Security Force Assistance: Roles and Missions for SOF and Conventional Forces

[Old Eagle]

The fact of the matter is that it is in our own self interest to develop the security forces of other states and organizations.

1 -- The U.S. military is unlikely to grow significantly in the near future, therefore the only way we are going to be successful is to be able to partner with security forces that are at a level of development where they can be true partners. PfP in the new democracies of central Europe was a major tool in developing our new NATO allies, as an example.

2 -- The only way to succeed against highly networked non-state adversaries is, as RAND's Dave Ockmanek reminds us, to be everywhere, all the time through our partners.

3 -- In order to prevent long-term U.S. BOG, our partners need to be able to take care of their own security. That capability will not spring magically from the earth; it needs to be developed.

4 -- There are places/missions we need others to handle, especially PKO in far-flung regions with no direct impact on U.S. interests. These capabilities will also not develop magically on their own.

In short, there are huge requirements to assist other security forces in order to secure our own interests. It's not meddling or self-aggrandizement, it's a requirement, and it ain't going away.

[wm]

The fact of the matter is that it is in our own self interest to develop the security forces of other states and organizations.
[SNIP]
In short, there are huge requirements to assist other security forces in order to secure our own interests. It's not meddling or self-aggrandizement, it's a requirement, and it ain't going away.

Please make the case for the necessity/causal linkage to American national self interest alleged in this post. The argument smacks of the same kind of "logic" that produced the domino theory as a justification for American involvement in SE Asia.

Propping up a political entity that is unable to gain support (and, therefore, legitimacy) from the people that entity was intended to serve seems like a guaranteed way to keep the flames of discontent burning and probably spreading to other polities with nascent legitimacy issues.

I suggest a review of a lesson to be learned from the prisoner's dilemma. It shows quite clearly that acting on a "lop-sided" perception of what is most in one's self interest turns out to yield what is least in one's self interest.

[Ron Humphrey]

Please make the case for the necessity/causal linkage to American national self interest alleged in this post. The argument smacks of the same kind of "logic" that produced the domino theory as a justification for American involvement in SE Asia.

Propping up a political entity that is unable to gain support (and, therefore, legitimacy) from the people that entity was intended to serve seems like a guaranteed way to keep the flames of discontent burning and probably spreading to other polities with nascent legitimacy issues.

I suggest a review of a lesson to be learned from the prisoner's dilemma. It shows quite clearly that acting on a "lop-sided" perception of what is most in one's self interest turns out to yield what is least in one's self interest.

Who develops or determines decisions about how failed is failed enough that the international community has to act. Also in regard to determining why we should or shouldn't act I would think it should be just as important to identify why we shouldn't and be sure and provide best assessments of what that lack of action has brought about historically.

Finally lets not forget to look at those elsewhere who choose to act in a manner which they see beneficial to their own agendas and figure out if the ultimate question isn't really, Is one form of society better than another, If so which.

I think we could probably fill volumes with just these being discussed but all in all they seem to be the main points of contention throughout most of history.

[Gian P Gentile]

I did not mean to use Boot's post as, to use Tom Odom's words, a "training aide." But after re-reading my response I can see how one might read it that way.

I actually think that Boot's post represents an important underlying theme for the call for Advisory Corps that I wanted to get at and critique in this post. In no way did i want to cheapen what he said and call it an "agenda" but I can see how it might have come across that way.

And to be honest I did make the false assumption about handle relationships which I now no wasnt there and because of that caused my post to be read the way it was.

gian

[Boot]

I did not mean to use Boot's post as, to use Tom Odom's words, a "training aide." But after re-reading my response I can see how one might read it that way.

I actually think that Boot's post represents an important underlying theme for the call for Advisory Corps that I wanted to get at and critique in this post. In no way did i want to cheapen what he said and call it an "agenda" but I can see how it might have come across that way.

And to be honest I did make the false assumption about handle relationships which I now no wasnt there and because of that caused my post to be read the way it was.

gian

Point taken.

