Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
However, in my opinion, Lawrence had an excellent ability to understand culture and its "will to war" and published very good points on how to get the right angle of fighting someone else's war. On recollection of my own experiences of serving alongside Afghans, I found that many of his "Twenty-Seven Articles" mirrored my own observations of what worked. Obviously, my observations are not unique nor original - neither were Lawrence's; but they are excellent observations none the less.
I think you have to put that in context.

Across the British Empire there was literally thousands of multi-lingual British Officers, who worked extremely effectively within their area of operations. Guys like Lawrence were not common, but they were far from rare either. His observations were common practice in the British Imperial Army.
Lawrence was not a regular officer, ( thus mostly ignorant of the wider Army) and though adept at fitting in with Arabs, he was remarkably ignorant of how to fit into the Army that paid him. What the British Army leverage was Lawrence's huge emotional affinity for the Bedouin, the exact nature of which is somewhat "obscure".

What Lawrence brought into, encouraged by others, was a hunger for explanation of the carnage of the western front that portrayed there as being a "better way." Sadly, we now know there really wasn't.

Lawrence was relentlessly advertised way beyond his actual insights or ability. If anyone in the US COIN community ever bothered to research UK Irregular warfare in both breadth and depth, they would see Lawrence as far less remarkable.