Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife

[Maximus]

Quote: Originally Posted by Ken White
Of course, my solution is don't do COIN and advising on a major level; we really don't do it well at all. Never have and that is unlikely to change. We haven't got the patience for it and one can't do that kind of stuff even marginally well if one's going to have short tours and 15 months is a short tour; 12 months is also. Seven months or less is just a visit

We need to convince folks that hosting people who wish us ill is uncool. Best way to do that is to visit those that do so in an unpleasant mode, wreak major destruction and leave rapidly -- saying be nice or we'll be back.

Ken:

Sage advice from you as usual. Too bad others in higher places might not be listening. I think your plainly spoken words might be a good recipe for Afghanistan.

Gentlemen,

Have been following this exchange with great interest. The quotes above got me thinking: wouldn’t it be great if war was this easy. On second thought though, my mind came back to our retaliatory tomahawk “raids” into the Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. Did Al Qaeda get the “be nice or we’ll be back” message? Unfortunately, I think we sent just the opposite message: if you’re not nice we’ll launch an airstrike or two, maybe a few missiles, but otherwise leave you alone. And this only served to motivate Al Qaeda even further. If we left Afghanistan today, I’m afraid we’d pay an even greater price.

What else could we have done in 1998? Some might say altogether eliminate places where we believed Al Qaeda training grounds were on the map. This simply wasn’t an option in 1998, and unless Al Qaeda launches a WMD attack in the US or against one of our closest allies, I don’t think it will ever be an option.

So what other options did we have/do we have? Sending in the “stormtroops” from the 1stMarDiv or 82nd Airborne sounds great as well. Launch us into Afghan/Pakistan border, destroy a few villages alleged to support Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar and then come home to a parade. Don’t have to worry about lengthy deployments, heavy logistics tails, none of this SASO or COIN stuff. Don’t have to debate is the proper term: IW, Complex IW, hybrid, small wars, SASO, Phase IV or Phase V, COIN, etc. In fact, this is what we were told in the initial days of OIF: after Baghdad falls, the President wants his “stormtroops” home. This certainly motivated all the Marines in the “march up.” As we all know now though, the so-called “stormtroops” were extended for 5 months, sent home for about 7, and have been back on the ground ever since. Aside from reality differing from the “wreak destruction” and leave option, I think there’s a few other problems with this way of thinking as well. What’d we do after the Japanese attempted to wreak major destruction on us at Pearl Harbor? Did we succumb to their will? Again, just the opposite. And did the Japanese succumb to our will after losing island-after-island, enduring an intense firebombing campaign against Tokyo, the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, etc. I think in many ways Phase 4 and Phase 5 operations applied in Japan in 1945 just as they do in Iraq now. With respect to Iraq, did Saddam ever succumb to our will after Desert Storm or later when we tried an airstrike/tomahawk heavy attack during Desert Fox? I’d argue he was a constant pain in the a__ and our containment strategy against Iraq throughout the 1990’s was quickly losing all effectiveness, if not worse.

With respect to no large US advisor mission has ever succeeded… have we ever really tried? We had many “advisors” in Vietnam but these advisors were faced with many of the same problems we have today: too often ad hoc, not always the “best and brightest,” inconsistent training, unity of command, mirror imaging, etc. I think Ken makes a good point about it would take around 3 years to stand-up LtCol Nagl’s proposed Advisor Corps. Maybe. Depends on if we’re serious about the importance of the effort. I made a similar argument on the Marine Corps side of the house in late 2005-2006. We’ve (USMC) made strides in the right direction, but I still don’t think we’ve found the answer. If we identified training and advising indigenous forces as the main efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005-2006, Ken’s 3 year mark would already be here or at least we’d be very close. So here we are in 2008, still arguing about priorities, deployment lengths, stretching the force, allegedly destroying our conventional warfighting capabilities, etc. Leaves me wondering again and again: do we really want to succeed or is preserving the force and the current status quo the priority. As we close on the 5-year anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, the thought of us still arguing about what to do in Phases 4-5 really troubles me.

Semper Fi,
Scott

[Ken White]

...Have been following this exchange with great interest. The quotes above got me thinking: wouldn’t it be great if war was this easy...

Sure would, pity it never is.

