WHere is the heart of the "War on Terror" anyway?

[Rob Thornton]

I've heard repeated remarks from folks like the Speaker of the House (on today's Face the Nation) that "the "Real" War on Terror is in Afghanistan", and that it should be our focus.

I'm going to assume that going after Al Queda and its senior leadership is really - wherever they are at - is really what the Speaker and others mean when they say that; & that it could be those areas not only constricted to the recognized geographical boundaries of Afghanistan, but wherever AQ has established the conditions for safehaven. It could be in Areas of Pakistan, etc.?

I think there are some issues here that should be discussed - I started to put this into the existing thread "Afghan Surge not the Answer", but thought this was a broader since it concerns a conscious decision to redistribute means specifically from Iraq to Afghanistan, as well as emphasizing different political objectives and philosophies.

While I agree that killing UBL is of great value to us (and personal satisfaction), and helps realize certain political goals, I don't think that doing so is the panacea to the war and achieving our broader and enduring political objectives that some think it is. While UBL and the AQ brand name are the most infamous of the bunch - I think it may be a case of being the most visible physical manifestation of extremists using violence to achieve a political goal(s).

While AQ is guilty of planning and executing the most destructive attack on U.S. soil ever, they are not the only ones wishing us harm at home, or the only one wishing to see us withdraw from the world of Islam - not only physically, but in every way except those few which might best serve their political objective(s).

I think if we are going to look at Afghanistan's real value to U.S. Policy objectives - it must be seen in the context of where it sits physically in the world. We must consider it not only in terms important to us, but to its neighbors. Relatively poor in natural resources, land locked, sparse infrastructure, culturally diverse - it borders Pakistan, Tajikistan, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran. It has political value in that sense.

Iraq has both political value and clearly has resources value. It is not land locked, and has contiguous borders with other states from who we, some of our friends and our economic competitors draw the hydrocarbon resources from that fuel our economies and are relative to economic prosperity. Its northern borders join a NATO ally, its north-western border touches a state is that is of great historical significance & we believe overtly influences events in Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine. Its shares a south-western border border with a moderate state who we have gone to many times to broker political deals. Its Southern border is shared with a state with enormous resources and influence, and has a population with resources that can affect both the ME and the world economics in a big way. Iraq also shares a border with Kuwait, an ally we've gone to war to protect, has a government and state with resources and also has potential to affect world economics. Iraq shares an eastern border with Iran, who has means, and interests that extend into the Caspian Area, through the Persian Gulf, and all the way to Israel. Iran has a diverse cultural population which in its on way is resigned to a forced stability. Its production of hydrocarbons also interests other states, and it has vocalized its policy toward other states in the region in a manner that has been at times both counter to their interests, and counter to ours. It has visibly demonstrated its policy by funding and resourcing actions and activities that have put U.S. lives at risk, threatened the existence of other states, and shows no indication that it would do otherwise if appeased in any manner other then our absolute abandonment of our enduring policy goals - ones that do not change from Democratic administration to Republican administration or vice-versa. They are also arguably in the thick of producing the means to become a nuclear military power - they have stated it as a political goal.

Regardless of the war in Iraq, or a war in Afghanistan, the realization of our long term, enduring objectives must consider life after UBL and AQ. We must at least contemplate that while the problems facing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are in some ways different, they share many attributes - they are complex, challenging and offer just as much friction, chance and risk as elsewhere - that is the nature of inter-active war. They also both ultimately depend on political and economic development - those are long term undertakings - perhaps more so in Afghanistan given its physical and cultural characteristics, lack of existing infrastructure, historical political disunity, and the ability of intrastate movement by state and non-state actors who might wish to retard progress or prevent us from helping to move Afghanistan into something else besides a relatively weak and isolated piece of terrain that exports dangerous drugs primarily to western states where there is both an appetite for such things, and secular laws that don't emphasize death as a means to curb production and distribution.

Right now our enemies see Afghanistan in the context of Iraq, when they no longer do - for whatever reason(s) the context changes - pursuant to the outcome, they will either become more or less involved - they will not remain idle - it is not in their interest to do so. Questions such as "how does a strong strong Iraq vs. a weak Iraq influence Iranian actions with regard to Afghanistan, or the ME?; or how does the perception of U.S. resolve, commitment, and ability change, based on the outcome in Iraq; or how do regional outcomes change based on how Iraq turns out must be considered. BPC in Afghanistan is and will remain no picnic -its a long term project - perhaps more so then Iraq. Its outcome can't be seen in isolation from other U.S. activities or policy objectives - the various enemies in the ME see them all as related - so should we.

This is what concerns me when I hear a politician (any) use the argument that withdrawal from Iraq should be based upon the need to pour more resources into Afghanistan. In my opinion it shows both a flawed understanding of the conditions with regard to the enemy, time, terrain, civilian, etc., and it does not recognize the consequences beyond the immediate with regard to the absence and credibility of U.S. military force in the Persian Gulf. It does not see the Iraq, Afghanistan or the enemy as being related to broader policy goals - ours, the enemies' or partners and allies - rather it sees it as through a soda straw, perhaps because it just easier for them to do so. It also does not recognize that the danger associated with the rationale for invading Iraq, has changed over time - its not a binary question - our interests are broader then that.

While I can think of some reasonable arguments for withdrawal from Iraq that articulate risk - such as the strain on the force, and the inability to be have credible land power elsewhere, or that the price tag is just too high, the idea that somehow our security is assured by the killing or capture of UBL and top AQ leadership in the ungoverned area of Afghanistan is fallacious. It ignores the way Islamic Extremist terror groups have networked to extend the threat beyond the constraints imposed upon them by our efforts, and it ignores the fear, honor and interests of those in the region.

The nature of this war is unlikely to end with the killing or capture of one man, or even one group. I think its unlikely to have ended even if we'd done so immediately - we'd have felt better, but it would not be over. However, the removal of the Saddam regime politically changed things in the ME - he may have had to be removed eventually anyway, but removing him altered things for almost everyone in the ME - and by extension those involved in the ME.

It has provided the conditions by which other enemies - state and non-state perceive they can achieve their goals. Those goals are contrary to ours by the nature of who we are and what we believe. If you remove our military presence from Iraq the opportunities for some will increase, for others decrease, and the number of possible bad outcomes multiplies with regard to our long term interests. Until Iraq is strong enough politically and militarily to exercise sovereignty in a meaningful way - then not only is Iraq at risk, the broader ME, and our alliances within the region are.

I do believe Afghanistan is important, for a number of reasons, but that does not make Iraq any less important then it is. I'd say that politicians need to get beyond their cyclic biases and consider the nature of the war, our enduring interests and how our enemies are very adept at strategic adaptation - the nature of their governments and ideology facilitates that - but its not the nature of politicians who grow up in our system to do likewise, and while there is an enduring bureaucracy and infinite number of think tanks inside the beltway, any advice they might offer is subject to electoral politics.

Best, Rob