Tactical Jenga vs. The Strategic Stopwatch

[Ken White]

First, on a topic in several of the above posts; the Army in the early 70s. Both the drug and disciplinary problems existed -- both are also vastly overstated, mostly by revisionist historians with wee adzes to grind (most couldn't handle an ax). Both resulted as much from the societal breakdown that started in 1968 more than they did from any trauma from Vet Nam. The Army, in a harbinger of things to come, took about a year or so to realize there was a problem; another year or so to admit it and start programs to fix the problem and yet another year or two for those programs to start to work. By 1972-3 they were on the way to being significantly reduced, by 1977 they were for all intents and purpose gone.

My point is that it wasn't as bad as many today seem to believe or as many 'histories' imply, that it got fixed reasonably rapidly -- and that we are, indeed, no where near that today.

Cav Guy said:

"...I think the indicator to watch for, and the one most dangerous for the army, is the collapse of discipline. Numbers can be rebuilt, but from my observations the "soul" of the force is the key. It still seems healthy right now, even given the stress.

That's not to get cocky either, it could happen suddenly, in a tipping point fashion, rather than a long decline. Anyone with experience have advice on the indicators to watch?

agree -- and watch reenlistments. Not officer retention, reenlistments. We're over-officered (I know, I know -- but that overwork is due to Parkinson's Law, not being woefully understrength ). As long as the re-up rate stays at 25% or greater, there are no significant problems. Drug and alcohol, divorce, indebtedness are all indicators but they are also influenced by many things. I recall an early 1960s study that determined the divorce rate was higher for persons on short tours than it was for the Army as a whole or those on long tours. Duh. Cav Guy also said:

"...BCT readiness upon arrival at CTC's prior to deployment - unfilled key staffs, non-CCC CPT's in many key positions, some units without a MEL4 S3/XO, etc. All manned to 90% just before the CTC rotation, and in the "crawl" phase of teambuilding."

Happens in all wars, a peacetime structure (which IMO we should never adopt but that's another thread) has difficulty adapting to war. Elements of the Army have been at war many times over the last 58 years -- The US Army has NOT been to war since 1945. Most CPTs command or get staff jobs before they get to the CCC anyway -- or sure used to. You'd be amazed at how many non MEL4 MAJ -- and CPT -- have done a good job as an S3. Is it desirable? No. Is it an invitation to disaster? Only if commanders lacking self confidence allow it to be. Remember there was a time when Bn staff O's were all 1LTs, so the Co Cdrs outranked them. That was changed after Korea not to get more experience at Bn level (though that was of course the stated rationale) but to justify an overstrength in officers for mobilization purposes. Bn S3s were CPT by TOE until the mid-60s.

"...but it's akin to a "pro bowl" team rather than a "Super Bowl" team, which the modular BCT was supposed to solve - but can't with just-in-time manning. Makes me really worry that we have finally scraped the bottom, and may have entered a death spiral in readiness - that may result in elevated risk in deploying units."

Be far worse if it were a big war; we'd be sending in bush league teams. That's why I object to peacetime standards; they make life nice and fairly easy but they develop mindsets that don't adapt to wars at all well. I suggest we saw that in the first 18 months in Iraq and still have vestiges.

As an aside, In two tours in Viet Nam, I can assure that both Airborne Brigades I was with were C-4 across the board for the whole tour. Even with 2LT Co Cdrs, we had good, effective units.

Rank Amateur said:

I'm pretty confident that the subject will be discussed fairly seriously before the next election. (Though I will concede there is still a chance that the next election will be about Obama's pastor.)

Discussed seriously by whom? Certainly none of the candidates --none of them, including McCain (an Airdale) have much of a clue.

R.A also said:

"Is there anyone out there who doesn't believe that we need some new ideas and a different model?"

I know a number who don't believe that, some serving, some not. I'm one of the latter. I'd also suggest that there is no practical alternative to the Jenga model.

