Counterinsurgency Education Request

[Mark O'Neill]

Guys, re: my typing dyslexia in the previous post, please read '"Kormer" for "Kromer"

Mark

[Bill Moore]

can teach TTP's (VCP, counter IED, etc.), but HQ's personnel above the company don't really do TTP's except as personal protective measures while traveling about. We can also train COC battle drills, but using MERC Chat to pass word of a TIC or downed aircraft isn't COIN either. We need to do these types of events, but what I am aiming at for this project is education rather than training.

Heck it is Friday morning, so I'll kick the hornets nest once again. I can't speak for the person who made the request, but it seems he/she is getting at that gray area between education and training. Sort of like how do you implement strategy at the tactical level. Education being stragetic and training being tactical. The staff is in the middle, they have to know how to fuse both. Our operational level doctrine is outstanding for conventional warfighting, but one could make an argument that our staffs are not ideally task organized or trained to command and control COIN. We're great at responding to a troops in contact, medevac, pushing supplies out, etc., but I think we still fall short in the area of translating COIN strategic ideas into operational level plans that effect tactical operations.

The simple fix, but big Army will do Cheetah flips is to put Special Forces in charge, with big Army in support. SF can form an irregular or unconventional Joint/Interagency/Combined Task Force, and provide operational guidance to the supporting units. This will allow big Army to focus primarily on conventional warfighting skills, but still make significant contributions to the COIN fight without changing their staff structure significantly.

We can also train COC battle drills, but using MERC Chat to pass word of a TIC or downed aircraft isn't COIN either.

This statement is key and he is correct. These drills are common to all operations and must be trained, but what about COIN? May I propose SF?

[Randy Brown]

Earlier comments about "education is strategic, training is tactical" are on point, but only, if you'll forgive me, to a point. We've got Strategic SSGs and LTs out there, fighting the COIN fight.

I'm wondering if there's some sweet spot, somewhere in the middle, between education/training and strategic/tactical.

As a lessons-learned guy, I'm continually asked by our deploying soldiers about where to find TTPs, SOPs, etc. That's training stuff--I get that. At the same time, however, there's a real hunger for educational stuff that's a little meatier, without being too hard to digest. These soldiers want to know how to think, not what to think--but they also don't want to get a PhD in the process.

As an example of the type of thing they want, a few deploying/deployed Embedded Training Team (ETT) members have pointed out Lester Grau's "Bear Went Over the Mountain" and "The Other Side of the Mountain." These are collections of case studies of Soviet and Mujahideen tactics. Soldiers seem to like the multiple-vignette, easy-to-pick-up-and-put-down format. (One even called them "good latrine books"--apparently the true test of whether something is digestible.) They want to know whether there's similar, more contemporary material, applicable to OIF and/or OEF.

Earlier comments in this thread regarding learning-through-gaming make me wonder whether there's any existing or potential collection of vignettes, aimed at the COIN practioner level. I'm even reminded of the "Choose Your Own Adventure" books popular in the 1980s, or the "Encyclopedia Brown" (no relation) mysteries of a generation earlier. These were children's books, yes--but they forced a different kinds of interactions with the materials. Anyone seen anything like this in a COIN context?

[Ken White]

and that's usually dangerous...

Heck it is Friday morning, so I'll kick the hornets nest once again. I can't speak for the person who made the request, but it seems he/she is getting at that gray area between education and training. Sort of like how do you implement strategy at the tactical level. Education being stragetic and training being tactical. The staff is in the middle, they have to know how to fuse both. Our operational level doctrine is outstanding for conventional warfighting, but one could make an argument that our staffs are not ideally task organized or trained to command and control COIN. We're great at responding to a troops in contact, medevac, pushing supplies out, etc., but I think we still fall short in the area of translating COIN strategic ideas into operational level plans that effect tactical operations.

Is that not a function of the facts that COIN IS the Operational level when and where implemented and, far more importantly and less arguably -- the fact that we doctrinally, educationally and training wise virtually ignored COIN and ID for almost 30 years?

