I seriously wonder if most decision-makers in Washington conceptualize of war and strategy in a way that Gray (or Clausewitz) would approve.

From Ken:

is that all three envision a political and military convergence that has never existed in this country.

Ken- great point. I think the argument on the U.S.'s role in the world may be as old as our country is, although I suspect the argument's motivation and character has changed some over time based on the nature of our domestic politics. Occasionally, this argument has had bearing on our ability to secure both our FP objectives, and our domestic security (really talking about up to the early 1900s with regard to the domestic bit).

I'd be interested to hear from some of our British folks with regard GB's strategic culture and how its changed - particularly over the last 50 years.

I think you can get some great insights into this argument by questions like:

"How does our continued military involvement in Iraq benefit, or make safer the U.S?"

A legitimate question, even the construct of the question gives some insight into how we think about ourself, and about how we think about our role in the world. It plays to how a great many Americans feel about our focus, and I'd say reflects our beginnings and to some degree a nostalgia that we may have through our actions, physically left behind with our involvement in WWII, and post war role in the world. I say "physically" since that may coincide with developing and sustaining the means to achieve super power status, but the seeds for this were sewn long before.

I'm often amazed at how we seem to want it both ways, we want cheap goods, trade that benefits us, the honor & prestige associated with being American in terms of influencing others - be it our call for human rights around the world, freedom of expression extended to places that have forms of govt. that are incompatible with those ideas for a number of reasons, etc., but with the exception of the most visible, and undeniable circumstances, we don't wish to sustain the level of involvment (and the means to support them) to influence our objectives over time. In the tradition of fear, honor & interests (but with an American twist) we generally publicly eschew the use of military force except to respond to an attack, or to the clearest manifestation of a threat.

I think this often creates conditions that jeopardize national security - both by denying areas that are of interest to us directly and indirectly, and by extension, the readiness of our military forces (the examples that come to mind are Thomas Jefferson's Gunboat Navy ( a kind of coastal Navy), and the various drawdowns that have occurred as part of post war - including the Cold War - activities.) Ironically, the last reduction in military forces (particularly ground forces) was thought of as a "Peace Dividend", which culturally was sold and bought to some degree as a notion that strong military forces were not needed in post war environment to sustain U.S. interests, and to secure those freedoms for future generations - it may even be that culturally we see the sustained existence of those forces as both a draw on resources better spent on domestic issues, or as rational to go to war, as opposed to finding some way to work through our international disputes in a manner more fitting of how we'd like the world to be, or how we'd like to see ourselves.

Its also interesting to me how the conept of "airpower" has played a role in our national psyche - the idea that somehow its more fitting to our international role, then the messiness and risk associated with getting personal and interactive on the ground. Not a ding against our brothers in blue, but technology is a decidedly American theme, that to me somehow correlates to the false comfort of Jefferson's gunboats, and to the notion that interests can be secured by maintaining the equivalent of a "fleet in being" and a "Periclean Wall".

To me its clear that over the course of our history those Americans who have advanced the idea that military readiness must be maintained in times of relative peace, or those who have advocated for strong FP in order to safeguard our interests have been labeled as Hawks, or more recently "war mongers" by their corresponding American number, while somehow those who take an opposite tack, and I think contribute to inconsistency, and unpreparedness both from the standpoint of means and national will are labeled as Doves, Peacemakers, etc. There is virtually no middle-ground that allows for exploration of the requirement for strength that must occasionally, perhaps inevitably be challenged and exercised in order to sustain peace.

It seems we'd like to dispense with the unpleasant parts of human nature, and act surprised, and offended when someone does or wishes us harm - getting back to Thucydides, and Clausewitz, passion now overrides reason and consistent policy is out the window - all three; fear, honor and interest take hold on national scale, and domestic politics becomes FP writ large. Its no wonder our actions are unwieldy in that context. To add to that, it would seem that once our initial inertia is overcome, we overcompensate on the domestic political side and as a result remain in a sort of lumbering state - having forgotten or put aside our initial domestic passion for international action we remain fixed to the conditions as they were, vs. as they are, or dealing with the consequences of those actions with regard to abrupt policy changes which may set the conditions for future choices, some of which are very nasty, but potentially unavoidable unless we at least consider them as a result of actions or inactions. My assessment is we prefer to see the world as we'd like it to be vs. as the way it is, and we'd prefer to have things on our terms without putting forward the effort to achieve them.