I think the answer is wives (or husbands in some cases.) I'm not joking. 20 year olds can fight with no girlfriend back home, but when wives start saying "You have to choose between the Army and me" we're in trouble.

Got to disagree. That's true for officers (more often than not);it is not true for the Enlisted guys (again, more often than not). The Army effectively bribes enlisted guys into marriage; we should pay folks to stay single; instead we pay 'em extra if they're married -- plus married EM get other breaks their single buddies do not. Perverse system. Bottom line is that the divorce rate will go up but a lot of those divorces would probably have occurred without the deployments as an excuse. IIRC, the rate effectively tripled during Viet Nam and the Army didn't really break -- it bent, far more so than today -- but it didn't break. It's noteworthy that even in peacetime, units that deploy a a lot for training, the 82d and SF, have a divorce rate that is almost double that of the entire Army.

Ancillary point, most Officers will depart before divorcing; most NCOs won't. We are (in my opinion) over-officered and we have had a great reenlistment rate for several years, particularly in the combat arms -- so we should have an adequate number of NCOs and an acceptable if low fill of officers.

Gian said:

"Ken is chomping at the bit to get at me here."

Nah, I agree with you and 'breaking' is a concern; I just don't think we're as close to that as you do. We do need to get back to big war stuff but we can go another year or two without any major danger in that sphere. Be nice if we didn't have to but I don't see much of anyway to get there. I will say that JCustis said "I know we have heard and can say that it involves a sovereign Iraq, with security for the civilian populace, and the rule of law in place and supported by law enforcement, courts, etc., but what the hell does that REALLY mean? to which you responded:

"I dont know either and General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker were not clear either when asked in testimony last week. And it is exactly the questions you raise about what is the strategic endstate in Iraq that I combine with my own questions about the current state of the Army and is it worth breaking over Iraq, especially if smart folks like you cant even figure out what the goal is anymore?"

I think that both of you know to one degree or another what was meant by the desired end state and that your real and totally fair question is; "Is it worth it." Casey and Cody are answering for the Army. Only y'all can answer that for yourselves. I'm long retired so I have no vote but I do have a serving son who's been there a few times and shares all the concerns expressed here -- and he thinks it is worth it. So far. When he gets worried, I will...

[Ken White]

I sent this to Bill Nagle who has allowed me to post this. This is an older version of Wardens Time Value of Action. When I first met Warden I asked him what was the most important thing to remember and to my surprise this is it. I had a copy of his book and he accidentally drop it and it fell open to graph of the Time Value of Action. Spooky

http://smallwarsjournal.com/images/t...action-war.jpg

So which point on the graph does the council think the US is at?

and went off the paper on an uphill slope about two years ago, I'd say. He may need to go back to the drawing board.

[jcustis]

I see your point Ken, and I do think I have a good grasp on the endstate. I'm at a loss, however, when I read comments posted to Youtube clips, military servicemember support sites, and even on threads on Military.com. I tend to think that I'm not the audience for the IO campaign, but we aren't getting through to the level we need to be...The American public does not have an inexhaustible well of patience, especially in the midst of a looming recession.

Although I agree that we will be in Iraq for a long time, the risk factors are going to change within a year of the new President coming into office, regardless of party affiliation. We will downsize sharply and the guys left on the ground wil be advisers in a pure sense that we are familiar with from wars past (to include yours). I'm not worried that it will come to that, I suppose, because I don't think our military is going to be broken in the process. The collective will of our nation will be broken before the troops, and I'm afraid that we won't see the watershed before it's already on top of us. That watershed is going to be something akin to another Samarra Mosque bombing, or a fight on the order of Fallujah in Nov 2004.

I wish I didn't hold that view, and I may sound overly-fatalistic, but I've always seen that damn glass as needing a refill.

[Ken White]

in this whole thing has been beyond bad. You're correct on the public but there's also a degree of collective wisdom that seems to appear and preclude the really bad knee jerks. We'll just have to see how it unfolds.

