Tactical Jenga vs. The Strategic Stopwatch

[Rank amateur]

I'll say the y axis is the level of coalition intervention required. The objective is to withdraw resources without collapsing the governmet: like jenga.

My personal spin is that - like jenga - the only way to prevent the entire structure from collapsing is to stop withdrawing pieces.

Kilkullen is an excellent writer

I agree - he chooses every word carefully - which is why I'm surprised that he chose the jenga analogy. Every game ends with the structure collapsing.

[Gian P Gentile]

I'll say the y axis is the level of coalition intervention required. The objective is to withdraw resources without collapsing the governmet: like jenga.

My personal spin is that - like jenga - the only way to prevent the entire structure from collapsing is to stop withdrawing pieces.



I agree - he chooses every word carefully - which is why I'm surprised that he chose the jenga analogy. Every game ends with the structure collapsing.

thanks, my friend, this helps

gian

[Rank amateur]

thanks, my friend, this helps
gian

You're very welcome. Let me add Gian's comment's in World Politics Review

In COIN, a precondition for success is the existence of a legitimate government. The United States has one success in the history of counterinsurgency since WW II to its credit: it succeeded in assisting the legitimate government of El Salvador defeat an internal communist insurgency. However, it was not the U.S. military that defeated the FMLN guerrillas, but the Salvadoran military under the control of its own government, with U.S. encouragement and no more than 50 or so U.S. military advisors. Moreover, El Salvador was not simply a sovereign state: El Salvadoran society was and is a single identity -- an essential prerequisite for successful internal defense of a government struggling for survival and legitimacy.

None of these conditions apply to Iraq, where the Iraqi government does not appear to be legitimate in the eyes of its people -- whether Shia, Sunni or Kurd -- and it seems that one Iraqi society does not exist.

And mention a concept I'm sure you're all familiar with: Occam's razor

This will make a lot more sense i it ends up driving towards the Coalition forces having to draw down ( take pieces out) while at the same time the HN fills gaps with whatever forces it has put together effectively.

This is a logically consistent theory, but - and I really hope you won't be offended by this term - it is a socialist theory. You can make a lot of logically consistent arguments about welfare - and sending out welfare checks to poor people will reduce the violence in a community - but in reality the theories don't matter; human psychology does. In the real world, people on welfare don't start looking for jobs until the welfare is about to run out. I really think that the Sunni sheiks are smart enough to realize that as soon as there is reconciliation we're going to stop sending them US dollars.

[John T. Fishel]

I was stumped by the slide. Even worse, this old fogie had never heard of Jenga, so what was I to make of it. Wish Kilcullen or SWJED (yeah, Dave ) had put it in simple English.

To move tangentially, don't make too much of the unity of the Salvadoran Armed Forces - police really didn't answer to the military high command; they were under a separate Vice Ministry of Public Security and the 3 police institutions didn't like each other very much. Today, the police - National Civil Police - are under a wholly separate ministry and there are still some tensions with the Ministry of Defense, but not as bad. Final comment, the Philippines with US assistance, was able to defeat the Huk Rebellion - see Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars.

But I still don't get the slide so that is the reason for my tangential reaction.

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

The slide looks like a poor imitation of Warden's TVA slide. The Time Value of Action. I sent SWEDJ a copy to post if he wants. I could not figure out how to do it But basically it is meant to convey that the longer you take to achieve your objective the more things can go wrong and the more likely you will fail in achieving your objective.

This is a good picture one Warden's posters it combines both the business and war response in it,
http://estore.websitepros.com/1761861/Detail.bok?no=27

Warden was talking about this over a decade ago!

[Gian P Gentile]

I was stumped by the slide. Even worse, this old fogie had never heard of Jenga...Final comment, the Philippines with US assistance, was able to defeat the Huk Rebellion - see Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars. JohnT

John T:

Dont feel bad because when I first saw Jenga without looking at the slide I thought it was perhaps some obscure counterinsurgency war which i had never heard of; or, perhaps subliminally I mixed it up with Jena.

