The Taliban collection (2006 onwards)

[davidbfpo]

The Soufan Group's contribution:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrie...e-of-khorasan/

[davidbfpo]

Today there's a variety of commentaries after the Taliban finally announce their leader died sometime ago, two years maybe and in a presumably comfortable villa in a Pakistani city, Quetta and Karachi being mentioned.

A selection made by Shashank Joshi (RUSI):https://shashankjoshi.wordpress.com/...r-mullah-omar/

He includes IMHO the best expert, Michael Semple:http://www.politico.eu/article/the-m...stan-politics/

The Soufan Group:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrie...f-mullah-omar/

On Twitter Ali Soufan pointedly remarked so much for technical intelligence, Mullah Omar has been dead for two years and oh for a reliable human source.

This the thread on Afghan politics, which includes talking to the Taliban (by the Afghan state and IIRC ISAF):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=21567

There is an older thread just on the Taliban:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5299

Just what it means for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Taliban is a moot point.

[davidbfpo]

Hardly a surprise that WaPo reports:

In early 2011, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta confronted the president of Pakistan with a disturbing piece of intelligence. The spy agency had learned that #Mohammad Omar, the Taliban leader who had become one of the world’s most wanted fugitives after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, was being treated at a hospital in southern Pakistan. The American spy chief even identified the facility — the Aga Khan University Hospital in Karachi....

Link:https://www.washingtonpost.com/world...0ee_story.html

[davidbfpo]

It must be the week to say leaders are dead:

Chief of the Haqqani militant network and father of Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jaluluddin Haqqani, died almost a year ago of natural causes and was buried in Afghan province of Khost, according to reliable sources among the Afghan Taliban.While news of Jalaluddin Haqqani's death had been making rounds for almost a month now, multiple credible sources in Taliban confirmed today that he had died of illness almost a year ago.
The militant group has not officially given out a statement over Haqqani's demise yet.
Sources, however, say Sirajudin Haqqani, Jalaluddin's son, has been running the militant network for over a year now, ever since his father's illness.

Link:http://www.dawn.com/news/1197598/jal...aliban-sources

The Haqqani group was (is) noted as a very capable insurgent group and were loyal to Mullah Omar. Their name appears on many threads and there is an old (2011) RFI thread on them:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10387

[omarali50]

so the multibillion dollar intelligence agencies of the West did not know this till yesterday? isnt that interesting?

[davidbfpo]

A column by an Indian SME and ex-RAW insider. The full title being:

Don’t Blame The ISI
It didn’t create the Taliban. The elected government of Pakistan did

Link:http://indianexpress.com/article/opi...blame-the-isi/

It starts:

Some commentators have described the late General Hamid Gul as the father of the Taliban. Gul was no doubt the most virulent anti-Indian face among all ISI chiefs.
But it is not true that he created the Taliban, which was the brainchild of General Naseerullah Babar, Benazir Bhutto’s interior minister during her second tenure as prime minister (1993-96). Benazir did not trust the ISI. She tried to cut it down to size by firing Gul during her first tenure (1988-1990) for the ISI’s failure to oversee mujahideen operations to capture Jalalabad after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal.

[davidbfpo]

[120mm]

I'm not sure if this will link correctly here, but both Abdur Rahman Khan and the Soviets understood geopolitical reality.

Abdur Rahman Khan resettled Pashtuns in key areas where they a) conducted genocide and ethnic cleansing against the Hazara and b) provided a presence in every district, which lines were redrawn to provide "divide and conquer" in geographically defensible areas.

The Soviets attacked the drainage basins to depopulate these areas and drive them into more easily managed cities.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/afgha...spock-articles

Headwaters in the Central Highlands

Rivers always have relevance, but that significance varies based on their geographic context. In countries like Colombia, for example, many rivers are navigable and serve as transportation avenues through or around physical barriers. In countries like Afghanistan they are the opposite; the rivers there are the physical barriers to movement. Their importance, however, is indisputable in regard to agriculture, which directly relates to Afghanistan’s (ethnic) population distribution, peoples’ livelihoods, resource use, and the country’s overall (in)stability.

That a significant number of major rivers have headwaters in the higher elevations of the country’s Central Highlands—in Bamyan, western Maidan Wardak, and western Ghazni Provinces—in proximity to each other often escapes attention. Control over this area, at least in theory, would allow control over Afghanistan’s lifeblood, if the group who controls it is powerful enough. Hence, this is an important issue when considered in the context of ethnic politics and regional stability.