Well, I, on the other hand, have always been a half full guy. I guess if we ever get to have a drink together, we need to get a level headed submariner who believes their old mantra "If you aren't having fun, you aren't doing it right" to sit between us and say "Belay that, all our glasses are at half mast and I'm buying the next round."

[William F. Owen]

it does you, your cause and discussion here more harm than good. You're a smart guy but others here are as well. You're entitled to state your opinions -- and if you'll recall, I'm more often in agreement with you than not -- but it not only is not necessary to deride others in so doing, it seems to me it's actually counterproductive.

You can do better.

I suggest your points 1 and 2 above were unnecessary and that your number 3 is awfully close to insulting a fellow council member about a book you acknowledge you haven't even read. What's the point of the post except to be snide and condescending? Is there one?

Gentleman,

I apologise unreservedly for my post. It was in extremely poor taste, and I intended no offence whatsoever. It was intended purely as humour, but missed the mark badly.

On reading the offending item this AM, I am more than somewhat ashamed of my action and have no idea what possessed me to write it, as I certainly I did intend to offend Dave Kilcullen, (who has been personally helpful to me) or John Nagl, who I know, full well, frequents this board - and I have no wish to offend.

Again, and in closing, I apologise to all concerned.

[ODB]

I came in the Army after DS/DS. Everyone I saw had a CIB or combat patch, but funny thing is 5 years later you rarely saw someone with those things. Those first five years were some of my best years. Training was realistic and battle focused, we were still experiencing the hangover from the war. As the years passed the training became more and more check the block, tasks that had to be completed quarterly, semi-annually, and annually. Ever year we did at least one CTC rotation. Our training transition from individual tasks to collective tasks. Many of the leaders I had when I came in experienced wartime conditions in some form, many of those leaders 5 years or so later retired, many of the younger soldiers ETS'd and so we went and again became a peacetime Army. Ever once in a while we'd get someone in the unit who was a Panama or Grenada vet and we'd regain our focus as much as possible them they would continue on and we'd lull back into peacetime Army. As unfortunate as this is this is the nature of things. Having talked with veterans over the years many have experienced this same trend.

A few years after 9/11 we had many soldiers who had more combat strips than service strips. These soldiers had not spent any significant amout of time in the Army in garrison. Yes we had a lot of DUI's, fighting, divorces, etc...but when gone 18 months out of 24 months it's going to happen. Especially with young soldiers and young wives. They just didn't know how to act in a garrison environment. The best is a month after we returned from fighting overseas we had to do CTC rotation so we could be validated to go to war. This is a primary example of peacetime Army at it's best.

If the re-enlistment rates stay high I feel it can do nothing but benefit the Army in the future. Many of these young troops will have multiple deployments and experiences to fall back on and hopefully keep their troops battle focused throughout the years following todays current conflicts and not allow the Army to lull itself to sleep. I was one of the lucky ones who had great leadership at a young age (2 CSM's who were Vietnam Veterans) and many SL/PSG/1SG who were Panama and Grenada Veterans that developed me into what I am today.

One last thought from the boots on the ground perspective. We are tired, tired of the political games our congress plays with us. Let us do our jobs and you do yours. Media do good or do nothing, at this point nothing would be good. An in general if the population thinks that what news is telling them is the truth then we are in for a world of hurt in the next 4 years.

One question. Would a massive reduction in force actually be the right answer to end it? Let those who trained to fight it this kind of war do so the way it is suppose to be don, by, through, and with indig forces? Sorry 2 questions.

