US Army Exoskeleton

[Ken White]

Few thoughts for you to ponder. Some are with respect to the mechanical aspects, some tactical, some training and some combine two or more of those factors.

The vehicle is high; in combat other than in the desert, height is generally not your friend. I understand the logic of the design but in most situations, that height is an adverse factor. Given a lower vehicle with a CROWS on top, survivability would be better.

That height would also affect lateral tipping action. Much vehicular movement in combat is spent traversing side slopes. IMO, a minimum 30 degree slope must be tolerated by a tactical vehicle. Generally, this mean the vehicle must be as wide as it is tall or very close to it. This is a critical concern in tactical cross country movement and it is at odds with the urban environment requirement

Having been inserted a few times 'ahead of supply' and many more where there would be no supply to speak of -- or resupply could not be guaranteed at much better than 50% probable, I'll have to disagree to an extent with the now serving Special Ops types. The worst thing one can do is take too much stuff. Give a man 120 rounds and he'll fire 'em and make it work -- give him 8,000, he'll fire them and make it work. Given 8K rounds of 7.62, that's about 450 pounds of ammunition. Aside from the logistic problem, that's a training and an operational problem -- too much ammo encourages promiscuous shooting and It's a tactical operating problem as I'd estimate it would take at least 15 minutes and probably longer to reload that ammunition container...

Vehicles tie their operators to the vehicle, they encourage the carrying of extra gear and if they vehicle goes inop, the gear is likely to have to be destroyed or left. Thus, practically speaking, the vehicle should be as small as possible to discourage the carriage of too much gear. No matter it's size and small as it may be, it is a bigger and more attractive target than would be two men and if it is powered, it has a heat signature and that is a certain weapon magnet. Technology moves rapidly, as you've said -- thermal sights and IR sensors can be expected to be in the hands of almost everyone in less than ten years.

The troops can't get far from their vehicles (and generally won't get as far away from them as they could) for obvious reasons thus any organization using the vehicle is going to be constrained in what they can do. A good operator can put a decent vehicle in a surprising number of places -- but good operators take a lot of training time. The vehicle has weapons mounted, the weapons take training time. Both things simultaneously take more training time. The troops can handle that-- I'm not sure the system that is the Army can do so. They fought the Paladin for ten years because it gave too much power to to a Staff Sergeant -- and you propose to give it to Specialist Snuffy. I'd go along with that but my suspicion is that the carpeted office folks might demur.

You said:

"Another note, relative to the Somalia example is achieve the maneuver agility to stay unpredictable to the enemy.

Maneuver agility is achieved more by smart tactical thinking than by mode of travel. Somalia is an example on many levels, from the National Command Authority to the operating units (all) of how not to do things.

"In answer to Ken's link to Textron's dispersing aerial strike "bombs", in an urban setting it would be about the user's political will to create collateral damage within a civilian area, and in anything less than a direct hit on the JAKEs' small footprints, the JAKE's ballistic shields could protect a warfighter from blast shrapnel (better protection than dispersed or grouped foot soldiers plied with the same weapon)"

The Skeet munition has proven to be great at avoiding collateral damage and I suspect that any commitment to a full blown war would see no hesitation at all in using it downtown. It has an IR seeker and thus would home in on the power pack of the vehicles; due to that IR homing and the fact that it fires an EFP, the only fragments would come from the flying parts of the vehicles that were hit by that EFP, it would be of no consequence to any nearby dismounted troops who could sit back and watch burning vehicles.

Targets are targets.

[Russ Strong]

Thanks Ken,

Good comments. Sorry, I was away yesterday and these are good aspects to discuss, so shall speak to what I can of this.

Relative to the vehicle being high, this was a key interest of Special Ops in the urban setting in order to see over cars and have good situational awareness, which was also of interest relative to picking out IEDs or suspicious areas (where in the desert they were more interested in a keeping a low target profile on horizon).

Any design with height does need to pay good attention to stability and areas of operation. The JAKE concept we are speaking of here is in its “alley fighter” configuration for urban ops, so favors a compact package with maximum agility. There are traits of the unit’s suspension that address stability. One of the advantages of the modular design of this JAKE platform is that, for example, in re-supply configuration on tracks, this unit can traverse a 40 degree, and greater, side slopes. You can see this within the video on the website: http://www.americanagility.com/video...otsoldier.html In fact in the view of the track unit traveling away towards the end of the video, you can see that it is as you say, wider than it is tall. Its balancing features also provide interesting stability advances in going up grades and down.