More at the link.

[SWJ Blog]

Afghan Officials: Islamic State Fighters Finding Sanctuary in Afghanistan

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

A lengthy article by Professor Theo Farrell, ex-Kings War Studies, partly based on his first-hand research with ISAF and the Taliban. IT appears on WoTR from an affiliated website.

He opens with:

Insurgencies are famously difficult to defeat, yet the Afghan Taliban have proven especially so. Accounts of Taliban resilience have focused on both the deficiencies of Western efforts and the Afghan state and on Pakistani support for the Taliban. These accounts fail, however, to reveal the full picture of how the Taliban have been able to survive. Drawing on original field research, this article explores how the Taliban’s success has been shaped by factors internal to the insurgency, namely, the social resources that sustain it and the group’s ability to adapt militarily.

(He ends with) In the end, ramping up the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan risks reenergizing the Taliban’s sense of purpose and uniting a movement that may be beginning to unravel. If the United States is not careful, it could end up bombing its way to defeat in Afghanistan.

Link:https://tnsr.org/2018/05/unbeatable-...fghan-taliban/

[davidbfpo]

This post will be cross-posted in the thread on ANSF performance.

A report from the probably independent Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) on the recent attack on Farah city. It opens with:

An attack on Farah city had long been feared. For years now, the Taleban have been taking control of the provincial capital’s outlying districts and inching their way towards the central hub. For a few days in mid-May, it looked as though the Taleban were about to take Farah city, which would have been their most significant military triumph since capturing Kunduz for two weeks in 2015. Their strategy of consolidating control over rural areas then digging in at a provincial centre’s outskirts before launching an attack appears to be an increasing trend. While they lost the battle in Farah on this occasion, the Taleban still pose a serious threat to the area. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig together with Ali Mohammad Sabawoon, Rohullah Soroush and Obaid Ali unpack the attack and its aftermath.
This is the first of two dispatches examining the recent attack on the city of Farah. This first dispatch focuses on the attack and its aftermath. The second contextualises the attack in light of post-2001 developments in Farah.

It ends with:

With regards to Farah, the fact that the Taleban were only pushed back to positions just outside the provincial capital from where they started their attack means that new attacks can be expected. Farah is only one example for a situation that prevails in at least a quarter of Afghanistan’s provinces.

Link:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org...e-for-farah-i/

[davidbfpo]

Long ago Pakistan detained a significant Afghan Taliban figure, although some contest his importance and via Twitter there is a story:

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, co-founder of the Afghan Taliban, popularly known as “Mulla Baradar” has been finally released from jail in Pakistan.

Link:https://www.thenews.com.pk/amp/38384...-from-pak-jail

He was detained in 2010, alas the posts about this cannot be found - the search function fails.

[davidbfpo]

Spotted via Twitter yesterday:

Taliban insurgents have detonated a powerful bomb near a major military base in Afghanistan's southern Kandahar province, killing at least five soldiers and wounding six others.

The attack happened Tuesday night in the volatile Maiwand district, where Taliban rebels dug a two-kilometer tunnel into the Afghan National Army base and planted the explosives. A security official requesting anonymity confirmed the details to VOA on Wednesday.

A Taliban spokesman, Qari Yousaf Ahmadi, claimed its "tactical explosion flattened" the army base and killed at least 40 security forces, though insurgent claims are often inflated.

Link:https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-tu...k/4725499.html and a little on:https://www.rferl.org/a/five-afghan-.../29688268.html

I don't recall previous attacks using this approach; a tactic that requires skill, patience and dedication IMHO. Hence a new thread.

Note there are some recent posts on underground warfare between Israel and it's enemies on the IDF thread.

[Bill Moore]

Spotted via Twitter yesterday:
Link:https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-tu...k/4725499.html and a little on:https://www.rferl.org/a/five-afghan-.../29688268.html

I don't recall previous attacks using this approach; a tactic that requires skill, patience and dedication IMHO. Hence a new thread.

Note there are some recent posts on underground warfare between Israel and it's enemies on the IDF thread.

David,

Tunneling as a military tactic has been around for a while, but this is the first time I recall the Taliban using it.

See: https://spartacus-educational.com/FWWtunnelling.htm

On the Western Front during the First World War, the military employed specialist miners to dig tunnels under No Man's Land. The main objective was to place mines beneath enemy defensive positions. When it was detonated, the explosion would destroy that section of the trench. The infantry would then advance towards the enemy front-line hoping to take advantage of the confusion that followed the explosion of an underground mine.