[Old Eagle]

In the past, the U.S. has had problems dealing with the SFA mission, and applying it where it really was important. A coupla us here are members of the "Pay any price, bear any burden" generation. De Oppresso Liber! Etc.

1 -- Cold War engagement was just as much anti-Soviet as it was ever pro-U.S. Oops. Really hope that we have learned our lesson there.

2 -- In the past, U.S. assistance tended to be mainly military, and often at the tactical level. This led to two problems: we made lower-ranking military organizations/personnel more capable than other govermental organizations. Several then felt the necessity to replace the governments they were supposed to be defending. Now, had the new governments been more responsible than those they replaced, it would be easier to turn a blind eye, but usually, one corrupt government replaced another. Oops. Secondly, we often left the newly trained militaries without sustaining institutions, so many turned into flash-in-the-pan efforts.

The upshot of the above is that new engagement has to be targeted on the right countries. It needs to be "whole of government", so that it's not just mil-to-mil anymore. We need to actively instill and nurture basic values and institutions that increase the legitimacy of any government or organization we work with. This needs to go hand-in-hand with economic development in most areas.

If we have to get involved in some country of region because of no lie, vital U.S. interests, it's best to do so early-on, by, with and through the nations involved. Add to that the fact that the external force cannot "win" COIN/FID/ETC. It is ONLY by building local forces that are competent, confident, capable and committed in support of legitimate authority.

More later. I'm up to a body part in a crash mission. One Rob should be doing.

[Rob Thornton]

Wayne,

A few quick points on what OE said:

1) not every where we do SFA is to prop up, or rebuild a failing government - sometimes it is about enhancing a state with the capability and capacity to govern itself, but with an eye to taking a more responsible and active regional role - building capacity for coalitions.

2) However, if its in a state where the enemy is considering for safehaven, or recruiting, or for any purpose that enhances his freedom of movement and resources, we need to place it in the context of priorities - as OE said, our efforts must be aimed where we get the most in return, but sometimes it might require thinkning in terms of preventing the enemy from getting returns. There are ends with regard to your own, with regard to your allies, and others, and ends with regard to your enemy.

3) There are other reasons beyond the war against extremism to conduct SFA (remember its does not just touch FID, but SA and SC depending on why you are doing it and in support of what end - its a framework). If you are interested I can lay them out, but suffice to say, they have not changed all that much in a couple of thousand years.

Now before OE tracks me down on my pass - prior to me taking off for Carlisle and UQ 08 for 2 weeks - I'm taking the family out for chow

Best, Rob

[Bill Moore]

wm and W. Owen make excellent points. It is an assumption, and a weak assumption that enhancing our capacity to conduct FID/COIN on a larger scale than we do now will address our national security objectives. That assumption depends on the willingness of our pals to do our bidding. Most nations won't want to be perceived acting on behalf of another nation.

What type of and what size (capacity) FID capability do we really need? To answer that we need to "clearly" articulate our national security objectives and strategy, conduct a realistic threat assessment (and realize it will probably be wrong, so be prepared to flex), then design the appropriate force structure across the government, not just within DoD. I do think DoD will need to increase their capacity to conduct FID, but perhaps it will not need to be as large as some of the proposals that have been floated. I think we must assume that we will still have to act unilaterally when we can't convince another nation to take care of problem that is a threat to our interests, so based on the emerging threats (new generation), what does this force structure need to look like?

Personally, I think the threats tomorrow will continue to be diverse and we'll need a why range of capabilities in our military and equally important throughout our government. In a perfect world, we would have international capabilities (e.g. a functional UN).

[wm]

1) not every where we do SFA is to prop up, or rebuild a failing government - . . .

2) . . . our efforts must be aimed where we get the most in return, but sometimes it might require thinkning in terms of preventing the enemy from getting returns. There are ends with regard to your own, with regard to your allies, and others, and ends with regard to your enemy.

3) There are other reasons beyond the war against extremism to conduct SFA . . .

Now before OE tracks me down on my pass - prior to me taking off for Carlisle and UQ 08 for 2 weeks - I'm taking the family out for chow

Best, Rob

Rob,
I concur with all three of your points as well as with the two points from OE's follow up post. However, I still want to caveat that agreement. And my caveat incorproates a point that Ron H made.