... On second thought though, my mind came back to our retaliatory tomahawk “raids” into the Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. Did Al Qaeda get the “be nice or we’ll be back” message? Unfortunately, I think we sent just the opposite message: if you’re not nice we’ll launch an airstrike or two, maybe a few missiles, but otherwise leave you alone. And this only served to motivate Al Qaeda even further. If we left Afghanistan today, I’m afraid we’d pay an even greater price.

True in both cases, IMO.

What else could we have done in 1998? Some might say altogether eliminate places where we believed Al Qaeda training grounds were on the map. This simply wasn’t an option in 1998, and unless Al Qaeda launches a WMD attack in the US or against one of our closest allies, I don’t think it will ever be an option.

That's true as well. I would submit that had we heeded the gospel according to Ken, 1998 as you appear to use the year, would not have occurred. Goes back to Carter's mishandling of Iran; Reagan's miserable failures in Lebanon, G.H.W. Bush's failure to drive on to Baghdad when it would have indeed been messy -- but almost certainly not as messy as this has been.I won't even address clinton's fly swats. All those things and four Presidents from both parties put us in Iraq in 2003.

So what other options did we have/do we have? Sending in the “stormtroops” from the 1stMarDiv or 82nd Airborne sounds great as well. Launch us into Afghan/Pakistan border, destroy a few villages alleged to support Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar and then come home to a parade. Don’t have to worry about lengthy deployments, heavy logistics tails, none of this SASO or COIN stuff. Don’t have to debate is the proper term: IW, Complex IW, hybrid, small wars, SASO, Phase IV or Phase V, COIN, etc.

I doubt that would have been an option -- I certainly wouldn't advocate it, sounds terminally stupid, in fact. Bears and BB guns and all that. I've alrerady given my opinion on fly swats; so I thought did you -- they do more harm than good.

In fact, this is what we were told in the initial days of OIF: after Baghdad falls, the President wants his “stormtroops” home. This certainly motivated all the Marines in the “march up.” As we all know now though, the so-called “stormtroops” were extended for 5 months, sent home for about 7, and have been back on the ground ever since.

Whose fault is that? Serious and I think an important question.

Aside from reality differing from the “wreak destruction” and leave option, I think there’s a few other problems with this way of thinking as well. What’d we do after the Japanese attempted to wreak major destruction on us at Pearl Harbor? Did we succumb to their will? Again, just the opposite. And did the Japanese succumb to our will after losing island-after-island, enduring an intense firebombing campaign against Tokyo, the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, etc. I think in many ways Phase 4 and Phase 5 operations applied in Japan in 1945 just as they do in Iraq now.

And I think you've just mixed then and now. As well as a potentially existential threat with a pestiferous threat. It was a different world then -- and vastly different capabilities are now available. Even more and better capabilites could be available if we had spent the money in better places than we have...

With respect to Iraq, did Saddam ever succumb to our will after Desert Storm or later when we tried an airstrike/tomahawk heavy attack during Desert Fox? I’d argue he was a constant pain in the a__ and our containment strategy against Iraq throughout the 1990’s was quickly losing all effectiveness, if not worse.

Yet another example of what applying half hearted measures will get you. War cannot be fought in the 'softly, softly' mode, to do so is simply to prolong the agony and cause more casualties for everyone. Polticians cannot seem to absorb that fact. Soldiers and Marines should be able to -- but they aren't in charge. Important point, that...

With respect to no large US advisor mission has ever succeeded… have we ever really tried?

That's not what I said; I said no large scale COIN effort has done well. Contrary to what you seem to assert below, the Advisory effort in Viet Nam, hampered by all the things you mention, was really pretty successful. Can't say as much for the overall COIN effort there.

We had many “advisors” in Vietnam but these advisors were faced with many of the same problems we have today: too often ad hoc, not always the “best and brightest,” inconsistent training, unity of command, mirror imaging, etc.

This is likely to change in what way?

I think Ken makes a good point about it would take around 3 years to stand-up LtCol Nagl’s proposed Advisor Corps. Maybe. Depends on if we’re serious about the importance of the effort.

That is my point -- we are not serious and we are highly unlikely to get serious about it so we'll be doomed to halfhearted measures.