What you speak of is one of the key problems that I have witnessed in working with the military, where all requirements get tossed on one vehicle, to where the vehicle does everything, and then nothing fully well. This is to the point that they get a unit that can drop into the water and cross the Mekong, yet in an alley, the soldier’s survivability is compromised by carrying all it takes for this capability that the soldier won't use in his total tour. Hence the JAKE’s modular approach, but any one configuration doesn’t meet all requirements (or the one that does, doesn’t provide the urban ops radical agility characteristics that is the reason the JAKE offers interesting opportunities). So here is a problem with the JAKE getting a program in the normal system.

Relative to your thoughts on resupply, the first interest in the JAKE is in carrying soldiers’ gear with them on patrol (mobile toobox), where today they are having to work further and further from their trucks (as the MRAPs get big). This lightens the soldier’s load, thus helping the soldiers’ own speed, agility and patrol endurance, thus survivability. On the use of ammo, if we are going to ask these soldiers to win this war, we have to have them with the training and discipline to execute. I have heard before the feeling that “too much ammo encourages promiscuous shooting”, but I have also heard that this was the reason that the Northern Army didn’t use the seven shot Springfield rifle in the first of the Civil War: fear that they would shoot too much and they were trained to stop and reload. Anyway, from conversations, I do not see just any soldier being a fighter JAKE operator, as I see these soldiers on fighter JAKEs having to be qualified just as today’s pilots. The upside on capabilities and firepower can be well worth efforts of study here.

Any vehicle is obviously a bigger target than a soldier. The trick is to get its size reduced as best possible and take the advantage that the soldier in it is more protected and more agile. Carriage of gear must be optimized for the missions. Modularity and varied racking help this, and our soldiers and their leadership are sharp and we can count on their adjusting well to the results they find in varied operations and threat levels and varied durations of patrol. The ready availability of medical evacuation is expressed often as high interest, enabling more of the team to stay in the fight. In urban patrol, a high interest in the JAKEs also comes from its next generation design being with hybrid diesel-electric drive so that there is an hour, or 3 mile, run quiet mode. This is good for speaking with civilians, for stealth operations, for redundancy, available electrical power and power generation. It may also offer advantages to be worked into tactics relative to reducing heat signature in certain operations.

The key, as you point out is to design and then evolve the design to the Soldier and the Marine and the way they find to use and expand capabilities. This will involve new concepts in maneuver and ratios of mounted and dismounted warriors and how they cover each other and also team with larger vehicles supporting operations. I have heard many comments like you have found, that this looks like it will give too much power to the Sergeants and Corporals, but I have also retired Marine Commandant, General A. M. Gray make the pitch at Quantico that we need something like the JAKE (that was standing in front of him) to use as an opportunity to open up what these young strategic Corporals and Sergeants can do. He states that they will think of 100 – 200 things we haven’t thought of…of course this is the reason for the conversation here on this thread: to get what head start we can.

So, I appreciate your insights and your obvious experience in the challenge of shifting the game. As most of the contributors of Small Wars Journal, and I would assume Small Wars Council members, are looking forward, writing on, and asking how we adapt to 4th and 5th GW warfare, there has to be courage taken if we are going to step equipment into this realm also. Of course, from other comments of yours on other threads, I sense you are of the same mind in getting something new and half intelligent into our young soldiers’ hands and see how they advance it. This is where stuff really starts happening.

[Surferbeetle]

Russ,

Welcome. I appreciate your work to get us ahead of the curve.

My initial impression of your vehicle is that it is interesting, and I have some questions:

1) How good is my 360 visibility?

2) Can I toss a ruck, some mre's and some water in this vehicle and somehow prevent the hordes of Iraqi kids from reaching in and snatching whatever I am not wearing when I am parked? If my teammate gets hurt or dead can I haul him out on this?

3) From time to time we would be in areas where the civilians would stone us, what type of protection does this offer?

4) How much metal do I have to touch to drive this thing, Iraqi summers do a heck of a job of heating up metal? Winter ops are no fun either, does it have a heater?

5) How tough are the tires and how easy are they to change out in the field away from help?

6) Silt is a huge issue, it gets into everything, are the moving parts 'silt-proof'?

I am afforded the opportunity to provide civil engineering support along the US border and find that portions of it remind me of the areas and conditions I had to operate in Iraq. I think you could get some heavy duty field testing data by having the Guard and Border Patrol put the Jakes through their paces on the border. If soldiers can break something they will, and they will quickly help you find any issues that may exist.

Regards,

Steve

[zenpundit]

Exoskeleton, shmexoskeloton....how about some kick-ass cyborgs?

[SWJED]

Tech for Troops by Frank J. Gaffney Jr., Washington Times, 4 Mar 08.

... What if there were something more we could do, something that might make a real difference — both to the safety of our guys on the ground and to their success? My guess is that millions of Americans would be willing to help.

