Cop in the Hood

[Shek]

I came across this excerpt from the book http://www.amazon.com/Cop-Hood-Polic...rginalrevol-20 from one of the blogs I frequent. While I don't know how well fleshed out the critique from Sherman is, it certainly rings familiar with a lot of our early COIN experience in OIF.

Car patrol eliminated the neighborhood police officer. Police were pulled off neighborhood beats to fill cars. But motorized patrol -- the cornerstone of urban policing -- has no effect on crime rates, victimization, or public satisfaction. Lawrence Sherman was an early critic of telephone dispatch and motorized patrol, noted, "The rise of telephone dispatch transformed both the method and purpose of patrol. Instead of watching to prevent crime, motorized police patrol became a process of merely waiting to respond to crime."

[oblong]

Moskos has some interesting remarks in the comments on that post, if it was. I'm very interested in the Kansas City Preventative Patrol experiment he mentioned.

[Shek]

Oblong,

Thanks for pointing out that Moskos had commented on the post - I hadn't checked out the comments yet. This is from the same blog post you were thinking of: http://www.marginalrevolution.com/ma....html#comments

Here's a link with more information on the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/kansas.html

Here's Moskos' blog: http://www.copinthehood.com/

Interesting stuff.

[Maximus]

I think I've stated this elsewhere in previous threads... if not here goes, among the best two PMEs/instructional lessons I've had since back from OIF II were 2 ride-alongs with the Metro PD in D.C. and one with a counter-gang unit in LA. Both truly eye-opening experiences with a number of lessons learned on things that I wish I'd done and trained my unit to do in Iraq. With respect to comments on vehicle patrols, both in D.C. and LA I travelled in vehicles at times, "walked the beat" at times, and even ate at local restaurants while on the job. The major difference I noticed between the cops and Marines/Soldiers when it comes to employing vehicles is that the military used HMMWVs as a primary means of patrolling and rarely, if ever got out. The cops used the vehicles to reach the outer fringes of their AOs and got out often. For example, the cop I was with in D.C. knew every kid/teenager on the street throughout the night, where they lived, most parents' occupation, etc. I barely knew the names of 10 families in my AO (granted I was 1 of 2 patrolling elements in the 600,000 person town of Najaf). The cop's "AO" was no larger than 500 meters x 500 meters. I also was only in Najaf for 4 months. The cop worked in his AO for 2 years.

While I'm not a huge fan of technology and the dispatch type-operating environment mentioned, I did see the merit of such a system while in D.C. In the course of the patrol we stopped in one section of a neighborhood. While stopped dispatch called with the address of an ongoing domestic abuse incident. The cop "knew his turf" so well that we were at the door (along with another squad car) within 1 minute (a few blocks drive). The cops proceeded to knock on the door, saw the woman with a mark on her neck, asked who was responsible, the woman said "my boyfriend" and before she could finish saying his first name, one of the cops stated his last name, asked if he still drove a certain make/model of a car and lived at a certain address. She shook her head yes. The cop then tapped the button on his motorola radio and had another squad car routed to the guy's house. This all within a 2-minute time period. As I watched I thought NOW THIS IS EXPLOITING ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE!

My experience with the LA counter-gang unit was equally valuable. We in the military have lots to learn from our brothers in arms back here at home.

Semper Fi,
Scott

[bismark17]

I have to agree with the comments. It's an easy solution to maximize your patrol coverage by going to one person cars and getting as many people out there as you can but it's just a false panacea. It's a feel good solution that is meant to cut down on call dispatch times as well as maximize visibility. However, having those as your main areas of focus removes officers from having time to gain rapport with the people and players in their beats. There just isn't time to talk to people when your jumping from call to call. It seems that Police Administrations jumped on that but didn't jump on the other part of the methodology which was focused based policing or Intel led policing. Random patrol equals random results.

[slapout9]

Shek, I have only read short excerpts and reviews of this guy's book but from what I have seen it is very accurate. He is dead on about walking a beat being used as a form punishment. I saw that happen more than a few times.

[Sergeant T]

I always thought of single officer vehicle/911 response oriented deployment as the public safety equivalent of the Just-In-Time business process. Moving away from that would require hiring more bodies, something nobody has the money to do. At this point it would probably be cost prohibitive to move to a different model.

Bicycle patrol is a proven method that bridges the gap between foot and vehicle patrols, offering public accessibility and good mobility. The problem more often than not is administrators raised on the single officer vehicle that simply can’t let go of the paradigm. (The other problem is finding officers fit enough to ride a bike for an entire shift.) As crime stats rise and response times lengthen the refrain heard over and over from management is to “Hit the nail harder”.

[davidbfpo]

Nice to see another American academic has left his university (aka ivory tower) for the reality of the mean streets and put a uniform on. There was a classic sociology professor who did this in the early 1980's, alas name lost.

Although both books are from the early 1980's I always enjoyed James McClure's observations on policing: Spike Island (set in Liverpool) and Cop World (set in San Diego). McClure was a South African born journalist, who wrote several novels on policing in South Africa and died a few years ago.

I've seen US policing first hand, mainly in urban areas and have been a UK cop for 25yrs plus. Motorised policing is far too confrontation orientated and few US departments actually did patrol by walking and talk. Here there is a noticeable difference between those who started by walking and talking compared to those who were taught in a car.

The UK has gone through periods when local / neighbourhood policing has been emphasised and then withers - we currently are in a neighbourhood team everywhere process, with the Prime Minister's personal endorsement.