[selil]

I was reminded earlier this month by one of my "war widows", young ladies married to young service members who are absent from home, that her husband of five years has spent three of them in Iraq. He is some sort of communications guy at the e-5/6 level (I'm being purposefully vague) and we was given the opportunity to re-enlist and get a bonus. When he said he wanted out they said they'd just suck him back in and no bonus. That is going to radically change re-enlistment numbers. Did I mention he "was" a reservist? One of my Marine reservists (cannon cocker) got 72 hour notice that he was to report earlier this semester. I know short call up times are not the norm and IRR threats aren't likely the norm either. It is hard not to notice though that of the dozen+ veterans I had in my classes we are now down to exactly 2. One is thinking he's going to jump for a warrant officer position, and the other is Air Force and not subject to recall.

[Steve Blair]

One of my Marine reservists (cannon cocker) got 72 hour notice that he was to report earlier this semester. I know short call up times are not the norm and IRR threats aren't likely the norm either. It is hard not to notice though that of the dozen+ veterans I had in my classes we are now down to exactly 2. One is thinking he's going to jump for a warrant officer position, and the other is Air Force and not subject to recall.

We had a kid (Marine college officer program) have more or less the same thing happen to him. He had a week to drop classes and get stuff in order before reporting to training. So far it hasn't touched any of our AF people (regular duty or reserve).

Back to the slide.... I do like the jenga model, although as mentioned earlier it might benefit from the idea of players putting sticks in the lower areas at the same time someone's taking them out above. JCustis' musical chairs idea is also fitting. The stopwatch, I think, is based more on what politicians believe is American domestic patience and/or political expediency (in our case...it can be different in other countries) and often ignores outside circumstances or realities. It's an internal clock, and that may well be where some of our problems start. As soon as things get difficult the focus swings to internal factors and away from whatever the desired end-state might have been when the whole thing started.

Of course, any time there's a change in leadership (and it's worth considering that the US has a controlled revolution of sorts every two years - since you have to take congressional elections into account as well) the stopwatch resets...but with a variable amount of time. It could be less than before, more than before, or stay the same.

Just some early morning thoughts...feel free to hack away at 'em.

[Eden]

This thread seems to have developed a split personality, so I'll try to hold up both ends.

First, on the stresses in the Army. I agree with Ken that the Army is over-officered and definitely over-generaled, but I worry more than he does about the quality of the officer corps. Promotion rates to major and lieutenant colonel have skyrocketed; I can't help but feel this will reduce the quality of our senior officer corps in the future as a larger percentage of drones survive into the ranks where decisions are made, rather than just implemented. I also worry that our younger officers are being short-changed as promotions accelerate and they have less time to learn their trade. Yes, they gain priceless combat experience and that is good, but I think that our future officer corps will have a very narrow set of well-developed skills and will lack that broad understanding of the institution required for intelligent leadership.

The bottom line on this is that we are still organized to fight WWIII; our personnel, training, acquisition, and doctrinal systems have not been changed to reflect current circumstances. This is why everything seems to have become an adhocracy as we struggle to circumvent - rather than modify - the system. This will, eventually, lead to a train wreck of some sort.

As for jenga and stopwatches: The problem with the stopwatch analogy is that it implies that there is a definable block of time available that is impervious to change. Performance on the ground and the resources expended affect - I might go so far as to say they determine - the time available for reaching your endstate. I believe that the American public can both be patient and accept casualties if they perceive that progress is being made. So we can extend the time available for action if we can demonstrate that sacrifices made are worthwhile.

It is also unhelpful that our desired endstate is not achievable given our current committment of resources. I am not a fan of Obama, but his question of Petraeus during the recent congressional testimony was spot-on: why have we set the bar so high? We are, in effect, trying to make Iraq more stable and safer than, say...Pakistan, or any number of other countries out there that have active terrorist cells, sectarian strife, and one or more smoldering insurgencies.

[wm]

why have we set the bar so high? We are, in effect, trying to make Iraq more stable and safer than, say...Pakistan, or any number of other countries out there that have active terrorist cells, sectarian strife, and one or more smoldering insurgencies.

I suspect that the answer to this question requires us to talk about the elephant in the room.

