Security Force Assistance: Roles and Missions for SOF and Conventional Forces

[ODB]

I realize this is not dealing with issues at the tactical level, unfortunately through the years this is where it has started. At some point those at the top started way down the totem pole where I am today. This unwillingness to work together is not something that started when they got into upper levels, it started years before when they were at the tactical level. My statement about 6 years after some of the most combined operations in US history we are still trying to cut each others throats, applies to all levels and in many cases between all services. Someone please help me understand how it is, if I at the bottom of the pecking order can see this, how is it those above me just don't get it? I attribute a lot of this attitude to the simple fact we (SOF/conventional) do not interact in our professional/advanced schooling/development. It has to start somewhere, where better than in the school house. This goes inline with my statement regarding many forget where they came from. Yes many of us started on the conventional side, but many forget what that side is like, additionally how fast all sides change. Just because we started on the conventional side does not make us experts in planning on the use of conventional forces, especially in todays asymetrical battlefield. By integrating both SF and conventional in the school house, both stay abreast of how they are operating. Allows our brillant minds on both sides an open forum to learn from each other about each other.

As I just reread the initial posting I think we have all strayed off the orginal questions ask of us which I'm still contemplating my response.

For the forum;
-These new organizations are here to stay, what is the best way for SF to handle it?
Refuse to deal with them? Pretend like it ain’t happening?, Get on board and work with them, thereby assisting in the direction they go?, which if done right will only complement SF be it MARSOC(JMO).
-What is the best way for new organizations (Army, Navy, USAF, Marines) to go about training these individuals and teams for this type duty. In MSOAG’s case, they have to meet the SOCOM standards, but what is the best way to train “conventional” forces? Don’t they deserve first class training to prepare them for this type duty?
-I do advocate a screening process for these conventional advisors. We do it all the time in the Marine Corps for Recruiters and Drill Instructors and in the Drill Instructors case, they really weed out those who can’t cut it. I have often heard the term “Drill Instructor Mafia” used. Its almost like they are an elite force within the Marine Corps within that context. Although both Recruiter school and Drill Instructor school are very demanding, I would say Drill Instructors are better analogy because they are teachers, trainers and mentors. Believe it or not(Sorry GySgt Emery, don’t mean to shatter the myth). My point is that Drill Instructors are weeded out and have a course that does this. Plenty have been dropped, so it is possible for conventional advisor courses to do the same, different mindset but similar process.
-Where is this leading, I will point out as I have before, that many of the Officers and SNCO’s in the Marine Corps who fought and won WW I and WW II cut their teeth in these “Savage Wars of Peace”. Lots of Marines made names for themselves during the Banana Wars (Chesty Puller).
I don’t know where conventional advisors will lead and how history will look upon this, but I would love to hear others views, should conventional forces do this and move out into something that has for at least the last 40 years SF's province (as the SecDef pointed out), how do you do it and not just pay lip service and do it right?. From what I have read here there are many on this board with experience in many of these areas, love to see your views. I’ll button up now, helmet is on…

Will once again resume my position on the bottom of the pecking order, just hope one day those who haven't been there in years remember where it was they got their start

[Boot]

I realize this is not dealing with issues at the tactical level, unfortunately through the years this is where it has started. At some point those at the top started way down the totem pole where I am today. This unwillingness to work together is not something that started when they got into upper levels, it started years before when they were at the tactical level. My statement about 6 years after some of the most combined operations in US history we are still trying to cut each others throats, applies to all levels and in many cases between all services. Someone please help me understand how it is, if I at the bottom of the pecking order can see this, how is it those above me just don't get it? I attribute a lot of this attitude to the simple fact we (SOF/conventional) do not interact in our professional/advanced schooling/development. It has to start somewhere, where better than in the school house. This goes inline with my statement regarding many forget where they came from. Yes many of us started on the conventional side, but many forget what that side is like, additionally how fast all sides change. Just because we started on the conventional side does not make us experts in planning on the use of conventional forces, especially in todays asymetrical battlefield. By integrating both SF and conventional in the school house, both stay abreast of how they are operating. Allows our brillant minds on both sides an open forum to learn from each other about each other.

