TE Lawrence: a merged thread

[Tom Odom]

Latest history lesson:

Then I estimated how many posts they would need to contain this attack in depth, sedition putting up her head in every unoccupied one of these hundred thousand square miles. I knew the Turkish Army inside and out, and allowing for its recent extension of faculty by guns and aeroplanes and armoured trains, still it seemed it would have need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a post could not be less than twenty men. The Turks would need six hundred thousand men to meet the combined ill wills of all the local Arab people. They had one hundred thousand men available... The Turk was stupid and would believe that rebellion was absolute, like war, and deal with it on the analogy of absolute warfare. Analogy is fudge, anyhow, and to make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.

This history lesson is both old and new. Old in that I am again offering T.E. Lawrence's Evolution of a Revolt, a paper I used in a history lesson back in 2003 when the application of the term "insurgency" in Iraq was under debate. New in that it bears looking at with the benefit of three years hindsight. The Combat Studies Institute offers this paper as a reprint (see the link below).

LAWRENCE AS AN ICON

Remember when you read this paper, that T.E. Lawrence was not the typical British officer of his day. Indeed he was not the typical Britain of his day. But much has been made of Lawrence as the prototype foreign area officer/unconventional warfare genius of his day. He was in many ways just that, a genius who found it difficult to fit into his own society and ultimately failed to fit into his adopted Arab world.

EVOLUTION OF A REVOLT

So why do I offer "Evolution of a Revolt" again? Simply that it remains a remarkable template for insurgent strategy in Iraq and even Afghanistan, one based on insights from a successful rebel/insurgent who unhinged the Turkish occupation of the Middle East.

CONVENTIONAL AND THE UNCONVENTIONAL

As was almost inevitable in view of the general course of military thinking since Napoleon, we all looked only to the regulars to win the war. We were obsessed by the dictum of Foch that the ethic of modern war is to seek for the enemy's army, his centre of power, and destroy it in battle. Irregulars would not attack positions and so they seemed to us incapable of forcing a decision.

In this analysis, Lawrence broke away from what he describes as the trap of conventional thinking. Indeed, Lawrence admits that at first he and the other British and Arab leaders found themselves mired in that same trap, trying to use the irregular Arab forces to defend conventionally, when he had already realized they could not attack conventionally.

CONTINUED EXISTENCE EQUALS CONTINUED THREAT

...the books gave me the aim in war quite pat, "the destruction of the organized forces of the enemy" by "the one process battle." Victory could only be purchased by blood. This was a hard saying for us, as the Arabs had no organized forces, and so a Turkish Foch would have no aim: and the Arabs would not endure casualties, so that an Arab Clausewitz could not buy his victory.

Lawrence realized that penning the Turks in Medina and allowing limited use of their rail supply lines essentially achieved the aim of the Arab Revolt years before WWI ended. A foe confined to base is a foe contained and possibly defeated. Indeed such confinement whether self-inflicted or enforced by an enemy surrenders not only "99 per cent" of the terrain but all of the population that resides on that terrain.

MEDIA WAR FOR HEARTS AND MINDS

It was the ethical in war, and the process on which we mainly depended for victory on the Arab front. The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander, and we, being amateures in the art of command, began our war in the atmosphere of the twentieth century, and thought of our weapons without prejudice, not distinguishing one from another socially.

"The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander"hopefully jumps out at anyone reading the above paragraph. Lawrence states that the importance of the word as a weapon was more readily apparent to him as an amateur than his professional counterparts. Translate "printing press" to information operations and then ask yourself have we really changed that much from the days of T.E. Lawrence: have we truly grasped the primacy of IO in winning a population during counter-insurgency operations (COIN)? I believe that we have, although not as rapidly as we should have.

LAWRENCE'S REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESS

Finally in looking at this paper I urge you to read it through to the end for Lawrence reserved his most important messages for the final page. There Lawrence offers his requirements for a successful revolt (insurgency). And before those who would dismiss revolt as something different from insurgency, Lawrence uses the term insurgent to make his points.

AN UNASSAILABLE BASE

It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it: such a base as we had in the Red Sea Ports, the desert, or in the minds of the men we converted to our creed.

