Counterinsurgency Education Request

[SWJED]

... I directed the author of the request here. Please keep the ideas coming and again, much appreciated.

[ODB]

At the risk of drawing ire and fire from you, UBoat, ODB and others, I have to point out that a conventional Infantry Battalion can be trained to do much -- not all -- of what SF can and would do in a COIN fight. Conversely, I do not believe SF can expand without significant loss of quality to do what a slew of those Infantry Battalions can do. I'd also ask while this grand COIN fight is going on, who would be working the missions that SF has that those Infantry Battalions cannot or should not be trained to do...

Actually no fire from me, well not much anyways. I was the above guys for 14 years before I came SF (I know late transition). Which to this point is a good thing. (If you wanna no more PM me Ken) Yes many of the infantry battalions can do a lot of what we do. Big difference is the assets available. As you mentioned those specific things we legally can do that they can't. Welcome to loss in quality or should I say maturity and experience? But I'm sure that has been said many times over throughout the years.

Is that not a function of the facts that COIN IS the Operational level when and where implemented and, far more importantly and less arguably -- the fact that we doctrinally, educationally and training wise virtually ignored COIN and ID for almost 30 years?

Did not that neglect extend at least in part to SF who looked at, er, uh, other missions, while admittedly keeping a finger or two in the COIN / ID water?

100% on point here. As I've stated earlier if we stayed in our respective lanes a lot of things would be meshing better.

All that said, there's a valid case for integration of SF Officers and NCOs on the staffs of COIN or ID involved units -- and vice versa...

Well said would like to add one thing to this. This integration or "cross pollination" needs to start in professional development and advance course levels as well. The learning process needs to start here, additionally I believe this would help SF and conventional forces understanding of each others capabilities and METL. What's your thoughts out there on this?

Lastly, Ken I would love to pick your brain over a bottle of Kentucky bourbon sometime....

[Maximus]

After writing/thinking out loud in my last post in this conversation, I began to remember a short text from my Officer's Basic Course. It took me a couple of hours, but I finally came up with the example of E.D. Swinton's The Defence of Duffer's Drift. Seven tactical scenarios with lessons delivered in the form of seven dreams by "LT Backsight Forethought," written after Swinton served in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).

Here it is on the Internet:
http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/du...fers_Drift.htm

Has anyone seen anything like this--short on words, big on concepts, and that encourages readers to engage the material in an atypical manner--applied to the COIN context?

Not sure if you have CAC access. If yes, The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa located here: https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/..._Al_Doreaa.pdf is exactly what you've requested. In my opinion, a brilliant piece of work that serves as a great learning tool for tactical level leaders in wars of insurgency.

Semper Fi,
Scott

[Randy Brown]

Not sure if you have CAC access. If yes, The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa located here: https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/..._Al_Doreaa.pdf is exactly what you've requested. In my opinion, a brilliant piece of work that serves as a great learning tool for tactical level leaders in wars of insurgency.

Semper Fi,
Scott

Steel on target, thanks! I look forward to passing this reference to users throughout my organization.

And, while I'm still trying to figure out the SWJ interface--where's the button to electronically send you a virtual beer?

[Bill Moore]

Ken,

A lot of us have been having frank discussions about conventional and SF (not SOF, but SF) roles in COIN. Others are simply talking past one another reinforcing the party line, which is less than helpful.

Since we both have more years in SF than most CPTs have on this planet (although during different eras) it worth discussing the education and training that separates us from conventional forces.

First, we have a selection process that weeds out the weak and undesirable and those who really don't want to be in our organization. Quite simply we have the finest construction material available to form a great organization. Many of these fine Soldiers come from the conventional ranks, but the difference is we weed out the weak links.

Then we put them through a qualification course second to done that last well over a year where they are educated and trained on their MOS technical skills, tactical skills, common combat skills, language, culture, and unconventional warfare is sprinkled throughout the course (this is key, because we engrain a different mindset in our Soldiers). The conventional army can't, nor should they even try to replicate that.

Then the new green beret is assigned to ODA where he gains operational experience and receives advanced training (both individual and team) for whatever mission set(s) his detachment has under the mentorship of a very experienced Team Sgt and Warrant Officer. Most of our Soldiers, not all, are career Soldiers, so this process is a life long training/education experience. The Marines nor the Army will never replicate it, but they'll spend a lot of money trying.

there was a constant tension within SF and at the Center between proponents of emphasis on DA vs. UW vs. ID. My belief is that SOCOM has exacerbated those tensions. If that is true, then it is a potentially disruptive effect your recommendation confronts.

