Next Small War

[Robal2pl]

I have a question : what is Your opinion about situation in former USSR?
I think that possible areas of confilct (includnig small wars) in western part of former USSR are :
1)Baltic States : conflict beetwen russian minrity and Latvian/Lithuanian/Estonian majority
2) Belarussia : the confilct is possible when Lukaszenko regime will fail or his leadershib will be close to end
3) Ukraine : I think tahat state of crisis can occur. pepole can be dissapointed after "Orange Revolution" , because current leadership is not able to solve basic problems. Also, Russia will support pro-Moscow political groups (mostly in DonBas industrial area) wich can lead even to civil war. (there was such possibility year ago)


Robal2pl

[zenpundit]

I think the chances for widening conflict are far greater in the Transcaucasian region and Southern Russia. Too many micronationalities in Daghestan and Georgia who can be agitated into taking up arms - Ossetians, Ingush, Kalmyks, Abkhazians, Mingrelians...

I would not rule out clashes within Ukraine though between nationalistic, Uniate, Western Ukrainians and Eastern, Orthodox, Russophile Ukranians being egged on by local nomenklatura-mafias

[GorTex6]

Venezuela prepairing to wage 4GW against the US

[Strickland]

Venezuela prepairing to wage 4GW against the US

My original post on this thread asserted that Chavez's Venezuela could be the scene of a Small War in the future. With sympathetic segments or organizations in Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, and Nicaragua, Chavez could become a larger threat or irritant than Castro ever was to us in the past. He could also enable a dying Castro to try to fulfill his revolutionary desires with one last gamble in Central or South America.

[M. J. Dougherty]

ALCON,
Thanks for the outstanding feedback! Currently I am working on a thesis that the "chaos" stategy of Jemaah Islamiyah in SE Asia is to achieve victory by denying us decisive victory. How? In my opinion, one of the more important lessons of Korea and Vietnam for potential U.S. adversaries is that the average American is not interested in fighting a war without a clear moral issue- a pure cause that will justify the bloodshed & destruction of major sustained combat operations that result in decisive victory, defeated and complient enemy, and a American interests clearly achieved.
JI is employing a strategy that leverages inherent instabilities of the SEA reagion to maintain a relatively high level of violence and social discord. When opportunities (such as the tsunami, Mollukus, the '98 financial crisis) to create an environment that is difficult for a U.S.-led coalition or UN to justify a prolonged intervention to restore stability. Just look at the restricitions and risk assessments that occured in just sending the hospital ship and medical aid. As the credability and legitmacy of governments erode, capital flight destroys the economy and countries collapse bring even more social upheaval and violent competition.
In a grand strategic sense, SEA is just as important if not more so to U.S. long-term interests as the Mid-East oil. More than 60% of maritime shipping passes trought the Straites of Mulacca; Korea & Japan get 80% of their oil through here; China's oil consuption needs are expected to increas 40% by 2015 and they need to secure this route as well; one-third of the world computers are maunufactered here and over half the worlds computer chips, the list goes on ad naseum.
A hostile entity (Islamic Caliphate) based in Indonesia could have serious consequesnces for U.S. long-term security interests and might even spark future Chinese intervention.

[CPT Holzbach]

In my opinion, one of the more important lessons of Korea and Vietnam for potential U.S. adversaries is that the average American is not interested in fighting a war without a clear moral issue- a pure cause that will justify the bloodshed & destruction of major sustained combat operations that result in decisive victory, defeated and complient enemy, and a American interests clearly achieved.

I recommend reading an article in the Nov/Dec issue of Foreign Affairs, if you havent seen it already, entitled "The Iraq Syndrome" by John Mueller. It addresses this very issue.

[NDD]

I recommend reading an article in the Nov/Dec issue of Foreign Affairs, if you havent seen it already, entitled "The Iraq Syndrome" by John Mueller. It addresses this very issue.

Interesting. Iraq is now a "war"? This would appear to me to be purposeful mis-characterization by political elements in the US that is gaining traction.

[AdamG]

That said - Castro's death will be a wild card in this equation and most certainly draw our attention to Cuba. Anyone want to dare a call on this scenario?

I will, but first -

I find that it is hard for us to play the role of the red cell when we war game various courses of actions. I think most of us, even though we try to avoid doing so, are forced to use mirror analysis, which I define as seeing ourselves when we look at the enemy. I think we frequently assume the enemy has our values, uses western logic in his decision making (remember game’s theory?), etc. It is hard to overcome years of training indoctrination and to apply our vocabulary (our thinking tools) outside of its intended use.

Not only does our non-western enemy think about war differently, I think our non-western enemy has a distinct advantage in that there is not as much separation between the political and the military, so they understand the concept of the total war better (military is truly tied into political objectives), while I think our military is focused on staying in its lane and destroying the enemy’s fielded forces, which puts us at a distinct disadvantage.
.

Bingo! Someone gets it.

To answer the original question, we have to remember that Cuba has been suffering from a drought for the last decade, the military has been on a shoestring budget for even longer and the people have been tasting capitalism ever since tourism brought foreigners in on a regular basis.

1. Castro succumbs to old age and his brother Raul becomes a walking dead man. There is a period of mourning and much-emoting, while Raul puts the armed forces on their highest-capable war footing and warns the US against any Imperialist moves (realistically, this is as much to protect himself as to protect Cuba).

2. Chavez immediately echoes Raul's warnings, pledging all manner of aid if Cuban sovereignty is violated. Backs it up by moving F16s and/or MiG-29s to Havanna and NE Cuban coast.

3. Raul and whatever Generals are the top contenders for the throne are involved in a brief stare-down resembling the three-way climax at the end of the Good, the Bad and the Ugly. Raul dies, probably from a bomb but the majority of Cuba doesn't have a problem with it - think Ceausescu's end.

4. The Generals' factions duke it out in Havana (Chavez and China have their favorites, which may not be the same person). The wild card is the Miami families.

5. The US has to sit on it's hands, leaving Spain and Canada to be the credible peacemakers (both of which send naval units under a UN mandate). The drama in Havanna lasts for a week, after which Cuba emerges as a quasi-democracy: they like US tourist dollars, but they're not as close to Chavez as he'd like (unless by a stroke of luck 'his' guy comes out on top).

6. Donald Trump is on a flight down there before the last barrel cools. Havana vacation packages from LA, Dulles and Newark become the hottest tickets to get.