Thailand (catch all)

[Merv Benson]

Bill, I am not sure what their objectives are.

They have killed a lot of school teachers and Buddhist. They may have an agenda beyond hatred for education and a desire of Muslim apartheid, but I have not seen them articulate it. I have seen indications that many are based across the border in Malaysia. I have a vague recollection that they may have had ties to Hambali before he was captured which would put them pretty much in the al Qaeda camp.

I don't really see the situation as improved since the coup. If anything their genocide against Buddhist seems worse. Since my daughter and her family are in Bangkok, I have tried to follow the news of events there pretty closely. If someone in the group has evidence that the situation there has improved, that would certainly be welcomed.

[Bill Moore]

Merv,

I haven't seen much on the unclassified side on Hambali's role in Thailand, other than he was allegedly planning attacks against several Thai Hotels, and maybe the APEC summit. Hambali is as evil and perhaps as good (tactically) as they come. His organization was largely responsible for a number of church bombings in Indonesia, which led to seriously bloody strife between Christians and Muslims. His goal is to create a greater pan-Islamic State that includes most of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand, and since he spent a fair amount of time in Malaysia isn't too far of reach to assume he "could" have contacted the insurgents in S. Thailand.

The million dollar question is do the insurgents want anything to do with the transnational movement? Most think they just want to liberate their region from Thailand, but then there rumors of rifts within the insurgent leadership, and if true does that mean there is a more radical faction vying for power?

Unfortunately the situation in Southern Thailand remains in a downward spiral, so your concern is not misplaced. For the most part (if not entirely) the insurgents have focused their attacks in the Southern Provinces. They are getting more effective (but still not anywhere near what I would call good yet). I think they're learning new TTP over the internet, because they still seem to be pretty clumsy compared to insurgents elsewhere who have had hands on training, but if you see a sudden spike in competence, then we can assume there is a reason for it, and I would suspect a training camp where foreigners are providing expert knowledge first hand.

The military wanted to implement a new strategy (more along the lines of a traditional COIN approach, where the focus is a political settlement), but I haven't seen many signs of it in the media yet. This situation deserves to be watched, and I only hope the Thai government reverses the current trends noted.

[Jedburgh]

They have killed a lot of school teachers and Buddhist. They may have an agenda beyond hatred for education and a desire of Muslim apartheid, but I have not seen them articulate it.

They do not have a "hatred for education" per se. The Thai education system is highly centralized, and as an ethno-religious separatist insurgency (Malay Muslims), they perceive state education as a Thai Buddhist attempt to destroy their cultural and linguistic identity through their children. Targeting of schoolteachers for this specific reason has been common in many ethnic-based separatist insurgencies, i.e. the PKK's campaign in Turkey (before the capture of Ocalan) stands out in this respect.

I have seen indications that many are based across the border in Malaysia

Funny, this is the second time tonight I'm referring to article in the 17 Feb 07 issue of The Economist:

Thailand and Malaysia: In Need of Help to Douse the Flames

...the treatment of Thai Muslims is a sensitive subject in northern Malaysia, where the country's Islamist opposition is strong. So Mr Badawi will not want to risk providing political ammunition to his opponents.

Co-operation would be a welcome change from the two countries' frequent rows over the Thai south. Mr Thaksin used to accuse Malaysia of sheltering the militants. He was furious when, in 2005, it refused to send back around 130 Thai Muslims who had fled across the border, claiming their lives were in danger.

Since the Thai coup, there have been tensions over a security barrier that the Thai generals want to erect along the border. The Malaysians were miffed at General Surayud's claim that funds were being raised for the insurgency by extorting money from restaurants selling Thai tom yum kung soup in Malaysia....

I have a vague recollection that they may have had ties to Hambali before he was captured which would put them pretty much in the al Qaeda camp.

I highly recommend a read of the May 05 ICG report linked in the first post on the thread (Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad), it provides an excellent overview of the conflict.