It turns out that there is something else we as civilians might be able to do to transform the effectiveness and survivability of infantry soldiers and Marine "ground-pounders," troops who are obliged to perform today's tough jobs in urban settings and elsewhere pretty much the same way their grandfathers did in World War II. It involves a device known as a "Jake" — an infantryman's personal mobility, sensor and weapons platform best described as a "Segway on steroids."

The invention of the Jake is a classic American story. It is the brainchild of Russell Strong, a brilliant engineer and innovator known in his industry as "Mr. Tractor" for his revolutionary designs in the agricultural and heavy equipment industries. He started out in 1999 trying to perfect a means of providing revolutionary mobility to wheelchair-bound individuals. When he presented his concept to veterans wounded in Vietnam and Somalia, they urged him to adapt it for their comrades fighting today's wars — and tomorrow's...

[William F. Owen]

OK, so what does Jake do that I can't get from better training and organisation?

What's all this about "Fire power" yet operating within a civilian population? Western forces do not lack "firepower." If anything they have way too much.

Can't all the Quad bike and "Supacat" designs do this job just as well. 16 Air Assault in the UK has looked at Patrolling with 1 x Supacat in support to carry rucksacks and other impedimenta.

http://www.supacat.com/supacat_products_catMil.htm

Don't know what conclusions they came to, but I can probably find out.

[Russ Strong]

Russ,

I have some questions: 1) How good is my 360 visibility? 2) Can I toss a ruck, some mre's and some water in this vehicle and somehow prevent the hordes of Iraqi kids from reaching in and snatching whatever I am not wearing when I am parked? If my teammate gets hurt or dead can I haul him out on this? 3) From time to time we would be in areas where the civilians would stone us, what type of protection does this offer? 4) How much metal do I have to touch to drive this thing, Iraqi summers do a heck of a job of heating up metal? Winter ops are no fun either, does it have a heater? 5) How tough are the tires and how easy are they to change out in the field away from help? 6) Silt is a huge issue, it gets into everything, are the moving parts 'silt-proof'?

I think you could get some heavy duty field testing data by having the Guard and Border Patrol put the Jakes through their paces on the border. If soldiers can break something they will, and they will quickly help you find any issues that may exist.

Thanks for the questions. I will try to cover these, realizing that this is yet to be fully worked out with you soldiers in the dirt at full power.

1) A key interest is for the JAKE operator to have 'full head swivel' visibility, good situational awareness (can crank all the way to look through the back ballistic glass), can post a rear view on his display, and if slowed or stopped he can readily rotate the whole unit (much like you would turn around and take in a situation behind you if you were on foot). The ease at which you can do this may answer a comment of William Owen on how this is different than with a Quad bike and "Supacat. Your ballistics protection obviously rotates around with you.

2) When you toss your ruck and gear on, you can elect to place it more secure in its core pallet bin/storage. Some stuff you may put in the operator 'pod' which can be closed when you are out. The future play here is the ongoing overwatch of your unit also by your remote located buddy who may engage evasive maneuvers or active denials...in near-term, you have a closable storage, but this is a great area of discussion, with young techies coming up with humorous solutions. On your more serious note, extracting a buddy from the fight who is wounded is a key interest with the JAKE. There can be fold down stretchers, or stretcher holds across the front. As well, you can drop off a unit's pallet and pull a guy into that area (and work with him, if needed) so a unit's operator can get him out fast. What I have heard is the interest in ability to keep the most warfighters in the game and yet get guys in and out quickly when you are 6 blocks from your supporting truck.

3) Despite this unit being seen by many as a two soldier unit, largely due to existing doctrine and a 'drive and strafe' thinking, I watch the discussions continually move to singular operators (with others jumping on and off the side foot decks when folded out (powered, so others aren't jumping on that you do not want), thus the single operator is in the upper rear 'pod' which provides ballistics protection. Obviously, this can have a transparent shield also on top...getting to question 4...this 'pod' is such that it is able to be heated or cooled (a very real interest with chemical gear, as the JAKE would allow maneuver of soldiers in NBC gear, expanding the soldier's endurance significantly...I have heard others say you are in a war and aren't supposed to be comfortable...I have no idea how you guys do it out there in that heat, so I am with you on the cooling

5) The present tires are 'run-flats' and there is some great technologies happening to extend capabilities here even more. Keeping these prime tires as common as possible with JLTV units will enable drawing on the best there is at the time. The front tires are also run-flats, but with the JAKE's balancing system, you can take almost all the weight off the front, and if you have to, you could likely continue movement even 'skidding' a totally destroyed front end around.

6) Silt sand...here is where good engineers talking with good soldiers will do what they can...which goes the same for the well stated ability for soldiers' ability to break stuff

I think border work would be a great place to work these units out, with their teaming and overwatch capabilities, particularly if operated by guys from the urban fight.

