Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
..
Weapons cache halts building
Daily Dispatch
East London, South Africa
2010/01/26
WORK on a multi-million rand construction project at Lovedale Further Education and Training College in King William’s Town has not progressed since an arms cache was found at the site last year.
The R1.2 million three-phased classroom development was stopped in November after workers digging foundations came across a massive cache of Anglo-Boer War weapons.
Experts believed the find, which consisted of rifle barrels, bayonets, swords and burnt wooden rifle butts, was buried on the site by the British army after the war ended in 1902.
They said the college is situated on the site of the old Military Reserve, which traces its origins to 1847 when Sir Harry Smith, Governor of the Cape Colony, established King William’s Town as the administrative and military capital of British Kaffraria.
They said the weapons were buried by a British regiment after they abandoned the Military Reserve in 1913.
Last edited by Ken White; 02-01-2010 at 10:26 PM. Reason: Remove unnecessary comment
Pete has inspired me to pull out my copy of "With Allenby in Palestine". This should make for a good read on another trans-Atlantic flight.
Reading anything on Allenby is time well spent, especially the book on him by Wavell. Allenby was a total professional in sharp contrast to the total-amateur of Lawrence.
I'd also strongly suggest reading Yigal Sheffy. British military intelligence in the Palestine campaign, 1914-1918
It's an excellent corrective to the Lawrence view and basically shows how cool headed and methodical the British were, and what Lawrence actually did versus what he and others claim.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Ahh, but American culture is distinct from British culture (perhaps due largely to the nature of that separation). It is one that values the successful military amateur over that of the successful military professional. At least it used to.
For the past 60 years or so, that we fell into a very colonial sustaining/ containment role we drifted, like our Euro parent, to being more focused on the professionals required to perform those peacetime tasks and are coming to see that as the gold standard.
I think America was a better country, with a better perspective, when it valued the amateur over the professional. We've slid down that slippery slope. Crafty old amateurs, such as George Washington, would shake his head in wonder at the America of today for this change of perspective and approach to the world.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I'm sorry Bob's World, but I can't agree with that lamentation.
Considering most, if not all, Western armies didn't have an Army "profession" (as defined by Huntington) in the 18th century and that much of the officer corps consisted of aristocrats, Washington could hardly be considered an amateur when held up to them. He definately was a "seasoned" amateur.
Canada used to be dominated by the "militia myth", believing that the militia was enough and that when threatened, the patrotic citizen mustering to the defence of the realm was more effective than a standing army. A poor reading of history commonly accompanied the "militia myth". That myth has since been demolished and it is a common understanding that despite a history of successful amateurs like Currie and Hoffmeister, neglect of the profession means that amateurs generally learn their professional shortcomings with the blood of their soldiers.
Oh, we created the military academies to ensure we had that core of professionalism; but it was the "myth of militias" that fought and won the American Civil War; Spanish-American War; World War I and World War II to name but 4.
Count the regulars on the battlefield, and they are few and far between. Count the senior commanders with military academy heritage, and they dominate the field. Today's problem is made worse in that we have gotten into messy peacetime engagements that we have labeled as "wars" and that we are employing our modern militia far to heavily overseas to wage peace. Militias should only be called upon in time of war, and our nation is not at war.
A small regular force can't be employed by the government to cause too much trouble in the world during times of peace. It is a valuable check on the abuse of power. This is but one more example of where America has taken off former self-constraints on actions overseas. Our current willingness to quickly move to militarily delivered deadly violence in the sovereign space of others is another example of such relaxing of self constraint. For my money, there is few more effective applications of power than constraint. Constraint coupled with the absolute certainty that when a certain line is crossed that it will come down with a frightening degree of certainty and effect. Used to often, and one loses much of that effectiveness and gains a reputation as a bully or a loose cannon. This is where we find ourselves today.
We have gotten all mixed up in our approaches and priorities.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I don't know where the distinction of Amateur and Professional occurs. Amateur (Gentleman) has always been a term of derision to me. As far as I am concerned, the preference is always for Professionals, as a description of men who study what they do and take it seriously.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
In my experience, many of our "Armatures" are more versed in the profession of arms than our "Professionals" are. It is a distinction of what one does as their primary means of income, not a distinction of one's competence in a particular subject.
In fact, many a disaster has occured by placing too much trust in one who wears the badges and titles of a "professional," but lacks any real talent or expertise in their chosen profession.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
US ArNG like to foster that idea...True, though I disagree with the drifting or the 'Euro parent' ideas. We didn't drift, we were propelled by FDR et.al. ...For the past 60 years or so, that we fell into a very colonial sustaining/ containment role we drifted, like our Euro parent, to being more focused on the professionals required to perform those peacetime tasks and are coming to see that as the gold standard.Having been around before you arrove, I missed that. However, that's neither here nor there. We are where we are and dreams of returning to a kinder, gentler time are just that -- dreams. Nothing wrong with dreams but one must account for reality and not sugar coat the memories in order to convert the dream into meaningful progress.I think America was a better country, with a better perspective, when it valued the amateur over the professionalMore dreaming. In 1939, prior to the onset of WW II, the US Army and ArNG numbered about 400K -- about .3% of the then population. Smedley Butler would disagree with your "self constraints."A small regular force can't be employed by the government to cause too much trouble in the world during times of peace. It is a valuable check on the abuse of power. This is but one more example of where America has taken off former self-constraints on actions overseas.