As I just reread the initial posting I think we have all strayed off the orginal questions ask of us which I'm still contemplating my response.



Will once again resume my position on the bottom of the pecking order, just hope one day those who haven't been there in years remember where it was they got their start

I welcome your thoughts. I do know that conventional forces within the Marine Corps will carry out this role (FID) and for the near term its here, so of course coming from someone that does this for a living is welcomed, of course all other thoughts are welcomed whether you have done it or not.

[Gian P Gentile]

My comments here are generally outside the bounds of this thread as it was established by Boot. My comments in no way take away from the thoughtful observations and comments by the experts and knowledgeable folks contributing to this thread.

The Advisor capacity that Boot is trying to figure out is really not at all an end in itself. And the end in my mind for Boot is not a rebuilt foreign nation with strong internal defenses assisted by the American military and its advisor capacity; no, it is much less lofty than that.

Instead the end for Boot with this Advisor capacity is American ground force military involvement in the world (read; lots of boots on the ground), primarily now in the middle east, on a never-ending, existential basis. Since I imagine Boot worries about folks like me in the Army wanting to take his service back to the early 80s trying to fight world war II all over again at the Fulda Gap (which of course I am not) which in turn in his mind would mean an American Army that is hunkered down on big bases in the United States waiting to fight the big one that in his mind will never come, he therefore wants to force the American Army into building an institutionally and long-term capacity for foreign internal defense advisory. In short the Advisors for Boot are the tip of the spear which are attractive to policy makers because they offer a seductive and quick solution but Boot really has on his mind the knowledge that once you put American Army (non SF) conventional advisors on the ground you must also bring many other troops behind them to provide support. Hence the goal that Boot is looking for to be permanent American ground force engagement on foreign lands; whether or not the advisors ever rebuild the foreign nation and its army is not what is really important, it is their presence on the ground that is.

And by the way, Boot likes to throw the example of the Marines as another Boot named Max has often done in the past, to provide an example to the Army of how to do the Advisory mission and involve itself in Small Wars. Unfortunately what Boot does not tell us is the very mixed record the Marines have had in Small Wars, especially in Central America in the inter-war years; but again, considering Boot’s overall goal it doesn’t really matter how successful the Marines were during the Small Wars but the fact that they were present on the ground in a foreign land.

And one final comment which is admittedly outside the established bounds of this thread. As we discuss the topic of how to create an advisor capacity we should always keep in mind what effect creating that capacity will have on an already severely atrophied American Army.

Boot does not seemed to be too worried about the American Army fighting the "big one;" but I certainly do. And that worry ultimately is where the tension between me and Boot and the notion of an Advisory capacity lays.

Instead of focusing on the Marines moving pack-mules over the mountains in Nicaragua in the 1930s perhaps we should be paying attention to what happened to Israel Army in Lebanon in Summer 2006.

gentile

[Boot]

My comments here are generally outside the bounds of this thread as it was established by Boot. My comments in no way take away from the thoughtful observations and comments by the experts and knowledgeable folks contributing to this thread.

The Advisor capacity that Boot is trying to figure out is really not at all an end in itself. And the end in my mind for Boot is not a rebuilt foreign nation with strong internal defenses assisted by the American military and its advisor capacity; no, it is much less lofty than that.

Instead the end for Boot with this Advisor capacity is American ground force military involvement in the world (read; lots of boots on the ground), primarily now in the middle east, on a never-ending, existential basis. Since I imagine Boot worries about folks like me in the Army wanting to take his service back to the early 80s trying to fight world war II all over again at the Fulda Gap (which of course I am not) which in turn in his mind would mean an American Army that is hunkered down on big bases in the United States waiting to fight the big one that in his mind will never come, he therefore wants to force the American Army into building an institutionally and long-term capacity for foreign internal defense advisory. In short the Advisors for Boot are the tip of the spear which are attractive to policy makers because they offer a seductive and quick solution but Boot really has on his mind the knowledge that once you put American Army (non SF) conventional advisors on the ground you must also bring many other troops behind them to provide support. Hence the goal that Boot is looking for to be permanent American ground force engagement on foreign lands; whether or not the advisors ever rebuild the foreign nation and its army is not what is really important, it is their presence on the ground that is.

