The Taliban collection (2006 onwards)

[Jedburgh]

Frontline: Return of the Taliban

Excellent documentary. Essentially it turned out to be a long indictment of Pakistan. I was surprised that Musharraf and his generals allowed themselves to be interviewed in that manner as well as filmed squirming in the hot seat making weak denials. I was especially interested in the video of the Pakistani general giving the anti-American speech to the tribesmen in Waziristan.

The full documentary, as well as transcripts of the interviews, is available on the website - along with a few extras.

[marct]

I'm still thinking about what I saw last night.

On the issue of Pakistan, I'm not surprised they allowed the filming or interviews. Musharef and his crowd are walking a tightrope and, in view of the recent shift in Musharef's interviews, it looks like he is playing it safe with the jihadists at the moment.

I think I may need to take an old friend and ex-coworker out for coffee. She is a Pashtun and related to the Minister of the Interior.

Marc

[Jedburgh]

...and this just in from CRG:

...An explosion on 4 October took place near the Army House in Rawalpindi and was followed on 5 October by the discovery of three rockets near the parliament building in the capital Islamabad.

Previous bombings and security incidents in these cities have been related to opposition to President Gen Pervez Musharraf within the military and intelligence agencies and from Islamic extremist groups. Although there has been speculation that Baluchi militants were involved in the latest incidents, Baluchi rebels have not tended to operate outside of Baluchistan. Meanwhile, the incidents do not fit with Islamic extremists' usual modus operandi. Several additional factors support the assessment that these incidents may be linked to elements within the military and intelligence services who wish to send a warning to Musharraf to express their increasing disillusionment:

* Islamabad and Rawalpindi have strong security measures in place, making militant infiltration difficult.

* The two incidents were well planned, showing tactical sophistication and apparent knowledge of Musharraf's movements.

* They coincided with Musharraf's highly controversial efforts to sideline and replace a corps commander.

Opposition to Musharraf

Musharraf has recently returned from a trip to the US, during which he launched his controversial autography and made highly critical comments about elements within the military. In addition, the president on 5 October appointed new 10 Corps Commander Lt-Gen Salahuddin Satti as Chief of General Staff (CGS) at the General Headquarters (GHQ). These developments have increased speculation that Musharraf's political and military support base might be becoming increasingly disillusioned with the personalised nature of his rule.

There have been three assassination attempts against Musharraf and one against his close associate Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. In December 2003, two assassination attempts were carried out against the president in quick succession in Rawalpindi. They were initially linked to Islamic extremists, but subsequent investigations revealed links to elements within the military and intelligence services.

Rawalpindi and Islamabad incidents

The explosion in Rawalpindi's Ayub Public Park (1.3 miles (2km) from Musharraf's residence) appears to have been caused by a rocket. The following day, bomb-disposal experts defused three rockets that were found less than half a mile (1km) from the national assembly and were
aimed towards the building. The rockets were attached to mobile (cell) phones to enable remote launching, and were positioned in woods near to the diplomatic enclave, providing an opportunity to target several buildings in the area. This area has high security measures in place because of the presence of the national assembly, several government ministries, the prime minister's office and the president's office. Musharraf was addressing a press conference in the area at the time of the discovery.

Nobody has claimed responsibility for the incidents, which are likely to be linked. The authorities have provided little information apart from these basic facts...

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 5 Oct 06:

Pakistan's Peace Deal with Taliban Militants

...Anticipating the "bright future," Pakistan set out to build bridges to the Taliban. The September 5 peace deal is the first major step in this direction. Musharraf is now painting the Taliban as a popular resistance movement. On September 11, he told an audience in Brussels: "The center of gravity of terrorism has shifted from al-Qaeda to the Taliban," which "has its roots in the people" (Dawn, September 12). The Afghan government, however, was quick to reject his revisionist view, dismissing the Taliban as "a creation of Pakistan" (The Nation, September 13). Musharraf's thinking on the Taliban, however, does not square with his policies. In Kabul, he asked the Afghan government, "Let's fight the Taliban together" (Daily Jang, September 11). Yet, why does Musharraf make peace with the Taliban if he wants to fight them?

These contradictions reflect Musharraf's desire for Pakistan to be seen as a frontline state in the war on terrorism, which left it $20 billion richer by 2003. Most recent estimates, which have been widely circulated in the Pakistani media, show that Pakistan has cashed in $50 billion (half of its GDP) in grants-in-aid, soft loans, debt write-offs, debt-rescheduling, preferential terms of trade, selective investment and remittances between 2001 and 2006. While Islamabad is realigning its strategic interests with the resurgent Taliban, it certainly does not want to lose billions of dollars either, which have continued to flow in its direction since 9/11. Hence, Islamabad stands by the Taliban and fights them too.