Did not that neglect extend at least in part to SF who looked at, er, uh, other missions, while admittedly keeping a finger or two in the COIN / ID water?

The simple fix, but big Army will do Cheetah flips is to put Special Forces in charge, with big Army in support. SF can form an irregular or unconventional Joint/Interagency/Combined Task Force, and provide operational guidance to the supporting units. This will allow big Army to focus primarily on conventional warfighting skills, but still make significant contributions to the COIN fight without changing their staff structure significantly.

Aside from the rather enjoyable contemplation of seeing portly Generals doing cheetah flips, I may see some practical problems.

Philosophy impeded practice. I've been retired retired for 13 years; a lot can change. However, from 1960 until 1995, there was a constant tension within SF and at the Center between proponents of emphasis on DA vs. UW vs. ID. My belief is that SOCOM has exacerbated those tensions. If that is true, then it is a potentially disruptive effect your recommendation confronts.

Size. Not everyone is equipped to be SF, only so many will have the requisite psychological profile and be able to adapt to alien cultures and languages. As currently constituted, SF could capably deal with the SEA missions as they are structured and with Afghanistan -- that is true as is OR using your approach. I submit SF isn't large enough to do those and add Iraq, or, really, to do Iraq on it's own. Obviously that's tour length and a few other things dependent but on balance, I don't think there's enough SF to do what you suggest in the current circumstances.

Increasing the size. You could do that. Having been there a long time ago in a galaxy far away when that happened, I wouldn't recommend it. Not at all...

Focus. One of the strengths of SF is the regional or area focus and specialization. More than one anecdote would seem to indicate that SF elements operating in an unfamiliar environment are just as prone to errors as are conventional units. If regional orientation is a strength, that further limits the ability to provide an adequate sized force for the C2 effort required.

C2 capability. SF is unique and has great capabilities in its designed area of expertise but the nuts and bolts of war at the operational level -- which I very strongly contend is precisely what COIN is in the country involved -- on stuff like "...responding to a troops in contact, medevac, pushing supplies out, etc." they'd be a bit out of their element and thus, the big army force they were trying to provide elegant and informed C2 for would, by default own the tempo.

At the risk of drawing ire and fire from you, UBoat, ODB and others, I have to point out that a conventional Infantry Battalion can be trained to do much -- not all -- of what SF can and would do in a COIN fight. Conversely, I do not believe SF can expand without significant loss of quality to do what a slew of those Infantry Battalions can do. I'd also ask while this grand COIN fight is going on, who would be working the missions that SF has that those Infantry Battalions cannot or should not be trained to do...

All that said, there's a valid case for integration of SF Officers and NCOs on the staffs of COIN or ID involved units -- and vice versa...

[Randy Brown]

After writing/thinking out loud in my last post in this conversation, I began to remember a short text from my Officer's Basic Course. It took me a couple of hours, but I finally came up with the example of E.D. Swinton's The Defence of Duffer's Drift. Seven tactical scenarios with lessons delivered in the form of seven dreams by "LT Backsight Forethought," written after Swinton served in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).

Here it is on the Internet:
http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/du...fers_Drift.htm

Has anyone seen anything like this--short on words, big on concepts, and that encourages readers to engage the material in an atypical manner--applied to the COIN context?

[SWJED]

... I directed the author of the request here. Please keep the ideas coming and again, much appreciated.

[ODB]

At the risk of drawing ire and fire from you, UBoat, ODB and others, I have to point out that a conventional Infantry Battalion can be trained to do much -- not all -- of what SF can and would do in a COIN fight. Conversely, I do not believe SF can expand without significant loss of quality to do what a slew of those Infantry Battalions can do. I'd also ask while this grand COIN fight is going on, who would be working the missions that SF has that those Infantry Battalions cannot or should not be trained to do...

Actually no fire from me, well not much anyways. I was the above guys for 14 years before I came SF (I know late transition). Which to this point is a good thing. (If you wanna no more PM me Ken) Yes many of the infantry battalions can do a lot of what we do. Big difference is the assets available. As you mentioned those specific things we legally can do that they can't. Welcome to loss in quality or should I say maturity and experience? But I'm sure that has been said many times over throughout the years.