And by the way, Boot likes to throw the example of the Marines as another Boot named Max has often done in the past, to provide an example to the Army of how to do the Advisory mission and involve itself in Small Wars. Unfortunately what Boot does not tell us is the very mixed record the Marines have had in Small Wars, especially in Central America in the inter-war years; but again, considering Boot’s overall goal it doesn’t really matter how successful the Marines were during the Small Wars but the fact that they were present on the ground in a foreign land.

And one final comment which is admittedly outside the established bounds of this thread. As we discuss the topic of how to create an advisor capacity we should always keep in mind what effect creating that capacity will have on an already severely atrophied American Army.

Boot does not seemed to be too worried about the American Army fighting the "big one;" but I certainly do. And that worry ultimately is where the tension between me and Boot and the notion of an Advisory capacity lays.

Instead of focusing on the Marines moving pack-mules over the mountains in Nicaragua in the 1930s perhaps we should be paying attention to what happened to Israel Army in Lebanon in Summer 2006.

gentile

But I will try to respond...

1) Actually in my mind the role of an advisory force isn't to bring in bigger forces but to enable that HNSF to do for themselves in the long run, rather than American forces being tied up. Persistent engagement. Tip of the spear, not sure. One thing I realized after the Berlin Wall came down was that the world just became a much more scarier place, with lots of brush fires, somewhat what the world was like pre-WWII or even WWI.
2) No again I don't advocate larger forces...your second paragraph...really lost me, but No I don't want to be engaged in these forever wars by putting boots on the ground. That certainly isn't anything I would advocate. The last thing I want is my children and grandchildren dealing with a problem that should have been handled in my lifetime.
3) I agree that the Army is severely strained as is the Marine Corps. I wondered about why we were drawing down our armed forces after the Cold War when the world just got that much more complicated and thought it very premature to do so without some deep analysis.

Lastly,
No I don't have a secondary agenda here. Not at all. IF I knew more about what the Army has done wrt to small wars, then I would cite more. This ISN'T about the Army or Marine Corps. I simply cite what I do know. Wrt mixed results during the Banana Wars, well if I were in the Army I would do the right thing and analyze what the Marine Corps did right and wrong and not try to make the same mistakes and that could be said about many organizations SF or not.
In fact the US Army vs. the Indian nations out in the western US after the Civil War could perhaps be the longest COIN operation our nation has ever conducted. I am suprised no one has (that I know of) done an analysis of the Indian campaigns.
Let me STRESS this isn't about whether Marines should be doing this or not, this is about should conventional forces be doing this or not. Right now both Soldiers and Marines engaged in COIN some are mixed teams. SO if its here to stay, what is the best way to do it? SF can't do it all, they are simply not big enough whether it be Marines, Army, Navy or Air Force SF.
Please do not put words in my mouth or try to find some secondary agenda. If you want to continue this dialog off line, feel free to PM me. Btw, my handle is simply coincidental I had no idea Max Boot is a Marine (former).

[Tom Odom]

I am not weighing in on the discussion here as it is flowing nicely. But I would add a caution on tone. Speaking toward a council member as if he is a training aid to make your points is skating on thin ice. If you have a point of issue or order with someone's ideas. speak to those ideas and not about the person.

thank you

Tom

[wm]

One thing I realized after the Berlin Wall came down was that the world just became a much more scarier place, with lots of brush fires, somewhat what the world was like pre-WWII or even WWI. .

