The Taliban collection (2006 onwards)

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for this report, note the source is the Taliban's website and maybe not a place to visit:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....r-died-in.html

An alternative website is:http://jihadology.net/2012/02/13/new...-allah-akhond/

Opening paragraph:

The Taliban yesterday confirmed that its former defence minister....Shaheed Mullah Obaidullah Akhond ... during the Islamic Emirate had died nearly two years ago in a Pakistani prison. Their website says that he was detained on 3 January 2007 by the Pakistani government in Balochistan, but that little was heard from him after that. Only in the last few days did his family receive news from Pakistan that he died in prison in Karachi due to "heart complications" on 5 March 2010.

Closing paragraph:

Was he seen by the Pakistanis as one of the old guard around Mullah Omar, whose outlook did not suit Pakistani interests any longer? Although he was one of those who began to reorganise the Taliban once it had fled into exile in Pakistan, it is possible that he favoured negotiations to end the conflict. He was close to Mullah Barodar, who was also arrested by the Pakistanis, some say because Barodar was also in favour of negotiations with the Karzai regime. If his death was natural why was it covered up by the Pakistanis for so long? Any more information would be appreciated.

This is all very odd IMO. Whose jail? I understand ISI has it's own custody facilities. Why no leaked news? The questions are plenty. Answers few.

Makes one wonder if recent negotiations, which included his release along with others, led to the family being notified. Hardly likely to endear ISI to the Taliban or was he just a casualty of war?

[Dayuhan]

I think one of the things the last ten years has re-taught us is that popularity is largely irrelevant in the wider case (especially of the sort done by polling firms in war zones), though certainly it can sway individuals - what is more important is control, either through military coercion or overriding popular legitimacy.

I'd think a simple calculation of who's most likely to win would trump either popularity or attempts at control. Nobody wants to be one of those who supported the losing side when the dust settles, for good reason... so people will stay on the fence, try to avoid antagonizing any armed force in their neighborhood, and lean toward whoever they think will win. Survival is a powerful motivator.

[Cavguy]

All,

An interesting conversation was started in my workspace, and I'm interested in the opinion of the larger community.

What insurgent strategy is the Taliban using currently? Some argue that they are using classic Maoist Protracted Popular War, others a vague neo-Maoist approach, a subversive approach or others.

I am currently leaning to a modern version of a Maoist insurgent model from my readings, but defer to the community's expertise.

If we understand their strategy, we can perhaps combat them a little more effectively.

[Steve Blair]

From what I've read and seen (granted from a sideline view) I'd say they were using a variation of the Mao strategy, with heavy overtones of Ho and Giap thrown in for good measure. Just my opinion, of course.

[reed11b]

From what I've read and seen (granted from a sideline view) I'd say they were using a variation of the Mao strategy, with heavy overtones of Ho and Giap thrown in for good measure. Just my opinion, of course.

Wouldn't the religious and tribal aspects of the Taliban make using a communist model problematic? Any similar patterns from the current conflict and the Talibans actions vs the SU and after the SU withdrawal? I would trust those models more personally.
Reed

[Entropy]

To paraphrase a famous quote, "all insurgency is local." I would argue, therefore, that there is more than one strategy being implemented, depending on the region. I haven't followed Afghanistan closely for a few months now, but it seems to me there is quite a difference between the strategy in the N2K region and down south (Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan) to give one example. I won't pretend to know enough about insurgency theory to try to fit each piece into a particular model, so I'll leave that to others to hash out

[Steve Blair]

Wouldn't the religious and tribal aspects of the Taliban make using a communist model problematic? Any similar patterns from the current conflict and the Talibans actions vs the SU and after the SU withdrawal? I would trust those models more personally.
Reed

I don't know that you can write off the Giap/Ho model as being simply a communistic model. While the leadership was certainly communist, the framework proved pretty flexible. That and the model itself could be easily lifted and modified to follow any number of settings and/or ideologies. I tend to think it's a mistake to assume that any model is automatically restricted based on the ideology of either those who created it or the leanings of the most famous practitioner. Restrictions or limitations based on social organization (i.e., the Cuban model or aspects of the National Socialist strategy) make more sense to me.

[Van]

Earlier models of insurgency spend a great deal of time building and preserving a cell structure while establishing a shadow government, a (semi-)legitimate political front, and eventually creating 'no-go' areas within the region. There has to be some form of sanctuary (historically geographical, and often in a different sovereign region) from the beginning, and usually external financial and material support.

AQ has written a new script. Their public statements assert that their plan is that

"NO one should feel safe without submitting to Islam, and those who refuse to submit must pay a high price. The Islamist movement must aim to turn the world into a series of "wildernesses" where only those under jihadi rule enjoy security."

, Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, in "Governance in the Wilderness". Rather than methodicly building up their capabilities, they are trying to disrupt their opponents and move in to the security void. They are not bothering with much in the way of a legitimate political front in the system (like Sinn Fein), but establishing a new political system in vacuums (like the Taliban). Much of this is done exploiting 'wannabes', viral disemination of TTPs, and rather than doing things themselves, encouraging others to do things for them.

What has stayed the same; the need for sanctuaries (although some aspects of traditional sanctuaries have migrated into the internet), and the need for financial and material support. Zakat (Islamic charitable donations mandated by the Koran) is a natural source of income, as they sell themselves as a "holy" cause, and historically, terrorists routinely use conventional crime as income source. I'm not saying AQ is in the opium business, but they would surely be tempted by it, and if their not in it, the 'good Muslims' in the trade have to make Zakat somewhere... Of course, there are many illicit and profitable trafficks in Central Asia, one of the more novel ones being the smuggling of birds of prey.

I think the AQ model is well suited to a theologically based movement, which explains the departure from the traditional models which were ideologically and politically based.

[davidbfpo]

The Kings of War wbsite (Wars Studies Dept, Kings College, London) also poses a similar question:

It cites this Canadian article, on a recent ambush: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servl.../TPStory/Front and a previous comment (again Canadian): http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2008...-out-land-ish/

My own view from this armchair is that the Taliban are relying on wearing down foriegn support for the Afghan government, following the tactics used to end the USSR's support.

davidbfpo

[Hacksaw]

First, I know I'm not supposed to think the enemy is stupid, but in this case they do seem a bit scitzo...

Anyhow, we can parse it out a little....

Political Wing - used to have one, do they still... yes but underdeveloped and largely underground

External support - yes at least in the form of sanctuary in the FATA, but not a nation-state and it doesn't confer legitimacy accept perhaps amongst Pashtuns... so yes but limited

Focus of attacks on AFG and Coalition forces and infrastructure - IO directed at populace

My SWAG is Phase II protracted, with a goal of transitioning to a subversive strategy but not able to position candidates to win / assume seats of government.

I shall return to building pretty slides boss

[Rex Brynen]

What insurgent strategy is the Taliban using currently?

I'm not sure how useful it is to try to understand Taliban strategy in terms of other doctrines—it is rather like asking whether US COIN strategy in Afghanistan is "Russian" or "Israeli."

I think that its a safe assumption that 95-99% of Taliban commanders have never read Mao, Giap, Lenin, Trotsky, Guevara, or Carlos Marighella (etc)--or, for that matter Saint Carl or Sun Tzu. Rather, their strategy and tactics arise fundamentally from the interaction of local social and geophysical conditions, weapons availability, experience with the Soviet occupation and civil war, and more recent learning. There is a real risk of miscasting its strengths, weaknesses, foundations, and implications if understood in other terms.

They will have "read" Muhammad—some aspects of the Prophet's rise to power in Arabia have some insurgent overtones in the early period. However, I wouldn't read much into this, given the very, very, very great differences.

Second, there are some key differences in fighting against an external occupier (as seen in Taliban eyes) and seeking to overthrow a rival domestic power, especially around the way in which one casts issues of legitimacy. (Of course, it depends on whether one is looking at CCP strategy in the 1937-45 period, or 1945-49).

Third, the Taliban probably suffers from far less unity of effort and command than did the CCP.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have to agree with Rex that this is not a popular uprising in the Maoist sense. My limited experience in the south and west indicated the average "man on the street" did not like the Taliban any better than they liked the coalition. This is a power struggle by a minority group not a mass popular uprising.

I will go one step further and suggest that to try to use any COIN doctrine outside the two major cities may be a mistake or at least a waisted effort. Certainly you must fight remembering that the ultimate goal is a stable pro-coalition government in place (i.e. don't randomly kill civilians, don't use airpower or artillery when you can do the same job with a more precision tools, don't appear to the locals that your life is worth any more than theirs is). We can certainly loose the war that way but I don't think that you will defeat the Taliban through attempts to win the hearts and minds of the average villager with a well or a road. I think you are going to have to defeat them by crushing, overwhelming force directed against the Taliban leadership.

[Norfolk]

In the sense that the Taleban (at least in certain areas of the country, first in parts of the South, and now parts of the East as well) like to build up over time from small guerrilla bands to pseudo-conventional light infantry companies and battalions, then I agree with Cavguy and Steve that they are following a hybrid Maoist/Vietnamese pattern, though in the manner in which they gain and maintain local support, they seem to follow more along the lines of the VC (I use these terms only in a loose sense). For some reason, the Taleban sometimes like to go big when they have amassed the means to do so. Strategically and operationally, of course, they are all about winning the Information War; but tactically, they like to have the capability (though employing that capability somewhat judiciously) to go toe-to-toe, mano-a-mano with their enemy.