I appreciate what you guys do out there for us.

Russ

[Russ Strong]

Yesterday, I put several videos on Youtube to help answer a number of questions surrounding the JAKE program. The descriptions and links are provided below.

This may aid visualization of the general JAKE characteristics. Please understand that portions of these videos are over 5 years old and concepts have evolved, and applications and configurations of the units have changed. We are not showing elements of the technology or unit’s chassis architecture that enable many of the units’ claimed and future capabilities. I know this frustrates some people (its is an engineer thing ). Since we are at considerable risk relative to our development costs until we partner with the larger defense companies, I ask your understanding here so that we can hold this larger conversation to think through advances in our warfighters’ capabilities.




The "American Agility - Gap in Soldier Power" is a fast moving video that attempts to provide a clear view of the overall situation of the power gap halfway between the foot soldier and the HMMWV. This is aimed at a Congressional audience to help them understand the need for funding in this realm, and may be thought provoking for those within defense think tanks also (5 minutes). This speaks to advances possible in a whole sector, in which the JAKE is only a first illustration of the ensuing opportunities for all defense technology companies…thus full industry efforts relative to SWJ and SWC discussions here in addressing 4th and 5th generation warfare.

http://youtube.com/watch?v=LCRkJpvcfLw



The "American Agility - Jake Soldier Power" is video showing units operating and full program view, philosophy of use, engaging discussion of how an agile carrier can open new capabilities (4 minutes)

http://youtube.com/watch?v=7uC2hfKpHAQ


The "American Agility - Call to Action" is a video of various people, soldiers and Marines speaking on what Jake means to them, what they see it providing in capabilities and why America should get together on this. This includes images of the JAKEs operating also.

http://youtube.com/watch?v=l4hYVc1QyOg


Russ Strong

[William F. Owen]

The "American Agility - Gap in Soldier Power" is a fast moving video that attempts to provide a clear view of the overall situation of the power gap halfway between the foot soldier and the HMMWV. This is aimed at a Congressional audience to help them understand the need for funding in this realm, and may be thought provoking for those within defense think tanks also (5 minutes). This speaks to advances possible in a whole sector, in which the JAKE is only a first illustration of the ensuing opportunities for all defense technology companies…thus full industry efforts relative to SWJ and SWC discussions here in addressing 4th and 5th generation warfare.

http://youtube.com/watch?v=LCRkJpvcfLw

Sorry, but I fundamentally disagree with the premise of this idea that there is a gap in "soldier power" - and that even if there was, that it could be solved by some type of miniature mobility device. The whole argument is founded on a series of catergoric statements, which are mostly incorrect and and misunderstands the nature of infantry operations and role of dismounted patrolling.

I have been writing, researching, and consulting on dismounted operations for the last 5 years and am currently commissioned to write a book on my findings, so I am not "pulling it out of my ass" when I say that
a.) there is no gap in soldier power. There is a misapplication of the dismounted capability.
b.) Infantry capability can be increased with better training and organisation.
c.) The rational application of EXISTING equipment types, more than adequately address the vast majority of operational challenges.

The infantry does not need more equipment.

In my opinion, and I am prepared to argue this with any 3 Star General who wants to, JAKE is seeking to solve the wrong end of a problem derived from asking the wrong question.

[Russ Strong]

Sorry, but I fundamentally disagree with the premise of this idea that there is a gap in "soldier power" - and that even if there was, that it could be solved by some type of miniature mobility device. The whole argument is founded on a series of catergoric statements, which are mostly incorrect and and misunderstands the nature of infantry operations and role of dismounted patrolling.

I have been writing, researching, and consulting on dismounted operations for the last 5 years and am currently commissioned to write a book on my findings, so I am not "pulling it out of my ass" when I say that
a.) there is no gap in soldier power. There is a misapplication of the dismounted capability.
b.) Infantry capability can be increased with better training and organisation.
c.) The rational application of EXISTING equipment types, more than adequately address the vast majority of operational challenges.

The infantry does not need more equipment.

In my opinion, and I am prepared to argue this with any 3 Star General who wants to, JAKE is seeking to solve the wrong end of a problem derived from asking the wrong question.

William,

With all respect, I must ask the one primary question that I posted this thread for: Why, in the middle of a war, with all the discussion of a changing battlespace and changing nature of war, are we not exploring all areas of potential in expanding our capabilities?

I did not identify this area of military interest with the JAKE. Some of our best "ground pounders" did. I have just used my experience and talents to expand concepts and then try to keep up with their next thoughts.

