Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife

[Maximus]

Quote: Originally Posted by Ken White
Of course, my solution is don't do COIN and advising on a major level; we really don't do it well at all. Never have and that is unlikely to change. We haven't got the patience for it and one can't do that kind of stuff even marginally well if one's going to have short tours and 15 months is a short tour; 12 months is also. Seven months or less is just a visit

We need to convince folks that hosting people who wish us ill is uncool. Best way to do that is to visit those that do so in an unpleasant mode, wreak major destruction and leave rapidly -- saying be nice or we'll be back.

Ken:

Sage advice from you as usual. Too bad others in higher places might not be listening. I think your plainly spoken words might be a good recipe for Afghanistan.

Gentlemen,

Have been following this exchange with great interest. The quotes above got me thinking: wouldn’t it be great if war was this easy. On second thought though, my mind came back to our retaliatory tomahawk “raids” into the Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. Did Al Qaeda get the “be nice or we’ll be back” message? Unfortunately, I think we sent just the opposite message: if you’re not nice we’ll launch an airstrike or two, maybe a few missiles, but otherwise leave you alone. And this only served to motivate Al Qaeda even further. If we left Afghanistan today, I’m afraid we’d pay an even greater price.

What else could we have done in 1998? Some might say altogether eliminate places where we believed Al Qaeda training grounds were on the map. This simply wasn’t an option in 1998, and unless Al Qaeda launches a WMD attack in the US or against one of our closest allies, I don’t think it will ever be an option.

So what other options did we have/do we have? Sending in the “stormtroops” from the 1stMarDiv or 82nd Airborne sounds great as well. Launch us into Afghan/Pakistan border, destroy a few villages alleged to support Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar and then come home to a parade. Don’t have to worry about lengthy deployments, heavy logistics tails, none of this SASO or COIN stuff. Don’t have to debate is the proper term: IW, Complex IW, hybrid, small wars, SASO, Phase IV or Phase V, COIN, etc. In fact, this is what we were told in the initial days of OIF: after Baghdad falls, the President wants his “stormtroops” home. This certainly motivated all the Marines in the “march up.” As we all know now though, the so-called “stormtroops” were extended for 5 months, sent home for about 7, and have been back on the ground ever since. Aside from reality differing from the “wreak destruction” and leave option, I think there’s a few other problems with this way of thinking as well. What’d we do after the Japanese attempted to wreak major destruction on us at Pearl Harbor? Did we succumb to their will? Again, just the opposite. And did the Japanese succumb to our will after losing island-after-island, enduring an intense firebombing campaign against Tokyo, the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, etc. I think in many ways Phase 4 and Phase 5 operations applied in Japan in 1945 just as they do in Iraq now. With respect to Iraq, did Saddam ever succumb to our will after Desert Storm or later when we tried an airstrike/tomahawk heavy attack during Desert Fox? I’d argue he was a constant pain in the a__ and our containment strategy against Iraq throughout the 1990’s was quickly losing all effectiveness, if not worse.

With respect to no large US advisor mission has ever succeeded… have we ever really tried? We had many “advisors” in Vietnam but these advisors were faced with many of the same problems we have today: too often ad hoc, not always the “best and brightest,” inconsistent training, unity of command, mirror imaging, etc. I think Ken makes a good point about it would take around 3 years to stand-up LtCol Nagl’s proposed Advisor Corps. Maybe. Depends on if we’re serious about the importance of the effort. I made a similar argument on the Marine Corps side of the house in late 2005-2006. We’ve (USMC) made strides in the right direction, but I still don’t think we’ve found the answer. If we identified training and advising indigenous forces as the main efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005-2006, Ken’s 3 year mark would already be here or at least we’d be very close. So here we are in 2008, still arguing about priorities, deployment lengths, stretching the force, allegedly destroying our conventional warfighting capabilities, etc. Leaves me wondering again and again: do we really want to succeed or is preserving the force and the current status quo the priority. As we close on the 5-year anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, the thought of us still arguing about what to do in Phases 4-5 really troubles me.

Semper Fi,
Scott

[Ken White]

...Have been following this exchange with great interest. The quotes above got me thinking: wouldn’t it be great if war was this easy...

Sure would, pity it never is.

... On second thought though, my mind came back to our retaliatory tomahawk “raids” into the Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. Did Al Qaeda get the “be nice or we’ll be back” message? Unfortunately, I think we sent just the opposite message: if you’re not nice we’ll launch an airstrike or two, maybe a few missiles, but otherwise leave you alone. And this only served to motivate Al Qaeda even further. If we left Afghanistan today, I’m afraid we’d pay an even greater price.

True in both cases, IMO.

What else could we have done in 1998? Some might say altogether eliminate places where we believed Al Qaeda training grounds were on the map. This simply wasn’t an option in 1998, and unless Al Qaeda launches a WMD attack in the US or against one of our closest allies, I don’t think it will ever be an option.

That's true as well. I would submit that had we heeded the gospel according to Ken, 1998 as you appear to use the year, would not have occurred. Goes back to Carter's mishandling of Iran; Reagan's miserable failures in Lebanon, G.H.W. Bush's failure to drive on to Baghdad when it would have indeed been messy -- but almost certainly not as messy as this has been.I won't even address clinton's fly swats. All those things and four Presidents from both parties put us in Iraq in 2003.

