The Taliban collection (2006 onwards)

[Merv Benson]

There is ample reason to question Pakistan's deal with the tribal leaders and considerable evidence that it has helped the enemy. It is hard to say whether this AP story in the NY Times is evidence of Pakistan responding to the criticism or attempting to look like it is.

Police acting on a tip raided several militant hide-outs in southwestern Pakistan and arrested 48 suspected Taliban who had arrived in small groups from Afghanistan, police said Saturday.

The arrests were made during the past 24 hours in Quetta, the capital of southwestern Baluchistan province, said Wazir Khan, the city police chief.

However, no important Taliban figures were among the detainees, he said. They were being questioned to determine the purpose of their presence in Pakistan.

...

The last quoted paragraph may say something about the sincerity of the Pakistan effort. What the story does not say is whether the tribal leaders were responsible for the information leading to the arrest or whether the arrest show the tribal leaders are in violation of their agreement.

[Jedburgh]

USIP, Oct 06: Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the neighboring regions would all benefit from a recognized open border between the two countries. Such a border would clarify that all Pashtuns have rights as citizens of one or another state and would enable them to communicate, trade, and develop both their economy and their culture in cooperation with one another. Such a settlement would strengthen democracy in both states and facilitate both Pakistan’s access to Central Asia and Afghanistan’s access to the sea. It would lessen domestic ethnic tensions and strengthen national unity in both states. It would, however, require difficult internal changes in both countries, a reversal of the hostility that has predominated in relations between the two governments for sixty years, and credible international guarantees.

A major challenge to such objectives is the Islamist insurgency on both sides of the border. In 2005 Musharraf responded to charges that the Taliban were engaging in cross-border activity by proposing to fence and mine the Durand Line, a solution reminiscent of the policies of Israel and Uzbekistan. As in Central Asia and the Middle East, such a solution will not work for many reasons. International political and military officials in Afghanistan, as well as counterinsurgency experts, agree that the key to strategic success is disrupting the Taliban’s command and control, mainly in Quetta and Waziristan, not wasting resources on the impossible task of blocking infiltration by easily replaceable foot soldiers across snow-capped mountains and trackless deserts. Fencing would further isolate the border region and create an additional obstacle to its economic development.