My work is based on over 30 years of product development involving advancing design and exploring new markets, analyzing customer interests through 'focus groups', customer clinics', following trends and what drives them. From this, we work to create product advances. I have worked on over 50 programs with major corporations, including Caterpillar, John Deere, New Holland and CNH.

In all of my work, if there is one recurring theme, it is that building something and getting it in the hands of the user opens new ideas and provides solid advance forward. Committees and talking have rarely led to the conclusions that resulted from building something that many saw of interest (not all, and some vehemently against), and then getting it in the field and working with it. Some of the greatest breakthroughs involved overcoming a swirl of discussion and comments almost identical to yours (A tractor does not need a cab...does not need air conditioning. There is no need for a combine header over 16 ft wide. No one can handle big bales. US farms do not need telescopic loaders. Homeowners can't operate zero-turn mowers...)

So it is my thought, as only one point of reference amongst many, that with an $800 million Army recruiting ad campaign per year, in the midst of a war and recruiting challenges, what would it hurt to spend $10 Million and open mindedly explore new capabilities that already generate excitement with both seasoned warriors and our youngest soldiers. When you hear the spectrum of thoughts, feelings and instincts expressed, this is what generates trends and points to where someone is going to take the future. Let me clearly state that the advances identified with the JAKE will occur. I believe it is good for America to be at the front in exploring this.

As one skeptical soldier admitted: "If Jakes are a total failure, we will still find 50 new ideas that we would never have thought of."

What are we fearing? We can always determine we are fine with what we have.

Russ Strong

[William F. Owen]

William,

With all respect, I must ask the one primary question that I posted this thread for: Why, in the middle of a war, with all the discussion of a changing battlespace and changing nature of war, are we not exploring all areas of potential in expanding our capabilities?

Because the "battle space," and the nature of war are not changing. People with an inadequate military knowledge and understanding, keep trying to suggest it is, but it clearly isn't. The idea that there is some "capability gap", is a pure myth. Gaps that do exist could be easily closed.

Your video is suggesting things as problems to be solved, when these things are not problems in the way you suggest.

I spend a great deal of time exploring how things can be done better and how the infantry can do better things.

JAKE may have some use. I can't tell because there simply is no proper specification or data that I can find to judge. (Weight, dimensions, power pack, mobility specs, 3D drawings, controls, materials etc.)

Soldiers are carrying too much because of poor technical and tactical equipment choices, combined with a lack of training and leadership. The last thing we need to do is to make it possible for them to carry more impedimenta. I predict, if JAKE ever enters service, it's weight will increase 50% in the first 18 months of operations, because folks always ask the wrong question.

I am the last man to discourage innovation, but I am pretty sticky when it comes to the military thought/science and doctrine that backs it up.

[Russ Strong]

Because the "battle space," and the nature of war are not changing. People with an inadequate military knowledge and understanding, keep trying to suggest it is, but it clearly isn't. The idea that there is some "capability gap", is a pure myth. Gaps that do exist could be easily closed.

Your video is suggesting things as problems to be solved, when these things are not problems in the way you suggest.

I spend a great deal of time exploring how things can be done better and how the infantry can do better things.

JAKE may have some use. I can't tell because there simply is no proper specification or data that I can find to judge. (Weight, dimensions, power pack, mobility specs, 3D drawings, controls, materials etc.)

First, a pretty complete description of specifications and an image showing relative size are provided on the start, or intro, of this thread. And as you note, the JAKE can have a spectrum of uses other than warfare, such as homeland security around ports, critical facilities, airports and borders.

I think where the discussion may be getting thrown off is in the definition of infantry.

Is it best for maintaining doctrinal context to see infantry as the same as today (and now just able to be lighter as they are able to off-load some of their gear onto JAKEs that are moving in some number with their squads)?

Do we need to define a new category of armored maneuver? In a discussion in December, retired General Fritz Kroesen saw the JAKEs as a parallel to the Cavalry. Should we be speaking in terms of the return of the Cavalry? Or is this defined as tanks and LAVs in smaller size, distributed and agile entities? (saying small may bring up the wrong image, since with today's weapon systems a JAKE will be able to carry most all the same firepower in some format, and a 3,000 lb unit with 2,000 lb payload standing taller than a HMMWV, is small relative to what when you are moving down an alley?)

Where the battlespace has changed, as I understand it, is in conflicts being pulled into prolonged events within tight urban environments where the enemy is not necessarily the population. This is not the same battlespace as tanks enjoy in rolling across Iraq or Poland. It seems that this calls for review of weapons (leading to more use of active denial systems, non-lethal weapons, low collateral damage weapons, and so forth). And, if we visualize the use of Bradleys as moving platforms supporting dismounted infantry in such a case, wouldn't it be good if we had units that are more agile than Bradleys, more distributable, smaller value targets for our enemy, less intimidating to civilians carrying on their daily business, able to stay closer to the infantry as the infantry move in smaller alleys and courtyards.