Acknowledge your elaboration of El Salvador and your point on the Huk Rebellion. I did not use the Huk Rebellion because American efforts toward it were largely in supplying military equipment as compared to El Salvador which had a lengthy commitment of American advisers. But your point is well taken and thanks for putting it up.

I am working on an essay but cant get anything down so I keep clicking on SWJ or AM blogs; sort of like I am having a "25 or 6 to 4" moment. You know the classic 70s rock group Chicago song about having writers block.

gian

[slapout9]

Gian you need some Slapout MTV

[Gian P Gentile]

Gian you need some Slapout MTV

Slap, buddy, I just listened to it. Not a big fan of R/B;

as grand master of ebo (respectfully stated of course); what effect are you trying to produce.

gian

[Mark O'Neill]

I have to admit, like some other people who have posted in this thread, I had no idea what 'jenga' was. It is not played in Australia.

When I first saw the title I also wondered which insurgency the 'Jenga' had fought in and why I hadn't previously heard of them......

That said, Dave D, I get nothing from that slide other than a motherhood statement of the obvious - I think that without context it might be doing DK a disservice.

Cheers

Mark

[John T. Fishel]

is an Aussie!!!!

[Mark O'Neill]

is an Aussie!!!!

That is exactly the point in my title - he has been working with the US so long that he uses terms that Aussies do not use or understand...

You could walk thorugh Sydney for days and quiz people about what 'Jenga ' is - most would probably guess it is a type of Indian Takeaway.....

[Tom Odom]

looking at a wrist watch.

I know it must be useful 'cause someone built it...

But I could use it equally to keep track of my left wrist versus my right

Or as a reminder which hand to use when...

[SWJED]

Well, the point here is to get some discussion going concerrning transition.

Several days prior to the briefing I asked Dave K. to present something to the 180 JUW participants that would stimulate thoughts along that line. The tactical Jenga and the strategic stopwatch was simply a visual tool to generate that thought. The bottom line for the brief was to set up key questions and issues, to introduce some ways of thinking about the problem and for Dave to seek participant input via a healthy Q&A session. The brief did all that.

Up to this point (the briefing) the participants had been struggling a bit in coming to terms with the differences in an events driven transition (conditions based) vs. what we all know as a political truth – a time imposed transition. Part of the timed transition is a drawdown in coalition force levels that the tactical commanders have no control over.

Concerning the stopwatch, Dave illustrated what he called the “Aden Syndrome” with his hypothesis that in a timeline-driven drawdown, local allies will turn against the withdrawing power at the approximate midpoint of the drawdown - local allies fearing loss of external support, must consolidate their future power base in an environment that is not going to include external actors, so they turn on departing external power to shore up local support and avoid retribution from resistance actors. He used two examples - Aden, 19 June 1967 and Iraq 31 March 2004.

He went on to discuss the irreversibility of a drawdown – doing so would indicate deterioration of the security situation, admitting deterioration would undermine political support – both domestic and host nation, the shifting of domestic and host nation political expectations as a drawdown continues, and the drop in troop readiness as the extraction of combat forces is completed. A caveat was that the decrease in readiness applied to forces drawn out of theater – not out of major combat operations.

Dave went on later to discuss the evaluation and assessment of the transition posing this – if it’s Jenga, how do you know the stack is getting wobbly? Concerning the stopwatch – if it’s a stopwatch, how do you ask for a timeout?

That’s the wavetop, and again – the purpose here is to get some discussion going on transition and the Jenga slide was posted merely as a means to get that discussion off the ground – for a knuckle dragger like me it most certainly did.

I hear those who have a healthy distaste for PowerPoint but in front of large audience a slide used as prop is quite useful in generating discussion as well as Q&A.

On edit: Mark, welcome back!

[Rank amateur]

Dave went on later to discuss the evaluation and assessment of the transition posing this – if it’s Jenga, how do you know the stack is getting wobbly? Concerning the stopwatch – if it’s a stopwatch, how do you ask for a timeout?

Did Mr. Kilcullen offer a third option? Or are we stuck with two ineffective alternatives?

