Tactical Jenga vs. The Strategic Stopwatch

[Steve Blair]

it does you, your cause and discussion here more harm than good. You're a smart guy but others here are as well. You're entitled to state your opinions -- and if you'll recall, I'm more often in agreement with you than not -- but it not only is not necessary to deride others in so doing, it seems to me it's actually counterproductive.

You can do better.

I suggest your points 1 and 2 above were unnecessary and that your number 3 is awfully close to insulting a fellow council member about a book you acknowledge you haven't even read. What's the point of the post except to be snide and condescending? Is there one?

Gotta agree with this. Everyone has opinions, but here we should post them respectfully. I haven't seen anyone here (myself included) who has a corner on truth. Let's all remember why we're here: to make sense of (hopefully) this thing we call "small wars." It may be that "war is war is war," but even the most skeptical should admit that there are a number of plateaus or break points between total peace and LeMay-esque "nuclear combat." In my view (and with mod hat off at this point), claiming anything different is ignoring many thousands of years worth of military history and human history.

Back to the question (or thought) about the Army "breaking": I'd say it's in much better shape now than it was during the latter stages of Vietnam. Ken's got the first-hand experience there...but I've done a fair amount of reading and analysis into that area and I'd say we're in fair shape. Not as good as we could be, perhaps, but certainly not as far-gone as we were in 1969 or so. What I see are strains similar to those the all-volunteer force experienced in the later 1800s. Different level of combat to be sure, but the same sense of being stretched too thin and paid too little to take on a job too few care about. It's a point to be watched, but it's a far cry from race riots and some of the other sundry problems the military faced in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

[Gian P Gentile]

It's a point to be watched, but it's a far cry from race riots and some of the other sundry problems the military faced in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Agree that we wont see mutinies or things like that which the French Army experienced in early 1917. But I think it is much worse than you or Ken allow for. I think that Gens Casey and Cody have tried over the past few months to show how serious things are without using the "B" word. 3000 captains short; equipment under serious stress; an Army that does pretty much nothing but coin (I got the operational necessity for that because we are fighting two coin wars now). and at least for the next 10 months troop levels stay the same in Iraq and Afghanistan which means 12 months in and 12 months out for many combat outfits. The troopers are completing their third tour and will soon be staring down their 4th or even 5th? Right, there wont be mutinies or cataclysmic breaks; just a slow grinding down to a shell of the force we had in 2001. I accept the role of an army in the American Democracy and if our nation wants to break us for Iraq then so be it; I have served and will continue to do so until unable. I just wish folks outside of SWC members and in the greater nation would take seriously and debate this issue.

gian

[Rank amateur]

A I just wish folks outside of SWC members and in the greater nation would take seriously and debate this issue.

gian

I'm pretty confident that the subject will be discussed fairly seriously before the next election. (Though I will concede there is still a chance that the next election will be about Obama's pastor.)

Back on topic. I think I understand the slide now. Mr. Kilcullen is smart enough to know that the only way to get a crowd to criticize both the Republican plan and the Democratic plan is to have the Democrats attack the Republican plan and the Republicans attack the Democrats plan and then there is is a decent chance that most of the people in the room will come to the conclusion that neither plan is going to work.

Ron is 100% correct that the theoretical exit strategy is having the Iraqis replace the Jenga pieces. I agree 100% with Ken that the reality is if we stick with the Jenga model we're going to need to stay there for a very long time. I don't think the stopwatch is going to work either. I'm pretty sure that Mr. Kilcullen's next slide isn't, "so we're screwed and have no hope." Is there anyone out there who doesn't believe that we need some new ideas and a different model?

Anyone with experience have advice on the indicators to watch?

I have no experience, but I think the answer is wives (or husbands in some cases.) I'm not joking. 20 year olds can fight with no girlfriend back home, but when wives start saying "You have to choose between the Army and me" we're in trouble.

[Cavguy]

I think that Gens Casey and Cody have tried over the past few months to show how serious things are without using the "B" word. 3000 captains short; equipment under serious stress; an Army that does pretty much nothing but coin (I got the operational necessity for that because we are fighting two coin wars now).

gian

Sir,

Good point. I too am worried about ARFORGEN breaking the army, I don't know that it won't be a tipping point, that after a 4th or 5th tour the LT/CPT/SGT/SSG just says "enough, I can't take it", and we see an en-masse departure from the Army.

I also am getting extremely distressing anecdotal reports of BCT readiness upon arrival at CTC's prior to deployment - unfilled key staffs, non-CCC CPT's in many key positions, some units without a MEL4 S3/XO, etc. All manned to 90% just before the CTC rotation, and in the "crawl" phase of teambuilding. There is a large experience base from prior deployments, but it's akin to a "pro bowl" team rather than a "Super Bowl" team, which the modular BCT was supposed to solve - but can't with just-in-time manning. Makes me really worry that we have finally scraped the bottom, and may have entered a death spiral in readiness - that may result in elevated risk in deploying units. Perhaps that is behind Casey's comments?