[Merv Benson]

Zachary Abuza has a long informative post on the Thai situation at the Counterterrorism Blog:

...

... While the justification and rationale for the coup is still debated, people across the political spectrum placed considerable hope that the Council on National Security (CNS) and the government that they installed would do a better job than the Thaksin administration in stemming the violence.

Yet, the exact opposite has been true: the daily average rate of killing has more than tripled in the past six months, from 1.6 people a day in 2006 to almost four per day. Over 400 people, roughly 19 percent of the 2,100 people killed since January 2004 have died since the coup. Attacks have become more sophisticated and coordinated. Sadly the junta leaders remain oblivious to the reality on the ground and show precious little resolve in dealing with the insurgency, they remain mired in petty political squabbles in Bangkok and blind to the reports from their field commanders.

Besides the dramatic escalation in the number of people killed, there have been six discernable trends since the coup.

...

Second, the attacks have been far more provocative, such as the attack on the minivan. The rate of beheadings has increased: 10 percent of all the beheadings have occurred in 2007, alone. In this year alone, there have already been three attacks on members of royal entourages. While insurgents have stepped up their attacks on police and soldiers, civilians, monks, women (including pregnant women), and children have been killed with appalling frequency. A week ago, insurgents opened fire on a class of 5th graders, leaving one 11-year old in a coma. The following day two female students were gunned down on their way to class. Monks have been targeted as well. These provocative attacks are meant to illicit heavy-handed government responses to further alienate the security forces from the broader Muslim community. While insuurgents have not attacked soft targets out of area, it is on the table. teams were caught in Bangkok in November 2005 and in Phuket in September 2006. It is on the table, yet, unlikely to be emplyed now as their tactics are working: they're winning.

Third, teachers and schools, those vulnerable agents of secularization and assimilation, continue to be prime targets of the insurgents. This has both eroded the social fabric of the region, while at the same time, forced the Muslim population to send their children to the private Islamic schools favored by the insurgents. Insurgents have killed Muslim teachers at government-supported Islamic schools with a mixed curriculum. On 17 March, insurgents struck an Islamic school in Songkhla, killing three boys between 12-14. While they were sending a message to the Muslim community to not send their children to government-supported schools, they were also hoping that many in the community would blame the government or Buddhist vigilantes for the attacks. Which leads to the fourth trend, more sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing. Already, 15 percent of the Buddhist community has fled the region. There have been stepped up threats and more leaflets left by insurgents to intimidate the local Buddhist population to leave.

...

While no group has taken credit for any attack, nor publicly stated their demands, this is not a bunch of nihilistic youths. This is a highly organized, though cellular, movement, with clear command and control. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinasi and the Gerakan Mujihidin Islamiyah Pattani are able to execute coordinated attacks, near simultaneously, across four provinces on a regular basis. Thai Muslim insurgents have never been more disciplined and united.

Their ideology has also never been so Islamist. The insurgents today are fundamentally different than previous generations. In addition to the broadened targeting of women, children, monks and the de facto ethnic cleansing that has transpired, the Islamist agenda is manifest in other ways. They are not out to win hearts and minds: they are thuggish, brutal, and imposing their values on the community. Over 50 percent of their victims have been fellow Muslims....(Emphasis added.)

...

There is much more. The high number of attacks on fellow Muslims may have been the biggest surprise in this post, but it is consistent with the Taliban nature of the groups and their search for "purification" of Islam along with the religious bigotry toward people of other religions. Abuza is a political science professor at Simmons College in Boston where he teaches Southeast Asian politics.

[Bill Moore]

Terrorizing one's own is a sound insurgent tactic. The goal is to create a climate of fear and to discredit the State, and eventually create a situation where the population comes to the realization that only the insurgents can protect them, so they feel compelled to opt in with the insurgents.

The counterinsurgent could counter this if he can and will provide adequate levels of protection for the population. Obviously the insurgent isn't trying to win hearts, but rather win control over the population, and coercion works. The Thai government needs to act quickly and stop taking half steps.