So what other options did we have/do we have? Sending in the “stormtroops” from the 1stMarDiv or 82nd Airborne sounds great as well. Launch us into Afghan/Pakistan border, destroy a few villages alleged to support Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar and then come home to a parade. Don’t have to worry about lengthy deployments, heavy logistics tails, none of this SASO or COIN stuff. Don’t have to debate is the proper term: IW, Complex IW, hybrid, small wars, SASO, Phase IV or Phase V, COIN, etc.

I doubt that would have been an option -- I certainly wouldn't advocate it, sounds terminally stupid, in fact. Bears and BB guns and all that. I've alrerady given my opinion on fly swats; so I thought did you -- they do more harm than good.

In fact, this is what we were told in the initial days of OIF: after Baghdad falls, the President wants his “stormtroops” home. This certainly motivated all the Marines in the “march up.” As we all know now though, the so-called “stormtroops” were extended for 5 months, sent home for about 7, and have been back on the ground ever since.

Whose fault is that? Serious and I think an important question.

Aside from reality differing from the “wreak destruction” and leave option, I think there’s a few other problems with this way of thinking as well. What’d we do after the Japanese attempted to wreak major destruction on us at Pearl Harbor? Did we succumb to their will? Again, just the opposite. And did the Japanese succumb to our will after losing island-after-island, enduring an intense firebombing campaign against Tokyo, the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, etc. I think in many ways Phase 4 and Phase 5 operations applied in Japan in 1945 just as they do in Iraq now.

And I think you've just mixed then and now. As well as a potentially existential threat with a pestiferous threat. It was a different world then -- and vastly different capabilities are now available. Even more and better capabilites could be available if we had spent the money in better places than we have...

With respect to Iraq, did Saddam ever succumb to our will after Desert Storm or later when we tried an airstrike/tomahawk heavy attack during Desert Fox? I’d argue he was a constant pain in the a__ and our containment strategy against Iraq throughout the 1990’s was quickly losing all effectiveness, if not worse.

Yet another example of what applying half hearted measures will get you. War cannot be fought in the 'softly, softly' mode, to do so is simply to prolong the agony and cause more casualties for everyone. Polticians cannot seem to absorb that fact. Soldiers and Marines should be able to -- but they aren't in charge. Important point, that...

With respect to no large US advisor mission has ever succeeded… have we ever really tried?

That's not what I said; I said no large scale COIN effort has done well. Contrary to what you seem to assert below, the Advisory effort in Viet Nam, hampered by all the things you mention, was really pretty successful. Can't say as much for the overall COIN effort there.

We had many “advisors” in Vietnam but these advisors were faced with many of the same problems we have today: too often ad hoc, not always the “best and brightest,” inconsistent training, unity of command, mirror imaging, etc.

This is likely to change in what way?

I think Ken makes a good point about it would take around 3 years to stand-up LtCol Nagl’s proposed Advisor Corps. Maybe. Depends on if we’re serious about the importance of the effort.

That is my point -- we are not serious and we are highly unlikely to get serious about it so we'll be doomed to halfhearted measures.

I made a similar argument on the Marine Corps side of the house in late 2005-2006. We’ve (USMC) made strides in the right direction, but I still don’t think we’ve found the answer. If we identified training and advising indigenous forces as the main efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005-2006, Ken’s 3 year mark would already be here or at least we’d be very close. So here we are in 2008, still arguing about priorities, deployment lengths, stretching the force, allegedly destroying our conventional warfighting capabilities, etc.

Ain't America grand; 300M opinions looking for a home. That, too is unlikely to change no matter how much some wish.

Leaves me wondering again and again: do we really want to succeed or is preserving the force and the current status quo the priority.

The latter.

As we close on the 5-year anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, the thought of us still arguing about what to do in Phases 4-5 really troubles me.
Semper Fi,
Scott

Me too -- but it's reality. Reality is a bore but it seems to be always with us.

BTW, I trust you also noted the fact that while I disagree with an Advisory Corps, I agree with John Nagl on the need for Advisory training; on the lack of flexible and adaptive thinking on the part of E-ring; and on the fact that we must be prepared to do COIN work. Trying to avoid it is smart IMO, but we have to be able to do it and do it better than we did this time. That's why I support the T-MAAG concept, far better COIN training than we're managing today and that both the Army and Marines HAVE to be full spectrum forces.

Unlike a lot of people, I believe that the services and the kids can do that full spectrum bit. Can the leadership adapt to it? That's another question...

[SteveMetz]

Thing is, though, it can be done. Look at the Bacevich, et al. monograph on El Salvador. Something of the same situation--no NCO tradition. We kind of crammed it down their throat, and it eventually worked out.

I'm not as familiar with the Arab context but it sure would seem that the lightbulb would go one in someone's head and they would say, "Let's see--no Arab state has won a major war for several centuries. Maybe it might be time to consider some innovation."

[Ken White]

Progress is a two forward, one back process. Should we improve the basic competence of NCOs in Afghanistan and /or Iraq, when we leave -- and we will someday -- I'd expect regression. However, I'd also expect that the younger guys who saw the real benefits for a period would oppose total return to old ways and gradually reassert a new model. The cycle would then repeat.

My perception is that your final light bulb idea is very slowly gaining traction throughout the ME -- and that in relation to many things, not just wars...