So I Started Reading the Feith Book...

[Jedburgh]

Higher up the network? So this, by implication is a hierarchical system, and thus an organisation, not a network.

I feel I may have started an entirely useless discussion! Apologies.

No system consists purely of equals working together in pursuit of their goals. If you restrict yourself to that mode of thinking about networks, you are operating with blinders. I certainly feel you are mistaken in attempting to slap a divider between the terms organization and network.

A clandestine network is a form of organization, and although it's structure may reflect classic hierarchies in certain respects, it would be a mistake to categorize it as such. Even traditionally tightly structured Maoist organizations (such as the PKK and Sendero Luminoso), although they do have clear hierarchies at the upper-to-mid levels, their cellular structures devolve in a manner similar in character to the subject under discussion at the operational and tactical levels. In any case, no matter what organization or grouping is the target, there are always leaders, although the context and nature of the leadership roles often differs significantly from one group to the other.

A network in the context of which I am referring to is not a purely hierachical system (much less so even that the Maoist examples provided above), but may consist of several connected hierarchies, as well as autonomous entities, within a loosely structured system that functions well enough to provide strategic direction to one degree or another. Where tactical and operational direction, planning and guidance orginate varies with both leadership personalities and organizational structure.

Compartmented, decentralized cellular threat organizations are not plain ol' hierarchies. If only that were so, it would be that much easier to deal with them.

The conversation is not useless, but perhaps better suited to a different area/thread.

[SteveMetz]

We're bordering on Limbaughism here--he is so obsessed with bashing the State Department at every opportunity that it's getting downright absurd. On p. 151 he writes, "...training and equipping foreign military forces was normally a job for State, not Defense." The implication here is that DoD had to make great exertions because of State's failure.

Does he really not understand that while security assistance programs are administered by State, the State Department doesn't actually train or equip a military? Or does he actually know but figure that his readers won't?

[SteveMetz]

And he continues on p. 151: "...Congress had not foreseen that a mission of this kind (rebuilding the Afghan army)...might be the key to winding down our enormously expensive military effort in Afghanistan."

See--that explains it: it was Congress' fault for not anticipating the need to rebuild the Afghan army. We can't blame OSD for not antcipating it since, as Feith explains earlier by quoting Rumsfeld, crap happens. But Congress, State, and the military should have been prescient enough to develop capabilities that the President and SECDEF told them not to in anticipation that the President and SECDEF would later change their minds.

[SteveMetz]

And, again, p. 158, "...the bureaucracy was underequipped and poorly organized for strategically important stability and reconstruction operations."

Why, then, did the administration develop a strategy which placed great stress on stability and reconstruction operations? It's like a basketball player who jumps into the air with the ball, then starts thinking about what he's going to do. Plus, by early 2002 when such capability was needed, the administration had had nearly a year and half to come up with some sort of comprehensive reorganization and legislation package to augment stabilization and reconstruction. But it had not. In fact, it had not done so by March 2003. All this after the orginal strategy assumption--things will kind of take care of themselves--proved wrong.

[marct]

Selil and Jedburgh's points about critical nodes notwithstanding, you can attack either the critical node or a critical circuit (nodes and connections) in a loosely coupled network. Even more importantly, you can induce "noise" (think of rumour in a social network) or feedback (think truly viscious rumours) through a network circuit that can damage or destroy it. In a tightly coupled network, you can do the same thing by accelerating a circuit vector. For example, you can take an orthodox belief in a social circuit and then put it on steroids - "everyone must believe X or they will be killed", etc. A biological analogy would be poisoning someone with overdoses of vitamin B.

[Jedburgh]

Selil and Jedburgh's points about critical nodes notwithstanding, you can attack either the critical node or a critical circuit (nodes and connections) in a loosely coupled network. Even more importantly, you can induce "noise" (think of rumour in a social network) or feedback (think truly viscious rumours) through a network circuit that can damage or destroy it. In a tightly coupled network, you can do the same thing by accelerating a circuit vector. For example, you can take an orthodox belief in a social circuit and then put it on steroids - "everyone must believe X or they will be killed", etc. A biological analogy would be poisoning someone with overdoses of vitamin B.

At this point, I think I should clearly state that all my maundering on about networks is relative only to clan threat networks of human beings. Ranging from HOIS agent nets, to terrorist organizations across a broad spectrum of types, as well as the underground support structures for overt insurgencies.

Destruction is the goal we strive for with such networks, and damn difficult to reach, unless you catch'em early and eliminate the movement at the fetal stage. The methods that Marc refers to are difficult to plan and implement effectively against an organization with any roots at all. On the rare occasions when such tactics have been effective (i.e. Kenya, the Philippines) it has been in a relatively narrow sense, and only resulted in the type of temp disruption that I mentioned in an earlier post. When that temp disruption is exploited in a structured manner to dig deeper into the threat structure, and the opportunity is seized for aggressive follow-up, then it can lead to network destruction, but not as a stand-alone approach.

Again, I'm referring only to the types of organizations I mentioned above, not to emerging, immature entities that can be easily (in a comparative sense) destroyed by the methods Marc stated. On the other, repressive governments have often used such methods with great success against dissident networks. The study of dissident networks in Eastern Europe during the Cold War period offers a lot of valuable lessons on clan comms and security measures evolved by the various groups to mitigate against this sort of threat to their underground existence.