[wm]

I see the chart as an attempt to demonstrate that one’s point of view has a direct impact on how one sees progress. Using the 80,000’ strategic, soaring eagle’s view of the world, progress towards one’s goal(s) may seem to be linear, as the straight line shows. However, one needs to remember that the stopwatch needs to be rewound or it will slow down and not perform as desired—hence the downward slope of the line. Another interesting point about the eagle’s eye view is that as the eagle dives towards its prey, it loses the ability to see other options. It may end up with a meal that is sub-optimal. By focussing on the chipmunk during its dive, it may miss the javelina 100 feet away.

At the ground-level, tactical, worm’s-eye-view level, one starts with a monolithic effort, or coherent/cohesive force, as indicated by the original Jenga tower. The wavy line seems meant to show that progress at this level is much hard to track. Over time, the tower loses its structural stability as blocks are removed. Removing blocks may represent fragmentation of effort away from the original single focus. It may also represent a fracturing of the original force structure caused by asymmetrical unit rotations or an overall reduction in the deployed force. Others have already noted another aspect of the unpredictability of stability caused by the Jenga blocks’ removal: uncertainty is introduced as each side makes its choice of a next play. That is part of the reason that stability of the tactical effort is rather unpredictable.
As an aside, to those who haven’t played Jenga, sometimes removing an additional piece brings a little more stability to the surviving structure. Of course it is not as stable as the original monolith, but it may be more stable than a preceding combination.

One thing I do not like about either metaphor is the pessimism that seems operative in each, reflected by the downward trend in each line. Another problem for me was much better put by Tom Odom’s metaphor. I can put this slide to a lot of different uses, not least of which is a mystical example to obfuscate what I took to be an obvious point. (Slapout MTV’s “All Along the Watchtower” link works here: “There's too much confusion, I can't get no relief.”) Maybe Slapout MTV also needs a link to the Stone’s tune, “You can’t always get what you want.”

[SWJED]

As an aside, so as not to be confused with an obscure insurgent group, the latest rock video discovered by Slapout or an Australian take-away delicacy, here is some info on Jenga.

Jenga is played with 54 wooden blocks; each block is 3 times as long as it is wide, and slightly heavier in height than in width. The blocks are stacked in a tower formation; each story is three blocks placed adjacent to each other along their long side, and each story is placed perpendicular to the previous (so, for example, if the blocks in the first story are pointing north-south, the second story blocks will point east-west). There are therefore 18 stories to the Jenga tower. Since stacking the blocks neatly can be tedious, a plastic loading tray is included.

Once the tower is built, the person who built the tower moves last. Moving in Jenga consists of taking one and only one block from any story except the completed top story of the tower at the time of the turn, and placing it on the topmost story in order to complete it. Only one hand at a time may be used to remove a block; both hands can be used, but only one hand may be on the tower at a time. Blocks may be bumped to find a loose block that will not disturb the rest of the tower. Any block that is moved out of place may be left out of place if it is determined that it will knock the tower over if it is removed. The turn ends when the next person to move touches the tower, although he or she can wait 10 seconds before moving for the previous turn to end.

The game ends when the tower falls in any significant way -- in other words, any piece falls from the tower, other than the piece being knocked out to move to the top. The loser is the person who made the tower fall (i.e. whose turn it was when the tower fell); the winner is the person who moved before the loser.

[jcustis]

as to advance a couple of questions to muddy the water...

What is the desired endstate when the clock runs out? Put another way, what are the "right" conditions and circumstances for say, Iraq, at the end of all this that will put the pottery pieces back together with sufficient glue?

Are the "right" conditions in your mind at odds with what you understand the administration's desired endstate to be? Furthermore, is the administration's endstate clear anymore? I know we have heard and can say that it involves a sovereign Iraq, with security for the civilian populace, and the rule of law in place and supported by law enforcement, courts, etc., but what the hell does that REALLY mean?

I know I've beat this drum at length already, but how do the recent events in Basrah/Sadr City square with the desired endstate? I look at the stunts that Sadr has pulled recently and I ask myself, It's great that he supposedly convinced his followers to be non-violent, but why is he allowed to retain so much stroke?

