My comments here are generally outside the bounds of this thread as it was established by Boot. My comments in no way take away from the thoughtful observations and comments by the experts and knowledgeable folks contributing to this thread.

The Advisor capacity that Boot is trying to figure out is really not at all an end in itself. And the end in my mind for Boot is not a rebuilt foreign nation with strong internal defenses assisted by the American military and its advisor capacity; no, it is much less lofty than that.

Instead the end for Boot with this Advisor capacity is American ground force military involvement in the world (read; lots of boots on the ground), primarily now in the middle east, on a never-ending, existential basis. Since I imagine Boot worries about folks like me in the Army wanting to take his service back to the early 80s trying to fight world war II all over again at the Fulda Gap (which of course I am not) which in turn in his mind would mean an American Army that is hunkered down on big bases in the United States waiting to fight the big one that in his mind will never come, he therefore wants to force the American Army into building an institutionally and long-term capacity for foreign internal defense advisory. In short the Advisors for Boot are the tip of the spear which are attractive to policy makers because they offer a seductive and quick solution but Boot really has on his mind the knowledge that once you put American Army (non SF) conventional advisors on the ground you must also bring many other troops behind them to provide support. Hence the goal that Boot is looking for to be permanent American ground force engagement on foreign lands; whether or not the advisors ever rebuild the foreign nation and its army is not what is really important, it is their presence on the ground that is.

And by the way, Boot likes to throw the example of the Marines as another Boot named Max has often done in the past, to provide an example to the Army of how to do the Advisory mission and involve itself in Small Wars. Unfortunately what Boot does not tell us is the very mixed record the Marines have had in Small Wars, especially in Central America in the inter-war years; but again, considering Boot’s overall goal it doesn’t really matter how successful the Marines were during the Small Wars but the fact that they were present on the ground in a foreign land.

And one final comment which is admittedly outside the established bounds of this thread. As we discuss the topic of how to create an advisor capacity we should always keep in mind what effect creating that capacity will have on an already severely atrophied American Army.

Boot does not seemed to be too worried about the American Army fighting the "big one;" but I certainly do. And that worry ultimately is where the tension between me and Boot and the notion of an Advisory capacity lays.

Instead of focusing on the Marines moving pack-mules over the mountains in Nicaragua in the 1930s perhaps we should be paying attention to what happened to Israel Army in Lebanon in Summer 2006.

gentile