Today we have about 1M in the Army and ArNG -- about .3% of today's population. The more things change, the more they remain the same. Oh -- and Smedley would still disagree with you.
Infanteer also had this right: ""That myth has since been demolished and it is a common understanding that despite a history of successful amateurs like Currie and Hoffmeister, neglect of the profession means that amateurs generally learn their professional shortcomings with the blood of their soldiers."" The US has failed to fully comprehend that significant problem even though in the all the big wars you named, Civil War forward, there was ample evidence of its truth...That may be true but it is the policies that must be changed and I still await your proposal on how to get both the Politicians and the great unwashed to subscribe to your approach...We have gotten all mixed up in our approaches and priorities.I agree with the latter sentence, my experience with the former is that the statement is partly true but for few as opposed to many.In my experience, many of our "Armatures" are more versed in the profession of arms than our "Professionals" are. It is a distinction of what one does as their primary means of income, not a distinction of one's competence in a particular subject.That is totally correct. It is unfortunately exemplified by current US personnel policies which opt for 'fairness' (or the politically correct version thereof... ) over competence. The system produces far too many who are adequate or less so as opposed to the number who are good or better.In fact, many a disaster has occured by placing too much trust in one who wears the badges and titles of a "professional," but lacks any real talent or expertise in their chosen profession.
That is an exceedingly long way of getting to my points.
- Wilf and Infanteer are right, a good pro can whip a great amateur most always.. .
- We can agree on flawed policies. We might not totally agree on which are flawed but that's broadly immaterial as we do agree on many. The question neither of us can answer is how does one turn the Elephant herd that is the US political milieu and its accompanying defense bureaucracy. Wishing will not get that done...
Perhaps. Of course my point of order with Wilf was that he uses "Armature" when he means "Incompetent." Such bias-driven loose applications of meaning are how bar fights get started.
As to the 30s vs. now; As I recall the US did not have compete dominance of Air, Space, Land and Sea then as it does now...and a small percentage of a small nation creates small problems, such as the banana wars that Smedley rightfully found distasteful after the fact. Today, a small percentage of a large nation with such dominating enablers is able to get out there and create trouble on a much larger scale, and need not stop by the Congress to ask for permission on the way out the door...
And all things being equal, a good professional is indeed better than a gifted armature. But go to a surgeon and he will recommend surgery. Go to a Priest and he will recommend prayer. Go to a General and he will recommend war.
Which brings me to my second point with Wilf; not all violence for political purpose is war; nor should it be. Waging it as such can lead to far greater problems than the events that set things in motion to begin with.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
The thread pertains to Lawrence, good topic.
Moving right along...
Of note on Lawrence.
Sadly, IMO, this is more intellectual posing yearning after a romantic and arcane figure. Same as the Galula stuff. Perceived exoticness, rather than actual content. The deifying T.E. succinctly encapsulates all that is wrong with "new-COIN."
Lawrence is a pop-romance figure. Nothing more. Get over it!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
it's just a tad bit of hagiographic rhetoric. Even in death TEL still manages to “back into the spotlight.”
"What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."
I know! ....but I can never understand what it is about T.E> that causes the COIN-clubbers to drop their shorts and get on their knees. 90% of what is thought good about T.E. was announced to the world by T.E.
..just another example of apparently good men, using bad history and coming up with more bad ideas.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf:
I thought that George Bernard Shaw wrote a great work in the Seven Pillars, so its a well-told tale that deserves re-telling,like any other literary work.
Allenby could have done just as well, too, if he had GBS do his book.
You want facts about ME? Try Gertrude Bell, a very good reporter of what she really saw and did. I particularly enjoy the glimmers of her insights into Ottoman systems which, in real life, provide the more appropriate context for understanding much of the genetic code of ME systems (for better or for worse). Understand Ottoman systems, and you understand the start points for, say, modern Turkish systems which actually do provides a path for positive evolutionary bridging between two worlds.
Otherwise, it is like an Ottoman trying to understand British/American systems with no knowledge of the Magna Carta, Bill of Rights, etc...the old foundations on which our Western systems of individual-focus societies are grounded.
Agreed on the whole COIN thing. Absent credible understanding of the way real things work in systems of governance, economy and politics, its just not practical to explain to die-hard Coinistas (or is that an oxymoron?) why it is that what they would like to believe will not bear the fruits they expect.
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