Much has been written since WWII especially on Algeria and Indochina (Vietnam) on the subject of COIN. And gratefully much of that writing has resurfaced and been incorporated in discussions on COIN in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the greater COIN effort called the Global War on Terror. Nearly all of those writings have postulated that a successful insurgency must have a sanctuary or base beyond the reach of counter insurgent forces. Lawrence writing this paper in 1920 correctly points out that the ultimate sanctuary of the insurgent is inside the minds of the insurgents and their supporters.

AN ALIEN ENEMY LIMITED IN NUMBERS

It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfill the doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole area effectively from fortified posts.

Lawrence choice of words--or at least as I interpret his writing--was careful. This short quote reflects that care; the numbers issue is obvious and has been well debated in terms of OIF and more recently OEF. But look at the concept of an "alien" enemy. At first glance, one might--wrongly--assume all enemies are alien. Certainly in the case of an occupying force that is usually the case. But in a COIN environment, not all enemies are alien; in this short paper, Lawrence highlights the use of Arab members of the Turkish Army who defected to the rebel cause. In a larger sense, though, Lawrence was speaking of an enemy that remains alien or alienates itself from the population.

DEFINING A FRIENDLY POPULATION

It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. active in a striking force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic.

COIN theory keys on the role of the population as the objective of COIN operations and strategy. Dr. Kalev Sepp in his "Best Practices in COIN" article for Military Review rightly highlights this factor. French Colonel (now deceased) David Galula similarly points out the pivotal role of the population in COIN. Lawrence offers the insight that a passive population is a population essentially friendly to the insurgents.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE INSURGENTS

The few active rebels must have the qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply. They must have the technical equipment to destroy or paralyze the enemy's organized communications, for irregular war is fairly Willisen's definition of strategy, "the study of communication" in its extreme degree, of attack where the enemy is not.

Lawrence's campaign against the Turkish rail net was not to cut them as lines of communications, but to make the Turks feel the pinch of lost supplies and infrastructure. In this paper he essentially identifies material as a Turk center of gravity, stating that the Turks cared about lost equipment--especially rail--much more than losses in soldiers. The Arabs on the other could not sustain casualties and Lawrence sought to hurt the Turks by targeting their rail LOCs, not their strong points. In many ways the enemy's use of improvised explosive devices has repeated this strategy while changing its target to Coalition soldiers.

INSURGENCY IN 50 WORDS

In fifty words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.

Ypu can read or download this paper at CSI .

Best
Tom

[MASON]

Great read and analysis.

[Rob Thornton]

I thought Robert Bateman's latest blog had some good insights - it is all too often that we take what sounds like a good piece of advice from its proper context and apply it liberally to whatever ails us.

However, I think he basically uses the same the same type of bias in his closing paragraph:

From Blog:

If Lawrence were still around, working as a strategist for the Iranians, for example, he would certainly be advocating this position. After all, so long as the greater part of the land combat power of the United States is consumed in attempting to squelch violence in Iraq, those forces cannot be used elsewhere. He would, as he did along the Hejaz railway, recommend calibrated support to agitated elements inside Iraq. His advice to his higher command would be that they never allow the pressure to drop so much that we withdraw after declaring a victory, nor raising the pressure so high that we actually quit the place. Iraq, through the eyes of Lawrence, is our Medina.

I think its wrong to assume Lawrence would try and advocate the same position as though the political context of his time could be laid down upon the current one. The Iraqis are not the Bedu, Iraq is not Arabia as Lawrence knew it. The Americans are not the Ottomans or the Germans. Iran is Iran, and the political context of today is different for a number of reasons. Iran may or may not view its interests as keeping a large U.S. presence in Iraq, from our standpoint we are strengthening Iran's neighbor who also happens to have been a formidable enemy in the not too distant past. Our presence there and our commitment to regional allies could also be seen as standing in the way of Iran extending its influence.

I think a legitimate argument could be made that if Iran continues to foment distrust against its Arab neighbors across the Gulf, and if it continues to threaten Israel, and if it continues to support terrorism, and if it continues to support proxies, and if it continues to pursue a nuclear program that seems geared toward nuclear armament, then it will create a political context that put it at odds in the region and possibly with regard to much of the West.