I made a similar argument on the Marine Corps side of the house in late 2005-2006. We’ve (USMC) made strides in the right direction, but I still don’t think we’ve found the answer. If we identified training and advising indigenous forces as the main efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005-2006, Ken’s 3 year mark would already be here or at least we’d be very close. So here we are in 2008, still arguing about priorities, deployment lengths, stretching the force, allegedly destroying our conventional warfighting capabilities, etc.

Ain't America grand; 300M opinions looking for a home. That, too is unlikely to change no matter how much some wish.

Leaves me wondering again and again: do we really want to succeed or is preserving the force and the current status quo the priority.

The latter.

As we close on the 5-year anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, the thought of us still arguing about what to do in Phases 4-5 really troubles me.
Semper Fi,
Scott

Me too -- but it's reality. Reality is a bore but it seems to be always with us.

BTW, I trust you also noted the fact that while I disagree with an Advisory Corps, I agree with John Nagl on the need for Advisory training; on the lack of flexible and adaptive thinking on the part of E-ring; and on the fact that we must be prepared to do COIN work. Trying to avoid it is smart IMO, but we have to be able to do it and do it better than we did this time. That's why I support the T-MAAG concept, far better COIN training than we're managing today and that both the Army and Marines HAVE to be full spectrum forces.

Unlike a lot of people, I believe that the services and the kids can do that full spectrum bit. Can the leadership adapt to it? That's another question...

[dubya]

I recently read Col. Nagl's book and the piece he did last June for the Center for a New American Security

http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?145

I'm interested in what others here thought of the book and his suggestions about an Army Advisor Corps.

Thanks.

[tequila]

You can check and contribute to this thread.

[Ken White]

There's a lot of information here. Before starting a new thread, check the existing threads to see if one on the topic already exists and, if so, continue that thread rather than starting e new one.

In this case, I appended the New thread name to the existing thread; I'll change it back to the original name later.

[dubya]

Yup I'm a worm who's unfamiliar with this particular software package... but I will learn.

Thanks for your patience!

[marct]

Going back to the original CNAS piece (available here), one thing that really stuck out for me was this.

Advisor Team Composition

Team Leader
Team NCOIC
Team Adjutant
S1 NCOIC
Team Intelligence Officer
Team Intel Sergeant
Team Intel Specialist
Team Ops Officer
Team Ops Sergeant
Team Logistics Officer
Team Logistics Sergeant
Team Medical Officer
Team Medical Sergeant
Team Light Wheel Mechanic
Infantry Squad (Personal Security
Detachment/Infantry Trainers)
Total Strength: 25
(insert, p.7)

Now, maybe I'm being a touch too sensitive here, but I think that John has missed 2 major components - a cultural analyst and a DB/IT expert.

To my mind, half of the reason for creating such a specialized Corps would be to transfer the experience back into the Army. Certainly the career path proposals appear to me to be an attempt to regularize service with an Advisor Corps (AC), but I don't see any on-the-ground way of retaining cultural knowledge and institutionalizing that.

Part of the reason I am mentioning this is the current role of the HTTs. It strikes me that an AC would be a natural place to train part of the HTT component, so IMO, it would also make sense to work such a component nto the actual operation of the teams themselves.

[Surferbeetle]

Going back to the original CNAS piece (available here), one thing that really stuck out for me was this.

Now, maybe I'm being a touch too sensitive here, but I think that John has missed 2 major components - a cultural analyst and a DB/IT expert.

To my mind, half of the reason for creating such a specialized Corps would be to transfer the experience back into the Army.

Marc,

Too true, an inability to understand the culture can get you and your team killed especially when you are forward and away from a nice big warm FOB.

Here is an old military review link
which describes the HTT concept...it's in line with what you are describing.

Regards,

Steve

[Tom Odom]

The Sergeant Solution
By ROBERT H. SCALES

But no matter what he says, it is clear that the writing is on the wall. The bulk of American ground forces will be leaving Iraq. The only question is how many and how fast.

After we leave, the Iraqis will have to shoulder the burden of maintaining stability in their country. How well prepared they are for this task will depend on how strong the Iraqi army's noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps is when we leave. NCOs, sergeants and corporals, provide a center of gravity for effective fighting forces and often lead small units. They will be vital to sustaining the Iraqi army through the battles ahead.