I also look at the Maliki government, the response in Basrah, the acts of some of the police commandos, and ask What next dude? It's beginning to be your show, but all I'm hearing are boos. What will we be doing when the fractures become worse in say, another year when something happens in Kurdistan (I can't crystal ball that anything would, but I use that area to illustrate my point)? What will we be doing if the purported Iranian influence in the south gets worse? We are laying the blame squarely at the feet of the Iranians in the recent testimony, but what's the foot-stomp? Is it a dull saber rattle, or part of some grand scheme to move towards diplomacy by highlighting how pissed we are about their EFPs?

I'm slowly beginning to wonder if the model is less tactical Jenga and simply a case musical chairs, where the game started with only half as many chairs as there are players.

EDIT: I'm torn by all these questions because I really don't know if the American public - which can either pull one or more pieces, or wind the clock forward - understands what the endstate is anymore. I fear that we will come to the end not because we are done and it is time to go, but we have achieved a "decent interval" and that is enough because we have lost enough treasure and can go no further.

[Gian P Gentile]

as to advance a couple of questions to muddy the water...

What is the desired endstate when the clock runs out? Put another way, what are the "right" conditions and circumstances for say, Iraq, at the end of all this that will put the pottery pieces back together with sufficient glue?

Are the "right" conditions in your mind at odds with what you understand the administration's desired endstate to be? Furthermore, is the administration's endstate clear anymore? I know we have heard and can say that it involves a sovereign Iraq, with security for the civilian populace, and the rule of law in place and supported by law enforcement, courts, etc., but what the hell does that REALLY mean?

Well put, Jcustis.

I dont know either and General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker were not clear either when asked in testimony last week. And it is exactly the questions you raise about what is the strategic endstate in Iraq that I combine with my own questions about the current state of the Army and is it worth breaking over Iraq, especially if smart folks like you cant even figure out what the goal is anymore?

this is why i continue to link the condition of the Army to this most important thread and its discussion. Transition of course is the key issue in this thread but the army's ability to affect that transition is directly tied to it.

gg

[slapout9]

This is an older version of Wardens Time Value of Action. When I first met Warden I asked him what was the most important thing to remember and to my surprise this is it. I had a copy of his book and he accidentally drop it and it fell open to graph of the Time Value of Action. Spooky

http://smallwarsjournal.com/images/t...action-war.jpg

So which point on the graph does the council think the US is at?

[Ken White]

First, on a topic in several of the above posts; the Army in the early 70s. Both the drug and disciplinary problems existed -- both are also vastly overstated, mostly by revisionist historians with wee adzes to grind (most couldn't handle an ax). Both resulted as much from the societal breakdown that started in 1968 more than they did from any trauma from Vet Nam. The Army, in a harbinger of things to come, took about a year or so to realize there was a problem; another year or so to admit it and start programs to fix the problem and yet another year or two for those programs to start to work. By 1972-3 they were on the way to being significantly reduced, by 1977 they were for all intents and purpose gone.

My point is that it wasn't as bad as many today seem to believe or as many 'histories' imply, that it got fixed reasonably rapidly -- and that we are, indeed, no where near that today.

Cav Guy said:

"...I think the indicator to watch for, and the one most dangerous for the army, is the collapse of discipline. Numbers can be rebuilt, but from my observations the "soul" of the force is the key. It still seems healthy right now, even given the stress.

That's not to get cocky either, it could happen suddenly, in a tipping point fashion, rather than a long decline. Anyone with experience have advice on the indicators to watch?

agree -- and watch reenlistments. Not officer retention, reenlistments. We're over-officered (I know, I know -- but that overwork is due to Parkinson's Law, not being woefully understrength ). As long as the re-up rate stays at 25% or greater, there are no significant problems. Drug and alcohol, divorce, indebtedness are all indicators but they are also influenced by many things. I recall an early 1960s study that determined the divorce rate was higher for persons on short tours than it was for the Army as a whole or those on long tours. Duh. Cav Guy also said:

"...BCT readiness upon arrival at CTC's prior to deployment - unfilled key staffs, non-CCC CPT's in many key positions, some units without a MEL4 S3/XO, etc. All manned to 90% just before the CTC rotation, and in the "crawl" phase of teambuilding."