That conflict continues, and while it is frustrating when we swing too heavy to one side or the other, the reality is they are complementary. Experienced SF operators can either work through, by and with other nations forces as trainers, or they can combat advise them as they are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. If they did not have the warrior skills engrained in them through DA training, then they would be hard pressed to be viable combat advisors (look at the difference between an ad hoc MiTT and an ODA). Our men don't join SF to be in the peace corps, where they talk to little old ladies in their native tongues about the price of tomatoes. If they couldn't be warriors, they would leave the force. We signed up to be warriors, diplomats and teachers.

Coventional forces, neither Army nor Marines, or task organized or trained to do this, nor they come close to having the depth of experience to lead these operations. My point about having SF lead irregular warfare missions, doesn't mean they have to deploy a large headquarters forward, not with the C4I we have now, but to provide operational direction/guidance. BCTs will still C2 themselves, but the strategy they support will come from gray beard SF types in some type of headquarters that is joint and interagency in CONUS (with a forward element) that is uniquely organized and trained to C2 irregular warfare missions.

Conventional forces are capable of doing much of what we do, but at a cost. If they're serious they'll have to rape their units of their best Offices and NCOs, which will have an undesired second order effect. Seems to be we have managed to overly complicate things, when we have side lined the force that is uniquely trained for this and that our tax payers have paid for to a key supporting role.

[Ken White]

Angels fear to tread...

Ken,

A lot of us have been having frank discussions about conventional and SF (not SOF, but SF) roles in COIN. Others are simply talking past one another reinforcing the party line, which is less than helpful.

True, people will get parochial. We all do to one degree or another even though it's generally unhelpful to our own position. The key is to catch ones self and interject reality, I think.

Thoughts on the nest few paragraphs of yours follow pretty much in order. True on the selection process. The process gets rid of a lot of weak links but it will never get rid of all of them and I'd caution that the law of supply and demand does seem to get satisfied. Having wandered into the fold before there was a Training Group and having watched it form and do its thing for a while, I agree with you on the depth of training -- I would point out, however, that I'm not advocating nor do I see any need for conventional units involved in COIN (or multi spectrum capable units) to even try to replicate that training. They just need to adapt a small part of it that is pertinent. That was done with conventional units destined to deploy to Viet Nam in the early days and the first few units over there did learn and did perform well (in spite of MACV). COIN is not rocket science; I agree with Gian -- it isn't even the graduate level of war; it's merely more precise management of effects than is required in conventional combat (Yeah, I know that's simplistic but you get my point -- even if many will miss it. ).

The Marines and the Army are not, I do not think, trying to replicate SF training -- they are trying to adapt those SF techniques that are pertinent and achievable in an Infantry Battalion construct to their purposes. It is my view that should be encouraged, not discouraged. Imitation is the most sincere form of flattery and all that -- plus, the object is to get the job done regardless of who gets credit I always thought...

I still have an aversion to the word Warrior applied to what should be competent, trained and self disciplined Soldiers but I don't disagree with your point. That doesn't address the fact that the dichotomy between DA / UW / ID is in high places -- I know the Teams can cope -- and that affects missions and employment (and perhaps aids in a perception of sidelining...).

Coventional forces, neither Army nor Marines, or task organized or trained to do this, nor they come close to having the depth of experience to lead these operations...

I agree but would suggest that adequate training to do an acceptable job -- I'll take a 75% solution in a second; perfection is a myth -- is possible and much is already being done in that vein; the issue is whether to embed it in the system or not. Further, I'm not sure I agree that the depth of experience is now lacking (again, in adequate as opposed to bountiful amounts) -- admitting that it probably was a year or more ago. Time will tell on that score, I think.

My point about having SF lead irregular warfare missions, doesn't mean they have to deploy a large headquarters forward, not with the C4I we have now, but to provide operational direction/guidance. BCTs will still C2 themselves, but the strategy they support will come from gray beard SF types in some type of headquarters that is joint and interagency in CONUS (with a forward element) that is uniquely organized and trained to C2 irregular warfare missions.

I totally agree with that, thus my suggestion that both sides -- and they are opposing sides in the perennial battle for $$$ and spaces, most unfortunately and needlessly -- should swap folks on their staffs.

Conventional forces are capable of doing much of what we do, but at a cost. If they're serious they'll have to rape their units of their best Offices and NCOs, which will have an undesired second order effect. Seems to be we have managed to overly complicate things, when we have side lined the force that is uniquely trained for this and that our tax payers have paid for to a key supporting role.

Raping units of best Officers and NCO to create special purpose units is absolutely the wrong thing to do. The entire unit just needs a little additional training to more effectively operate in the COIN mode. Again, we aren't talking rocket science here. The BCTs are modular by design so that CA, PsyOps, MI -- what have you -- can be tacked on easily, If we improve initial entry training, officer and enlisted (and we REALLY need to do that to inculcate a thorough knowledge of the basics) then a little added unit training will create a reasonably competent COIN force of adequate size (note that point...) to reliably cover an AOR. You guys are doing great stuff where you are; the 'Stan is different and Iraq is different yet. Again, I'm afraid raw numbers are going to impact the goal of letting SF do it all in some places at some times; METT-TC and such...