I would have to say that Bob Scales got this one wrong. If we are truly dependent on creating a successful NCO corps in Iraq, especially when as General Scales says the writing is on the wall and most troops are coming out, then we are screwed.

This simply tranference of values--the Iraqis have no tradition of strong NCOs--and wishful thinking, especially when it is set against a limited timeframe as prescribed by the author.

Tom

[Stan]

I would have to say that Bob Scales got this one wrong. If we are truly dependent on creating a successful NCO corps in Iraq, especially when as General Scales says the writing is on the wall and most troops are coming out, then we are screwed.

This simply tranference of values--the Iraqis have no tradition of strong NCOs--and wishful thinking, especially when it is set against a limited timeframe as prescribed by the author.

Tom

I fully concur, Tom. A serious misconception. Even if Iraq's former military psyche, relative levels of discipline and culture could be reversed, it is unlikely to exclusively happen following a 5-week training course for Corporals. I don't agree with settling for 'just strong enough' to defeat one's enemy - wrong strategy for a training environment, and 'set to fail' down the road to experience.

[Ken White]

the handwriting being on the wall. I suspect we'll be there in some numbers for some time. We'll see.

Re: NCOs in the ME. the Iraniha had no such tradition but started trying to build one around 1964. When I was there five years later, there were signs of a beginning professional NCO corps. Friends who were there later said that by 1975, it was small but very competent and, even more importantly, had the faith and respect of the Officers. It may be noteworhty that when Khomeini cemented his power in late '79, among the people they killed in the blood orgy that followed were a number of senior NCOs from all services.

[William F. Owen]

If we are truly dependent on creating a successful NCO corps in Iraq, especially when as General Scales says the writing is on the wall and most troops are coming out, then we are screwed.

This simply tranference of values--the Iraqis have no tradition of strong NCOs--and wishful thinking, especially when it is set against a limited timeframe as prescribed by the author.

NCO's, as seen in the British Army are a pure product of the class system. How the NCOs work in the UK is exactly how an Edwardian Gentleman and landowner organised his servants and staff. It's the same system - and it worked pretty well. (No place for it today. Better ways must, and can, be found.)

The US does not really have a "proper" class system, which is why their NCO system is not the same as the UK.

Now look at the IDF/Palmach. A British trained and inspired Army, that has no class system, as anyone from Europe of the US would understand it. Works just fine as Officers are trained as NCOs first. There is no parallel development course, and arguably they do just fine without an NCO culture along UK, or even US lines.

Now, I am not that familiar with Iraqi societal structures, but they do seem to have had an educated middle class - which almost always forms the basis for an officer corps - not NCOs. If Iraq is anything like Algeria, then there is simply no hope of forming a professional NCO culture.

[William F. Owen]

Advisor Team Composition

Team Leader
Team NCOIC
Team Adjutant
S1 NCOIC
Team Intelligence Officer
Team Intel Sergeant
Team Intel Specialist
Team Ops Officer
Team Ops Sergeant
Team Logistics Officer
Team Logistics Sergeant
Team Medical Officer
Team Medical Sergeant
Team Light Wheel Mechanic
Infantry Squad (Personal Security
Detachment/Infantry Trainers)
Total Strength: 25

Looks awfully like an SF A-team structure to me. IIRC, a 12-man A-Team could train, organise and lead a 650 man battalion. I only know of one A-team that actually did it, and that was part of Project White Star, but I'm sure Ken will correct me on this!

[Tom Odom]

As I read Gen. Scales piece, I interpreted it as him hoipng that an Iraqi NCO Corps would emerge that would be capable of leading small units in COIN operations.

My experience from teaching, living with, and serving around Arab armies suggests this is not an achievable goal in a short to mid term, short being our efforts so far and possibly another year or two, and mid term being 10 plus years.

Sudan: 4 months in the Sudanese Army as student and I can safely say that NCOs were regarded as nothing more than glorified bat boys who terrified the troops as necessary.