[SteveMetz]

I was sidetracked for a few days, but now I'm back on track. Tale after tale of how "mistakes were made," but NEVER by the President, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, or Feith himself. The most recent nausea inducing twist of scapegoating is on page 139 where Feith writes, "Our armed forces and civilian officials lacked the institutions, authorities, and resources needed for reconstruction work." He clearly intended that as a way of shifting blame to others for what transpired. I guess it never occurred to him that a strategy based on nonexistent capabilities is flawed (Strategy 101: a strategy must be suitable, acceptable, AND feasible). Oh well, "mistakes were made."

[SteveMetz]

As I get to the Iraq sections, I see Mr. Feith continues his longstanding process of ignoring real criticism and, instead, creating and demolishing straw men assuming, I guess, that readers will lose track of this tactic.

On p. 183 he writes, "Soon after Saddam's overthrow in 2003, some war critics began to contend that not only was the war unnecesary, but that Saddam had never been a significant problem for the United States--regarding terrorism, WMD, or any other matter."

Now, there may have been "some war critics" taking that absurd position. But the serious criticism was that the extent of the threat posed by Hussein did not justify the expected strategic costs and risks of invasion and occupation. Mr. Feith does not address this serious criticism, instead devoting his attention to the easily debunked one he described in this quotation.

[J Wolfsberger]

... Mr. Feith does not address this serious criticism, instead devoting his attention to the easily debunked one he described in this quotation.

Aha! I've figured it out!

Mr. Feith is running for President.

[SteveMetz]

Finally, an explanation for what went wrong with the post-conflict planning!! On pp. 189-90:

Chalabi--a secular, U.S.-educated Iraqi businessman and banker--became a central figure in the story of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, but not because he shaped or implemented U.S. policy. It was, rather, because of the suspicion and antagonism he excited in key parts of the U.S. national security establishment, as well as within the Arab world. That suspicion would in the end derail the U.S. government's preparations and plans for Iraq's political transition.

So, see, it wasn't that OSD inadequately planned for the post-conflict transition. OSD was stabbed in the back by "key parts of the U.S. national security establishment" antagonistic to Chalibi. It is all so clear to me now!

[JJackson]

Thank you Steve

Now let me just check I have got this clear if we had dumped all that Phase IV stuff and photocopied them a copy of the constitution and put in Chalibi as President we could all have gone home after we had pulled down Saddam’s statue?

[SteveMetz]

On p. 200 he takes another dig at the CIA for not, in his estimation, pushing hard enough to remove Saddam Hussein out of concern for the stability of Iraq.

So, Doug, how's that instability stuff working out for you?

[SteveMetz]

p. 203 "The coup option (for removing Saddam Hussein) would thus require either a huge leap of faith--or a complete abandonment of principles."

A "huge leap of faith"?? In contrast to the idea that Chalabi would run Iraq, the Iraqi military and police would secure the country, and Iraqi itself would pay for reconstruction?

[Ken White]

Heh. That's rich coming from him. He and Wolfotwits having a discussion on the merits of principle is scary to contemplate. What a yo-yo...

[Tom Odom]

Rumsfeld to Write His Memoirs
Donald H. Rumsfeld, who resigned as secretary of defense in late 2006, will write his memoirs for the Sentinel imprint of Penguin Group USA. Mr. Rumsfeld, 75, will cover not only his years in the Bush administration but also his experiences with Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford and Ronald Reagan; his work in the private sector; and his early life.

Man I cannot wait to get my copy....

After WWII, the Center for Military History made its name for the next 4 plus decades with the Green Book series.

What are we going to call this peculiar group of memoirs emerging (dripping? spewing?) from the icons of the current administration? The Dream Books?

We have so far

George Tenet's "They Were Mean to Me"

Bremer's "I was only a proconsul so don't blame me"

Feith's "Damn the State Department, You guys go with Ahmed (Chalabi)"

Franks "COIN? Who needs a coin?I am outta here"

Who will be next?
Powelll--naw he did his 10 years ago and the ending was better
Cheney--no way
Conde Rice--possibly
Wolfowitz--possibly if he can get the World Bank to front the advance


Tom

[Rex Brynen]

...a "Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith walk into a bar.." joke.

[marct]

...a "Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith walk into a bar.." joke.

Rex, Rex, Rex <shaking his head>..... When did the unholy trinity ever walk anywhere when they could send their aids to do it instead ?

[SteveMetz]

Wouldn't surprise me.

[SteveMetz]

On p. 397 Feith decries that while the conventional campaign was underway, Franks was willing to send a military liaison to the Kurdish parties but not the INC. Feith attributes that to the nefarious influence of CIA and DOS. I'm sure that was the reason and it didn't have anything to do with the fact that the Kurds had tens of thousands of trained fighters in the field, and the INC had an untrained and unequipped paper force of a few hundred. I think there was a unicorn there at the time too.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

like those "Hearts, Stars, and Horseshoes, Clovers, and Blue Moons! Pots of Gold and Rainbows, and me Red Balloons!"