I'm only speculating, but based on the tactics the insurgents are using, I don't think they have a popular base of support.

[Jedburgh]

HRW, Mar 07: Enforced Disappearances in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces

...Abuses by both the militants and the security forces have fueled a deadly cycle of violence over the past three years. The predominant militant group, the National Revolution Front-Coordinate (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi, BRN-C), has taken advantage of abuses by the Thai security forces to gather support for their separatist cause. On an almost daily basis, the BRN-C’s youth wing (pemuda) and guerrilla units (Runda Kumpulan Kecil or RKK) have carried out shootings, bomb attacks, arson, beheadings, and machete attacks; statistics show clearly the intensity and lethality of their attacks, as well as evidence of a disturbing trend towards more frequent attacks on civilians and civilian objects. A Human Rights Watch report on militant abuses in southern Thailand is forthcoming.

The present report focuses on the practice of the Thai security forces of “disappearing” persons suspected of being militants, or of supporting them, or of having information on separatist attacks. Under international law an enforced disappearance occurs when a person has been arrested, detained, or abducted by government officials or their agents, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of the person’s liberty or to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person. Enforced disappearances invariably violate a number of fundamental human rights, including the right to life; the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; the right to liberty and security of the person; and the right to a fair and public trial. “Disappearances” are particularly pernicious as they also cause untold suffering to family members and friends, who never know whether the person they care about is alive or dead....

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 7 Jun 07:

The Role of Foreign Trainers in Southern Thailand's Insurgency

The first five months of 2007 have seen a dramatic increase in both the lethality and brutality of the Thai insurgency, prompting numerous Thai military officials to suspect the growing presence of foreign trainers. The arrest of an Indonesian on May 19 further raised suspicions. Nevertheless, Thai political leaders, including former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, head of the National Reconciliation Commission Khun Anand Panyarachun and current Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont, along with the diplomatic community, have all insisted that the insurgency is a purely domestic affair with no foreign linkages. This view is being challenged by a growing body of evidence that shows that Thai officials have begun to speak more openly about the influence of foreigners on the Thai insurgents....

...and this excerpt speaks to the subject of the first post in the thread, threat migration:

...It took insurgents almost two years to develop IEDs larger than five kilograms. This year has already witnessed 15 and 20 kilogram devices used several times a week, causing much higher casualty rates, especially among police and soldiers. Many of the devices are similar to the one found and defused on May 28: a 20 kilogram ammonium nitrate bomb constructed in a fire extinguisher, stuffed with bolts, nuts and pieces of rebar and hidden on the side of the road awaiting an army convoy. The bomb was command detonated, but cell phone detonators are still currently used. Casio watches, which have been used routinely in Iraq, are now also regularly employed in southern Thailand....

[Jedburgh]

HRW, 14 Jun 07: Thailand: Education in the South Engulfed in Fear

....Officials in Narathiwat province have been forced to close more than 300 government schools in all 13 districts this week after insurgents killed three teachers on June 11. Two gunmen walked into the library of Ban Sakoh school in Si Sakhon district around noon and shot two female teachers, Thippaporn Thassanopas, 42, and Yupha Sengwas, 26, in the head, abdomen and legs. They died instantly in front of some 100 children, who were playing in front of the library after lunch. Both teachers received warnings before they were killed.

Approximately an hour later, a male teacher was shot dead in a grocery store in Ra Ngae district. Sommai Laocharoensuk, 55, a teacher at Ban Jehke School, was hit six times by AK-47 fire in the head and body. An eyewitness said six gunmen walked into the shop and opened fire on Sommai, who was registering the names of children to be enrolled in his school.

Human Rights Watch said it believed those responsible were separatist militants because of a long pattern of similar attacks on government schools and teachers, along with continuing public threats.

“Insurgents are terrorizing teachers and schools, which they consider symbols of the Thai state,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “These attacks are grave crimes and cannot be justified by any cause.”...