Egypt: 5 years in and out of Egypt as a UN observer, student, travelr, and historian. Interesting in that Egyptian Army was/is a an amalgamation of British, Soviet/Russian, and Egyptian culture. While the first did have an effect in that it created an NCO corps (as it did in Sudan), the Soviet approach coupled with the Egyptian emphasis on status means that an Egyptian NCO has not progressed beyond the file closer mentality of the 18th/19th century.

Jordan: the Arab Legion still claims a close identity with its British roots. My interaction with it has been limited to studying its operations and teaching its officers with some in-country time as an observer. The roles of The NCO corps seems frozen in time around the period that Glubb Pasha helped form the Legion.

There are very few militaries in the world that will turn to its NCO corps the way we do. There are even fewer militaries in the world that senior NCOs are expected to act as advisors and often mentors to the officers around them. I do not believe Sudanese, Egyptian, or Jordanian officers would accept such a role for their NCOs. My contact with Iraqi military culture is limited to studying Arabic in close contact with former Iraqi officers as well as studying the Iraqi military as an intelligence officer. Nothing I have seen indicates the Iraqis are any different that the Sudanese, Egyptians, or the Jordanians when it comes to how they use their NCOs.

Tom

[Rex Brynen]

There are very few militaries in the world that will turn to its NCO corps the way we do. There are even fewer militaries in the world that senior NCOs are expected to act as advisors and often mentors to the officers around them. I do not believe Sudanese, Egyptian, or Jordanian officers would accept such a role for their NCOs. My contact with Iraqi military culture is limited to studying Arabic in close contact with former Iraqi officers as well as studying the Iraqi military as an intelligence officer. Nothing I have seen indicates the Iraqis are any different that the Sudanese, Egyptians, or the Jordanians when it comes to how they use their NCOs.

Indeed, I think the challenge of developing competent NCOs in Iraq will be particularly severe, given the extent to which decades of extreme authoritarianism drove much of the initiative out of the military. The Iraqi Army under the Ba'th was not a place where you wanted to be very creative or innovative. Rather, you were understandably reluctant to take responsibility (and blame) for actions when you could leave it for others to decide (or fail to do so).

Obviously this is a particular problem when you're trying to train an configure an Iraqi military for what will be primarily COIN duties for the foreseeable future, given the extreme importance of small unit leadership in COIN operations.

If so, that raises an interesting question in training/mentoring: to what extent do you 1) try to change existing military (and societal) culture in building a new conception of the role (and required qualities) of NCOs in the new Iraqi military; 2) forego this as an impossible task and train along existing local models; and 3) pursue a middle course/synthesis/hybridization (or new models altogether)?

It my gut sense (as someone who doesn't do this!) that the first is near-impossible, other than in the most limited and subcultural sense, a view reinforced by the posts I see here and elsewhere in SWJ. I'm interested, however, in how one addresses the second and third options--especially the third. What exactly does that look like in Iraq? In Afghanistan? Where are the real areas one should concentrate efforts?

Thoughts from those who have been there/done that?...

[marct]

Hi Steve,

Too true, an inability to understand the culture can get you and your team killed especially when you are forward and away from a nice big warm FOB.

Actually, I'm quite familiar with the HTT concept and the current HTS . What is bothering me about the exclusion of something similar by John is that it seems to contradict the title of his work - Institutionalizing Adaptation - by leaving out one of the more successful mutations to appear in the past couple of years. Right now, the HTS is scrambling to meet the demand for cultural knowledge but, if something similar to an Advisor Corps were to be created, then that Corps should, as part of its deployment, conduct at least minimal exercises in gaining cultural knowledge. So why, I ask, is it left off ?

[Ken White]

"There are very few militaries in the world that will turn to its NCO corps the way we do. There are even fewer militaries in the world that senior NCOs are expected to act as advisors and often mentors to the officers around them. I do not believe Sudanese, Egyptian, or Jordanian officers would accept such a role for their NCOs. My contact with Iraqi military culture is limited to studying Arabic in close contact with former Iraqi officers as well as studying the Iraqi military as an intelligence officer. Nothing I have seen indicates the Iraqis are any different that the Sudanese, Egyptians, or the Jordanians when it comes to how they use their NCOs."