At the risk of derailing this thread, I feel compelled to address Boot's comment above. I will say upfront that I think my remarks are germane to the overall topic. I think they highlight a fundamental sssumption that seems to underlay the idea that America's military should be doing SAF/FID missions. I propose that until this normative assumption is fully debated and resolved to the extent that we can clarify what our national goals are in conducting SAF/FID, we cannot effectively move to the next step of deciding what type of forces to employ to achieve those goals.

I suspect that what really happened in America, post-Wall destruction, is a shift of awareness. I suspect that the world is not all that much scarier. We just have had the opportunity to shift our focus away from a monolithic enemy--sort of a "road to Damascus" moment--and to see that a whole lot of folks around the world are pretty busy shooting each other up on a pretty routine basis. Being the good, paternalistic folks with a missionary zeal that we Americans are, we seem to feel the need to try to keep these folks from blowing each other away by meddling in their internal affairs. This is, to some degree, I suspect the same spirit that motivated the Monroe and Truman Doctrines. (It is also reflective of what is happpening in Texas with regard to the intervention with the FLDS, IMHO--but that is another thread not germane to SWC/SWJ).

I submit that performing SAFD/FID missions generally are not the kinds of things that are crucial to the nation's continued existence/territorial integrity/political sovereignty and, as a result, are not obligatory actions on America's part. We should continue to train our forces to have a general advising/training/nation-building capability more like the crowd control and infrastructure rebuilding efforts we demonstrate in the wake of a natural disaster like Katrina or the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Our SAF/FID posture should be predicated on an invitation from a host country and should be tailored to repond to the request for assistance from that country. If the request is for something other than what we would deploy at home as a response to a natural or humanitarian disaster, it would probably be in America's best interest to decline, while advising other potential "invitees" to keep their hands off the problem as well.

To bring this back to Boot's point--if the world today really is "a much more scarier place" I suspect America has itself to blame--for poking its nose in business where America does not belong.

[Old Eagle]

The fact of the matter is that it is in our own self interest to develop the security forces of other states and organizations.

1 -- The U.S. military is unlikely to grow significantly in the near future, therefore the only way we are going to be successful is to be able to partner with security forces that are at a level of development where they can be true partners. PfP in the new democracies of central Europe was a major tool in developing our new NATO allies, as an example.

2 -- The only way to succeed against highly networked non-state adversaries is, as RAND's Dave Ockmanek reminds us, to be everywhere, all the time through our partners.

3 -- In order to prevent long-term U.S. BOG, our partners need to be able to take care of their own security. That capability will not spring magically from the earth; it needs to be developed.

4 -- There are places/missions we need others to handle, especially PKO in far-flung regions with no direct impact on U.S. interests. These capabilities will also not develop magically on their own.

In short, there are huge requirements to assist other security forces in order to secure our own interests. It's not meddling or self-aggrandizement, it's a requirement, and it ain't going away.

[wm]

The fact of the matter is that it is in our own self interest to develop the security forces of other states and organizations.
[SNIP]
In short, there are huge requirements to assist other security forces in order to secure our own interests. It's not meddling or self-aggrandizement, it's a requirement, and it ain't going away.

Please make the case for the necessity/causal linkage to American national self interest alleged in this post. The argument smacks of the same kind of "logic" that produced the domino theory as a justification for American involvement in SE Asia.

Propping up a political entity that is unable to gain support (and, therefore, legitimacy) from the people that entity was intended to serve seems like a guaranteed way to keep the flames of discontent burning and probably spreading to other polities with nascent legitimacy issues.

I suggest a review of a lesson to be learned from the prisoner's dilemma. It shows quite clearly that acting on a "lop-sided" perception of what is most in one's self interest turns out to yield what is least in one's self interest.

[Hacksaw]

I concede that my point has been heard and acknowledged by my friends in JCISFA. No doubt they understand the pitfalls. However, this warrants continued monitoring.

Gian -- I used your name in vain -- because I do think of you as the wild-eyed prophet screaming from the bluffs over looking the Hudson. You are not alone, but I think there is a middle ground. Nor am I advocating an advisor corps like my Sosh brother, but...

