Having lived in Thailand and spoken at length to the Thai Army about the "problem in the South" one of the major obstacles is the senior leadership of the Thai Army and how Thai culture views problem solving.Originally Posted by Dayuhan
If there is one insurgency that could be ended with 24 months hard work, the one in the South of Thailand is it.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
ICG, 8 Dec 09: Southern Thailand: Moving Towards Political Solutions
....the southern insurgency continues unabated, claiming more than 3,900 lives during the last six years. While sweep operations launched in mid-2007 temporarily curtailed violence, intensifying attacks in 2009 show the rebellion against Thai rule has not been extinguished. The June attack on Al-Furqan mosque was an alarming sign of deepening communal tension and steadily deteriorating relations between Muslims and Buddhists. The government has made little progress in addressing political grievances or alleviating the sense of injustice among Malay Muslims. Its inability to hold security forces accountable for human rights abuse feeds into the narrative of “unjust” Thai rule and provides more fuel for the ethno-religious struggle. The failure to arrest and prosecute perpetrators of the mosque attack has become another symbol of injustice and inevitably a rallying cry to attract new recruits.
Political solutions should be seriously pursued as a way to end this deadly insurgency. The government’s rhetoric of development and justice needs to be translated into policy and practice. Development projects should be implemented transparently and with grassroots participation to ensure they address real needs rather than going into unwanted projects or the pockets of those managing them. Investigation and prosecution of security forces accused of abuses should be expedited. The foundations of peaceful engagement are already in place, should the government wish to pursue dialogue with insurgent representatives. If it is committed to this route, there are plenty of ideas to bring to the negotiation table to encourage compromise from the insurgency. Hope rather than fear should be the spirit of engagement. Dialogue with insurgent movements elsewhere in the world has not often led to separate states splitting off but exploring a new governance structure for the South could help stem the mounting death toll.
I suspect that the only solution to S. Thailand is a political one. The Thai government must make the same bold step that the American government did when it passed the civil rights act. It must concede that it treats this segment of the populace injustly, and make true steps to right that wrong.
To merely "enforce the rule of law" among a segment of the populace that percieves strongly that the law is unjust as applied to them, is to make the same mistake that King George made when he sent his Navy and Army to Boston. It is quite likely to push a subversive movement into full-blown insurgency, or push what is an insurgency among a radical fringe into the mainstream.
The security forces of S. Philippines and Thailand can shape conditions, but these matters can only be truly resolved in Manila and Bangkok.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Lowy Institute, Apr 10: Confronting ghosts: Thailand’s shapeless southern insurgency
This monograph analyses the changing nature of the insurgency in Thailand’s southern border provinces and the inability of the Thai Government to understand and deal with it. It analyses new dimensions of the conflict, and considers the extent to which the insurgency is a coherent movement. In addition, the monograph also critically examines the response of the Thai state to the insurgency. Taken together, these two analytical threads allow us to address the questions of why and how the insurgency morphed in the direction it did, and what this portends for both counterinsurgency efforts and the state of affairs in Thailand more generally. In brief, four arguments are made:
• First, despite the discernible religious hues in insurgent discourse and language today, today’s insurgency remains fundamentally based on earlier localist narratives, goals and motivations.
• Second, the nature of the insurgency itself has changed from the hierarchical and structured struggles of the past that were mostly led by an ethnic Malay political and religious elite to the fluid and shapeless organisational structure of a ‘new’ insurgency that as yet lacks clear, negotiable political goals.
• Third, although there may be agreement among groups involved in the insurgency as to what might be the broad objectives of the movement (in fact, there might even be disagreement on this count), each may have different opinions as to how to proceed to achieve them.
• Finally, tackling the insurgency on both military and political counts will pose an even greater challenge for the Thai Government because of its inability to make significant headway in its counterinsurgency effort with properly calibrated responses.
Michael Yon is in Thailand right now, live tweeting his observations of lots of gunfire. A lot of shooting and probably hundreds killed in the past two hours. This sounds like the two sides are not longer messing around...
See his twitter feed for more. About 40 or so similar tweets in just the past hour. Sounds like a donnybrook.
Last edited by Schmedlap; 05-16-2010 at 04:43 PM. Reason: Added link
In the Libyan insurgecy involved many al Qaeda fighters and mercenaries from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other Islamic countries. Can not exclude the participation of Malay separatists. In one of the posts Libyan spokesman Musa Ibrahim said about the arrest of 17 mercenaries, including several Europeans and a resident of the Asian countries (not name the country). Islamists have stolen a lot weapons from depots Libyan Army. Now this weapon can occur anywhere - in Egypt, Palestine, Somalia, Afghanistan, India and Sinkiang. Do you think it possible the emergence of "veterans" of the Libyan's war and Libya's weapons stolen in southern Thailand?
Also the chief of Libyan islamic fight group (LIFG) and the commander of Tripoli Abd al Hakim Balhaj was arrested in 2002 in Malaysia and was transfered from malay special forces to CIA in Bangkok.
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