So, the gap in support of the foot soldier is as noted in the video in being halfway between the foot soldier and the HMMWV, and now widened as MRAPs replace HMMWVs (this point is at least in physical size, since whatever fills this gap might carry the full on weapons of the HMMWV or tanks).

What I take William to be saying is don't mess with the definition of infantry.

In the video, noted a couple posts above, it is postulated: "What if you could amplify a select group of these (soldiers) into 'Apache helicopters on the ground', effectively, getting them the firepower so that the whole team (supporting infantry and this select group, as compared to just infantry) can move up to a new level of capabilities?" Would this 'select group' be infantry moved up into 'JAKE jockey' specialists, or would they be armor guys moved down into 'smaller armor'? The interesting thing with JAKEs in use is that the operator will get out of the JAKEs (particularly when supported by a remote located buddy who can take over control of the unit to operate it robotically) and fully function as an infantryman with those infantry men his unit is supporting. (Note this is something that Apache helicopter pilots and jet pilots have little option for...at least not the getting back in and continuing on)

Interesting thoughts in defining who has the gap. Let's say it is an opportunity to be taken. Maybe that is the problem. No one will claim it because the US Army Rapid Equipping Force called it a "Capabilities Gap" in 2005 (which could denote someone is missing something). Is it possible that we solve this by establishing a whole new branch of the Armed Services? What would this be called?

Russ Strong

[William F. Owen]

What I take William to be saying is don't mess with the definition of infantry.

No. Please mess with definitions! It's how we make progress. The ONLY thing I am saying, is that, IMO, your justifications for JAKE are not correctly characterised.

JAKE may have some use in supporting dismounted operations. The work I have done to date clearly shows that there is role for what I call a "Patrol Support Vehicle." - something like a Supacat, or quad-bike.

...but Russ, In order to make this judgement, I and others really need firm facts and figures. How is the dang little gizmo-thing powered and what is it's endurance, loaded and un-loaded etc etc.

From what I have see so far, a low profile (<1.2m) band-tracked JAKE would seem to have the greatest potential.

Hope this helps

[marct]

Hi Folks,

I think where the discussion may be getting thrown off is in the definition of infantry.

Is it best for maintaining doctrinal context to see infantry as the same as today (and now just able to be lighter as they are able to off-load some of their gear onto JAKEs that are moving in some number with their squads)?

Do we need to define a new category of armored maneuver? In a discussion in December, retired General Fritz Kroesen saw the JAKEs as a parallel to the Cavalry.

No. Please mess with definitions! It's how we make progress. The ONLY thing I am saying, is that, IMO, your justifications for JAKE are not correctly characterised.

JAKE may have some use in supporting dismounted operations. The work I have done to date clearly shows that there is role for what I call a "Patrol Support Vehicle." - something like a Supacat, or quad-bike.

Russ, I think you may be right that part of the problem is with the definition. From what I can see about how you are currently thinking on deployment, JAKEs look like some cross between Dragoons and stirrup-infantry; almost similar to the old (late 15th century) French concept of a Lance (1 knight, 2 squires, 3 men-at-arms).

..but Russ, In order to make this judgement, I and others really need firm facts and figures. How is the dang little gizmo-thing powered and what is it's endurance, loaded and un-loaded etc etc.

From what I have see so far, a low profile (<1.2m) band-tracked JAKE would seem to have the greatest potential.

Totally agree, Wilf. Add in turning radius, centre of gravity (from physics, not Clausewitz ), ability on gradiants, ability to deploy non-lethal weaponry on its hardpoints (for political reasons in, say border patrol settings), etc. I'll also note that this type of information should NOT be made available online, which does put all of us in something of a bind (PMs and emails would be an option, but check with your security personnel first).

Having said all the negative stuff, let me spin out another option. In urban settings, I suspect the high profile will be more useful that Wilf's low profile version; especially in a COIN setting. The ability to shift between high and low profile versions would prove useful. Second, on red teaming the JAKE, I would use a mental analog of heavy cavalry from ca. 1500 supported by infantry "retainers". Base rule would be "hit the Jake first, then decide on the rest". By "hit", I mean anything that would immobilize it, even for a few minutes - the goal would be to get it to shoot and cause collateral damage. The second rule, and I would use it in all pastoralist cultures, would be to make the JAKEs look foolish; not a direct kinetic goal but, rather, a piece of political theatre. I think I'm going to stop now .