Up to a point; if they are restricting themselves to company-level attacks, and no higher, they may well win this war by continuing to avoid physical destruction while still being able to disperse easily enough to control the population while concentrating quickly enough to inflict the death of a thousand paper cuts on the will of NATO countries. I think they may have learned at Second Panjwai in 2006 that operating much above company-level would be too costly and lead to repeated setbacks. Going no higher than company-level lets them elude detection and destruction while still marshalling enough fighting power to do real damage, politically as well as tactically, at their chosen time and place. And to continue growing in strength.

[reed11b]

I have to agree with Rex that this is not a popular uprising in the Maoist sense. My limited experience in the south and west indicated the average "man on the street" did not like the Taliban any better than they liked the coalition. This is a power struggle by a minority group not a mass popular uprising.

I will go one step further and suggest that to try to use any COIN doctrine outside the two major cities may be a mistake or at least a waisted effort. Certainly you must fight remembering that the ultimate goal is a stable pro-coalition government in place (i.e. don't randomly kill civilians, don't use airpower or artillery when you can do the same job with a more precision tools, don't appear to the locals that your life is worth any more than theirs is). We can certainly loose the war that way but I don't think that you will defeat the Taliban through attempts to win the hearts and minds of the average villager with a well or a road. I think you are going to have to defeat them by crushing, overwhelming force directed against the Taliban leadership.

I would have to disagree almost 100%. What leadership are you going to strike at? Taliban is fueled by out-of-power tribes, not by a charasmatic leadership with over-arching goals AFAIK. COIN may be exactly the way to beat them since while unpopular, they are still funded by "taxing" the countryside. Create security for the countryside, and you sap their support. Find a way to get the disaffected tribes to "buy in" the Kazari goverment and you sap there manpower. The question then is, how the heck do you do that? Wish I had an idea, but I do not.
Reed

[reed11b]

Curmudgeon, I do agree with your assesment and observations, just not with your stated course of action. Hope that helps clarify.
Reed

[William F. Owen]

What insurgent strategy is the Taliban using currently? Some argue that they are using classic Maoist Protracted Popular War, others a vague neo-Maoist approach, a subversive approach or others.

I am currently leaning to a modern version of a Maoist insurgent model from my readings, but defer to the community's expertise.

If we understand their strategy, we can perhaps combat them a little more effectively.

Probably not Maoist. Back in the 1990's Ahmad Shah Massoud met with an Australian Journalist who had stuided Mao's writings in China in the 1970's.

(I know the guy and he knows more about Maoist insurgency philosophy than anyone I have ever met.)

He wanted to use the Maoist model against the Taliban. It failed early on because basically, Confucian constructs do not work in Afghan culture.

Why? I really couldn't tell you but I know a man that can.

[carl]

I wonder the right question is being asked. Perhaps we should be asking what insurgent strategy the ISI is currently using?

If the ISI is trying to run the same game on us they ran on the Russians, I don't think there is an ultimate goal beyond Afghanistan in chaos and most any strategy will do.

[reed11b]

I wonder the right question is being asked. Perhaps we should be asking what insurgent strategy the ISI is currently using?

If the ISI is trying to run the same game on us they ran on the Russians, I don't think there is an ultimate goal beyond Afghanistan in chaos and most any strategy will do.

I find myself nodding my head in agreement. But what are our options w/ Pak? Any funding we pull out the Chinese will be more then happy to replace. Supporting India would do little to help us in A-stan, and other neighbours are either outright hostile (Iran) or have such limited infrastructure as to be of limited assistance. Not being defeatist, just admitting I have no idea what could be done. I would love to hear ideas on this.
Reed

[carl]

Ultimately, the Pakistanis will have to realize the wishes of the ISI are probably not to the long term benefit of the country. They are the ones who will have to reign them in, or reign the military in, or both. Apparently, much of what drives them is the perceived need to confront India, Kashmir, revenge for past defeats etc; and a weak Afghanistan is a flank they won't have to worry about. So somehow, there has to be a change in that attitude. How we can effect that, I haven't a clue.

It has to be done somehow though because if the de-facto sanctuary that exists in Pakistan isn't removed, I don't see how we can win in Afghanistan.

[120mm]

http://pakobserver.net/200905/01/news/topstories04.asp

Afghan insurgents delink from Taliban
Akhtar Jamal

Islamabad—Afghan insurgents known as “Talilban” are apparently disassociating themselves from more brutal Taliban militants in Pakistan and have even stopped calling themselves as Taliban.

A close study of statements issued by Afghan Taliban showed that for some time they have ceased using the word Taliban and have began calling themselves as “Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”

According to area experts the move is apparently designed to de-link with brutal Taliban who are getting highly unpopular due to recent atrocious moves and horrifying killings of kidnapped prisoners.

Afghan experts saye that Mullah Omar and his close acquaintances had more than once denounced any action inside Pakistan and had ordered concentration only against “occupation foreign forces.”

More at the link. Very interesting development, and frankly, one I'd expected long before this. Very few places in A-stan are the Taliban well-loved.