If Iraq gains strength militarily, economically and politically (and I believe it will) - it alters the context further. With its oil revenue, Iraq stands to be a different state then it was under Saddam. Its a combination of its how it is reforming (yes it is slow, and it is violent - political transformation usually is) and its economic potential that stand to make it among the most powerful states in the region. Its alliance with the United States - and yes I call them an ally, and the process which have grown its institutions will make it a formidable regional player.

My point is the same one that Robert Bateman used in developing the argument - context matters. The conditions and all the possibilities must be considered. I'm not so sure that:

His advice to his higher command would be that they never allow the pressure to drop so much that we withdraw after declaring a victory, nor raising the pressure so high that we actually quit the place. Iraq, through the eyes of Lawrence, is our Medina.

is sound advice to Iranian leadership, we are not just sitting idly by allowing ourselves to be strategically fixed - there is more to our end then extracting ourself from Iraq. There is also the question of crossing a threshold you did not intend to cross by upping the ante with regard to "keeping up the pressure" and triggering an event you did not anticipate, or wish to happen, after all, this an environment where chance often influences policy in unanticipated ways.

Best, Rob

[SWJED]

... the link.

[Ken White]

"Iraq, through the eyes of Lawrence, is our Medina."

Cool. Except the issue is how we see it. Besides, Lawrence is dead...

[Tom Odom]

As a historical metaphor. Rob, I have used Lawrence twice in the past 5 years to illustrate what was happening with the insurgency in Iraq via my history lessons.

The problem with Bateman's sourcing is that he would have been on much safer ground had he done the same. Seven Pillars of Wisdom is a turgid, wandering, and very much self-promotying memoir that has been effectively challenged with regards to accuracy.

You can read a better essay by Lawrence here at The Evolution of Revolt

My last use of this essay is introduced in the attachment.

Tom

[JJackson]

While I know little about Lawrence beyond a bit of general knowledge, Bateman’s post and that film the conclusion – if not the route taken to get there - seems valid.
The conclusion being this part from Rob’s original post.

After all, so long as the greater part of the land combat power of the United States is consumed in attempting to squelch violence in Iraq, those forces cannot be used elsewhere.

Many of you have significant military backgrounds and I have none but it seems to me looking at it from the position of an Iranian military strategist this would make perfect sense.
That it would be in Iran’s interests to keep the US forces occupied elsewhere would seem obvious. The one recent occurrence most likely to influence their thinking would have been the NIE report - which knocked the wind out of some of the more hawkish sails and so will have reduced their fear of attack. As seen from an Iranian standpoint up until the NIE report a quick clean Phase III to Phase IV transition – a la Rumsfeld, Feith & friends – would have left the US with troops free to deal with another axis-of-evil target. A little aid to those in a position to keep those forces otherwise engaged would seem to be a cost effective solution.
Faced with a similar problem in Afghanistan the US supplied the insurgents in the same way – training, weapons. As they were militarily and diplomatically fire proof they were unconcerned about the source of supply being traced back to them, they also supplied MANPADs. One suspects that a traceable supply of man-portable anti-amour or air-defence would, in this context, be enough to provoke an attack on Iran.

[Steve Blair]

I just replied to this one...spurred on more by Gian's little snip than Bateman's entry, honestly. He does take the example out of context, and like Tom I've seen many serious questions raised about the Seven Pillars and indeed the overall impact of Lawrence in the area. There's good points there, to be sure, but I think the conclusion is a bit shaky.

JJackson, I moved my original reply to better deal with the points you raised. While the situation may look similar on the surface, there are in fact a great many differences both in terms of the overall strategic situation and the makeup of the groups involved. For the Ottoman Empire, Arabia was a weak flank - menaced by a sizable British force in the bargain. They lacked the manpower and transportation infrastructure (which they had in common with all WW I powers) to deal with multiple threats, and Lawrence's activities posed major problems for them in this regard. The Ottoman army was also a fairly weak reed in this theater, and it was facing an invigorated command under Allenby. Given the WW I framework, abandoning the region wasn't an option for them.

That said, in realpolitik terms the US has more options than the Turks did when facing Lawrence. Currently we do have a large number of ground forces in Iraq, but they aren't tied there by the same considerations that kept the Turks locked in place. Remember, I'm not talking from the morally right or wrong standpoint here, but what could be considered international 'reality.' The US could easily declare victory and leave, or taper off the ground force presence under a pretext similar to that used in South Vietnam (where we pulled out and stayed out in terms of ground forces in the face of two major attacks on our ally).