Is that not a function of the facts that COIN IS the Operational level when and where implemented and, far more importantly and less arguably -- the fact that we doctrinally, educationally and training wise virtually ignored COIN and ID for almost 30 years?

Did not that neglect extend at least in part to SF who looked at, er, uh, other missions, while admittedly keeping a finger or two in the COIN / ID water?

100% on point here. As I've stated earlier if we stayed in our respective lanes a lot of things would be meshing better.

All that said, there's a valid case for integration of SF Officers and NCOs on the staffs of COIN or ID involved units -- and vice versa...

Well said would like to add one thing to this. This integration or "cross pollination" needs to start in professional development and advance course levels as well. The learning process needs to start here, additionally I believe this would help SF and conventional forces understanding of each others capabilities and METL. What's your thoughts out there on this?

Lastly, Ken I would love to pick your brain over a bottle of Kentucky bourbon sometime....

[Maximus]

After writing/thinking out loud in my last post in this conversation, I began to remember a short text from my Officer's Basic Course. It took me a couple of hours, but I finally came up with the example of E.D. Swinton's The Defence of Duffer's Drift. Seven tactical scenarios with lessons delivered in the form of seven dreams by "LT Backsight Forethought," written after Swinton served in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).

Here it is on the Internet:
http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/du...fers_Drift.htm

Has anyone seen anything like this--short on words, big on concepts, and that encourages readers to engage the material in an atypical manner--applied to the COIN context?

Not sure if you have CAC access. If yes, The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa located here: https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/..._Al_Doreaa.pdf is exactly what you've requested. In my opinion, a brilliant piece of work that serves as a great learning tool for tactical level leaders in wars of insurgency.

Semper Fi,
Scott

[Randy Brown]

Not sure if you have CAC access. If yes, The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa located here: https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/..._Al_Doreaa.pdf is exactly what you've requested. In my opinion, a brilliant piece of work that serves as a great learning tool for tactical level leaders in wars of insurgency.

Semper Fi,
Scott

Steel on target, thanks! I look forward to passing this reference to users throughout my organization.

And, while I'm still trying to figure out the SWJ interface--where's the button to electronically send you a virtual beer?

[Bill Moore]

Ken,

A lot of us have been having frank discussions about conventional and SF (not SOF, but SF) roles in COIN. Others are simply talking past one another reinforcing the party line, which is less than helpful.

Since we both have more years in SF than most CPTs have on this planet (although during different eras) it worth discussing the education and training that separates us from conventional forces.

First, we have a selection process that weeds out the weak and undesirable and those who really don't want to be in our organization. Quite simply we have the finest construction material available to form a great organization. Many of these fine Soldiers come from the conventional ranks, but the difference is we weed out the weak links.

Then we put them through a qualification course second to done that last well over a year where they are educated and trained on their MOS technical skills, tactical skills, common combat skills, language, culture, and unconventional warfare is sprinkled throughout the course (this is key, because we engrain a different mindset in our Soldiers). The conventional army can't, nor should they even try to replicate that.

Then the new green beret is assigned to ODA where he gains operational experience and receives advanced training (both individual and team) for whatever mission set(s) his detachment has under the mentorship of a very experienced Team Sgt and Warrant Officer. Most of our Soldiers, not all, are career Soldiers, so this process is a life long training/education experience. The Marines nor the Army will never replicate it, but they'll spend a lot of money trying.

there was a constant tension within SF and at the Center between proponents of emphasis on DA vs. UW vs. ID. My belief is that SOCOM has exacerbated those tensions. If that is true, then it is a potentially disruptive effect your recommendation confronts.

That conflict continues, and while it is frustrating when we swing too heavy to one side or the other, the reality is they are complementary. Experienced SF operators can either work through, by and with other nations forces as trainers, or they can combat advise them as they are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. If they did not have the warrior skills engrained in them through DA training, then they would be hard pressed to be viable combat advisors (look at the difference between an ad hoc MiTT and an ODA). Our men don't join SF to be in the peace corps, where they talk to little old ladies in their native tongues about the price of tomatoes. If they couldn't be warriors, they would leave the force. We signed up to be warriors, diplomats and teachers.

