COIN Companies

[Distiller]

Good post #14, to remember Malaya, Portugese Africa, Rhodesia, &c.

I'm affraid this look back tends to be too romantic, boy-scout and action movie type romantic.

And when ordered to build a unit, I have to ask for what mission. Rural? Urban? The real deal, or "hearts and minds" stuff?

Generally, these days I would go irregular. Recruiting people of suitable and theatre-compatible racial/tribal/cultural background, either in the theatre itself, or from the huge pool of economic and political refugees that is available in the West. Exploiting racial, tribal and social conflicts. Led by visually compatible members of special forces with special education.
Pose as business men, workers, tourists, local security, the new gang in town, &c.

The whole outfit organised flat. Trooper - Section Leader - Company Leader. No status games and a minimum of "Sirs". No real uniforms, blending in with locals.
The size of the section maybe 8 men (not different from a regular squad), the company maybe 15 to 20 sections. But the section here is more important, the company more a paper unit. The sections would avoid "coming home" when in theatre.

Logistics support by buying stuff, other stuff by FedEx or DHL. (I'm not joking, FedEx is in Iraq since 2003. A lot of stuff can be delivered commercially - very low profile).
In more rural areas GPS-parachutes.
For mobility take a taxi, or buy something.

Two huge advantages a Western COIN unit has are ISR and precision stand-off fire power (which is important in case a hundred Pashtuns decide to have your scalp).
That makes the question of weapons a little secondary, for some missions a concealed PDW might be enough.
Otherwise it depends heavily on the ops environment, but blending in would be important, like:
For rural areas AK47/103 (optionally with UGLs), one or two marksman rifles like a M110, a PKM, some MGL, maybe a Javelin, hand grenades, plus some night-vision equipment. Basically no different than light inf.
For urban areas low profile is even more important -- silenced SMGs, low caliber LAWs, maybe some unusual and expensive high-tech toys like guided LAWs and unmanned sensors, &c.

[Richard W]

Distiller:

You posted in part:

"I'm affraid this look back tends to be too romantic, boy-scout and action movie type romantic."

I reply: And what do you expect with a new Indiana Jones movie coming out?

Regards

Richard W

[Distiller]

Distiller:

You posted in part:

"I'm affraid this look back tends to be too romantic, boy-scout and action movie type romantic."

I reply: And what do you expect with a new Indiana Jones movie coming out?

Regards

Richard W

Didn't mean to criticize the look back. For rural and bush COIN/CT ops all the lessons from places of the last 60 years (maybe going back further to the Philippines of 1902ff, or Deutsch-Südwestafrika) are still valid. And I too like to read all the stories from Angola and Rhodesia and such.

But the environment has drastically changed. I guess these days it's far more likely to operate in a suburban slum or a run-down city like Beyrouth. Afghanistan or the Saharan desert are NOT the typical ops areas of the future, I'm affraid.

[Richard W]

Distiller:

I think your comments are spot on. Please keep them coming.

Regards

Richard W

[Sabre]

Two huge advantages a Western COIN unit has are ISR and precision stand-off fire power (which is important in case a hundred Pashtuns decide to have your scalp).
That makes the question of weapons a little secondary, for some missions a concealed PDW might be enough.

As awe-inspiring as Western ISR and precision ADM's may be, they have very real limits, and I have heard of plenty of actions where an SOF team was in trouble and it either wasn't available, or couldn't be brought to bear effectively (for a variety of reasons). So, in such a case, there still needs to be a robust force package for extraction, close enough to respond quickly. Which means CAS, helos, and possibly a rifle platoon or company reaction force, and all of this will require security...

Please forgive a comment from the peanut gallery, but I just couldn't let that one slip by...

[VMI_Marine]

Sabre,
Couldn't agree more, and I'm one of the guys who is supposed to call in that precision standoff firepower. I think our reliance on close air support in the two current wars is a potential vulnerability that the bad guys have not learned to fully exploit yet.

[Distiller]

Sabre,
Couldn't agree more, and I'm one of the guys who is supposed to call in that precision standoff firepower. I think our reliance on close air support in the two current wars is a potential vulnerability that the bad guys have not learned to fully exploit yet.

