Terrorist Prisoners and Deradicalization

**davidbfpo** · 03-07-2009

Originally Posted by Bob's World

(Partly quoted) I can't decide which is greater when it comes to this concept of "Deradicalization": The Ignorance of the program, or the Arrogance....First, it is founded in the popular, but baseless "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency". Now if we simply expose the Pied Piper as a fraud, they will see the light and settle down and become good citizens once again....Causation and Motivation are two very different things, and should not be confused. Causation typically lies in poor governance. Motivation is typically some inspiring ideology or big event, or both. Addressing motivation without publicly recognizing and addressing causation is a fraud on the populace....The duty of government is not to fix the thinking of its populace, the duty of governance is to fix its governance of the populace.

Typically Bob's World comments have led to some hard thinking about policy in the UK and in a May 2008 government paper on our nationals strategy: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ne...sm?view=Binary

I found this described as an objective: 'support individuals who are at risk of radicalisation'. On Bob's criteria we have failed IMHO. So back to thinking again.

davidbfpo

**Bob's World** · 03-08-2009

In my experience, politicians in particular, and governments in general, do not take responsibilities for their failures well. Far easier to blame the effects of those failures on some third party.

This is why most counterinsurgency efforts are such long, drawnout affairs. The effort is usually focused on defeating the illegal element of the populace that is acting out, as opposed to fixing the failures of governance that led to the illegal activities in the first place.

The book "1776" is a great case study in this phenomena. The King of England had so many opporutinities to offramp the growing insurgency in America, but could not get past the fact that he was in the right (legally, and logically), and recognize the much more emotional, subjective factors of poor governance that typically give rise to insurgency.

**Jedburgh** · 06-22-2009

ICSR, Apr 09: Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen

In 2002, Yemen, a country known to have been a breeding ground for al-Qaeda members, initiated a project to use dialogue as a means to alter the ways of suspected militant Islamists held in the state’s prisons. The project received international attention for its bold attempt to use their common reference to Islamic law as a peaceful means for the state to impact the militants. However, the actual implementation of the strategy was steeped in arbitrary arrests, indefinite detentions, torture and other violations of human rights. Furthermore, it was unclear what the charges against the detainees were and what impact the dialogue sessions had. The project was discontinued in 2005.

This paper examines the Yemeni experience of dialogues with Islamists it concludes that, though such a strategy might be a useful means for counter-terrorism, an environment for genuine dialogues cannot be established without taking into account wider issues of the state’s legitimacy vis-à-vis its citizens.

**davidbfpo** · 06-22-2009

A good book on this theme is: 'Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement', edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (Pub by Routledge 2009). Some theoretical and general chapters, then case studies and not just featuring Islam. Took time to read and worthwhile.

I will copy this to the main reading thread.

davidbfpo

**davidbfpo** · 07-09-2009

A different aspect to the traditional 'rehab' policy in Saudi Arabaia: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ourt-case.html

davidbfpo

**Rex Brynen** · 07-09-2009

Recent publication on this topic, focusing on the Egyptian and Algerian cases:

Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London: Routledge, 2009).

This book is the first detailed study of the causes of de-radicalization in armed Islamist movements. It is based on frontline research that includes interviews with Jihadist leaders, mid-ranking commanders, and young sympathizers, as well as former security and intelligence officers and state officials.

Additionally, it is also the first book to analyze the particular conditions under which successful de-radicalization can take place. The current literature on Islamist movements attempts to explain two principal issues: their support of violence (radicalization) and their changing attitudes towards democracy and democratization (moderation). However, the reasons behind renouncing (behavioural de-radicalization) and de-legitimizing (ideological de-radicalization) violence have not been evaluated to date. The author provides an in-depth analysis of the de-radicalization processes of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (1951-73), former allies of al-Qa'ida, such as al-Gama'a al-Islammiyya (Islamic Group of Egypt, 1997-2002) and al-Jihad Organization (2007- present), as well as of Algerian Islamist groups (1997-2000). The book also analyzes cases of de-radicalization failure.

The two questions that the book highlights and attempts to answer are Why? and How? For example, why do radical Islamist militants revise their ideologies, strategies and objectives and initiate a de-radicalization process; and what are the necessary conditions behind successful de-radicalization? De-radicalization of Jihadists shows how a combination of charismatic leadership, state repression, social interactions and selective inducements can ultimately lead jihadists to abandon 'jihad' and de-legitimize violence.

This book will be of great interest to students of radical Islamist movements and Islamic Studies, terrorism and political violence, security studies, and Middle Eastern politics.

Omar Ashour is a Lecturer in Politics in the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. He has a PhD in International Relations from McGill University in Canada.

**goesh** · 07-10-2009

http://fubar.com/stashEntry.php?stashId=5613345

It's a good day to die

I just don't believe counseling and incentives can turn a man who wants to die with you that easily but I don't argue against the attempts of conversion

**davidbfpo** · 01-22-2010

CT Blog pointer to a WINEP report starts with:

In December 2001, Sajid Badat and Richard Reid, two young Muslims from England, were scheduled to blow up two U.S.-bound planes by using explosive-laden footwear, Jacobson writes. Reid -- like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, al-Qaeda's most recent alleged plane bomber -- made the attempt and failed. Badat, however, abandoned the plan, later telling prosecutors he wanted to "introduce some calm" into his life. What led Badat to choose an alternative path? (My emphasis)What can we learn from his case and from the many other terrorist "drop outs" who have left al-Qaeda? In a newly released Washington Institute study, I explore these difficult but important questions.

I have asked about those who have given up the fight, not necessarily the cause and few academics appear to have considered this - so even if I've not read the report yet - I welcome this and will return when read.

The link to full report:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/p...-who-have-left

**davidbfpo** · 02-10-2010

I suppose this was to be expected and appearing in The Daily Telegraph is no surprise.

In short:

Saudi Arabia says it will not give up a controversial rehabilitation programme for Islamist radicals heavily criticised in the US after former inmates set up an al-Qaeda cell in neighbouring Yemen.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...on-scheme.html

Note a 20% recidivism rate is cited by the Saudis (not seen that before).

**davidbfpo** · 06-25-2010

The much-lauded and criticised Saudi rehab process has re-appeared after a rare official statement:

About 25 former Guantanamo Bay detainees have returned to violence after going through a rehabilitation programme in Saudi Arabia, a senior Saudi official has said.

Abdulrahman al-Hadlaq, the director of the interior ministry's ideological security administration, said on Saturday that about 20 per cent of the 120 repatriated former prisoners have returned to radical activity after graduation from a rehab centre in Riyadh, the Saudi capital.

More on the link:http://english.aljazeera.net/news/mi...047249951.html or Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65I22220100619

Hat Tip to The Legal War on Terror Weekly Brief.