Coventional forces, neither Army nor Marines, or task organized or trained to do this, nor they come close to having the depth of experience to lead these operations. My point about having SF lead irregular warfare missions, doesn't mean they have to deploy a large headquarters forward, not with the C4I we have now, but to provide operational direction/guidance. BCTs will still C2 themselves, but the strategy they support will come from gray beard SF types in some type of headquarters that is joint and interagency in CONUS (with a forward element) that is uniquely organized and trained to C2 irregular warfare missions.

Conventional forces are capable of doing much of what we do, but at a cost. If they're serious they'll have to rape their units of their best Offices and NCOs, which will have an undesired second order effect. Seems to be we have managed to overly complicate things, when we have side lined the force that is uniquely trained for this and that our tax payers have paid for to a key supporting role.

[Cavguy]

Not sure if you have CAC access. If yes, The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa located here: https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/..._Al_Doreaa.pdf is exactly what you've requested. In my opinion, a brilliant piece of work that serves as a great learning tool for tactical level leaders in wars of insurgency.

Semper Fi,
Scott

It's also on the AKO Fileshare (in addition to the SharePoint your linked) of COIN.ARMY.MIL, and on Company Command. Was written by a former CO now an O/C at NTC.

[Vic Bout]

I have found it interesting in conventional forces unwillingness to train with SF and SFs unwillingness as well. On installations where both are stationed we should be taking advantage of each other. Simple think an ODA using an infantry battalion as its indig force for a few weeks of training. The experiences both would gain. Additionally in a perfect world many of these units that are stationed together would be deployed in the same AO simultaneously. The working relationship and capabilities would be a sight to see IMO.

Somebody, somewhere is trying to make the SF/CF integration/interoperability piece work. Case in point: prior to my last IZ deployment my ODA went to JRTC (mid-2006). Before we got there we were swamped with SOF/Conventional integration/interoperability checklists, how-to's, and common operational picture stuff. Upon arriving Ft Polk we were linked with a conventional Cav unit and told that they would be deploying to and owning the same battlespace for our deployment. In short, somebody got it right...train with the guys you're going to fight next to. We had an outstanding JRTC rotation....most of the integration/interoperability stuff was sensible, relative and workable.

Of course, the good idea fairy fell off the wagon (again) and the happily ever after never happended. The Cav unit was re-directed to another location in-country and we ended up working with a BN of the 82nd instead. Luckily, they had mature leadership and a cross-pollenated staff (former SOF experience) that enabled us to build a lasting rapport that supported a successful combat rotation.

There are some SF/CF horror stories to come out of OIF/OEF and I actually lived through a couple of them. And, as in all cases, it comes down to leadership. Pedantic, bull-headed, SOF-hating conventional 0-6's almost always trump immature and inexperienced ODA commanders.

But then I'm just running off at the keyboard...

[mmx1]

After writing/thinking out loud in my last post in this conversation, I began to remember a short text from my Officer's Basic Course. It took me a couple of hours, but I finally came up with the example of E.D. Swinton's The Defence of Duffer's Drift. Seven tactical scenarios with lessons delivered in the form of seven dreams by "LT Backsight Forethought," written after Swinton served in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).

Here it is on the Internet:
http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/du...fers_Drift.htm

Has anyone seen anything like this--short on words, big on concepts, and that encourages readers to engage the material in an atypical manner--applied to the COIN context?

The idea was readapted as "the defense of hill 781" in 1988 for mechanized warfare, a COIN version would be an ideal soldier's primer.

Edit: Ah, nvm, I see Maximus has posted a relevant primer. Off to fetch a copy Monday morning.

[Mark O'Neill]

Guys, re: my typing dyslexia in the previous post, please read '"Kormer" for "Kromer"

Mark

OK, I give up, one of those days I guess.. lets try 'Komer'....