...and, for a different perspective, from the International Relations and Security Network:

Pakistan Toys with New Strategy on Border

...Pakistan's military president General Pervez Musharraf has embarked on a new strategy designed to chip away at the Taliban insurgency by standing down the army and seeking to win the hearts and minds of the country's North Waziristan tribal agency, which borders Afghanistan.

The deal, announced earlier in September, has seen the some 80,000 Pakistani military troops deployed in North Waziristan reduce their profile and allow some local militia forces to take over the manning of some checkpoints in the area. The deal has also seen the release from custody of some tribal militants captured during the Pakistani military's recent operations in the region.

Reports also say the local tribal leaders have reciprocated by pledging to lower their profile as well, and to ensure that Taliban forces do not infiltrate the border from Afghanistan.

Musharraf believes that by standing down military troops and working toward reconstruction and development in the area, the tribal population - traditionally sympathetic to the Taliban - could shift its loyalties and work towards securing the border area...

[Jedburgh]

6 Oct 06 Telegraph: Nato's top brass accuse Pakistan over Taliban aid

...The cushion Pakistan is providing the Taliban is undermining the operation in Afghanistan, where 31,000 Nato troops are now based. The Canadians were most involved in Operation Medusa, two weeks of heavy fighting in a lush vineyard region, defeating 1,500 well entrenched Taliban, who had planned to attack Kandahar city, the capital of the south.

Nato officials now say they killed 1,100 Taliban fighters, not the 500 originally claimed. Hundreds of Taliban reinforcements in pick-up trucks who crossed over from Quetta – waved on by Pakistani border guards – were destroyed by Nato air and artillery strikes.

Nato captured 160 Taliban, many of them Pakistanis who described in detail the ISI's support to the Taliban.

Nato is now mapping the entire Taliban support structure in Balochistan, from ISI- run training camps near Quetta to huge ammunition dumps, arrival points for Taliban's new weapons and meeting places of the shura, or leadership council, in Quetta, which is headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar, the group's leader since its creation a dozen years ago.

Nato and Afghan officers say two training camps for the Taliban are located just outside Quetta, while the group is using hundreds of madrassas where the fighters are housed and fired up ideologically before being sent to the front...

[Merv Benson]

There is ample reason to question Pakistan's deal with the tribal leaders and considerable evidence that it has helped the enemy. It is hard to say whether this AP story in the NY Times is evidence of Pakistan responding to the criticism or attempting to look like it is.

Police acting on a tip raided several militant hide-outs in southwestern Pakistan and arrested 48 suspected Taliban who had arrived in small groups from Afghanistan, police said Saturday.

The arrests were made during the past 24 hours in Quetta, the capital of southwestern Baluchistan province, said Wazir Khan, the city police chief.

However, no important Taliban figures were among the detainees, he said. They were being questioned to determine the purpose of their presence in Pakistan.

...

The last quoted paragraph may say something about the sincerity of the Pakistan effort. What the story does not say is whether the tribal leaders were responsible for the information leading to the arrest or whether the arrest show the tribal leaders are in violation of their agreement.

[Jedburgh]

USIP, Oct 06: Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the neighboring regions would all benefit from a recognized open border between the two countries. Such a border would clarify that all Pashtuns have rights as citizens of one or another state and would enable them to communicate, trade, and develop both their economy and their culture in cooperation with one another. Such a settlement would strengthen democracy in both states and facilitate both Pakistan’s access to Central Asia and Afghanistan’s access to the sea. It would lessen domestic ethnic tensions and strengthen national unity in both states. It would, however, require difficult internal changes in both countries, a reversal of the hostility that has predominated in relations between the two governments for sixty years, and credible international guarantees.

A major challenge to such objectives is the Islamist insurgency on both sides of the border. In 2005 Musharraf responded to charges that the Taliban were engaging in cross-border activity by proposing to fence and mine the Durand Line, a solution reminiscent of the policies of Israel and Uzbekistan. As in Central Asia and the Middle East, such a solution will not work for many reasons. International political and military officials in Afghanistan, as well as counterinsurgency experts, agree that the key to strategic success is disrupting the Taliban’s command and control, mainly in Quetta and Waziristan, not wasting resources on the impossible task of blocking infiltration by easily replaceable foot soldiers across snow-capped mountains and trackless deserts. Fencing would further isolate the border region and create an additional obstacle to its economic development.