[Maximus]

Three months ago I had the opportunity to interview more than 15 Soldiers from LtCol Yingling's battalion in Ft Bliss as they were conducting a final exercise prior to deploying. During the interview process I spoke to senior NCOs, platoon leaders, company commanders, the battalion sergeant major, XO, and CO. It was a unique experience in that I was an unbiased outsider (Marine) asking hard questions and I feel I received honest answers. The primary focus of my mission was to get feedback on the 360-leadership assessment that LtCol Yingling had implemented in the battalion. My secondary mission was to assess the Soldiers' views on the "no ranks" combatatives initiative that he also implemented.

During my time in the desert, I watched the Soldiers conduct proper PCC/PCI, leadership supervise guard post turnover and routinely run their troops through ROE type scenarios. Morale, as best I could tell, was very high. I think this a particularly important "metric" for this unit as their mission in Iraq is to serve as prison guards for more than a year. This is a mission that I'm not sure too many units would openly welcome.

I learned a lot from my short visit. Leadership was almost 100% supportive of the 360-assessment process. "No ranks" combatatives were a welcome addition to the Army and all Soldiers stated that seeing the Bn CO and Sgt Major grappling with their Soldiers was great. Most said this was the best unit they'd ever served in. The only other unit that some Soldiers rated higher was one they'd served with in combat.

All this said, concerns about young leadership and company commanders that had yet to go to captain's career course were evident in the unit.

Semper Fi,
Scott

[Gian P Gentile]

Sir,

Good point. I too am worried about ARFORGEN breaking the army, I don't know that it won't be a tipping point, that after a 4th or 5th tour the LT/CPT/SGT/SSG just says "enough, I can't take it", and we see an en-masse departure from the Army.

I also am getting extremely distressing anecdotal reports of BCT readiness upon arrival at CTC's prior to deployment - unfilled key staffs, non-CCC CPT's in many key positions, some units without a MEL4 S3/XO, etc. All manned to 90% just before the CTC rotation, and in the "crawl" phase of teambuilding. There is a large experience base from prior deployments, but it's akin to a "pro bowl" team rather than a "Super Bowl" team, which the modular BCT was supposed to solve - but can't with just-in-time manning. Makes me really worry that we have finally scraped the bottom, and may have entered a death spiral in readiness - that may result in elevated risk in deploying units. Perhaps that is behind Casey's comments?

Cavguy:

Right; I think your characterization of it is very good. I will rely on it in the future. I dont know what "breaking" or "broken" looks like either. It certainly wont look like France in early 1917 after the Nivelle offensives where some large units actually mutinied. It wont look either like the American Army in 1970 with huge drug and discipline problems. But it might just look like something you describe above and to be sure General Casey is seeing those very same things which is why I am sure he has been trying to carefully raise alarm bells. Considering Kilkullen's Jenga and tactical conditions on the ground in Iraq and the fact that the American Army has a huge role to play with those conditions, I consider this to be a worthwhile topic for this thread. Or perhaps we should start another one if others want to continue to purse the Jenga riddle.

gian

[SWJED]

Cavguy:

Right; I think your characterization of it is very good. I will rely on it in the future. I dont know what "breaking" or "broken" looks like either. It certainly wont look like France in early 1917 after the Nivelle offensives where some large units actually mutinied. It wont look either like the American Army in 1970 with huge drug and discipline problems. But it might just look like something you describe above and to be sure General Casey is seeing those very same things which is why I am sure he has been trying to carefully raise alarm bells. As for RA's request to get back on topic for this thread; well, considering Kilkullen's Jenga thing and tactical conditions on the ground in Iraq and the fact that the American Army has a huge role to play with those conditions, I consider this to be a worthwhile topic for this thread. Or perhaps we should start another one if others want to continue to purse the Jenga riddle.

gian

Gian - Don't be coy, you know full well this is not about solving a Jenga riddle - the post was put up to discuss transition. I'll break away the breaking of the Army posts into a new thread if warranted. But please, don't condescend, thanks - Dave

[Gian P Gentile]

Gian - Don't be coy, you know full well this is not about solving a Jenga riddle - the post was put up to discuss transition. I'll break away the breaking of the Army posts into a new thread if warranted. But please, don't condescend, thanks - Dave

Dave:

Appologies; did not mean to be condescending but I can see how you would take my words that way. I appreciate the work that Dr Kilkullen does for the military (although I disagree with most of what he writes and thinks) his committment and service are never in question. Too, I accept your point earlier that perhaps we were making too much fun with his slide when in context he used it in an effective way during his presentation.

Again, sorry, did not mean to offend, just trying to be clever and not coy, but understand how my words were perceived in that way.

Ken is chomping at the bit to get at me here.