Soldiers in the trenches developed different strategies to discover enemy tunnelling. One method was to drive a stick into the ground and hold the other end between the teeth and feel any underground vibrations. Another one involved sinking a water-filled oil drum into the floor of the trench. The soldiers then took it in turns to lower an ear into the water to listen for any noise being made by tunnellers.

There are some documentaries online the topic if you do a search. The U.S. Army is beginning to identify subterranean as its own domain, one we need to learn to operate in and hopefully dominate.

[davidbfpo]

An update, even slightly optimistic, on the talks involving the Taliban; citing an ICG expert:

This has the potential to start the first serious peace process to end one of the biggest wars in the world. It’s monumental news, but we’re still at the early stages...We know the agreement has four parts: ceasefire, counter-terrorism, troop withdrawal, and intra-Afghan negotiations. Sequencing and timelines remain tricky.

Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...e-breakthrough

[omarali50]

An update, even slightly optimistic, on the talks involving the Taliban; citing an ICG expert:
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...e-breakthrough

I had a few random (very pedestrian and expected) thoughts on this topic https://www.brownpundits.com/2019/02...exit-to-chaos/

[Bill Moore]

I had a few random (very pedestrian and expected) thoughts on this topic https://www.brownpundits.com/2019/02...exit-to-chaos/

Based on general principles I think you basically nailed it.

Without knowing ANYTHING about the various layers of secret planning and execution going on right now, just on general principles (losers donÂ’t get to dictate terms, winners are not bound by promises they made, Trump is an ignorant conman, etc) this is not going to end well. There WILL be blood.

Beyond the obvious corruption on the US side there is the issue of ideological incompetence; the US is neither a capable imperial power, nor an innocent spectator with no interest in meddling in far away countries. And somehow its processes are so designed that it is easier to waste a 100 billion per year than it is to sit back and figure out what the aims are, where the carrots and sticks are most likely to work and now to apply them.

Our problem is not staying power, few nations can match the U.S.'s political will, means, and endurance to commit to enduring conflicts like these. I know the common misperception is we don't have staying power, but show me another nation that intervenes in the affairs of other nations with the tenacity that we do?

I find it hard to imagine that this could end up as a US “win”. As a US citizen, I will be happy if it does, but I am not holding my breath.

I think our President could use some mentoring on leadership. Sometimes a bitter pill goes down a lot easier with the right words. Not everyone can be a Churchill or Regan, but no one should spew out national security policy decisions by Twitter. This behavior is absurd for a national leader. He needs to understand the sacrifice thousands of Americans and our allies have made in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Then it will become clear he owes those who sacrificed more than a policy by Tweet. He owes them an explanation and his sincere gratitude for their sacrifice. The blame for the poorly conceived policy does not belong to those doing the fighting.

The President’s instincts may be right. Withdrawing may well be the right decision since all these adventures were in pursuit of unrealistic policy aims that wasted trillions of dollars. This great distraction (I’ll clarify) and diversion of resources allowed more serious threats to our nation to expand elsewhere. I now question LTG McMaster’s claim the answer to our problems (for terrorism) is not the 0’Dark Thirty response. Maybe it is the best response to prevent attacks on the homeland. You kill those planning to execute without committing a tremendous amount of resources to transform foreign cultures. Gen Mattis’s claim we have to build while we fight should also be suspect. This approach resulted in significant mission creep, a creep that exceeded our means and accomplished little. This is what I mean by distraction and diversion of resources. We should have, a should continue to employ forces to kill al-Qaeda and ISIS. I know the counter-argument, what happens if you leave? We’re leaving and whatever facade of stability we think we created will probably fall apart anyway. At the end of the day, the locals have to sort out the power arrangements.

There is a very uncomfortable moral hazard associated with pulling out. I don’t think there is a way to withdraw without pulling the rug out from our partners feet. They put everything at risk to support us on the assumption we would stand by their side. With our current immigration policies and bitterly divided political parties, it is unlikely we will offer them an alternative home. Once again we face with no good options, just less bad ones. On the bright side, this could be a catalyst to bring our political parties together when it comes to foreign policy. What principles we stand for as Americans seemed to be increasingly questioned around the world, and maybe within our own borders. We need Congress to perform its balancing role more than ever.