As to sidelining, I'm certainly not suggesting that or anything close to it. Nor do I think anyone in power is trying to do that. I would suggest that in some cases and some theaters over emphasis on DA has effectively sidelined some -- not all -- SF elements...

[ODB]

With the current situation in Iraq wouldn't the ideal scenario be along the lines of this: (In AOs where both forces are represented)

1. SF focus would be FID and intel collection (HUMIT)
2. Conventional forces would be conducting their operations based off the aboves intel.
3. In many cases operations would be combined (SF, HN, and Conventional)

Don't get me wrong in some places this is how things are happening, when the BCT and SF are coordinating their efforts and have a good working relationship and understanding of each others capabilities.

Seems to me with BCT commanders owning the ground and as much as it pains me to say this SF is a supporting force (force multiplier), the understanding by conventional commanders of eachs role would in effect make it a smoother operation. This is started in the education of both sides. Unfortunately over recent years many on both sides have blurred these lines and responsibilities. Understanding the current force structure and size on both sides many BCT elements are on their own in parts throughout the country.

I have found it interesting in conventional forces unwillingness to train with SF and SFs unwillingness as well. On installations where both are stationed we should be taking advantage of each other. Simple think an ODA using an infantry battalion as its indig force for a few weeks of training. The experiences both would gain. Additionally in a perfect world many of these units that are stationed together would be deployed in the same AO simultaneously. The working relationship and capabilities would be a sight to see IMO.

IMHO there is no reason we cannot at least have OPD/NCOPD taking place between the forces

Feel free to let me have it....

[Ken White]

With the current situation in Iraq wouldn't the ideal scenario be along the lines of this: (In AOs where both forces are represented)

1. SF focus would be FID and intel collection (HUMIT)
2. Conventional forces would be conducting their operations based off the aboves intel.
3. In many cases operations would be combined (SF, HN, and Conventional)

And I hear that is also being done very successfully in Afghanistan and that the combined ops have been particularly effective.

Seems to me with BCT commanders owning the ground and as much as it pains me to say this SF is a supporting force (force multiplier), the understanding by conventional commanders of eachs role would in effect make it a smoother operation. This is started in the education of both sides...

As is always true, personalities intrude. Ideally, that's what would happen but all it takes is a jerk on one side to mess it up.

... Unfortunately over recent years many on both sides have blurred these lines and responsibilities. Understanding the current force structure and size on both sides many BCT elements are on their own in parts throughout the country.

You've hit on the key parameter -- the size and scope of the effort. In an area with good SF potential and a functioning host nation forces, life is great and no US conventional forces are required -- or desired.

However, if the size of the country or effort required is beyond the capability of a pure SF operation, then other troops are required. If there is an adequate host nation force, then no US MPF are needed -- and that would be ideal on a number of counts. Lacking a fully functional military force in that nation and enough SF to do the job totally, what alternative is there? I'm sure open to suggestions...

I have found it interesting in conventional forces unwillingness to train with SF and SFs unwillingness as well. On installations where both are stationed we should be taking advantage of each other. Simple think an ODA using an infantry battalion as its indig force for a few weeks of training. The experiences both would gain. Additionally in a perfect world many of these units that are stationed together would be deployed in the same AO simultaneously. The working relationship and capabilities would be a sight to see IMO.

True. IMO, it goes in cycles. In the early 60s it was fairly common because all you had to do to get money for anything was say 'counterinsurgency' so both SF and conventional guys took advantage of that.

Before SOCOM some joint training happened at Bragg, not as often and as well as it should but a bit. After SOCOM and the added and moved Groups, I suspect it got to be very rare. Shame, it is more needed now than ever

IMHO there is no reason we cannot at least have OPD/NCOPD taking place between the forces.

True, easy to do -- all it takes is the will. That's a great idea!

[Surferbeetle]

Bill, Ken, and ODB,

Some of the things that stand out in your posts include quantity vs. quality, integration, and unity of command.

As phase IV of the war has dragged on we have moved from Divisions and Groups doing their own thing in their own AO to a tighter unity of command with a deeper focus upon synchronized COIN ops. This is a good thing and was overdue. Integration of DOS, USAID, and others into COIN & DOD or vice versa is still a work in progress although the cooperation between two of the lead gentlemen (DOD & DOS) on the ground is the best that I have seen to date. This does not mean however that we have reached a 'go' status on interagency, or ac/rc/arng/usn/usaf/sf/sof cooperation. If we transplanted this low level of cooperation that we currently see into a CAT or ODA it would not fly, and indeed there would be some behind the dumpster counseling until all concerned understood how things were going to work.