I think we as a nation have little choice but to transition to the strategic defensive... As you so rightly state our conventional posture right now consists of a bunch of broken equipment, tired personnel, and young leaders not really experienced in full-spectrum operations...

So what does that mean for national security in general and the military in particular... IMO it calls for an economy of force approach (heavy on SFA) to build partner capacity to govern inside their borders, while we re-build the materiel and grey matter capacity to fulfill the security responsibilities outlined by wm (secure our borders, etc).

Tom--If I am one whom broke the truce so to speak--then I apologize to all. I rarely use bold text for obvious reasons, but got quite frustrated with myself that I had so poorly communicated the gist of my thoughts.

My head is both bloodied and bowed

Gian--see you on the high ground

Live well and row

[William F. Owen]

At the risk of the stating the obvious, I think it's worth pointing out that the only reason why US SOF forces are associated with training and FID is a confluence of circumstances from the Cold War. - EG: SF used to train Guerillas, based on WW2 experience.

I cannot see anyone wanting to "train Guerillas" these days, but the need to train and sustain large numbers of security forces is a definite plus, but I cannot see any logical reason why this would be associated with SF/SOCOM, apart from the accidents of history.

Yes, I can see how one can make a very solid case (languages, skills etc) but the ability to train is inherent to a professional military. All officers and NCO's are, or should be trainers - in an ideal world, capable of training Indigenous forces for the equivalent role.

The reality is that culture and human needs, undermines this. But be aware the British Army went around the world, raising generally limited successful clones of themselves (India, Jordan, Pakistan etc) - and USSF themselves could be said to be descended from a British Army trained Unit!!

...however, if you just adopt the colour of the beret (Canadian Rifle Green) and not the mess silver, traditions and mess kit, it isn't quite going to be the same thing!

[Ken White]

and confluence of circumstances is where we are. As we all know bureaucracies in democracies are loth to give up roles and missions because thsoe mean money and power, so we're stuck with that.

In an ideal world it would be an Army mission (purely on a size, location and capacity basis), it is not but it is critical that the Army not try to fob it off as they did once before and as the many Gian supporters in high places would like to do. Those folks were wrong before and they would be wrong again.

Shame the good guys -- much less the bad guys -- won't play the way we want them too...

[Boot]

At the risk of the stating the obvious, I think it's worth pointing out that the only reason why US SOF forces are associated with training and FID is a confluence of circumstances from the Cold War. - EG: SF used to train Guerillas, based on WW2 experience.

I cannot see anyone wanting to "train Guerillas" these days, but the need to train and sustain large numbers of security forces is a definite plus, but I cannot see any logical reason why this would be associated with SF/SOCOM, apart from the accidents of history.

Yes, I can see how one can make a very solid case (languages, skills etc) but the ability to train is inherent to a professional military. All officers and NCO's are, or should be trainers - in an ideal world, capable of training Indigenous forces for the equivalent role.

The reality is that culture and human needs, undermines this. But be aware the British Army went around the world, raising generally limited successful clones of themselves (India, Jordan, Pakistan etc) - and USSF themselves could be said to be descended from a British Army trained Unit!!

...however, if you just adopt the colour of the beret (Canadian Rifle Green) and not the mess silver, traditions and mess kit, it isn't quite going to be the same thing!

Great points; Really good analogy wrt to the British Army. I have to wonder if this those indigenous forces in the long run, had resentment for GB or supported them.
An ancient example of someone who was trained by a standing Army was that came back to bite them was The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest which took place in the year 9 A.D. when Arminius, ambushed and destroyed three Roman legions led by Publius Quinctilius Varus. Arminius had received a military education from Rome and had even been given the rank of Equestrian. How knew their culture and how the Romans operated. Just food for thought.

[Rob Thornton]

Hacksaw said:

I get it Rob, decision made, time to move on... OK, but the question remains what does this decision signal... I thought those were valid discussion points on this panel. Putting this back into its "old bin" does not signal a change in approach, a recognition of the mission's importance from a GPF perspective...

bold emphasis added by Rob

Absolutely these are valid discussion points!

