Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife

[Ken White]

Sure sounds like "train the trainers" to me, Ken. With the added point that we do an especially good job at selecting that initial cadre. Maybe we could use some of our SF brethern as that cadre to train our "conventional" folks as a break from their deployments.

Whoops -- already used that line once today...

All true. Get SF off the fun of door kicking and back to their less fun and hard work primary job and that's easily achievable. Been done before, works well.

Interesting aside on the selection of the initial cadre. The Infantry School back in the '70s tried an experiment with IOBC. They decided to go to a Cadre process and selected a really sharp CPT, LT, 1SG and four SFCs. Ran the Class. It did great -- exceeded all the norms and broke records on everything. All observers agreed it was a highly beneficial effort and di great things. Then they tried to replicate that Cadre throughout the IOBC Bn. Pipeline couldn't support the quality required.

So said all involved. My take was that the pipeline wouldn't support the quality involved, a different thing...

[wm]

Interesting aside on the selection of the initial cadre. The Infantry School back in the '70s tried an experiment with IOBC. They decided to go to a Cadre process and selected a really sharp CPT, LT, 1SG and four SFCs. Ran the Class. It did great -- exceeded all the norms and broke records on everything. All observers agreed it was a highly beneficial effort and di great things. Then they tried to replicate that Cadre throughout the IOBC Bn. Pipeline couldn't support the quality required.

So said all involved. My take was that the pipeline wouldn't support the quality involved, a different thing...

Saw interesting outputs tied to quality of Platoon Level cadre at ROTC advanced camp--cadet platoons with good RA cadre (SFC and CPT) did great stuff, platoons with not so great cadre did less well. (I can here you saying "duh!!!" now--wait for it.) To your "could versus would" point, good cadre was hard to come by--no one who was a fast burner wanted to be sent off to be ROTC cadre. Funny thing though--platoons with a high percentage of prior service cadets seemed to do better with poor cadre than with good cadre (maybe it was because it was what they were used to when they were EM).

[John T. Fishel]

want to expand SF (or the entire force) precipitously. My focus was pretty long term. IMHO SF should never reduce quality - I am skeptical of direct accession. Would much rather see SF accessing real sergeants than ones who just came on board.

But I am concerned with how we solve the short and medium term problems better. John's Advisor corps idea ought to be looked at and possibly tweaked.

On re-greening. Yes, very important. But there are several ways to skin that cat. SF does it one way. Other units will do it differently. But it always needs to be done. Is that one of the costs of making SF a branch?

Writ large, the Army (armed forces) have passed a lot of functions off to the private sector. We can't just take them all back all at once. (Some we may never want to take back!) But for those functions that should be returned to the Army, it will take time, increased force structure, and more $.- lots more!

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

I agree with you that an in-country presence in a stable environment is probably the best way to try to improve an existing capacity. It does not require importing a ton of resources to execute, and one can observe and critique in a relatively leisurely way. It is sort of like coaching a sports team during an unopposed scrimmage.

I am not saying that is the ideal; merely that it is probably the easiest if all we are doing is training them.

But, we do not seem to have that sort of luxury in the current AOR. Instead, we are playing an away match in a hostile stadium (think England v. Italy in Rome playing a Round 1 World Cup spoccer match) in a "best-of-seven" tournament. We are looking to replace our A side with the freshman side, even though the score in the current match is still close, there are at least 4 or 5 more matches to play, and the other side is slipping in ringers from last year's world championship team to play in the "skill" positions.

Maybe if we can get the freshman side away from the distractions, give them some good training sessions on a "neutral" pitch away from the screaming fans in the stadium, and simultaneously slip some of our own "A" side ringers in to help out the team we are using to substitute for the very tired folks currently on the pitch, we can build a dynasty that will win this time and hold on to the championship for years to come.

Sports metaphors aside, we don't have the luxury in the current wars to do what you propose. Certainly we are doing limited training abroad (as in outside the AOR) and we have even had small elements here. In any case, there is something to be said for doing it on the ground where it counts the most.

And that is where advising differs from training. The advisor lives and fights with his counterparts; the trainer gives the training in the field or classroom and then is done.

Gee Tom, it sounds like we need someone to clarify the goals (both the US's and those of the countries we are assisting) then, don't we?

Yeah and it is a hell of a lot harder to do than it is to put it in a rhetorical question. That, too, is very much part of advising.

Tom

[wm]

And that is where advising differs from training. The advisor lives and fights with his counterparts; the trainer gives the training in the field or classroom and then is done.

Need not be that way. We used to send our AC battalion that was detailed to do RC training support to beautiful Camp Shelby, MS to live and work with their ARNG counterparts for the duration of the summer AT sessions--they lived, worked, and played together for the duration.


BTW, I was not trying to be flippant with my point about clarifying the goal. I was suggesting that we do not seem to have unity of purpose between the MTT plan and the overall plan for our commitments in the AOR, probably because IMHO we do not seem to have a clearly articulated and consistent set of goal statements. It is pretty hard to plan and execute an operation successfully without a clear and consistent mission statement/statement of commander's intent.