Marc

[Russ Strong]

The JAKE in “alley fighter” configuration is an “exo-skeleton” in a somewhat different sense, ...This compact unit allows quick rotation of the loaded vehicle due to rotation being about its center of mass. Though it may be compared to the Segway in ways, the JAKE is always stable, and adjusts to provide maximum stability when firing heavier weapons.

Note the operator is at a level where he can talk with people on the street ... By its balancing system, the JAKE maintains ...a “solid stance on its feet...up to 45 mph. The unit is operational manned and unmanned. In close quarters, this 3,000 lb unit has agile rotational maneuver, carrying a 2,000 lb payload. It is 5 ft wide, 8 ft long and 6 ½ ft tall, able to rapidly spin around within a 10 foot space (in ‘alley fighter’ configuration). Prime tires are HMMWV size and hybrid electric drive allows operation with diesel engine off, providing a 3 mile “stealth mode”...existing weapons systems (M249, M240, M134, M2)...JAKE’s cargo capacity and electrical system allow it to support various advanced weapon systems, lethal and non-lethal, area denial systems, sensors and robots. ...not all features of the Jake can be disclosed. For illustration and framing solutions, I am disclosing general information.

Per William Owen's questions above relative to JAKE specifications, I provide reference from start of this thread. As Marc noted in his post above, not all details are to be online. (some are already concerned with descriptions as they are).

I appreciate Wilf's comments and thoughts on definitions, since this is one a main areas of study and why the thread here, with a new system and tactics opened by the JAKE's capabilities. In a program framed up within the Army in 2005 (that got jammed up) there was to be a 2 month, 40 Special Ops guys, 15 JAKEs, a number of HMMWV's and LAVs and a series of mission scenarios within a MOUT facility. The exercise would run varied configurations of force: 3 JAKEs per HMMWV and 9 dismounted infantry, 4 JAKEs (1 remote operated) per HMMWV and LAV and 12 dismounted, or 6 JAKEs per HMMWV and 6 infantry supported by a LAV in remote support, etc... This would have fleshed out a lot of what William F. Owen and Marc are noting (and Marc would have recognized that they were working to take into account that someone like him would be on the Red Team) So, comments and the unique perspectives you bring are good. Relative to how easy JAKEs can be dealt with by an opponent obviously depends on how they are employed and how they move with teamed coverage.

Marc noted benefit of a unit having a high profile in the urban environment and COIN, and this was a prime interest of USASOC guys early on, wanting to be able to see over cars and people. They also wanted the unit to be able to take serious hits of cars and trucks, which JAKE configuration provides (same beltline and HMMWV sized tires) and some heft and payload, yet very compact and agile and always a 'ready gun position', or as an infantry guys have viewed it: "mobile foxholes" (something that an ATV isn't configured to be).

It may be interesting to note that the first USASOC interactions were prior to 9/11 with initial interests focused on Central and South American slums where the HMMWH size restricted their "go-zones" significantly. And, they liked that the JAKE could directly convert to tracks for other missions as needed.

In the challenge the JAKE has faced, and still faces, in getting an assessment program as teamed system (rather than normal assessing as a singular unit), it is interesting that after a demo of a JAKE and within ensuing discussions, a Marine will say "just make sure the Red Team doesn't have these". I second that. Make sure Marc doesn't have them hanging around in the background.

Russ

[marct]

Hi Russ,

In a program framed up within the Army in 2005 (that got jammed up) there was to be a 2 month, 40 Special Ops guys, 15 JAKEs, a number of HMMWV's and LAVs and a series of mission scenarios within a MOUT facility. The exercise would run varied configurations of force: 3 JAKEs per HMMWV and 9 dismounted infantry, 4 JAKEs (1 remote operated) per HMMWV and LAV and 12 dismounted, or 6 JAKEs per HMMWV and 6 infantry supported by a LAV in remote support, etc... This would have fleshed out a lot of what William F. Owen and Marc are noting (and Marc would have recognized that they were working to take into account that someone like him would be on the Red Team) So, comments and the unique perspectives you bring are good. Relative to how easy JAKEs can be dealt with by an opponent obviously depends on how they are employed and how they move with teamed coverage.

Hokay, that lineup does help a touch with planing. I must admit, I'm a touch surprised that you didn't also include a 3 or 6 remote JAKE option - I would have. And, just because I like political theatre so much, I would make sure that there are life size dummies in the remote versions. This way, the JAKEs could still operate in a fire-support and recon mode but have he added advantage of acting as stalking horses. The downside is that pesky relative cost ration between a JAKE and an IED or RPG.

In the challenge the JAKE has faced, and still faces, in getting an assessment program as teamed system (rather than normal assessing as a singular unit), it is interesting that after a demo of a JAKE and within ensuing discussions, a Marine will say "just make sure the Red Team doesn't have these". I second that. Make sure Marc doesn't have them hanging around in the background.