One of the points I was trying to get after in the last post is that there would be drawbacks to any of the likely proponents. If it had gone to Suffolk it would have been competing with allot of other stuff, and may have gotten lost. This is not a dig on JFCOM, they have a full plate and are doing some outstanding work in many other areas. Even though they are not the proponent, I imagine SOCOM realizes the role JFCOM needs to play, and so does SO/LIC. If it had gone to the Army, there might have been resistance the other way - besides the tough choices it must make with regards to being the Land Power capable of sustained campaigns, its also wrestling with it what it means to place Stability Operations on par with Offense and Defense. With the tasks before them, I'm not sure the timing would line up right.

I don't know ADM Olson, but he did decide he would support SFA and that it needed proponency. To me there is goodness in that alone because I believe personality matters. I also have reason to believe that SOCOM understands the scope of SFA as a concept, and that they recognize that to make it viable they cannot go it alone - its going to require JIIM participation, and just having proponency does not guarantee that everyone will fall in line.

The USAF and the USN have a strong role to play in SFA (as it is not only FID, but SA and SC). Assisting foreign security forces (sea, air and land) to extend the reach and governance of their HN, or to create regional capacity is going to require not only SOF and Ground GPF assistance, but will require air and naval FSF assistance. Some places cannot be reached otherwise, or cannot be reached in a manner that provides the HN or Regional Force some mixture of sustainability, economy, effectiveness and persistence. Road networks and supporting infrastructure for moving ground forces to where some of the enemy operates is not always available, in fact they may select it as a result. Many HNs are unable to extend governance beyond their cities, and even this is in question now as population #s increasingly migrate in to cities and overwhelm existing FSFs. Many are threated by regional and international threats - consider the increasing nexus between various groups and entities in the ME, Asia, the Americas, Europe and Africa.

In order to increase HN capacity in many places will require an increase in their very limited air and sea capabilities (which in some cases do not exist), as well as their land and SOF capabilities. Our enemies are increasingly exploiting these spaces and the adjacent commons for a number of reasons. Their effects are not just limited to effecting a specific HN, but impact us and our allies in a number of ways. So as an Army type, when I say I worry about service culture attitudes, I actually worry less about the Army and Marines then about the Air Force and the Navy (and yes the Coast Guard) - again, its not a lick on them, we ask a great deal of them, but they need to understand they have a piece of this - SOF and the ground services can't do it alone. So far they have only marginally engaged in the conversation - there are some within both services who understand the role they should play.

We do agree on allot, especially the fear that because of service cultures and competing priorities it will not get the attention it requires. However, I empathize with the services in trying to sort out priorities at this time - its just tough to do. I'm not sure there is an optimal answer given the conditions - the letter I sent Neil on "the King & I" about the state of Army FA by three former BCT CDRs makes some good points - and achieving balance right now is not really on the table - the number of missions and the supporting force structure are not there yet, and will not be so for probably 2-3 years - we'll probably meet in the middle with a filling out of BCTs and a decreased presence in Iraq (however - its certainly possible that those forces will be committed elsewhere to meet policy ends or unexpected crises.)

I think what matters most at this point is bringing the proponent together with the palyers (and convincing the players that they are such), this would include the non-DoD parts of the JIIM. The other part of that is getting the policy makers across the board to understand that although it seems to reside in one place, it impacts policy across the board - this has always been tough because people default to what they own, or what they perceive as clearly in their lanes. As such both the instructions that go forward to the proponent, and the actions that it generate matter. It is going to be hard - it would be no matter who got it - because you can't always guarantee that just because one person or group recognizes the need for cooperation, the rest will see the same, or provide significant resources (time, money, men, grey matter) to make it happen.

I think you are absolutely right to bring it up - if we discuss it in the open like this it gets more folks thinking about it.

Best, Rob