Actually I didn't mean CAS, but more artillery or mortars like the Dragon Fire.
You'll never have enough CAS for all the squads in contact with the enemy.
But it sure is true that the reliance on CAS is dangerous.

[anotherguy]

...What about deployment duration? Once you have the skills sets trained up and boots on the ground, how long do you want to keep your COIN company in place? It is impossible to fully replace a relationship with the indigenous people that has been developed over a 12 month deployment and hard won through shared victories and losses no matter how big or small.

[Fuchs]

...What about deployment duration? Once you have the skills sets trained up and boots on the ground, how long do you want to keep your COIN company in place? It is impossible to fully replace a relationship with the indigenous people that has been developed over a 12 month deployment and hard won through shared victories and losses no matter how big or small.

That relationship doesn't require the full company.

Redundancy & rotation helps.
Always have two to four officers in a meeting, including a representative of a higher level (Battalion, for example).
Sometimes, one or two can be missing because they're not deployed. But the meetings would always be attended and if possible the delegation be lead by at least one officer with several months experience.

A disconnect might still occur when units get moved to another region in the theatre, though.

[shark11]

Sabre,
Couldn't agree more, and I'm one of the guys who is supposed to call in that precision standoff firepower. I think our reliance on close air support in the two current wars is a potential vulnerability that the bad guys have not learned to fully exploit yet.

I agree but I think our biggest shortfall is not effectively using CAS in a COIN enviorment. I worked with one FAC who had it down....he used every bit of intelligence available to use his air assets and recorded all of his observations. These observations were of great use to me in fusing it with my work.....it was lethal, we ran a handful of devasting CAS missions together....sadly, the other two FACS I worked with were not nearly as adept and contempt on flying around and waiting for it to hit the fan......

You have to be proactive in all aspects of COIN and any warfare for that matter.

Also nice to see another SOCNET APO member on this forum.

[bikewrench8541]

I really like Distillers post on this topic.
However in a real world situation it would be hard to get past anyones command these days it seems.
Also can I get an oorah Socnet brothers.

[Randy Brown]

Thanks, Bikewrench8541, for casting my attention back to Distiller's remarks. At risk of taking out of context his point about urban-ops being the future rule, rather than the exception, I wanted to share a completely random connection you just inspired--to a 25 JUN Salon.com article that seems to be as much about video game design as it is about Bushido. I point it out here because I like the anecdote, and the punchline-quote reminds me of those dojo days, when my Army cadet buddies and I carried our Little Red Books of Sun Tzu in our left cargo pockets.

First off, here's Mr. Distiller's quote:

For rural and bush COIN/CT ops all the lessons from places of the last 60 years (maybe going back further to the Philippines of 1902ff, or Deutsch-Südwestafrika) are still valid. And I too like to read all the stories from Angola and Rhodesia and such.

But the environment has drastically changed. I guess these days it's far more likely to operate in a suburban slum or a run-down city like Beyrouth. Afghanistan or the Saharan desert are NOT the typical ops areas of the future, I'm afraid.

Now, here's the samurai story from Salon.com, which relates what author Andrew Leonard describes as "one of the greatest samurai disses of all time":

Kanetsugu was a successful military leader who served as chief councilor to Uesugi Kagekatsu, the daimyo of one of the major clans of the period. In 1600, the Uesugi clan was feverishly building up its defenses in preparation for a showdown with Ieyasu. Ieyasu became suspicious at all the military hustle and bustle and sent a messenger to Uesugi Kenshin demanding an explanation.

Kanetsugu replied: "While citified samurai busily collect tea implements, country samurai gather arms for war."

[reed11b]

Intelligance gathering training. Look at the current DOD program to have law enforcement personel supplant US troops in Iraq. That type of training would support a COIN unit well. Better electronic survielance resources (at a lower echelon) would be helpful too. beyond that, the original suggestion of leaving open slots for plug and play assests (interpreturs, Civ affairs, engineers, etc.) is very valid.

[reed11b]

perhaps some english majors as well since we infantry types obviously can not spell.
Reed