Thus, as Rex notes:

If so, that raises an interesting question in training/mentoring: to what extent do you 1) try to change existing military (and societal) culture in building a new conception of the role (and required qualities) of NCOs in the new Iraqi military; 2) forego this as an impossible task and train along existing local models; and 3) pursue a middle course/synthesis/hybridization (or new models altogether)?

It my gut sense (as someone who doesn't do this!) that the first is near-impossible, other than in the most limited and subcultural sense, a view reinforced by the posts I see here and elsewhere in SWJ. I'm interested, however, in how one addresses the second and third options--especially the third. What exactly does that look like in Iraq? In Afghanistan? Where are the real areas one should concentrate efforts?

I'm inclined to agree with him and believe that option 3. is the best -- and an achievable -- solution.

Wilf's correct that class and Edwardian attitudes play a part in that (even in the US) but that has also been diluted a great deal by the experience of the World Wars and societal changes since the '60s. NCOs in the British, Canadian and US Armies (as well as in most NATO Armies to one extent or another) today really draw any power to get things done from tactical and technical competence. That competence counts far more in how they are viewed by superiors, peers and subordinates than any other factors

In all Armies, including all those mentioned by name here, normal human factors play. Thus, Officers want NCOs to be competent just not as competent as they are. That's logical, no sense in having two equally well educated and trained sets of bosses for one less well educated and trained set of followers. Regardless, the world has settled on the three categories of military people as a de facto standard and most of the world has culturally allotted a pecking order to those the sets.

Culture is hard to change. It is not immutable, just a difficult and thus time consuming process, so any change in the way NCOs are viewed and used has to accept the cultural norms. Back to the basic point, the NCO's value is in his overall competence. In every military force I have seen, including Arab armies, truly competent NCOS get some respect. Mentoring of Officers does occur but it is, IMO, far more subtle than it is in western armies BUT it is accepted from only those NCOs accorded Super Hero status, the water walkers and legends. There typically aren't (or weren't) too many of them.

Thus it seems to me that the way forward is to accept the cultural difficulties and produce, through careful selection and training while we are in a position to influence that, more competent NCOs than was the norm before we got there. As nearly as I can gather, that's what we're trying to do. My sensing is that we'll thus end up with just that hybrid and if one put the Egyptian Army of 30 plus years ago on the scale at One and the US/British model at Ten; with any luck one could end up with a Four to Six in Iraq (slightly higher in Afghanistan due to less class trauma). Not at top level but better than it was with the potential to improve. A hundred years ago, even fifty years ago, the Officer-NCO relationship in the US Army was quite different than it is today...

[Tom Odom]

Ken,

Great post.

Thus, Officers want NCOs to be competent just not as competent as they are.

That single sentence is where all the cultural devils play. Indeed it is in defining competence and what levels of competence are acceptable, much less sought after. I agree that 100 years ago our NCOs were a different sort (then I met Stan and was transported back in time). That is not to say the debate on NCOs and NCO duties has been completely resolved in our own military. The dumbest officer I ever met in Africa was the one who told Stan after I departed Zaire that he was going back behind a desk "where he as an NCO belonged." I can confidently say that the best units we see here are the ones that make best use of their NCOs. But I cannot say that for every unit.

And therein lies the rub with General Scales premise that somehow it will be up to the Iraqi NCOs to determine success in Iraq. If we end up with 30 years, maybe so. Remember however that the British influence in Egypt was much longer. Frankly I hope that we our greatest influence has been on the leaders the Iraqis can identify as charismatic because ultimately they will as a culture select charisma over competency.

best

Tom

[Rank amateur]

they will as a culture select charisma over competency.

They're not the only ones. The Sunni insurgency seemed relatively decentralized and relied a lot on what I'll call "local initiatives" or "independent action." Do you think that the Lions of Iraq will be more effective at whatever level they have that compares to NCO? Will that have any influence on the Iraqi Army?

[SteveMetz]

Thing is, though, it can be done. Look at the Bacevich, et al. monograph on El Salvador. Something of the same situation--no NCO tradition. We kind of crammed it down their throat, and it eventually worked out.

I'm not as familiar with the Arab context but it sure would seem that the lightbulb would go one in someone's head and they would say, "Let's see--no Arab state has won a major war for several centuries. Maybe it might be time to consider some innovation."