It will certainly be a little dificult to set up POMCUS sites and training areas like Graf and Hohenfels in an unstable environment. Forward basing for SACCENT/USARIZ (vice SACEUR/USAREUR) requires a very stable and safe environment.

[Ken White]

Eden, I share your concerns on the Officer corps but having seen the same accelerated promotions during Korea and Viet Nam, am probably slightly more comfortable that most -- not all -- of them will work out. Sigh. One of the penalties of being old...

This from you:

The bottom line on this is that we are still organized to fight WWIII; our personnel, training, acquisition, and doctrinal systems have not been changed to reflect current circumstances. This is why everything seems to have become an adhocracy as we struggle to circumvent - rather than modify - the system. This will, eventually, lead to a train wreck of some sort.

Is way too true. I have heard that efforts to change the organizational structure and the doctrinal systems are underway -- logically, the training and acquisition processes will follow. Worrisome is the fact that no one seems to be addressing the Per system.

WM, as 'Enery 'Iggins said, "I do believe you've got it!"

[wm]

The bottom line on this is that we are still organized to fight WWIII; our personnel, training, acquisition, and doctrinal systems have not been changed to reflect current circumstances. This is why everything seems to have become an adhocracy as we struggle to circumvent - rather than modify - the system. This will, eventually, lead to a train wreck of some sort.

This from you:Is way too true. I have heard that efforts to change the organizational structure and the doctrinal systems are underway -- logically, the training and acquisition processes will follow. Worrisome is the fact that no one seems to be addressing the Per system.

I suspect that the WWIII prep mentality is also why we seem to think we need that forward base at the head of the Persian Gulf. BTW be wary of applying logic to the DoD acquisition system. It is not all about getting the troops the right tools to do their jobs.

[WM, as 'Enery 'Iggins said, "I do believe you've got it!"

Thanks Ken. I wonder why we cannot be upfront about this as our objective. The story ought to be a fairly easy one to tell and can be sugarcoated enough so as to make the hosts not appear to be selling out on their political sovereignty

[Ken White]

I suspect that the WWIII prep mentality is also why we seem to think we need that forward base at the head of the Persian Gulf. BTW be wary of applying logic to the DoD acquisition system. It is not all about getting the troops the right tools to do their jobs.

I do see minor glimmers of improvement; one can only pray.

... I wonder why we cannot be upfront about this as our objective. The story ought to be a fairly easy one to tell and can be sugarcoated enough so as to make the hosts not appear to be selling out on their political sovereignty

Dunno. Good question; I agree it could've been sold and told and would likely have done far better with many than some of the cockamamie things they did put out. This is the worst administration I've seen for getting their message out. For a crew that's supposed to be on-message and controlling, they've really done poorly.

[USMCTanker]

Just want to hear Council member’s thoughts concerning transition.

At JUW one response to 'tactical Jenga' was "transition is not like Jenga, more like the opening scene from the original Indiana Jones - Raiders of the Lost Ark" - where, when attempting to retrieve a precious idol - set with all kinds of 1930ish IED-like traps - Jones balances time and agility to replace the idol with a bag of sand. The counter-response from someone in the audience was along the lines that you have to be able to calculate the "right time" and have something of substance to replace the "idol" - not useless sand...

SWJ Disclaimer: The link to Indiana Jones was thrown in only because I love the soundtrack and this post does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or Steven Spielberg.

I was the short, bald individual and JUW 08 who made the Raiders of the Lost Ark analogy, resulting in the shots across the bow from the SMEs and Dr. Kilcullen. I still believe my analogy to be accurate.

In my uneducated (and unsolicited) opinion, transition can be considered a close system. Input = throughput = output. The Jenga reference to me infers the removal of military forces without backfill. The end state with the game is always failure - the Jenga structure always collapse.