Some of the reasons that I see for the bickering is that all concerned have spent much time studying their piece of the elephant and are convinced that in a life-threatening situation their knowledge of their piece of the elephant will keep them and theirs alive. Reflecting upon our return upon investment during '03-'06 brings this attitude into question.

Our successes in this war are due to the fact that all of the team members are finally getting together on the field (at the same time) and having to work together to describe the elephant. This needs to continue and we can use basic team psychology to improve things. Too steal from my one of friends in my solt class 'ability comes before rank and nobody wants to be the weak link in the chain'.

Like it or lump it, there are more regular ac folks than irregular rc/arng/sf/sof/dos/usaid/oga folks. So for me, bottom line is we take what we got, everybody gets on the same page, everbody gets some f-ing unity of command going, and most importantly we win this sob. I for one do not want to have my kids downrange trying to fix what we have started.

My 0.02c,

Steve

[Ken White]

Well said......

[mmx1]

After writing/thinking out loud in my last post in this conversation, I began to remember a short text from my Officer's Basic Course. It took me a couple of hours, but I finally came up with the example of E.D. Swinton's The Defence of Duffer's Drift. Seven tactical scenarios with lessons delivered in the form of seven dreams by "LT Backsight Forethought," written after Swinton served in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).

Here it is on the Internet:
http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/du...fers_Drift.htm

Has anyone seen anything like this--short on words, big on concepts, and that encourages readers to engage the material in an atypical manner--applied to the COIN context?

The idea was readapted as "the defense of hill 781" in 1988 for mechanized warfare, a COIN version would be an ideal soldier's primer.

Edit: Ah, nvm, I see Maximus has posted a relevant primer. Off to fetch a copy Monday morning.

[Cavguy]

Not sure if you have CAC access. If yes, The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa located here: https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/..._Al_Doreaa.pdf is exactly what you've requested. In my opinion, a brilliant piece of work that serves as a great learning tool for tactical level leaders in wars of insurgency.

Semper Fi,
Scott

It's also on the AKO Fileshare (in addition to the SharePoint your linked) of COIN.ARMY.MIL, and on Company Command. Was written by a former CO now an O/C at NTC.

[Vic Bout]

I have found it interesting in conventional forces unwillingness to train with SF and SFs unwillingness as well. On installations where both are stationed we should be taking advantage of each other. Simple think an ODA using an infantry battalion as its indig force for a few weeks of training. The experiences both would gain. Additionally in a perfect world many of these units that are stationed together would be deployed in the same AO simultaneously. The working relationship and capabilities would be a sight to see IMO.

Somebody, somewhere is trying to make the SF/CF integration/interoperability piece work. Case in point: prior to my last IZ deployment my ODA went to JRTC (mid-2006). Before we got there we were swamped with SOF/Conventional integration/interoperability checklists, how-to's, and common operational picture stuff. Upon arriving Ft Polk we were linked with a conventional Cav unit and told that they would be deploying to and owning the same battlespace for our deployment. In short, somebody got it right...train with the guys you're going to fight next to. We had an outstanding JRTC rotation....most of the integration/interoperability stuff was sensible, relative and workable.

Of course, the good idea fairy fell off the wagon (again) and the happily ever after never happended. The Cav unit was re-directed to another location in-country and we ended up working with a BN of the 82nd instead. Luckily, they had mature leadership and a cross-pollenated staff (former SOF experience) that enabled us to build a lasting rapport that supported a successful combat rotation.

There are some SF/CF horror stories to come out of OIF/OEF and I actually lived through a couple of them. And, as in all cases, it comes down to leadership. Pedantic, bull-headed, SOF-hating conventional 0-6's almost always trump immature and inexperienced ODA commanders.

But then I'm just running off at the keyboard...

[Ken White]

... And, as in all cases, it comes down to leadership. Pedantic, bull-headed, SOF-hating conventional 0-6's almost always trump immature and inexperienced ODA commanders.

that hardheaded big Army hating Double Decade guys can push immature and inexperienced ODA commanders to places they probably shouldn't go.

There's plenty of fault on both sides. That said, I was glad to read the first part of your comment; good to know it can and is being done right.

[Randy Brown]

I realize this might be a "dead thread," but, given our earlier conversation here regarding "Defence of Duffer's Drift," I thought I might call attention to the recent and similarly formatted CALL Pub 08-39, "Nightmare on Wazir Street." Check it out at: call.army.mil.

[Steve Blair]

This pub is discussed in this thread. Check it out if you're interested.