The option for cycling patrol now exists locally and one colleague just loves it, being paid to cycle around for eight hours talking to people great.

One snag with neighbourhood policing is that they can prefer to let others do the hand on bit, arrests and searching. Secondly in this IT age access to robust IT kit without going back to the local station (the Japanese get over this by having small facilities in every neighbourhood). Once the neighbourhood officer is in a station it is hard to get them out again.

In the Northern Ireland Troubles context the police, the RUC (now PSNI), could not patrol urban Republican areas without protection, armoured Land Rovers and community policing was largely done in plainclothes in clearly defined, safe contexts - with people you knew. Protestant or Loyalist areas were very different, some needed the same level of protection, there is testimony in several court cases where interaction with the public and suspects was possible.

One particular problem for both communities was the stealing of cars, their racing around and abandonment. Once the RUC had the power to remove such cars and reduce the local nuisance impact that helped with wider community policing issues. Interestingly this lesson learnt took several years to migrate across the Irish Sea to England.

Community or neighbourhood policing must be visible and seen by the local residents to have an effect now, not in some distant future.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

The major difference I noticed between the cops and Marines/Soldiers when it comes to employing vehicles is that the military used HMMWVs as a primary means of patrolling and rarely, if ever got out. The cops used the vehicles to reach the outer fringes of their AOs and got out often.

This is an interesting point. One of the greatest mistakes the IRA in South Armagh made was to use IEDs to stop the British Army using the roads. It took just 6-7 big IEDs for 95% of overt Army vehicle road movement in the area to cease, for over 10 years.

This meant extended wide area foot patrolling, and thus to kill British soldiers the IRA had to try and become snipers. The effort they expended versus the casualties they caused were massively disproportionate, and they got rolled up pretty quickly, because the skill the UK had in droves was Patrolling. - which is how they had defeated the snipers in urban areas.

...unless you can succeed on foot, all else is rubbish!

[Sergeant T]

Very quick read, clocking in at less than 200 pages. The first ¾ of the book is a drive by of what it’s like to be a patrol officer in an urban environment. Nothing big or shocking for anyone that’s currently or has ever been on the job. For those unfamiliar it might be a bit of an eye opener. Moskos gives pretty fair treatment to officer’s attitudes and discretion. The last ¼ of the book is dedicated to the War on Drugs and legalization. Overall not bad, but the last quarter should be expanded into a stand alone publication.

An innovative analysis by Eric Cadora highlights "million-dollar blocks"-individual city blocks where more than one million dollars per block per year are spent to incarcerate individuals from that block. Some blocks cost over five million dollars per year. Cadora does not question the justness of these incarcerations. But he does suspect there may be better ways to spend these criminal-justice dollars. A million dollars, coincidentally, is roughly what it would cost to pay for one patrol officer, twenty-four hours a day, every day for one year. pg. 188

Has anyone ever laid out the mechanics of how legalization would function? (Prescription only? Dispensation at public health clinics? Who manufactures?) Also, has anyone considered the pushback from current suppliers if they’re suddenly cut out of the market? Does anyone think a multi-billion dollar tax-free industry is going to go quietly into the night?

[Rank amateur]

Does anyone think a multi-billion dollar tax-free industry is going to go quietly into the night?

The mob moved on to other things when the government took over gambling. Legalization will never happen, but it could work. The key would be to legalize pot and put very high jail sentences for POSSESSION of all other drugs. That would start decreasing demand for the other drugs. Then, we'd need more policing, and more treatment, to get the addicts straight, or at least move them to pot and booze.

[slapout9]

Has anyone ever laid out the mechanics of how legalization would function? (Prescription only? Dispensation at public health clinics? Who manufactures?) Also, has anyone considered the pushback from current suppliers if they’re suddenly cut out of the market? Does anyone think a multi-billion dollar tax-free industry is going to go quietly into the night?

This is a very key point...and I agree they would not go quietly.

[selil]

Back in the 90s one of the non-trad magazine (Hustler, or Playboy I can't remember) did a n analysis of hard line anti-drug legislators and found drug money in their campaign contributions. If I remember correctly Doonesbury even did a comic about it. The drug runner have nothing to gain by legalization. With 48 perent of the current incarcerated state/federal population simple possession (no property or violent crime history) the system (unions, law enforcement, courts) have nothing to gain by legalization.

[bourbon]

Here is a particularly cynical question: How many countries economies or governments would collapse, or be significantly debilitated, if drugs were legalized and the price floor collapsed?

In how many of that number do we have an interest in making sure that does not happen? How many countries in the Balkan Route alone?

What would happen to Mexico? Further, being on the end of the value chain, what would happen to the U.S. economy if an industry, that on the global level rivals the automobile industry, went away overnight?

[Sergeant T]

With 48 perent of the current incarcerated state/federal population simple possession (no property or violent crime history) the system (unions, law enforcement, courts) have nothing to gain by legalization.

I think a 48% reduction in prison population would bring it down to a mere 100% of capacity, depending on the jurisdiction. Besides, California is talking about laying off DoC people. I heard the stat a while back that California adds 5000 inmates every 90 days.

Legalization would allow law enforcement to focus on things like crime. Moskos outlines the extra time and paperwork that a drug arrest entails, which runs pretty consistent with my experience. Plus, corrections departments would have more space available, negating the current choices between paroling a violent criminal or someone serving an absurd mandatory minimum. Violent criminals doing full time would do more towards reducing the crime rate than mandatory minimums ever did.