What I am suggesting is that the idol (US military forces) is replaced with a bag of sand (a combination of all instruments of national power). That sand could be host nation security forces, economic incentives, diplomatic actions, you name it. The bottom line is that in order to keep from getting "squashed by the rolling ball", a balance of effort with the host nation must be maintained.

Examples:

Withdrawing forces from South Vietnam without maintaining effective diplomatic/economic/military programs = squashed by the big boulder

Establishing a long term military presence, economic relationships and political unity in Japan = exiting the temple with the idol

This is my first post to the Small Wars Journal and would love to have my random thoughts torn apart. I am considering this theory as a thesis for a MMAS. Thank you for allowing me to comment.

S/F,
John

[Ken White]

JUW08 but what you said above makes sense and I'm curious as to what Dr. Kilcullen and the SMEs found objectionable (unless it was just the 'unsolicited' part -- that always upsets 'em... ).

As to the above cited response from the audience; well, duh. True but also went without saying.

Memo to self: continue to avoid using film, sports and game metaphors and references in discussing bidness...

[Randy Brown]

One caveat before I beg your collective indulgence for taking up too much headspace and timing.

Yes, I am aware that the purpose of this discussion is focused on the topic of "transition," not games and competitions of mental, physical, and architectural skill. Wrestling with the rhetorical concepts presented in the PowerPoint fragment first used to get the conversational-Raiders-of-the-Lost-Ark-ball rolling, as well as subsequent comments and insights offered by other posters, I decided to engage in a little research and play regarding Jenga, and how it might be modified to more accurately reflect the conflicting realities (and the realities of conflict) at work in "transition."

My efforts were immediately rewarded with some Fun Jenga Facts Worthy of Cliff Claven himself, including:

• "Jenga" is the imperative verb in Swahili "to build."
• There are authorized variants of Jenga, including: those involving colored blocks and randomization through dice ("Throw'n Go Jenga"); "Truth or Dare Jenga (don't ask, don't tell?); and even an "Xtreme" version that does not use uniform shapes or angles.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenga for more facts on the game.

Inspired by this initial success, I sought to conceptualize a Jenga variant that would incorporate factors including, but not limited to:

• A fixed timeline for success or failure.
• Actions by multiple actors, each self-interestedly pursuring different objectives or conditions for victory.
• Both "offensive" and "defensive" tactics.
• Opportunities for negotiation and alliance.

Below, please find an attempt to model "transition" using two sets of Jenga blocks. I propose to call the result "Jenga Jihad," because I have a sportscaster's penchant for alliteration, and because I like the juxtaposition of "To Build" and "To Struggle." (Cultural nano-brief follows: "Jihad" does not equal "holy war.")

I offer all this as a serious effort to play with a serious concept, and look forward to your comments. I'd also welcome any reactions driven by actual playtesting, as my family's Jenga set is currently deployed as a field-expedient set of building blocks, and may even be the fairy princess' last line of defense.

Enjoy!

Jenga Jihad

Players: Two or more.

Supplies Required:

• Two sets of Jenga(tm) blocks, each consisting of 54 unpainted wooden blocks.
  
• Stopwatch, clock, kitchen timer or equivalent device.

Game Layout:

Two Jenga towers are placed at a distance approximately two Jenga-block-lengths from each other. One tower is designated as the “Troop Levels” tower; the other is designated as the “Host Nation Government” tower.

Player No. 1 (“The Jenga-ist”) Objectives:

Dismantle your “Troop Levels” tower to achieve the smallest number of blocks possible (achieving “minimal/optimal footprint”), without allowing the structure to collapse. Simultaneously, build up your “Host Nation Government” tower as high as possible (without sacrificing stability!), using the blocks removed from the first.

Other Players’ (“The Jihadists”) Objectives:

Prevent Player No. 1 from achieving his/her objectives by removing one block from either the “Troop Levels” or “Host Nation Government” towers on each turn. Standard Jenga rules regarding block removal, “bumping,” ends of turns, etc., apply. (Again, see: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenga) Using the blocks you remove each turn, start and continue to build a small “Faction” tower anywhere within two Jenga-block-lengths of the “Troop Levels” and/or “Host Nation Government” towers.

