that might be true now.
But before Team America showed up, it was a happy place. They had flowery meadows and rainbow skies, and rivers made of chocolate, where the children danced and laughed and played with gumdrop smiles.
"What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
While the pathological scapegoating in the book ranges from annoying to disgusting, every once in a while Feith hits the target. I liked this line (describing a 2002 meeting): "The French defense ministry was represented by Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, a appealing person of formidable intellect and diplomatic finesse worthy of a government far more honorable than the one then in office in France." (p. 306).
That's gonna leave a mark.
I think there's an interesting story there that hopefully will come out some day. I was told by someone in C9 in Baghdad in April 2003 that they had captured documents that listed the payments to French officials. They shipped them back to Washington, never to hear of the issue again.
when he made his swing through Paris, Berlin and Moscow in December 2003 and all three nations suddenly did a vigorous about face and agreed to forgive massive quantities of Iraqi debt after six months of saying they would NEVER do that...
I'll tell ya, at times this slips from far fetched to downright bizarre, as Mr. Feith sales off the edge of reality. Check this out.
Of course, Feith never considers for a second that a position he held might actually be wrong. Hence when his position doesn't carry the day, he attributes it to the nefarious maneuvering of other individuals or organizations.
One of the biggies is whether or not to place a great emphasis on the Iraqi "externals" (especially Chalabi). He contends over and over that CIA and DOS led the opposition to this, mostly because Chalabi complained about them in the 1990s.
But then he has to explain why, if stressing the "externals" was the right approach, it didn't become the administration's position. He contends that POTIS and the NSC Principles were in favor of it, but CIA and DOS were able to work around the policymakers and influence Bremer and Franks. How, you might ask did they do this? You're going to love this: he argues that it was because DOS and CIA had senior reps on the CENTCOM staff (the POLAD and CIA equivalent) while OSD and the Joint Staff didn't. The implication is that this allowed CIA and DOS to exercise more influence over CENTCOM than OSD and the Joint Staff.
He writes: "The makeup of the interagency teams at the combatant commands helps explain why CENTCOM's thinkin on contested issues--training exiles, involving Iraqis in our war plans, setting up a provisional government--often clashed with the views of the Pentagon leadership. Rumsfeld wasn't shy about imparting his thinking to his commanders, but no Secretary of Defense would contribute daily war-planning guidance--or influence military officers' attitudes--as persistencly or effectively as the resident State and CIA advisers with whom those officers were in continuous collaboration." (p. 371-2)
Please, Mr. Feith, put the bong down and walk away!!!
Last edited by SteveMetz; 04-20-2008 at 07:05 PM.
and I don't mean angry. Surely no one is that naive. Surely?? Sure...hello! Hello, Doug???"...no Secretary of Defense would contribute daily war-planning guidance--or influence military officers' attitudes--as persistencly or effectively as the resident State and CIA advisers with whom those officers were in continuous collaboration."
I sincerely appreciate you reading this and posting excerpts -- so I don't have to waste coins on it...
I will say this: Mr. Feith has written an absolutely landmark classic in the burgeoning field of logical contortionism.
I like this one as he concocts an alibi for the looting of Baghdad: "Whatever Saddam's own doubts that the United States would actually invade, his regime may have planned the scorched-earth campaign as part of a postoverthrow insurgency strategy" (p. 414).
So, Hussein was convinced that the United States would never invade in the first place. Hence his unwillingness to fully cooperate with UN weapons inspectors or to undertake serious military preparations for the defense of Iraq. But at the same time, he made plans to loot all of Iraq's government ministries and his own palaces.
And, of course, he follows this demonstration of logical contortionism with slam #34,446 at the *real* culprits: "If so, the CIA's failure to discover those plans in advance was a serious problem."
I'll bet the CIA never was able to find those unicorns and leprechauns which populate the Magical Land of Feith either. That organization is simply worthless.
Last edited by SteveMetz; 04-23-2008 at 12:10 PM.
Just in from an anonymous informant....
Unicorns United denies ties to Feith
April 23, 2008
In a statement that has surprised a number of analysts, Unicorns United spokesman Galadriel has categorically denied giving Douglas Feith any strategic advice or direction.
"Are these analysts crazy?" Asked Galadriel to a packed press conference. "I mean,get serious! [Douglas] Feith doesn't meet even the minimal requirements for conversation with any unicorns!" [see here]
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Given the fact that Saddam did announce that's what he was going to do (and we all ignored it); did release all the prisoners from the jails (probably on the advice of Achalov (LINK), an ex-spetnaz urban warfare specialist); did plant weapons caches all over the country; did fire up Saddam's mujahadeen and a few other things."Whatever Saddam's own doubts that the United States would actually invade, his regime may have planned the scorched-earth campaign as part of a postoverthrow insurgency strategy" (p. 414)."
We pretty much got the word that's what was going to happen -- and proceeded to blithely ignore it. I'd like to say I twigged on to it but I didn't; couldn't figure out why he gave the two Russians medals -- until about July of 03. Then it dawned on me; Saddam telegraphed the whole thing and most of us just missed it.
Not that the tolerance of looting is thereby excused.
The Purple Oyster, also known as the "Purple Oyster (of Doom)", or "PO(oD)", is said to have once been one of the minions of the Invisible Pink Unicorn, but was cast out of her Pastures for the Great Evil of attempting to convince believers of the heretical notion that pepperoni and mushroom pizza is more pleasing to her than pineapple and ham.
"What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."
Two final thoughts about this and then, to borrow Chief Joseph's phrase, "I will rant no more for forever."
1. Feith does not understand the roots and causes of the post-Hussein conflict in Iraq. It was due to the unwillingness of the Sunni Arabs to accept a loss of power and status, and the unwillingness of the Shiites and Kurds to allow the Sunni Arabs to have disproportiante power and status. Feith asserts that a speedy handover of political authority to some sort of cobbled together Iraqi government would have prevented the rise of resistance. I don't think so since this would not have addressed the root cause of the conflict. Plus, Feith never makes clear whether this cobbled together Iraqi government was going to be defended by a cobbled together Iraqi security force, or by American troops. Given how hard it has been to build a new Iraqi security force, it's hard to imagine the former. And the latter would have inspired just as much anger, resentment, and resistance as having CPA run things in Baghdad. So Feith's silver bullet--a speedy handover of authority to Iraqis--is a pipedream (or feithdream).
2. Feith, like other members of the administration, cannot grapple with the idea that people may understand their policies and perceptions and still oppose them. He attributes all opposition, domestic and foreign, to failed strategic communications (mostly on the part of the State Department). As I often say, if you have a crappy product, the solution is not better advertising; it's a better product.
Now, if you'll excuse me, I've scheduled several hours of scream therapy.
Clearly you do not grasp that Wolfowitz as Feith's immediate boss had already declared that such sectarian schisms were of such a low order as to have no influence on the outcome. Ergo, they could not be root cause because they had no roots....1. Feith does not understand the roots and causes of the post-Hussein conflict in Iraq. It was due to the unwillingness of the Sunni Arabs to accept a loss of power and status, and the unwillingness of the Shiites and Kurds to allow the Sunni Arabs to have disproportiante power and status.
It is all very clear when you live in a controlled environment like the 2003 OSD.
Tom
Bookmarks