Nepal (catch all)

[JJackson]

Moderator's Note

This thread was called Nepal: Maoist Democracy coming soon? and has now been changed to Nepal (catch all) (ends).

Nepal's Maoists gain first seats

The Maoists have won four out of the seven seats already declared, election officials say.

But they are also ahead in 56 out of 102 seats whose partial results are coming through as the count proceeds

[Norfolk]

Talk about a fundamental contradiction in terms. It is practically impossible to see any good coming from a Maoist electoral victory in Nepal.

For that matter Maoist activities seem to really be on the upswing in Bhutan and North-East India as well in recent years and especially months. I am tempted to look for patterns here; not connections per se, just patterns.

[Jedburgh]

The Economist, 14 Apr 08: Maoists Take the Lead

Nepal's Maoists, who until two years ago were a vicious rebel party to a decade-long civil war, look likely to have won a general election. Of 186 seats declared on Monday April 14th the Maoists had won 103. A complicated electoral system mixing direct elections with proportional representation makes the overall complexion of the impending 601-seat assembly still hard to predict. But the Maoists may have won an outright majority.....

....An outright victory for the Maoists would be a nightmare for India. Plagued by a Maoist insurgency of its own, India until recently backed Nepal’s blundering King Gyanendra, who tried to crush the Maoists in the field. India forsook the king after he seized power in 2005. And it played an important part in brokering the peace process after his withdrawal from power following street protests the next year....

[William F. Owen]

Three years ago, I talked to retired Colonel living in Nepal. From what I gathered from him, if ever there was an insurgency that could have been quickly and easily defeated, it was this one. It was almost as if the Government didn't want to defeat them.

I am not so up on the nuances of Nepalese politics, but my I am pretty sure that no COIN doctrine was applied as we would understand The Nepalese Government clearly didn't act, in any meaningful way, but rather blundered despite a wealth of opportunities to do otherwise.

I'd be extremely interested to know anymore detail.

[Jedburgh]

Three years ago, I talked to retired Colonel living in Nepal. From what I gathered from him, if ever there was an insurgency that could have been quickly and easily defeated, it was this one. It was almost as if the Government didn't want to defeat them.

I am not so up on the nuances of Nepalese politics, but my I am pretty sure that no COIN doctrine was applied as we would understand The Nepalese Government clearly didn't act, in any meaningful way, but rather blundered despite a wealth of opportunities to do otherwise.

I'd be extremely interested to know anymore detail.

Well, hosted right here in our library is the USAWC paper The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996-2001.

The International Crisis Group has published quite a bit of good detail on the situation over the past few years. On their Nepal archive page you can find links to all of'em, if you have the time to go through them as backgrounders.

Jane's Intelligence Review has also published a few interesting pieces on the insurgency (a good one a couple of years back on the Maoist's use of IEDs) unfortunately, they're subscriber access only.

[Ray]

Three years ago, I talked to retired Colonel living in Nepal. From what I gathered from him, if ever there was an insurgency that could have been quickly and easily defeated,

Three years ago, I talked to retired Colonel living in Nepal. From what I gathered from him, if ever there was an insurgency that could have been quickly and easily defeated,

It is interesting to know that the retired Colonel from Nepal felt that insurgency in Nepal could be eliminated quickly and easily.

Obviously, he would have inputs for this belief and one would surely desire to know what inputs led him to this conclusion.

On the other hand, Nepal theoretically has all the ingredients for a successful insurgency. And experience including mine, indicates that once an insurgency takes root, it is indeed well nigh impossible to defeat it, especially when external elements in all its facet play a role. And in terrain like in India and Nepal with similar economic, political and social backgrounds.

The present King, I believe, is actually hated since he is imperious and appears to have schemed to ensure that democracy does not succeed. His ruthless use of the Army is well known as is the loyalty of the Army to him. It is believed that the higher ranks are staffed by people screened for the loyalty to the monarchy. This I learnt from the many Nepalese who work in India and in the Indian Army in various economic levels of society. His son, Crown Prince Paras' activities including running over a popular singer has also made him a disliked figure. There are also alleged corruption charges against the monarchy as also the belief that the current King played a role in the massacre of the last King's family and this is widely believed.

In short, the monarchy which should have been the binding factor since he is taken as the incarnate of the Hindu God, Vishnu, was instead reviled. It is also a fact, that Nepali, Maoist or otherwise, is deeply religious in nature.

The infrastructure and the economy were barely sustainable. Yet the aspiration was high given the innumerably Nepalis who work in India, including in the Indian Army (a large majority have settled down in India too!) and who show dissatisfaction when home given the vast difference in the lifestyle and visible economic disparity of India and Nepal.

In addition, there is said to be a nexus with the Indian Maoists (who are of serious concern to India's security) and the spread of ‘revolutionary’ thoughts is believed to be enhanced as the Communist Chinese have about 69 projects in Nepal. Neighbouring West Bengal in India has been a Communist ruled State for over 23 years and the influence of these cadres cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the spread of radical political thought in a semi backward population was possible.

Lastly the terrain, mountainous and harsh with population far and between is ideal country for guerrilla activities.

As I see it, insurgency was coming and it came, even if none wanted to address the issue seriously.

Insurgency came and it has been squashed by the ballot. This is a good sign since the ‘face’ of the insurgent and their actions will be ‘overground’ and can be addressed in a democratic manner within and without Nepal.

Had the insurgency taken root, it may have been difficult to control. But ofcourse, I am not aware of the inputs that the Colonel of Nepal has, which may prove my surmise a trifle off course.

Of course, it is difficult to state if the Govt of Nepal seriously addressed the insurgency. Prima facie, whatever inputs are in the public domain, indicates that they did!

[JJackson]

I for one am looking forward to having a Maoist Democracy if - as they claim - they wish to maintain multi-party democracy. This should be an interesting democratic experiment and I look forward to seeing how they adapt Maoism. I will be even more interested in seeing how they fair when they come up fro re-election after the Nepalese have found out what living in a communist state means. They seem keen to stop the supply of Gurkas but claim they will abide by all existing arrangements.
Good luck to you and welcome to the democracies club.

[William F. Owen]

It is interesting to know that the retired Colonel from Nepal felt that insurgency in Nepal could be eliminated quickly and easily.

Obviously, he would have inputs for this belief and one would surely desire to know what inputs led him to this conclusion.

This was in the early days of the Iraq insurgency, and as I remember we were discussing how you spot an insurgency in the early stages. He seemed convinced that the Nepal insurgency was very well forewarned and could have been dealt with early on.