Ionut, I think there is an interesting dichotomy at work with regard to politics. From what I can tell, most politicians do not conceptualize military or grand strategy in terms Clausewitz articulated - however, they certainly they certainly espouse those terms they choose when conducting political campaigns - since they spend so much time trying to get elected and remain elected, it may be all the energy they have time for. I draw a distinction between statesman (elected or appointed and I think Henry Kissinger had a good enough observation -- "The statesman's duty is to bridge the gap between experience and vision.") and politician - whose first obligation would be to get elected and the second to remain elected - and all that entails. I'd label those as archetypes, and most fall somewhere in between, as do most of us on the military fall somewhere between Anton Myers' Massengale and Damon.

Best, Rob

[jcustis]

Ionut,

I don't have anything enlightening to say, but I just wanted to take the time to say thank you for diving in of sorts here. It's refreshing to see thoughtful talent like yourself on the Council, and I hope you take away (and give back as well ) much from your future discussions.

[jcustis]

In my mind, lawmakers asking the questions and military and diplomatic professionals answering those questions should put Iraq within the context of what we are trying to achieve both inside and outside of Iraq, both now and with regard to the future.

Although Petraeus deferred from getting sucked into the question, he was asked during testimony today if he thought our presence in Iraq created more terrorists than we were eliminating.

It was an interesting moment, because the committee member asking the question (I can't recall who it was) was referencing discussion he'd had with purportedly senior intelligence officials. According to the officials, they thought we were in a negative sum game.

...then the singing started...

[Ron Humphrey]

Although Petraeus deferred from getting sucked into the question, he was asked during testimony today if he thought our presence in Iraq created more terrorists than we were eliminating.

It was an interesting moment, because the committee member asking the question (I can't recall who it was) was referencing discussion he'd had with purportedly senior intelligence officials. According to the officials, they thought we were in a negative sum game.

...then the singing started...

I've always been somewhat perplexed by the apparent lack of thinking all the way through that. I remember an apartment I had once where from the day I moved in I would end up killing at least 2 roaches. Quite the indicator of a much larger problem. At first opportunity I got everything prepared and I set off a (chemical bug elimination aparatus)

All the sudden not only did I see 2 or 3 but almost so many I lost count. Some got away most died but I don't remember ever thinking that perhaps I was making my problem worse.

Now why is that

[Rank amateur]

I've always been somewhat perplexed by the apparent lack of thinking all the way through that. I remember an apartment I had once where from the day I moved in I would end up killing at least 2 roaches. Quite the indicator of a much larger problem. At first opportunity I got everything prepared and I set off a (chemical bug elimination aparatus)

All the sudden not only did I see 2 or 3 but almost so many I lost count. Some got away most died but I don't remember ever thinking that perhaps I was making my problem worse.

Now why is that

Did you get rid of the roaches, or did they just find somewhere else to breed and keep coming back? Did you eventually decide that it made more sense to move to a roach free apartment?

I fully agree that members of Congress ought to realistically appraise what's the most likely political outcome that we can get in Iraq from this point on, regardless of initial expectations, and compare the costs of continuing our presence with the likely costs of withdrawal.

Unfortunately, to some degree all of those elements are subjective and most people have already made up their mind.

[Ron Humphrey]

Did you get rid of the roaches, or did they just find somewhere else to breed and keep coming back? Did you eventually decide that it made more sense to move to a roach free apartment?
.

I kinda figured after everything I had put into addressing the problem it wouldn't make sense leave, I mean after all I had chosen to deal with it rather than just leave because it was not the way I wanted it right off

The only problem I did have was this neighbor who swore up and down they didn't have them but there were lots of signs that they did. I addressed it through the landlord and eventually they went in and took care of it themselves

[Rank amateur]

The only problem I did have was this neighbor who swore up and down they didn't have them but there were lots of signs that they did. I addressed it through the landlord and eventually they went in and took care of it themselves

You can't believe lies about the breeding ground. You need to find it and neutralize it: even if you need to ask for help.

[Ron Humphrey]

You can't believe lies about the breeding ground. You need to find it and neutralize it: even if you need to ask for help.

One can't always isolate exactly where the breeding ground is because it is generally hidden within the environment. And one can't just neutralize anything within a given area because the neighbors might get upset when their pets are harmed. So generally you just have to be patient and when the eggs hatch you make sure and get them as soon as they show