We need to be sure that we are invited in for that SFA mission by someone that is an appropriate inviter. I am not sure, for example, that the invitation from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and concern about the safety of a few American med students at St Georges University, justified Urgent Fury, nor would it have justified dispatching SAF/IDAD/FID/SASO (pick your acronym de jour) team to prepare Dominica to be ready to repel an invasion by the Cuban-trained forces of Grenada.

Hope the family feed and the TDY to Jim Thorpe land goes well.

[Norfolk]

At first this statement sounds just bone-dumb, as SFA/FID or whatever you want to call them missions are probably performed mostly for a political, rather than military effect. Of course a military effect is desired, but except in those situations where a friendly foreign government is clearly in danger of crumbling, the military results of these missions are beside the main point; that point being that the friendly government is reassured that Washington is behind it and that political ties are secure. After all, how many (public) SFA/FID missions have resulted in long-term military, leading to political, success? Probably not the overwhelming majority, to say the least.

If this is the case, and I don't presume to know if it is, then as wm, Old Eagle, and Bill Moore are pointing out in one way or another, not only is the force structure and the "Strategy" that it is supposed to derive from out of whack, but SFA/FID as a tool of foreign policy is being overused, misused, or simply abused in lieu of having to make clear-sighted policy decisions. In short, the mission may be a crutch, both for the host nation, and for the US Government in so far as the sending of such a mission may well serve to disguise both the friendly government's unwillingness or utter inability to deal effectively with its own problems, as well as to let the US partially off the hook for putting real pressure on the host nation government to address the conditions that have led to its problems, by appearing to be doing something about it.

I am certainly not saying that SFA/FID is a wastefull or wasted effort; it is certainly beneficial and even necessary in some cases. But to the extent that it may be used more as a sort of "We're doing something about the problem" cover, when it may achieve little or nothing, the mission, and the force structure that performs it, may see either its capabilities squandered, or the force structure itself may be partially redundant.

It is strange to see the US SF (as opposed to SOF) force structure in comparison to many others'; the "tiers" with SFOD-D and SEAL 6 at JSSOC making up the heart of Tier 1 (with more or less SAS-type capabilities) and US Army Special Forces, AF CCT, and now the Marine SF making up the "Tier II", is quite at odds with what many other countries have. Tier I units, more or less corresponding to an SAS-type capability, until recently have formed the bulk of most nations SF (as opposed to SOF), and Tier II units along Green Beret lines are in many cases either relatively new, or at least do not grossly outnumber the Tier I types. Offhand, it would seem that having two tiers of SF may be unnecessary and inefficient.

Some of the roles and missions that Tier II SF can be performed adequately by regular forces or SOF that specialize in certain missions - in principle, at least, the formation of the SRR out of 14 Int Coy helped to relieve some of the burden on the SAS for strategic reconnaissance, and regular battalions are able to perform some of the SFA/FID mission either on their own or in cooperation with SF in a "low/high" sort of mix. In an ideal Army, there would be no "Tiers" of SF, just SAS-type units, and to the extent that other SOF exist, such as Commando Forces (Royal Mariones, Rangers, etc.) and specialists who do not require SF-level training to perform their roles properly (such as the Special Reconnaissance Regiment, Mobile Training Teams, etc.).

As Wilf and Ken raised earlier, it seems that the Tier II organization is both driven by, and in turn helps to drive, a level of redundancy that is perhaps inefficient at best and a downright drain on resources at worst. That is not to say that SF are over-manned and over-resourced; they are not, but they are over-tasked, and to an extent that is unnecessary, perhaps wasteful, and even counter-productive in that the SFA/FID role becomes a sort of band-aid "solution" that fixes little but allows business to continue as usual. And so, in a roundabout way, this contributes to avoiding having to make unpleasant decisions about who to support, and by what means. Not to mention identifying needs and priorities and formulating a comprehensive strategy to go about meeting them.