Game Play:

• Play ends either at the end of 12 minutes, timed by stopwatch or other device, or when the “Troop Levels” or “”Host Nation Government” tower collapses. (Editor’s note: 5 to 6 minutes is average for standard Jenga; the 12-minute duration here is only a suggestion.)
  
• Player No. 1 goes first, removing first a block from the “Troop Levels” tower and replacing it onto the “Host Nation Government” tower. On subsequent turns, Player No. 1 may remove a block either from the “Troop Levels” tower, or from any “Faction” tower; he/she may also add to any “Faction” tower.
  
• Play either alternates between two players, or rotates clockwise.
  
• Unlike standard Jenga, blocks may be removed from the topmost level of any tower.
  
• The topmost level on any tower must be complete (3 blocks, running perpendicular to the next-lower level) before a player may add further blocks to build upward. However, in order to stabilize a tower, players may also replace blocks on or lower than the topmost level. (In other words, blocks must not always be added to the top of a tower.)
  
• On each turn, players may remove one block from any of the following: The “Troop Levels” tower, the “Host Nation Government” tower, or any other player’s tower.
  
• Players may seek to influence others through negotiation, including the establishment of alliances.
  

Optional Rules:

• Player No. 1 may NEVER remove blocks from the “Host Nation Government” tower (to do so would be to invite Civil War).

OR

• Player No. 1 may remove blocks even from the “Host Nation Government,” particularly if he/she is attempting to build up one or more “Faction” towers.

Victory Conditions:

• Player No. 1 wins if both the “Troop Levels” and “Host Nation Government” towers remain standing at the end of play, and if the “Host Nation Government” tower is the tallest as compared to any remaining “Faction” towers. Any player openly allied with the “Host Nation Government” can also be considered to share in this victory.
  
• Any other player wins if his/her “Faction” tower remains standing after the collapse of either the “Troops Levels” or “Host Nation Government” towers.
  
• In the event that more than one “Faction” tower remains standing after the collapse of either the “Troops Levels” or “Host Nation Government” towers, the player with the tallest “Faction” tower (Editor’s note: This is not necessarily the tower comprising the most blocks) is the winner.

[Spud]

Damn ... I actually get that. Time to find some Jenga blocks and have a crack

[SWJED]

You did a real nice job at JUW 08 - thanks much. Welcome to the Council.

[Uboat509]

I like Jenga metaphor. As soon as I saw the title of the thread I formed a picture in my head before I even saw the slide. The way I interpreted it was perhaps a bit more abstract than others did. The Jenga tower represents the overall problem of transition and we must play the game (I don't picture a direct correlation between the removal of the blocks and specific things like troop levels and such, rather I saw it as task we must accomplish representing everything we must accomplish in Iraq). Those have played Jenga know that the early moves are relatively easy but the later moves get progressively harder and require more time to accomplish as the tower gets more unstable. The problem then becomes that we are now on a stopwatch, imposed by political expediency and John Q Public's ADHD among other factors. (I also saw the stopwatch as representing dwindling resources as well as time, by the way.) We no longer have as much time as we would like to make our moves. Unlike the normal game however, the goal is not to win by having your opponent crash the tower but have the tower still standing when time runs out (Ken's acceptable outcome vs "victory"). It is an imperfect metaphor but that is the way I pictured it.

SFC W

[slapout9]

Well lets see. Lets change the rules some. What if the Jenga tower represented the insurgency network and you have to figure out how to collapse it within a certain time frame? You would try to find a COG that would collapse the whole thing at once.... but insurgencies are more complicated than that. So the question is how could you collapse the tower in the fewest steps possible, within the alloted time and establish a secure environment. Once that is done you could do the nation building thing.