[Rob Thornton]

I think the realistic answer is that a combination of all 3 of these will continue.

Pat I think you've nailed it. There are questions of capabilities and questions of capacity. There are "surge" requirements and "steady state" requirements.

While ARSOF has a great deal of capability with regard to FID (for reasons of character selection, because they receive specialized training, and because the missions they do build experience in those areas), the capacity requirements have created conditions where the demand outstrips what was up to time our answer as a resource. There are also other missions which have increased the OPTEMPO for all of our SOF. I'd say one of the great things about ARSOF is that offers us a capability to work with indigenous forces where the infrastructure and sustainment mechanisms are immature, and they offer us a higher probability of success when the outcome requires people with special character, training and skills we don't normally see in the GPF.

With regard to BCTs, the reality on the ground is that BCTs are being placed in conditions that often require them to either field, augment, or support the gamut of transition teams. The character of the BCT CDR determines how successful they will be. Even within a BCT though, there are issues of capability and capacity - e.g. if a BCT gets asked to field a BDE MiTT, and 3 x BN MiTTs to work with an IA BDE on a 1:1 ratio, that is pretty well withing both their capability and capacity - considering that they still must conduct day to day offensive and defensive operations, and support the TTs they have fielded. If however that same BCT got asked to work on a 1 to say 6 ratio they would have a capacity issue. If they got asked to provide 2 IA BDES worth of MiTTs, 6 x PTTs (police) and 6 x BTTs, they'd have both a capacity and a capability issue. This last bit is important, because although we are using military teams to train PTTs, SpTTs, and BTTs, the skill set we as a military bring to a table is not going to be a perfect lift for training police (although we probably could mitigate that some with a good train up - in the end, we are often the only folks who can operate in those conditions). If a BCT was given the mission to do more, far enough out to do a good MA, and were given the additional resources (time, augmentation, special training, etc.) they could improve more I think - but you can only pile the plate so high before stuff falls off. I'd add that as more people come from TTs back into BCTs, the training base for the BCTs to draw on with regard to understanding the advisory mission is growing.

Individual augmentees brought together in an Ad-Hoc fashion - will remain a staple I think for as long as our steady state looks like it does now, or increases - ex. the need for more TTs in Afghanistan has already been identified. While this is far from perfect, it does allow for some tailored solutions. It goes not only to what normally springs to mind when we say "advisory effort" in Iraq now, but also to the PRTs, and the advisory teams that work at the ministerial levels working to build institutions and bureaucracy's that supports the kind of DOTMLPF developmental challenges HN security forces must create to support the government. Yes it is ad-hoc, but I'd say mostly these teams have done OK (and in many cases better then OK, and a few not so good), and at a time where manning is so critical across the force, it may just be the best we can do. I'm not saying we can't or should not tighten up with regard to HRC selection - particularly when there is a critical advisory job that requires both specific technical experience and professional maturity, but I am saying that within the broader context of the mission in Iraq, I think we continue to get better at it.

Some of the problems we create for ourselves. Ex. if a BN CDR responsible for day to day security operations in a city has assessed that the HN Army forces or doing pretty good and can stand on their own with minimal assistance, but the police need allot of help or they are going to fail, and he does not have the organic combat power to form PTTs out of hide, should he have the authority to reorient those ad-hoc, non-organic MiTTs in his AOR to turn them into PTTs? My point is that every set of conditions is a little different and somebody has to be in charge of the limited resources available in order to move things forward as effectively and efficiently as they can be, we often create self inflicted GSWs with regard to making it difficult for the tactical and operational commanders to adapt to the conditions that are emerging vs. the ones somebody sees from way back in space, time, or both.

The last think I'd say to consider, where does this mission go in the future? After Iraq and Afghanistan (whatever that means in years) do we believe that we no longer have a capacity issue? If you have no capability in a given area, then do you have any capacity? If you believe that you are going to have capability and capacity issues in meeting requirements generated as a result of a broader strategy, or FP - how do you institutionalize it do where you don't have to go through the Ad-Hoc process we did in Iraq and Afghanistan? What is the risk to the GPF for doing so? What is the risk for not?

These are some of the challenges with regard to determining where SFA (Security Force Assistance) needs to go, but they are not all. No easy answers.

BTW - I talked with a BCT S-1 this last week, he told me they had projected inbound for their unit reset a total of three FGs for the BCT - they will go through the reset like everybody else, piecemeal, and hopefully they'll have all their folks prior to deploying, but I'd be willing to bet there will be some 03s filling some 04 holes, and 02s filling some 03 holes - things are tough all over.

Best Regards, Rob

[John T. Fishel]

What interests me is the command relationship between the BCT cdr and the MiTTs in his AO. If he has them OPCON he should have no problem at all. If they are TACON then he should be able to give them a new mission. But, it it is any other relationship he has a problem - greater or smaller but a problem (or should I say challenge). Of course, if he is a culturally insenstive jerk then I, for one, don't want him to have OPCON or TACON of the MiTT.

What is the "normal" command relationship in this situation?

Cheers

JohnT