Happens in all wars, a peacetime structure (which IMO we should never adopt but that's another thread) has difficulty adapting to war. Elements of the Army have been at war many times over the last 58 years -- The US Army has NOT been to war since 1945. Most CPTs command or get staff jobs before they get to the CCC anyway -- or sure used to. You'd be amazed at how many non MEL4 MAJ -- and CPT -- have done a good job as an S3. Is it desirable? No. Is it an invitation to disaster? Only if commanders lacking self confidence allow it to be. Remember there was a time when Bn staff O's were all 1LTs, so the Co Cdrs outranked them. That was changed after Korea not to get more experience at Bn level (though that was of course the stated rationale) but to justify an overstrength in officers for mobilization purposes. Bn S3s were CPT by TOE until the mid-60s.

"...but it's akin to a "pro bowl" team rather than a "Super Bowl" team, which the modular BCT was supposed to solve - but can't with just-in-time manning. Makes me really worry that we have finally scraped the bottom, and may have entered a death spiral in readiness - that may result in elevated risk in deploying units."

Be far worse if it were a big war; we'd be sending in bush league teams. That's why I object to peacetime standards; they make life nice and fairly easy but they develop mindsets that don't adapt to wars at all well. I suggest we saw that in the first 18 months in Iraq and still have vestiges.

As an aside, In two tours in Viet Nam, I can assure that both Airborne Brigades I was with were C-4 across the board for the whole tour. Even with 2LT Co Cdrs, we had good, effective units.

Rank Amateur said:

I'm pretty confident that the subject will be discussed fairly seriously before the next election. (Though I will concede there is still a chance that the next election will be about Obama's pastor.)

Discussed seriously by whom? Certainly none of the candidates --none of them, including McCain (an Airdale) have much of a clue.

R.A also said:

"Is there anyone out there who doesn't believe that we need some new ideas and a different model?"

I know a number who don't believe that, some serving, some not. I'm one of the latter. I'd also suggest that there is no practical alternative to the Jenga model.

I think the answer is wives (or husbands in some cases.) I'm not joking. 20 year olds can fight with no girlfriend back home, but when wives start saying "You have to choose between the Army and me" we're in trouble.

Got to disagree. That's true for officers (more often than not);it is not true for the Enlisted guys (again, more often than not). The Army effectively bribes enlisted guys into marriage; we should pay folks to stay single; instead we pay 'em extra if they're married -- plus married EM get other breaks their single buddies do not. Perverse system. Bottom line is that the divorce rate will go up but a lot of those divorces would probably have occurred without the deployments as an excuse. IIRC, the rate effectively tripled during Viet Nam and the Army didn't really break -- it bent, far more so than today -- but it didn't break. It's noteworthy that even in peacetime, units that deploy a a lot for training, the 82d and SF, have a divorce rate that is almost double that of the entire Army.

Ancillary point, most Officers will depart before divorcing; most NCOs won't. We are (in my opinion) over-officered and we have had a great reenlistment rate for several years, particularly in the combat arms -- so we should have an adequate number of NCOs and an acceptable if low fill of officers.

Gian said:

"Ken is chomping at the bit to get at me here."

Nah, I agree with you and 'breaking' is a concern; I just don't think we're as close to that as you do. We do need to get back to big war stuff but we can go another year or two without any major danger in that sphere. Be nice if we didn't have to but I don't see much of anyway to get there. I will say that JCustis said "I know we have heard and can say that it involves a sovereign Iraq, with security for the civilian populace, and the rule of law in place and supported by law enforcement, courts, etc., but what the hell does that REALLY mean? to which you responded:

"I dont know either and General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker were not clear either when asked in testimony last week. And it is exactly the questions you raise about what is the strategic endstate in Iraq that I combine with my own questions about the current state of the Army and is it worth breaking over Iraq, especially if smart folks like you cant even figure out what the goal is anymore?"

I think that both of you know to one degree or another what was meant by the desired end state and that your real and totally fair question is; "Is it worth it." Casey and Cody are answering for the Army. Only y'all can answer that for yourselves. I'm long retired so I have no vote but I do have a serving son who's been there a few times and shares all the concerns expressed here -- and he thinks it is worth it. So far. When he gets worried, I will...