And, as Rob points out, since this isn't taking place against the backdrop of a major world conflict, there are many variables that Lawrence didn't have to consider. Since the situation hasn't escalated yet (at least in "world war" terms), both sides have to consider the possibility that it could jump into areas neither want to go to.

Interesting article, but again I think he's taking history out of context.

[Rob Thornton]

Steve, Well said:

Since the situation hasn't escalated yet (at least in "world war" terms), both sides have to consider the possibility that it could jump into areas neither want to go to.

I think it comes down to misunderstanding the stakes for one side or another (or as Clausewitz said "the object in view"), and the lengths that a side is willing to go to secure those ends. It would be a mistake for anyone to assume that because the bulk of our land power (meaning that which we use to compel others through through displacement and occupation of the same space) is involved in Iraq and Afghanistan that we are unable to employ the military element of national power toward a political end.

Its worth considering that any state that has an economy such as Iran has plenty of fixed site assets, and plenty that must be mobile to exert influence or fulfill their function, and as such they are at risk. Having said that, the damage done in terms of disrupting energy resources to other states who import from Iran; the risk that the military action will not wholly succeed; that it might engender other military reactions (both by Iran and others); that the action might risk other objectives; or the risk of creating conditions within Iran where instability is likely because we destroy its security and C2 assets are examples of possibilities that must all be weighed as risks against the use of military force to achieve a political objective. Its an environment where chance and the unknown are competitive.

Keeping that in mind, the value and attraction of the object in view - be it success in Iraq and the risk to U.S. military members, the risk of a nuclear armed Iran, or the possibility of a military empowered Iran that unduly influences the flow of world energy resources from the Persian Gulf - or any combination thereof - creates the opportunity for misjudgment and misinterpretation that leads to a new set of interactions.

A Iranian strategy that seeks to prolong the U.S. involvment in Iraq by supporting insurgency must be weighed against the possibilities that it by itself, or in combination with some other act (such as going nuclear, or some other action) may then require a reaction on the part of the U.S. that the other elements of policy (DIE) can no longer achieve.

In this context, I think there is a great deal of risk for Iran in adopting such a strategy. It doesn't mean that Iran has not done so - their actions would seem to suggest either they have adopted some policy aimed at supporting Shiite insurgents/groups, or it could be that the central authority does not have complete control, or that they have not considered alternatives for whatever reason -e.g. they may believe its a question of regime survival, or it may be that they believe they are somehow immune. If its the former, then diplomacy may work over time. If its the latter, sooner or later diplomacy will be ineffective. At that point its a question of how long before the two sets of political ends must be reconciled in some other fashion. Either side could come to that conclusion erroneously or at a different time then the other - but once they do, and once they act, it changes the nature of the interaction and stakes again. It stays this way until one side abandons, or modifies its end to a point that is acceptable by the other.

Best, Rob

[SWJ Blog]

Understanding Lawrence's Article 15

Entry Excerpt:

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.”
- T.E. Lawrence, Twenty Seven Articles, Article 15

T.E. Lawrence’s quote has become quite possibly the most over-used quotation by the U.S. Army in recent memory. Nearly every military presentation regarding our recent conflicts has some form of it embedded in the text. Nearly all U.S. military officers can parrot it with rote precision. However, application of Lawrence’s wisdom in the field remains spotty. One doesn’t have to look far to find accounts of U.S. soldiers and advisors emulating Larry the Cable Guy’s “Git r’ Dun” philosophy to prevent failure in Iraqi (or Afghan) forces. Sometimes this is required, but too often our own hubris and self-perception as the all-knowing American military overcomes the wisdom of listening to the host nation.

I learned this lesson the hard way in Tal Afar, Iraq. From March-May 2006, my company engaged in a difficult struggle for control of the Hai al Sa’ad neighborhood in the northwest part of the city.



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[davidbfpo]

On reflection there are several threads on TE Lawrence and it would make sense to combine them - prompted by the new book on him.

[Starbuck]

Been a while since I dropped by the Council. (Sorry to my old SWC pals for being absent) I had an essay on Lawrence in early '09 to add as well:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/jou.../183-burke.pdf