But that is a perfect counter scenario . Especially if they were "appropriated" by the other side <evil grin>. Anyway, I can always come up with other evil ways to play havoc with them, but not in a public forum .

Marc

[Russ Strong]

I'm a touch surprised that you didn't also include a 3 or 6 remote JAKE option - I would have. And, just because I like political theatre so much, I would make sure that there are life size dummies in the remote versions. This way, the JAKEs could still operate in a fire-support and recon mode but have he added advantage of acting as stalking horses. The downside is that pesky relative cost ration between a JAKE and an IED or RPG.

There were quite a number of other mission and force configurations framed up in the earlier assessment proposal. I listed only a couple. As you said, it would quickly grow, or be zeroed in from there with what did the trick for what ops mission.


Yeah, Marc, you are right there with our seasoned Special Ops dudes on this...as they wanted dummies to inflate (even remotely inflate and deflate) to produce a considerable range of deception tactics...the who is where, and who went where? And where the hell are they now?" And to draw sniper fire (where an obviously unmanned unit wouldn't) for marking sniper locations with its sensors (intel with less risk)

Costs of a JAKE lost, versus a warrior, is minimal. If you knew you were going to work some "stalking horses" into the mix, you might want to use "stripped out" units, but cosmetically the same (pretty simple, because the JAKE platform is highly modular) running at a fraction of a warfighter JAKE.

Russ

[William F. Owen]

Well having had another long look, I can't quite see where JAKE gets us, that is a whole lot further on than Supacat

http://www.supacat.com/supacat_products_catMil.htm

Supacat is just a little bigger, but already proven and in service. It could easily be armoured, and will go almost anywhere in an urban or rural environment.

I'm not trying to rain on anyone's wish to make money here, but I see no point in re-inventing the wheel.

[Russ Strong]

Well having had another long look, I can't quite see where JAKE gets us, that is a whole lot further on than Supacat

Supacat is just a little bigger, but already proven and in service. It could easily be armoured, and will go almost anywhere in an urban or rural environment…. I see no point in re-inventing the wheel.

This is a reasonable question, particularly with the Supracat being a “great piece of kit”, as the British would say. The answer is found in looking at the original warfighters’ interests in the Jake, and how interests have expanded from there. First, alleys and slums present different situations and a whole other terrain to that of open areas. Our warfighters were interested in "powered support" here, meaning heavier weapons, medivac and gear. But, they were only interested if powered support were with incredible agility (ability to individually react, fast rotation, high "dash speed", ability to reconfigure a situation rapidly), all in a compact package (now a key interest is fitting in a V-22 Osprey, which it will).

It comes down to the "powered support" unit having to be able to maneuver the most like a foot soldier maneuvers and splitting up our guys so they are the most independently reactive. There are new technologies that the JAKE incorporates in a new way, that bring new capabilities into this range of what they will consider. And, you can clearly see within the posts of this discussion the significant threshold of performance and characteristics that must be met to even consider altering definitions within infantry style maneuver.

I would not be here continuing to help get our troops new capabilities if there weren't serious seasoned warfighters encouraging me to keep going, that this effort is needed (in fact in a US Army BAA in 2005 titled "Vehicle for Individual Soldier Protection", of 23 submissions covering the range from ATVs to ‘Supracats’ type vehicles, the JAICV (now JAKE) was determined the only "innovation warfighting platform". The key words here being "warfighting" and "innovation". JAKE was noted as an "Agent of Change". This program is suspended due to the Army's issues with armor…and other stuff…)

The point was, and remains, how do we innovate into a step past incremental change in capabilities? Special Operations sees continued movement of conflict and stabilization efforts into urban environments, and increasing situations requiring rapid insertion of surgical force. So, what can be studied that provides the greatest opportunities for advance for these missions?

As a side note: They encouraged expansion of the JAKE's modular design, since when they can get JAKE "alley fighters", they saw it as highly desirable to be able to configure its common power units, robotics, controls, communications, diagnostics, etc, to other missions with tracks and 6WD so they do not have logistical challenges that come with more and different vehicles in the overall system (an increasing problem as all the stuff gets a bit more sophisticated today). But, the core focus was: "In the alleys, do not be restrained (affecting a warrior's surviveability) by requirements for missions they are not on. This meant, don't limit the guy in the alley with stuff to meet requirements for a mission in the Mekong Delta, and vice versa. When in the alleys, make him an "alley fighter", no holds barred. These guys tend to have some attitude and they make their point very clear.

I'm just trying to honor their insights and the fact they are the ones with their lives on the line.

Russ

[selil]

What can I say? Terminator? Alien? This suit does it all, video and some text at the link http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7351314.stm