The Taliban collection (2006 onwards)

[Steve Blair]

Wouldn't the religious and tribal aspects of the Taliban make using a communist model problematic? Any similar patterns from the current conflict and the Talibans actions vs the SU and after the SU withdrawal? I would trust those models more personally.
Reed

I don't know that you can write off the Giap/Ho model as being simply a communistic model. While the leadership was certainly communist, the framework proved pretty flexible. That and the model itself could be easily lifted and modified to follow any number of settings and/or ideologies. I tend to think it's a mistake to assume that any model is automatically restricted based on the ideology of either those who created it or the leanings of the most famous practitioner. Restrictions or limitations based on social organization (i.e., the Cuban model or aspects of the National Socialist strategy) make more sense to me.

[Van]

Earlier models of insurgency spend a great deal of time building and preserving a cell structure while establishing a shadow government, a (semi-)legitimate political front, and eventually creating 'no-go' areas within the region. There has to be some form of sanctuary (historically geographical, and often in a different sovereign region) from the beginning, and usually external financial and material support.

AQ has written a new script. Their public statements assert that their plan is that

"NO one should feel safe without submitting to Islam, and those who refuse to submit must pay a high price. The Islamist movement must aim to turn the world into a series of "wildernesses" where only those under jihadi rule enjoy security."

, Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, in "Governance in the Wilderness". Rather than methodicly building up their capabilities, they are trying to disrupt their opponents and move in to the security void. They are not bothering with much in the way of a legitimate political front in the system (like Sinn Fein), but establishing a new political system in vacuums (like the Taliban). Much of this is done exploiting 'wannabes', viral disemination of TTPs, and rather than doing things themselves, encouraging others to do things for them.

What has stayed the same; the need for sanctuaries (although some aspects of traditional sanctuaries have migrated into the internet), and the need for financial and material support. Zakat (Islamic charitable donations mandated by the Koran) is a natural source of income, as they sell themselves as a "holy" cause, and historically, terrorists routinely use conventional crime as income source. I'm not saying AQ is in the opium business, but they would surely be tempted by it, and if their not in it, the 'good Muslims' in the trade have to make Zakat somewhere... Of course, there are many illicit and profitable trafficks in Central Asia, one of the more novel ones being the smuggling of birds of prey.

I think the AQ model is well suited to a theologically based movement, which explains the departure from the traditional models which were ideologically and politically based.

[Cavguy]

Earlier models of insurgency spend a great deal of time building and preserving a cell structure while establishing a shadow government, a (semi-)legitimate political front, and eventually creating 'no-go' areas within the region. There has to be some form of sanctuary (historically geographical, and often in a different sovereign region) from the beginning, and usually external financial and material support.

AQ has written a new script. Their public statements assert that their plan is that , Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, in "Governance in the Wilderness". Rather than methodicly building up their capabilities, they are trying to disrupt their opponents and move in to the security void. They are not bothering with much in the way of a legitimate political front in the system (like Sinn Fein), but establishing a new political system in vacuums (like the Taliban). Much of this is done exploiting 'wannabes', viral disemination of TTPs, and rather than doing things themselves, encouraging others to do things for them.

What has stayed the same; the need for sanctuaries (although some aspects of traditional sanctuaries have migrated into the internet), and the need for financial and material support. Zakat (Islamic charitable donations mandated by the Koran) is a natural source of income, as they sell themselves as a "holy" cause, and historically, terrorists routinely use conventional crime as income source. I'm not saying AQ is in the opium business, but they would surely be tempted by it, and if their not in it, the 'good Muslims' in the trade have to make Zakat somewhere... Of course, there are many illicit and profitable trafficks in Central Asia, one of the more novel ones being the smuggling of birds of prey.

I think the AQ model is well suited to a theologically based movement, which explains the departure from the traditional models which were ideologically and politically based.

Van,

Great analysis, the kind I was looking for. As to your last - is AQI theology that different in its objective than say communist theology? Insurgents have often said military salvation comes from political conversion of the masses, what new aspect does Talibanistic Islam add to the mix over any other ideology?

Niel

[Van]

is AQI theology that different in its objective than say communist theology? Insurgents have often said military salvation comes from political conversion of the masses, what new aspect does Talibanistic Islam add to the mix over any other ideology?

Ya' know, the moment I mashed the 'post' button, I had a feeling this would come up.

The short answer is that under communist (or any other political ideology), when you're dead, you're dead. Under a Christian or Jewish theological ideology, there's an after-life, but suicide is a ticket right to the bottom of the eternal cludgie.

With the taliban's flavor of Islam, the desire to live is sinful if it doesn't expressly support Jihad. And if a young man dies in Jihad, his chances for finding romance improve dramaticly. Normally, I'm all about fighting an enemy who is ready to die for his cause, we have the same endstate in mind. These guys take it all the way around the bend.

[Hacksaw]

Van,

I can see your point as it pertains to the pointy end of the spear, but I'd argue we just be talkin' tactics with regard to the differences.

[Van]

Hacksaw,
The strategies are fundamentally different. In classic insurgency, you build up a structure in an environment controlled by an existing political structure; AQ's new model is to undermine an existing structure with a barely coordinated/semi-viral organization until it collapses, then move in. At first glance the AQ seems nihilistic, but the apparent nihilism is step 1... At this level, one major difference is that most historic insurgencies had a political campaign but that is optional for Islamic based insurgency, as they do not distinguish between matters of religion and matters of politics.

Islamic aspirations to Caliphate are their 'supreme ultimate' under divine guidance, where communist ideologues were at best useful-idiot true believers. Given that the communist followers were under the impression that they were fighting for workers, equality, etc, there was common ground to undercut the ideology through negotiation. AQ does not allow that; convert and accept the caliphate, or die.

[Hacksaw]

Van,

Are we talking of the Taliban in AFG, or are we talking AQ and some sort of "global insurgency"? You seem to float between the two.
I know the two are related in some ways but they are not synonymous.

To characterize the AQ ideology (movement if you want) writ large as a Global insurgency would seem to stretch the definition of insurgency beyond its useful purpose. AQ is most at odds with the muslim world most of all. It seeks a fundamental revival that it sees as only possible with the removal of western influence.

Taliban is fighting the newly constituted government, it serves the purposes of AQ, but it can more properly be characterized as an insurgency. However, I don't see why we would deem people who blow themselves up as some new form of insurgency. Rather tactics, despicable in the sense that individuals are manipulated in such a way and certainly a difficult tactical challenge, but don't see how it fundamentally changes the way we think about COIN